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British-Yemenis have received little attention, scholarly or otherwise, in the contemporary 
context of the UK. Similarly, there are few ethnographically-informed studies focusing on 
contemporary Liverpool despite the region’s rich histories of migration and its numerous 
diaspora groups. Addressing these gaps, this thesis presents an ethnographic study of 
contemporary Liverpool-Yemeni life based on fifteen months of fieldwork during 2017 
and 2018. The focus is primarily upon the constructions and performances of everyday 
Liverpool-Yemeni identities among the post-migration generation who continuously 
negotiate the diasporic tension of ‘roots’ and ‘routes’. Adapting Gerd Baumann’s 
framework of ‘the multicultural triangle’ to account for dimensions of translocality, 
Liverpool-Yemenis’ multiple belongings are explored along ethnic, national/local, and 
religious lines. 
 
The key finding of the thesis is that while second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis largely 
do not mobilise politically as an ethno-national ‘community’ to enact change in the 
homeland, ‘Yemeniness’ nonetheless retains salience in the production and performances 
of an aesthetic diaspora, which is rooted in the translocal family beyond the gaze of the 
institutions of wider society, yet also negotiated alongside multiple other belongings.  
 
While subjective ‘Yemeniness’ is rarely politicised, the milieu of L8 with its long history 
within Liverpool as a multi-ethnic locality provides an important, alternative space of 
belonging and engagement beyond family networks. In the context of this neighbourhood, 
processes of organic hybridisation and practices of demotic cosmopolitanism give rise to 
increasingly confident articulations of ‘Scouse-Yemeniness’. 
 
Additionally, Islam and Muslim identifications are more often articulated as inseparable 
from participants’ subjective ‘Yemeniness’. Yemen and Yemeni culture are instead 
reclaimed as legitimately ‘Islamic’, particularly against perceived Saudi antagonisms. 
Islam is also seen to provide a shared, but not de-culturated, form of belonging extending 
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Avtar Brah in her seminal Cartographies of Diaspora writes that: 
the identity of a diasporic imagined community is far from fixed or pre-given. It is constituted 
within the crucible of the materiality of everyday life; in the everyday stories we tell ourselves 
individually and collectively. (1996: 181) 
 
It is these everyday stories and experiences which form the basis of this study in exploring 
how second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis construct, articulate, and perform multiple 
subjectivities implicated in diasporic life. Using Gerd Baumann’s (1999) framework of the 
multicultural triangle, this thesis explores three salient and interrelated dimensions of 
Liverpool-Yemeni identities: the ethnicisation/hybridisation of identity, the production of 
imagined ‘communities’ along national or local lines, and the role of Islam in both 
reinforcing and transcending ethno-national identities. In this way, this thesis does not 
begin by assuming that any of ‘Yemeni’, ‘Muslim’, or ‘Scouse’ identities are prioritised in 
general terms or are more worthy of study than the other, but rather traces how these are 
constructed relationally in the specific contexts of ‘diaspora space’ (Brah, 1996: 181). As 
the title of this thesis suggests, hyphenated ‘Yemeni-Muslim-Scouse’ identities have been 
preferred to highlight that even within such labels as ‘British-Muslim’ or ‘British-Arab’ 
there exist multiple histories of migration and settlement which give rise to multiple 
positionalities. Such a framing also problematises beginning with the nation as an analytic 
lens in that the many (trans)local practices, flows, and demotic discourses of the 
participants discussed throughout this thesis often occur below the scale of the nation. 
Indeed, using ‘Yemeni’ as a category rather than a specific regional demonym parallel to 
‘Scouse’ is itself problematised in Chapter 4. This is not to say that the nation does not 
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continue to exert influence – indeed it will be seen to play an important role in shaping 
various aspects of Liverpool-Yemeni life. Nonetheless, an approach which recognises the 
importance of locality and its multiple scales both ‘here’ and ‘there’ is valuable in gaining 
a clearer understanding of how ‘roots and routes’ (Gilroy, 1993) are contextually and 
relationally negotiated and which, in many instances, do not take the ‘nation’ as a focal 
point. Such an approach echoes that taken by McLoughlin et al. (2014) in their edited 
volume Writing the City in British Asian Diasporas, in the introduction of which 
McLoughlin notes: 
This [the lived experiences of locality] must be set against glocalized systemic rhythms and 
fields of power, as well as competing, multiple narratives…including authoritative and 
influential institutional discourses. Indeed, we maintain that comparing and contrasting writing 
about the ‘lived experience of a locality’ with differently positioned texts is the proper starting 
point for investigating the ‘contestations’ and ‘ironies’, ‘transformations’ and ‘confusions’ that 
typify representations of British Asians (2014: 8, citing Brah, 1996: 192) 
 
Using a similar approach, but drawing upon empirical ethnographic data rather than ‘texts’ 
and ‘representations’ (although of course this ethnography itself becomes a ‘text’ and 
‘representation’), this thesis explores these differently positioned subjectivities, lived 
experiences of (trans)locality, and the contrasting but often intertwined dominant and 
demotic discourses of culture and ‘community' (Baumann, 1996). As McLoughlin (ibid., 
5) further notes, ‘new ethnicities’ arise out of these multi-local lives, as ‘Identity, 
belonging and embodied/emotional attachment are all generated through this intimate 
knowledge and memory of neighbourhoods and cityscapes’, while recognising that 
neighbourhoods and cities are also implicated in, and produced in relation to, 
national/global circuits of power and dominant discourses which exist beyond their 
confines.    
  
 3 
The intersection of Liverpool and specific localities within Yemen provides an exciting 
and original contribution to the field of diaspora studies by bringing to light a little-studied 
context. Both Liverpool and Yemen occupy a marginal space within their national/regional 
contexts, but nonetheless possess long and rich histories of migration spanning the Atlantic 
and Indian Oceans. Emphasising these translocal modes of living as seen through the 
complex interaction of the three cornerstones of Baumann’s (1999) multicultural triangle: 
ethnicity, nation (albeit problematised in this thesis as discussed above), and religion, this 
thesis uses a number of approaches drawing from various disciplines. One main 
consideration is present throughout the thesis, however – that these identities are 
contextual and situational. As Werbner writes:  
Postmodernists who attack essentialist constructions of ‘culture’ miss the fact that identities 
matter, deeply, and are long-term. At the same time, they are not simply pre-given or inherited: 
they are formed, made and remade; they exist in practice, dialogically, through collective action 
and interaction (2002a: 267) 
 
To explore what it means to be ‘Yemeni, Muslim, and Scouse’ means also taking seriously 
the situated and travelling histories of Yemen, Liverpool, and Islam. In the context of 
diaspora space, discrete ‘Yemeni’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘Scouse’ identities are not produced nor 
articulated in isolation, but also combine through various processes of hybridisation, 
becoming reconfigured ‘into one journey via a confluence of narratives’. (Brah, 1996: 180, 
italics original).  
 
Motivations for the Research  
My own experiences growing up in a strongly working-class region of North Liverpool 
have been a major motivating factor behind this research, and indeed my academic 
trajectory as a whole. Early encounters with Chinese and Yemeni peers during my school 
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years and the presence of a Yemeni newsagents opposite the family home sparked an 
intense (and somewhat atypical) interest in language and ‘culture’ – so much so that as a 
child I enrolled in a weekend-school run by a local Chinese community centre in the late 
1990s where I eventually gained a GCSE and A-Level in Chinese, ultimately leading me 
to spend a year at a university in north-eastern China between 2007 and 2008. Not being 
satisfied with just the one language, however, I then decided to undertake an 
undergraduate degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Leeds, a year of 
which was spent in Egypt in 2011, with a shorter stay in Kuwait. This interest in Arabic 
language, particularly the varieties of the Arabian Peninsula, encouraged me to engage 
with Liverpool-Yemenis as I began volunteering for an Arabic weekend school and the 
Liverpool Arab Arts Festival in 2013, as well as joining a community interpreting course 
which was primarily attended by Liverpool-Arabs. Comparing the local context of 
Liverpool to my experiences as a student in the environs of Leeds, I became aware that 
Liverpool was ‘different’. Unlike other Northern English cities many of whose Muslim 
populations are predominantly of South-Asian heritage, Liverpool is distinguished by its 
strong, yet little discussed, Arab presence. Nonetheless, in my everyday interactions with 
(predominantly) second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis, I also recognised that these were 
more often than not underscored by a strong sense of ‘Scouseness’ and a shared 
attachment to Liverpool. These experiences alongside my own family history with its 
connections to Ireland and Catholicism also led me to begin to think seriously about the 
nature of migration and identity-formation in a port-city strongly shaped by diasporic 
experience. It is out of the confluence of these academic interests, an examination of the 




Research Questions  
The overarching research question which this thesis addresses is, then, essentially: ‘How 
do Liverpool-Yemenis negotiate their complex, multiple positioned belongings?’ The 
participants in this study, excluding a small group of ‘community leaders’, can be 
considered ‘second-generation’ or of the post-migration generation, and therefore the main 
conclusions concern how this group negotiate a number of salient diasporic tensions and 
multiplicity of positioned belongings (see Brocket, 2020, who fruitfully employs the term 
‘multiple positioned belongings’). Nonetheless, the ‘story’ of the earlier generations is also 
given space to demonstrate the changing dynamics of diasporic life and to better illustrate 
how the post-migration generation are forging their own identities in response to new 
contexts and concerns. 
 
Of course, any single piece of research cannot hope to answer such a question in its 
entirety – if such a question can ever be ‘entirely’ answered, particularly so when the very 
concepts of diaspora, ethnicity, and identity are understood as continuous processes. 
Therefore, I emphasise that while this thesis presents a timely and original contribution to 
the field of diaspora studies, it is nonetheless a ‘snapshot’ of a particular moment in time, 
drawing upon a particular set of data. Although the overarching research question is 
intentionally broad, several main threads run throughout. One of these is the exploration of 
the dynamics of a diasporic tension expressed in terms of ‘ethnicisation’ (roots) and 
‘hybridisation’ (routes) of identities. McLoughlin (2005a: 533) usefully summarises these 
processes as ‘the reassertion of cultural distinctiveness’ and ‘the fusion and intermixture of 
cultures’ respectively. Both processes occur at multiple scales: from the material reality of 
the body, to the family unit, the neighbourhood, the city, and beyond. Both are also 
implicated in discussions of situated (ethno-)national/local and ethno-religious identities. 
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This being the case, the ethnographic chapters of the thesis pay particular attention to scale 
and context in recognising that what is prioritised in one context, may remain in the 
background in another. Another main consideration is that discourses themselves are 
dialogic – the dominant and the demotic, the emic and the etic, while also recognising the 
importance of material, embodied practices. In this way, the thesis traces how both 
dominant and demotic discourses of ‘culture’ are employed situationally by participants 
through their own narrations and performances of culture, while placing the ‘emic’ 
articulations of participants in dialogue with the academic ‘etic’ discourses. Seen this way, 
the thesis does not presuppose that, for example, an emic ‘reification’ of 
culture/identity/community is incongruent with academic ‘etic’ discourses which reveal 
their constructed and contingent nature. The purpose is rather to uncover which discourses 
play a prominent role in which settings, how they are employed, and why this might be the 
case. The final main thread which runs throughout the thesis is that the study of the 
demotic, local, and everyday can be equally as rewarding as studies which take institutions 
and nation states as the primary frame of reference. As de Certeau writes: 
Many everyday practices (talking, reading, moving about, shopping, cooking, etc.) are tactical 
in character. And so are, more generally, many "ways of operating": victories of the "weak" 
over the "strong" (whether the strength be that of powerful people or the violence of things or of 
an imposed order, etc.), clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things, "hunter's cunning," 
maneuvers, polymorphic simulations, joyful discoveries, poetic as well as warlike. (1984: xix) 
 
This study which examines constructions of everyday identities does not simply describe 
‘who people are’, but recognises that the negotiations which occur in constructing and 
performing identities represent claims of belonging and public recognition – power 
relations are a key property of space, including in the everyday. In this sense, they also 
possess a political dimension being produced against various antagonisms. That said, the 
primary aim of this thesis is not to show just how politicised these identities are (and 
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indeed, emic accounts are often not discussed in politicised terms at all), but rather 
recognises that the political dimension of identity construction is itself an inherent 
ontological condition (Mandaville, 2001: 10, citing Mouffe, 1994: 108). 
 
With the overarching research question in mind, the three ethnographic chapters each 
address a further and more narrowly focused sub-question which are structured around the 
three cornerstones of the multicultural triangle. These are: 
 
1) ‘How, when, and to what extent do Liverpool-Yemenis construct, maintain, and negotiate a 
Yemeni identity?’ A further consideration within this question is whether and/or how 
constructions of Yemeni identities take part in processes of ethnicisation which seek to reassert 
boundaries or distinctiveness vis-à-vis others, and processes of hybridisation involved in 
producing hyphenated Scouse-Yemeni identities. 
 
2) ‘What is the story of Yemeni-led ‘community building’ in Liverpool, and how does this 
reflect imaginaries of an ethno-national Yemeni ‘community’?’ This question broadens its scale 
somewhat by delineating the history and changing dynamics of Yemeni-led ‘community’ 
building in Liverpool. This chapter turns towards the ‘nation’ of the multicultural triangle 
which is examined from two main angles: to assess how the national contexts, ideologies, and 
certain political agendas of the UK and Yemen have impacted the trajectory of Yemeni-led 
‘community’ building, and to explore whether Liverpool-Yemenis organise or mobilise around 
an ethno-national ‘community’.   
 
3) ‘What is the role of (travelling) Islam in the construction of second-generation Liverpool-
Yemeni identities and imagined ‘communities’?’ This question turns to the role of religion in 
both individual constructions/performances of identity and imaginaries of ‘community’. It asks 
to what extent Islam and Muslim identities can be said to ‘reinforce’ ethno-national Yemeni 
identities, or, whether they are articulated in more ‘de-culturated’ terms. In contrast to an ethno-
national ‘community’ of the previous question, it also assesses whether Islam provides the basis 
for an alternative ‘community of co-responsibility’. 
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Overview of the Thesis  
The thesis is split into two halves. The first three chapters discuss the conceptual, 
methodological, and contextual underpinnings which inform the three ethnographic 
chapters. Each of the ethnographic chapters also address a specific research question 
detailed above, but should nonetheless be understood as forming part of a whole – the 
many interlinkages and (dis)junctures between these chapters form part of the 
ethnographic ‘text’. 
 
Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the various conceptualisations of diaspora. As 
studies on diaspora have proliferated, so too has the conceptualisation of ‘diaspora’ itself 
expanded in scope. The key point which this discussion arrives at is that although 
diasporas may share many common characteristics, diaspora is best conceived as an 
ongoing process being continually (re)produced according to specific contexts, 
contingencies, and orientations. The concept of transnationalism is then contrasted with 
the more clearly translocal focus of this thesis. The second half of the chapter explores the 
three cornerstones of Gerd Baumann’s (1999) multicultural triangle: ethnicity, nation, and 
religion, while noting certain adjustments to Baumann’s framework. Notably, this thesis 
explores the additional dimension of translocality in the diaspora which Baumann’s 
framework does not account for in any great detail, while also noting that from the 
participants’ emic perspectives the ‘local’ (Liverpool or neighbourhoods thereof, and 
localities within Yemen) is often more salient than the ‘national’. Nonetheless, the ‘local’ 
is often shaped by and configured in relation to broader national histories and discourses. 
As the multicultural triangle is essentially concerned with ‘cultural’ identities, ‘culture’ 
itself is understood in Zygmunt Bauman’s (1973) terms of ‘culture as praxis’, drawing also 
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upon his notions of ‘liquid modernity’ (2012, original edn., 2000) as a pervasive feature of 
the modern, globalising world. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces both the ‘practical’ methods used in the research, and how a 
methodology informed by the theoretical and conceptual approaches discussed in the 
previous chapter can be applied to ethnographic methods. It outlines why and how certain 
locations were chosen as field-sites, questions of access to these sites, the recruitment of 
participants, and limitations of the data. These are also considered alongside a reflexive 
discussion of the ‘insider-outsider’ debate and my own positionality as a researcher vis-à-
vis participants. Ethical concerns relating primarily to informed consent and 
anonymisation are also highlighted in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a broad, but necessary, discussion in which the relevant contexts of 
Liverpool and Yemen are delineated, before examining the literature on Yemeni migration 
to Britain. It pays particular attention to the numerous histories of migration which have 
shaped Liverpool, and argues for an understanding of a multi-ethnic Scouse identity in 
which, drawing upon Brown’s (2005) ethnography of ‘Black Liverpool’, Liverpool is 
reconfigured as a unifying ‘signifier’. While a more narrowly local focus upon certain 
regions of emigration within Yemen as a parallel to the Liverpool context would have been 
preferable, a lack of literature on these regions means a broader focus has been taken 
which examines Yemen’s salient geographical, sectarian, and political divides alongside 
the development of a social imaginary of a ‘unified’ Yemen – all of which will be seen to 
play an important role in the ethnographic chapters. The final section of the chapter 
presents an overview of the literature concerning Yemeni migration to Britain which is 
often described as having occurred in two waves, before considering a ‘third wave’ in 
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Liverpool. The available demographic data pertaining to Liverpool-Yemenis is also 
detailed to provide further context to the contemporary dimensions of Liverpool-Yemeni 
life. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the construction of Yemeni identities, and whether/how these are 
shaped by processes of ethnicisation and hybridisation. It begins with discussion of the 
strong translocal connections participants maintain between Liverpool and regions within 
Yemen, and the notion of ‘translocal families’. A Liverpool-Yemeni wedding I attended is 
then discussed as a context in which the concept of the Yemeni qabīla (tribe) is employed 
in producing gendered (masculine) Yemeni identities – nonetheless, participants will also 
be seen to contest various dominant discourses of social hierarchy rooted in the Yemeni 
context. Moving from the scale of the family to the ‘street’ or ‘neighbourhood’, an 
ethnographic tour of Lodge Lane as Liverpool’s ‘Yemeni hub’ is provided to contextualise 
the local and to further highlight several dynamics of Liverpool-Yemeni life. It then 
explores the role of language (Yemeni-Arabic and Scouse-accented English) in 
productions of ethnicised/hybridised identities before finally discussing how social 
imaginaries of Yemen have travelled and are remade in response to political conflict and 
Yemen’s perceived position in the Arab world. The main argument running throughout 
this chapter is that (ethnicised) Yemeni identities in Liverpool are constructed and 
performed primarily in and via translocal family networks which maintain and re-create 
Yemen’s ‘presence’ in Liverpool. As the second-generation increasingly make ‘roots’ in 
Liverpool through new ‘routes’, it also argues that these identities must be considered 
alongside processes of hybridisation and emerging ‘Scouse-Yemeni’ identities. 
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Chapter 5 broadens its scale in addressing two main concerns: to explore the histories and 
trajectories of Yemeni-led ‘community’ building in Liverpool with reference to the 
national contexts of the UK and Yemen, as well as the role of a set of community leaders 
whom I characterise as ‘urban Yemenis’. The social capital and positionalities of this 
group differ significantly from other Liverpool-Yemenis, and thus they are placed in 
‘dialogue’ with the more demotic articulations of the second-generation. The main 
contention of this chapter is that due to the shifting policies of the UK towards 
‘Community Cohesion’ agendas, Yemen’s complex and conflicted histories of nation-
building and unification, the changing demographics of Liverpool, and the positionalities 
and concerns of the community leaders contrasting with those of the ‘everyday’ second-
generation, participants are largely not invested in imagining or mobilising around a single 
ethno-national Yemeni ‘community’ – instead, second-generation participants are 
described as ‘demotic cosmopolitans’, invested in the spaces of the translocal family, as 
well as the multi-ethnic locality of L8 which is seen to be an important space of grassroots 
engagement.  
 
Chapter 6 first explores how Yemeni Islam has ‘travelled’, contributing to the landscape 
of Islam in Liverpool, before exploring how participants articulate and perform their 
Muslim identities alongside considerations of ethnicity, hybridity, and imagined religious 
‘communities’. The presence of a Yemeni-Sufi Bā ‘Alawī Order is also highlighted as an 
example of a ‘confluence of narratives’ – Yemen’s presence in Liverpool, as seen through 
this Sufi Order, has now extended beyond ethnicity as translocal/national connections are 
also being created and maintained by non-Yemeni Muslims in the city. While the turn 
towards religion among British-Muslims has been noted (see e.g. Roy, 2004; Akhtar, 
2005), leading to articulations of de-culturated Muslim identities among sections of 
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British-Muslim youth (see e.g. DeHanas, 2013a; 2013b), this chapter provides a 
counterpoint by delineating how, due to specific and contingent dynamics, ethnicity and 
locality remain salient in the construction of Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities, while at 
other times being articulated in imaginaries of multi-ethnic (but not necessarily de-
culturated or de-territorialised) ‘communities of co-responsibility’. 
 
These chapters combine in shedding light on how Liverpool-Yemenis negotiate their 
multiple positioned belongings in a globalising age where ‘time and space are compressed 
with such increasing intensity and extensity that the experience of simultaneity across 
distance is becoming possible’ (McLoughlin, 2010: 224). By limiting the focus to the 
everyday in one locality, a rich ethnographic text of a little-studied but uniquely positioned 
group is made possible, while also opening up new avenues of investigation. Although any 
ethnographic study of diaspora is necessarily limited and partial, this thesis above all 
reveals how everyday Yemeni-Muslim-Scouse identities are constructed, performed, and 
asserted, and in which the local contexts of both ‘here’ and ‘there’ continue to play an 
important role, but also combine to produce new forms of belonging in the diaspora.  
  
A main concern running throughout this thesis is, then, that all of ethnicity, locality, and 
religion matter in constructions and performances of second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni 
identities – how, when, why and for whom they matter is a question of context and scale. 
The ethnographic chapters thus address these various dimensions of identity, highlighting 





Situating the Study 
Studies on diaspora are by their nature often interdisciplinary, drawing from and 
combining a wide range of approaches. Indeed, the thesis draws upon ideas and concepts 
from sociology, anthropology, geography, history and area studies, to name a few. 
Nonetheless, it is perhaps the anthropological outlook which best characterises the thesis 
given anthropology’s inherent concern with both location and the (inter)connections 
between cultures, identities, and social relations.  
As there have been no ethnographic studies on Liverpool-Yemenis from an 
anthropological perspective, and very few published ethnographic studies based in 
Liverpool overall, I situate it alongside those studies which are similar in scope or which 
ask similar questions, albeit in a different context or location. Thus, the thesis most clearly 
stands alongside and in dialogue with two main bodies of literature. The first includes 
works on British-Muslim diasporas such as Werbner’s (1990, 1996, 2002a) ethnographic 
studies of Manchester-Pakistanis, McLoughlin’s (1996, 1998, 2002, 2009, 2015) various 
works on British South-Asian diasporas, and Kibria’s (2008) and DeHanas’ (2013a, 
2013b) studies on new forms of identification among British Bengalis. The other includes 
the limited amount of scholarship on Liverpool’s diaspora groups such as Brown’s (2005) 
ethnography of Black Liverpool, Bunnell’s (2016) study on Malay Liverpool, and studies 
which explore constructions and performances of Arab ethnicity, such as Aly’s (2015) 
Becoming Arab in London.  
In this way, the study equally contributes to the body of work on British-Arab/Muslim 
diasporas and to the literature on contemporary Liverpool by shedding light on a group 
which has received very little attention. 
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As much as increasingly security-conscious nation states attempt to erode ‘hyphenated’ 
identities (McLoughlin and Knott, 2010: 272), the everyday, local focus of this thesis 
emphasises how second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis challenge restrictive and 
essentialising notions of what being ‘Yemeni’, ‘Scouse’, and ‘Muslim’ means by actively 
asserting multiple, sometimes hyphenated, positionalities and identities. By drawing upon 
and engaging with a number of theoretical considerations discussed in the following 
chapter, i.e. locality-production (Appadurai, 1996), ‘diaspora space’ (Brah, 1996), the 
everyday as a site of embodied agency (de Certeau, 1984), and organic hybridisation 
(Bakhtin, 1981), within Baumann’s (1999) framework of the multicultural triangle and 
alongside the above mentioned empirically-driven work of scholars such as McLoughlin 
and Werbner, this thesis demonstrates that the study of everyday diasporic life can reveal a 
richly textured world which is not readily visible from an institutional gaze. Significantly, 
such an approach can disrupt notions of ‘culture’ and ‘community’ which rely on 
institutional accounts or begin with assumptions that the nation is the most relevant unit of 
reference, and instead reveal how individuals construct and perform their ‘everyday’ and 
multiple identities according to a complex set of experiences, concerns, discourses, 










Chapter 1: Conceptualising Diaspora and the Multicultural Triangle 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the key concepts which frame the thesis. Although 
each is given its own conceptual space here, it should be noted that the concepts of 
diaspora, ethnicity, nationhood, and religion are more often than not intertwined in a 
complex manner which does not always allow them to be neatly separated. The conceptual 
framing is in some ways a matter of clarifying a perspective in that certain concepts will 
take prominence over others according to the research questions and phenomena being 
examined. That said, it will be useful to summarise how I position the key concepts in 
relation to one another with the caveat that the reality of the social world cannot be 
contained in any single framework, and thus it functions here as a means to guide the 
thesis.  
 
The first section of the chapter looks at the concept of ‘diaspora’ as viewed from two 
angles: ‘ethnno-national’ diasporas and ‘religious’ diasporas, highlighting how the term 
diaspora can be expanded from its earlier usage and fruitfully applied to explore new 
articulations of belonging in a globalising world, emphasising both the real and imagined 
aspects of such diasporic connections to people and places elsewhere. The second section 
looks at the three elements of Baumann’s (1999) multicultural triangle (ethnicity, nation, 
religion), which play varying roles within the category of diaspora, and around which the 
three ethnographic chapters are structured. The metaphor of the multicultural triangle 
proved to be a useful tool in visualising three inter-related concepts which are all 
implicated in diaspora and diasporic identities both at a conceptual level and in the 
everyday lives of Liverpool-Yemenis. If diaspora can be summarily described as an 
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extension of ethno-national identities characterised by connections to people and places 
elsewhere and across national boundaries (albeit existing alongside notions of diaspora 
defined along religious lines discussed below), then the multicultural triangle of ethnicity-
nation-religion represents the different scales and dimensions of cultural identities which 
variously inform the notion of a ‘diasporic consciousness’. 
 
Werbner (2002a; 2002b; 2010) often highlights that individuals can belong to multiple 
diasporas. Her (2010: 75) notion that ‘Diasporas, it seems, are both ethnic-parochial and 
cosmopolitan’ underlies much of this discussion. As the ‘multicultural’ triangle suggests, 
culture (in the broadest sense) lies at the heart of the discussion and as such it will be 
discussed in reference to Bauman’s (1973) notion of culture-as-praxis, elaborated further 
on in this chapter. 
 
1.2 Conceptualising Diaspora 
This section begins with a discussion of how diaspora has been variously conceptualised 
and debated in the literature focusing on the ethno-national framework, and then discusses 
how an expanded understanding of the concept is useful for this thesis in considering new 
forms of belonging which may provide an alternative form of diasporic consciousness. 
Disputes concerning the specific etymology and semantics of the word ‘diaspora’ in 
Classical Greek notwithstanding, in Western scholarly literature a diaspora has been 
described as typically arising due to a ‘dispersal following a traumatic event in the 
homeland’ (Cohen, 2008: 2), with the Jewish diaspora(s) being the prototypical example.1 
                                                        
1 Dufoix (2016) gives a detailed account of the early uses of this word as it occurs in Greek corpuses from 
Homer to fall of Constantinople, contradicting Cohen’s (2008) assertion of the word having an earlier 
connotation of colonisation. 
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It was not, however, until the late 1980s that ‘diaspora’ as a term began to broaden in 
scope, leading to its proliferation in a variety of contexts – academic and non-academic. 
This proliferation was soon noted by prominent scholars in the field (Clifford, 1994; 
Tölölyan, 1996; Safran, 2004; Brubaker, 2005), generating discussion regarding how such 
a broadening of the term could impact upon its usefulness as a concept, with Brubaker 
(2005: 1) coining the phrase ‘the “diaspora” diaspora’ due to the ‘dispersion of the 
meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space.’ (ibid.) and Safran 
(2004: 9) writing that diaspora as a concept ‘has become an academic growth industry’. 
This stretching of the term has been ascribed in part to social constructivist theories which 
led to the decoupling of diaspora from its earlier roots in the ‘home/homeland and 
ethnic/religious community’ (Cohen, 2008: 9; Brubaker, 2005: 2) and subsequent 
proliferation. The current use of the term now indicates that the contemporary discourse of 
diaspora readily includes groups of dispersed peoples, whether or not they conform to the 
more rigid definitions of diaspora centred around the homeland. (Brubaker, 2005; 
Tölölyan, 2007). 
In response to the homeland-centred approaches, several scholars (Brah, 1996; Anthias, 
1998) proposed that diaspora as a concept should be expanded and de-centred in order to 
better accommodate intersectional approaches which place emphasis on questions such as 
‘How and in what ways is a group inserted within the social relations of class, gender, 
racism, sexuality, or other axes of differentiation in the country to which it migrates?’ 
(Brah, 1996: 179). Taking this further, Anthias (1998: 577) asserts that homeland-
orientated conceptualisations of diaspora risk over-homogenising its members and do not 
pay attention to ‘issues of gender, class and generation, and to other inter-group and intra-
group divisions’. In response to the broad use of the term, Dufoix (2016: 393) in a 
thorough overview of the terrain argues that continued unreflective and unproblematised 
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use of ‘diaspora’ as a concept has led to considerable confusion and ambiguity. 
Nonetheless and despite the apparent tensions, these various approaches to diaspora are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive or dichotomising but rather present different lenses 
through which to examine diaspora and indeed diaspora studies has been described as 
having entered a ‘consolidation phase’ (Cohen, 2008; Brubaker, 2017). This is echoed by 
Knott and McLoughlin (2010) who, instead of highlighting theoretical divisions across 
disciplines which the increased interest in diaspora has brought, emphasise that it has 
allowed for greater interdisciplinary approaches, bringing together multiple perspectives. 
Despite the extension of the term ‘diaspora’ coming to include a wide range of social 
groups, several scholars (Cohen, 2008; Brubaker, 2005; Tölölyan, 2007) have proposed a 
loose set of characteristics shared by many diasporas to better clarify the scope of the term. 
Brubaker (2017: 1557), reflecting on the criteria he listed a decade earlier, notes that his 
proposed ‘core elements’ of a diaspora were not intended to legitimise or discredit the 
various uses of the term, but rather to ‘highlight what I would today call the central 
constitutive tensions and ambivalences involved in efforts to define the field’. Although 
attempts to ‘identify’ what constitute a diaspora may appear normative, the criteria 
proposed by the above scholars is understood here as highlighting certain historical and 
social processes which continue to characterise diasporas; not a rigid system of 
inclusion/exclusion. Indeed Anthias (1998: 563) herself, despite arguing that Cohen’s 
typology of diasporas belies a certain element of primordiality, notes that ‘The importance 
of the typology must be that it acts as a heuristic device for the purpose of comparison’.  
Cohen (2008: 16-17) lists what he has identified as common features of diasporas, with the 
caveat that not every diaspora will share every feature and may exhibit them to varying 
extents. These common features include dispersal, labour migration, collective memories 
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of the homeland, the formation of an idealised (real or imagined) homeland, return 
movements, shared consciousness among co-ethnics over time, the nature of the groups’ 
relationship with the host society, a sense of responsibility among co-ethnics, and a 
distinctive creative life. He (ibid., 18) also provides a typology of diasporas according to 
‘Weberian ideal types’:  Victim, Labour, Imperial, Trade and De-territorialised diasporas. 
Alternatively, Brubaker (2005: 5) provides a more loosely defined criteria of ‘core 
elements’ which continue to characterise diaspora, noting that they can be interpreted in a 
broad manner: 1) dispersion, 2) homeland orientation, 3) boundary maintenance. Finally, 
Tölölyan (2007: 649) emphasises two points which signal that a group is in the process of 
becoming truly diasporic, rather than merely dispersed or settled away from the homeland 
as ‘not all ethnic communities are diasporic’. The first point is that a diasporic group will 
maintain elements of the homeland’s language and culture, and the second that there 
should be evidence of the group maintaining connections with co-ethnics elsewhere and 
commitment to the homeland which may take the form of remittances, travel, or political 
efforts in response to a situation in the homeland.  
Of course, many of these criteria have been contested, but I would like to draw attention 
here to Tölölyan’s (ibid.) notion of diaspora being a process, or ‘becoming diasporic’. By 
viewing diaspora as a dynamic, dialectal process rather than a static unchanging entity, it is 
possible to move away from taking the concept as a fixed given, to a perspective which 
places emphasis on the processes by which a diasporic consciousness and identities arise – 
these processes themselves are contingent and contextual, again accentuating that the 
criteria listed above serve only as a general guideline, not an absolute framework. If we 
understand diasporas as continually negotiating and re-negotiating themselves vis-à-vis a 
multitude of political and social considerations in the host/homeland, an ethnographic 
approach allows a closer look into the historically and contextually contingent nature of 
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these dynamics as well as how they may become reified or systematised (Werbner, 2010: 
74). Mavroudi (2007), looking at diaspora from within the discipline of geography, also 
reaches a similarly useful outlook in that by understanding diaspora as a flexible process it 
is possible to explore how essentialised notions of nation-state, ethnicity, and ‘community’ 
are utilised or mobilised within a diaspora (though nonetheless still contextually 
‘constructed’), while paying attention to the transnational and translocal linkages, aided 
and accelerated by modern travel and communication technologies. Although I did not 
begin the fieldwork period with a clearly fixed notion of what a diaspora should entail or 
how it should ‘be’, or even whether such a category was appropriate for Liverpool-
Yemenis, it soon became clear that while essentialised notions of homeland, culture and 
religion were present and invoked for various reasons, these notions occurred 
simultaneously alongside internal heterogeneity and hybridity. Werbner (2002b: 123) aptly 
describes this particular characteristic of diasporas as ‘chaorder’ – ‘diasporic groups are 
characterised by multiple discourses, internal dissent, and competition for members 
between numerous sectarian, gendered or political groups, all identifying themselves with 
the same diaspora’.  
As such, the thesis emphasises a conceptualisation of diaspora which does not overlook 
homeland attachment and the role of the nation-state or particular localities, as indeed 
Werbner (2011: 470) notes that diasporic groups are often ‘deeply implicated both 
ideologically and materially in the nationalist projects of their homelands’ while also 
noting that although diasporas are de-centred in terms of organisation, this does not 
necessarily mean all diasporas present a de-stabilising force with respect to hegemonic 
structures, nor should this be the sole point of focus. In other words, this study gives 
consideration to both ‘roots in the past’ and ‘routes in the present’ (Gilroy, 1993: 19; 
McLoughlin, 2013: 34).  
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1.3 Transnationalism and Translocality 
Concomitant with the concept of diaspora is that of transnationalism. If we take Vertovec’s 
(2009: 1) outline of transnationalism as entailing the ‘economic, social and political 
linkages between people, places and institutions crossing nation-state borders and 
spanning the world’, it is difficult to imagine a diaspora without at least some element of 
transnationalism. But how exactly do ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ stand in relation to 
one another? As the study of diaspora has produced a multitude of theories and definitions, 
so transnationalism has similarly produced a range of perspectives. Faist (2010: 33), while 
acknowledging that the various interpretations of the terms reflect different points of 
emphasis, notes that diasporic phenomena are ‘a subset of transnational social formations 
that have broader scope’, while Vertovec emphasises diaspora as the broader term, which 
may or may not include transnationalism:  
Diasporas arise from some form of migration, but not all migration involves diasporic 
consciousness; all transnational communities comprise diasporas, but not all diasporas develop 
transnationalism. (2004: 282) 
This development of a diasporic consciousness is in many ways a key feature 
distinguishing a diaspora from ‘transmigrants’ (Vertovec, 2000; McLoughlin, 2005a; 
Bruneau, 2010), and rests on a connection, real or imagined, that is maintained with the 
homeland and co-ethnics elsewhere and is continually being (re)produced. McLoughlin 
(2005a: 530) also highlights that the transnational aspect of diasporas has been greatly 
impacted by the use and availability of modern communications technology, so much so 
that the world may often be experienced as a ‘global village’. I take a perspective similar 
to that of Vertovec (2004, 2007) and McLoughlin (2005a) which does not attempt to 
completely extricate ‘transnationalism’ from ‘diaspora’ (or vice-versa) or restrict its 
meaning to a limited set of phenomena. While transnationalism implies relations between 
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and across nations, ‘translocality’ more accurately captures the nature of the local-local 
linkages which in many ways predominate in this study (see Mandaville, 2001; Kraidy, 
2005; Oakes and Schein, 2006; Freitag and von Oppen, 2010; Brickell and Datta, 2011 for 
further discussion of translocality), i.e. instead of the UK and Yemen, the specific local-to-
local sites of Liverpool and Malāḥ (or other Yemeni localities) are in many ways more 
salient. Conceptualising these linkages and flows in terms of translocality also better 
highlights how the global is reconfigured in terms of the local, or the processes of 
‘glocalisation’ (Robertson, 1995; 2012). As McLoughlin (2014: 4) writes: ‘Indeed, the 
local and the global should not be viewed as dichotomous or binary opposites; their 
relationship is dialectical, mutually constitutive and not necessarily mediated by the 
nation-state’. 
For anthropological studies which focus on the everyday of a particular site, a translocal 
perspective is useful in that it ‘conceptually addresses the attempts to cope with 
transgression and with the need for localizing some kind of order’ (Freitag and Von 
Oppen, 2010: 8), where transgression here refers to those processes which transgress 
national boundaries, or rather, translocality ‘investigates the tensions between movement 
and order’ (ibid.). For Smith (2011: 181), translocality neither prioritises ‘mobility’ as its 
defining aspect, nor ‘post-national identities’, but rather highlights ‘translocality as a mode 
of multiple emplacement or situatedness both here and there’. Brickell has also pointed out 
that diasporic ‘homelands’ are not necessarily equivalent to ‘nation’:  
In contrast to this trend, I argue that peoples’ sense of belonging in Cambodia is not necessarily 
best understood through a notion of ‘homeland’ which privileges ideas of national sovereignty 
in transnationalism studies, but rather one that includes local politics and points of familial 
affiliation evoked more appropriately through the term translocality. (2011: 27) 
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Thus while translocality as a distinct concept appears to have evolved out of transnational 
studies grounded in the everyday, and while many forms of translocality may also be 
implicated in transnationalism, the above discussion provides a conceptual underpinning to 
the thesis’ focus on the situatedness and emplacedness of Liverpool-Yemenis both ‘here’ 
and ‘there’ as well as the resulting ‘diaspora space’ which they produce and inhabit. Such 
a perspective does not take for granted that the ‘nation’ is necessarily the best or only 
starting point for discussion, but nor does it completely eliminate considerations of the role 
of the nation in articulations of identity and imagined ‘communities’. In this way, I 
distinguish transnational and translocal processes to emphasise different scales of circuits 
and flows of people, goods, ideas, etc. which are variously implicated in the formations of 
diaspora, both ethno-national and religious. 
 
1.4 Religious Diasporas and the Discursive Tradition of Islam 
While this thesis addresses the ethno-cultural/national dimensions of diaspora, it also 
questions the role of a religious diaspora, i.e. a Muslim diaspora centred around the global 
umma (McLoughlin, 2010). The role of new Islamic identities among British-South Asian 
Muslim communities has been the focus of several studies (see McLoughlin, 1996; Glynn, 
2002; Eade & Garbin, 2006; Kibria, 2008; Bolognani and Mellor, 2012; DeHanas, 2013a, 
2013b) some of which identify a Muslim identity as being more readily asserted by British 
South Asian youth who feel a diminishing connection to the birth places of their first-
generation relatives. By juxtaposing a ‘Yemeni diaspora’ alongside notions of a ‘Muslim 
diaspora’, this thesis aims to further enrich the debate concerning how ‘Muslim identities’ 
are interacting with, or even superseding, diasporic identities ‘rooted’ in ethnicity and 
homeland and hybridised identities. Whether the concept of a ‘Muslim diaspora’ or 
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‘Muslim-first’ identities (DeHanas, 2013a) operate in any meaningful way within the 
construction of everyday Liverpool-Yemeni identities is addressed in Chapter 6. 
The notion of ‘religious diasporas’ is one which continues to spark debate as McLoughlin 
(2005a: 540; see also 2010; 2013) notes that the concept has been ‘one of the more 
obvious theoretical issues to occupy scholars in the last decade or so’, particularly when 
discussing universalising religions such as Islam or Christianity which are not (or at least 
have not been for many centuries) closely connected to only one ethnic, national or 
linguistic group. Nonetheless, ‘Muslim diaspora(s)’ have gained a certain amount of 
traction in scholarly literature across disciplines and in an attempt to clarify its various 
conceptualisations Albrecht et al. (2016: 3) note that the term has more often than not been 
employed without sufficient conceptual or definitional clarity leading to it being used ‘in 
reference to many different things and, at the same time, as ontic categories with little 
explanation or theoretical reflection’. The following discussion will attempt to delineate 
how, with an expanded understanding of ‘diaspora’, a ‘Muslim diaspora’ can be 
conceptualised. 
As the notion of a ‘Muslim diaspora’ encompasses the many manifestations of Islam 
across a broad range of social, cultural, and ethnic groups which in their particular 
expressions may differ significantly from one another, it becomes important to clarify how 
Islam is understood as an object of anthropological study. Demant (2006: 43) notes from a 
historical perspective that ‘As Islam spread it thus diversified, spawning multiple and 
rather different Islams’, similarly Geaves (2010: 22) notes that despite many (if not the 
majority of) Muslims retaining the idea of Islam as a single tradition, diversity in 
interpretation and expression is widespread. Whether to speak of discrete, multiple 
‘Islams’ or a single-yet-diverse ‘Islam’ is a question which itself has occupied a central 
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space in the anthropology of Islam. Geertz’s (1968) seminal study Islam Observed 
emphasises the unity of Islam, while also highlighting the particularistic everyday lived 
forms of Islam. El-Zein, by contrast, reaches the conclusion that:  
the utility of the concept "Islam" as a predefined religion with its supreme "truth" is extremely 
limited in anthropological analysis. Even the dichotomy of folk Islam/elite Islam is infertile and 
fruitless. (1977: 252) 
Asad’s (1986a) response to the various formulations of Islam in anthropological studies is 
illuminating. In response to formulations which either essentialise Islam as containing 
some sort of unchanging ‘core’, or in the opposite direction, assert only ‘Islams’ in the 
plural, he seeks to affirm how Islam can be conceptualised as a single (yet continually 
developing) discursive terrain while also recognising internal heterogeneity: 
Islam as the object of anthropological understanding should be approached as a discursive 
tradition that connects variously with the formation of moral selves, the manipulation of 
populations (or resistance to it), and the production of appropriate knowledges. (1986a: 7).  
By placing the discursive tradition as its ‘uniting’ centre, it is possible to emphasise how 
recourse to tradition remains a powerful ‘binding relationship and orientation of the 
present (and future) to the past.’ (McLoughlin, 2007: 286) This disjuncture between the 
socially-constructed, contingent nature of categories such as ‘diaspora, religion, ethnicity’, 
against their common (emic) perception as ‘real’ or ‘stable’ is one which appears 
continually throughout their respective discussions. Furthering the debate from Asad’s 
conceptualisation of Islam as a discursive terrain but placing the focus more firmly on 
everyday, lived Islam, Schielke (2009, 2010, also Mahmood, 2005) provides an 
illuminating view which moves away the idea that piety and tradition take place outside of 
or in isolation from the ‘messier but richer fields of everyday experience’ (Schielke, 2010: 
6). Nonetheless, authors such as Fadil and Fernando (2015) have criticised the study of 
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‘everyday Islam’ as prioritising ‘moderate’ Muslims and casting Salafi, revivalist, or pious 
Muslims as somehow outside the scope of the ‘everyday’, therefore becoming a normative 
discourse in itself. As this study is primarily concerned with how Muslim identities are 
constructed and acted upon relationally vis-à-vis other multiple belongings rather than 
individual religiosity or performances of piety, Schielke’s (2010: 14) view that ‘grand 
schemes’ (such as Islam, capitalism, political ideologies, and so on) are enacted 
imperfectly in the everyday is valuable to this thesis which explores the multiple 
orientations according to which participants construct and perform their identities. In this 
way, ‘being Muslim’ in the everyday means recognising that while individual, embodied 
subjectivities are often multiple, ambiguous, and ambivalent, they are also constructed in 
reference to an external ‘discursive tradition’ in Asad’s terms, or a ‘grand scheme’ in 
Schielke’s which ‘by virtue of their apparent perfection they can be called and acted upon, 
and yet the contradictions and setbacks of everyday experience seldom shake their 
credibility’ (ibid.).  
The following section now turns to the concept of the global umma which underpins 
discussions of ‘Muslim diasporas’. 
 
1.4.1 The Global Umma 
The discussion of a Muslim diaspora here pays attention to three key elements: the 
ummatic discourse, Brah’s notion of ‘homing desire’ (1996: 16), and the role of 
transnationalism (see McLoughlin, 2010, who brings these concepts together in 
conceptualising a ‘Muslim diaspora’). All of these elements point to an understanding of a 
‘Muslim diaspora’ as pivoting between territorial and de-territorial aspects, and it is the 
interplay of the supra-national, de-territorialised discourses of the umma, with more locally 
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embedded forms of translocality and articulations of ethno-religious identities which this 
thesis aims to draw out. It will be useful to begin by first outlining how the notion of the 
umma and its contemporary discourses are central to the idea of a Muslim diaspora.  
The term umma appears throughout the Qur’an and the Hadith, but it is not until after the 
hijrah to Medina (known as Yathrib pre-hijrah) that it appears to refer more narrowly to 
the early Muslim community (Denny, 1975: 68). While the early significance of the term 
ummah has been debated, Mandaville (2001: 71) notes that: ‘In modern discourse, umma 
often appears as a central normative concept which appeals for unity across the global 
Muslim community.’ The popularisation of this discourse of umma as a supra-national 
community of believers stems in large part from pan-Islamist thinkers such as Rashīd 
Riḍā, ‘Alī ‘Abdul-Rāziq, Ḥasan al-Bannā and Abūl A’lā Mawdūdī, whose ideas were in 
many ways a response to European imperialism in the Middle East, and more broadly a 
reaction to universalising Western-dominated projects of modernity (Roy, 2004: 59; 
Mandaville, 2007: 49). That pan-Islamist thinkers were able to reconstitute the umma in 
such a way as a means to counteract Western hegemony highlights the ‘travelling’ nature 
of the term as Mandaville writes:  
there is still a sense in which all Muslims today are part of a diaspora whose ‘home’ is the 
umma of the Prophet’s Medina. It is here that we find a potent reminder of the fact that theories 
travel not only across space but also across time. (2001: 109) 
Similarly, Eickelman and Piscatori (1990: 3) in their edited book Muslim Travellers 
highlighted ‘the specific importance of travel and its significance as a process of social 
action in understanding “Islam”’ through chapters on the historical foundations of hijrah 
as a doctrine and its implications (Masud, 1990), and studies on later forms of Islamic 
pilgrimage (e.g. Mandel, 1990, from the same volume). It can thus be seen how the umma 
remains a powerful discursive, travelling concept with its roots in the early history of 
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Islam which is well suited to providing a new ‘centre’ of belonging in the face of a 
globalising world characterised by transnational flows made possible and accelerated by 
modern travel and communication technologies. While the umma as a discourse de-
emphasises territory and prioritises Muslim unity over ethno-national distinctions, we will 
now turn to how this discourse opens up ‘the possibility for a new, more mobile, ‘homing 
desire’’ (McLoughlin, 2010: 255, expanding upon Brah’s, 1996: 179-80, notion of a 
‘homing desire’). 
In contrast to Dufoix (2016: 19) who argues that the ‘centred’ and ‘de-centred’ 
conceptualisations of diaspora are in contradiction, I argue that Brah’s (1996) notion of a 
broader more ambivalent understanding of the ‘centre’ (or ‘home’) is valuable in that it 
acknowledges the ambivalences in diasporic attachments to ‘homeland’ as well as 
allowing the ‘home’ itself to take a more metaphorical, mythic, or imagined shape. This is 
particularly useful when considering religious diasporas as offering alternative forms of 
belonging. Despite the supra-national and de-territorial nature of the ummatic discourse, 
Mandaville (2001) and McLoughlin (2010) highlight that Islam as a ‘travelling’ religion is 
nonetheless well suited to creating ‘a homeland consciousness analogous to that of a 
diaspora’ (McLoughlin, 2010: 223), centred on Islam’s holy cities of Mecca: ‘the umma 
can be said to have a clear mytho-hisotircal and territorial orientation in terms of Mecca’ 
(ibid.), and Medina: ‘In these contexts the parameters of the umma are in flux: a 
community longing for the purity and stability of Medina’s golden age, but one that also 
realises … contemporary circumstances are very different.’ (Mandaville, 2001: 87).  
With the understanding of a homing desire not representing a desire for an actual 
geographical homeland, the ‘centres’ (Mecca and Medina) of a Muslim diaspora are used 
in this way to highlight how the moral and historical ‘travelling’ framework of Islam can 
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provide a new form of identification which those born in the diaspora may find more 
relevant than a purely ethno-national diasporic identity. As such, ‘This “home”, however, 
is not a place in the spatial sense of the nation-state, but rather an imagined nexus of past 
and future, something that once was and which could be again’ (Mandaville, 2001: 109-
10). This de-centred conception of diaspora will be seen to also be useful when discussing 
alternative imaginaries of Yemen which are less clearly orientated towards the modern 
nation state. Furthermore, the question of whether Liverpool-Yemenis place importance on 
the umma as oriented towards mytho-historical centres of Mecca and Medina is 
particularly pertinent at the time of writing given the historical relations between Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the ongoing conflict in Yemen. 
Having considered the ummatic discourse in supra-national and somewhat utopian terms, 
and where its mytho-historically located centres may lie, it will now be useful to consider 
what role Muslim transnationalism plays in relation to the concept of a Muslim diaspora 
and ummatic discourse(s). As Grillo writes:  
the “imaginary ummah” is abstract and deterritorialised; it manifests itself in rhetoric and 
endless Internet debates. By contrast the communities formed by many Muslims in Europe are 
local and concrete. (2004: 858, citing Roy 1998: 31) 
This necessarily presents us with a (dis)juncture in that although the umma envisions a 
supra-national unity, individuals act within/across nations and their surroundings (Grillo, 
2004: 864-5). The complex relationship between the ethno-national diaspora and ‘Muslim 
transnationalism’ has been discussed by scholars such as Mandaville (2009), Grillo (2004) 
and Bowen (2004) who examine different dimensions of Muslim transnationalism from a 
variety of perspectives. Bowen (2004: 881) recognises that Muslim transnational 
movements and practices often explicitly or implicitly describe dimensions of a diasporic 
context framed in ethno-national terms as he writes ‘these transnational religious 
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movements develop a diasporic character in the form of representations and imaginations 
of a homeland.’  (cf. Riccio, 2001; Grillo, 2004; Werbner, 2003). In contrast to the 
plethora of studies which highlight Muslim ‘diasporic’ transnationalism, Bowen (ibid.) 
points to the existence of a de-territorial form of a Muslim transnational public sphere not 
dependent upon migration. This public sphere allows debates and discussions concerning 
contemporary issues faced by Muslims and Islam in the West, with reference to traditional 
religious forms of authority, particularly scholars from the Arab world, and as a space 
which again recalls the ‘travelling’ (through space and time) dimension of Islam: 
Muslim public intellectuals who are engaged in serious discussions about how to adapt and 
adopt Islam to Europe are unwilling to cut themselves off from the transnational space that has, 
since the beginning of Islamic history, been the appropriate sphere for reference and debate. 
(ibid., 886) 
In some ways, this form of a transnational Muslim public sphere is indicative of post-
Islamism which, in broad terms, ‘represents an endeavour to fuse religiosity and rights, 
faith and freedom, Islam and liberty’ (Bayat, 2013: 8). While this form of de-territorial 
Muslim transnational space opens up new possibilities for the study of Muslim 
transnationalism, it is largely concerned with ‘the transnational elite of Islamic scholars’ 
(Grillo, 2004: 868) and so the important question for this thesis is if Liverpool-Yemenis 
find the modern conception of the umma a meaningful concept in their articulations of  
everyday Muslim identities, and whether the linkages of Muslim organisations/movements 
between Liverpool and Yemen could equally be framed in terms of (ethno-national) 
Yemeni translocality. This highlights Mandaville’s (2009: 493) point that: ‘For many 
Muslims in Europe, Islam is indeed an important reference point for self-identity, but one 
whose strength and meaning are contingent on circumstance rather than fixed.’ DeHanas’ 
(2013a) study on Muslim identity in the East End of London sheds light on this nature of 
de-culturated Islam arising out of a particular set of circumstances and contingencies, as he 
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concludes (ibid., 82): ‘elastic orthodoxy…is a skill young British Bengalis have developed 
for perpetually recontextualising their revivalist Islam as new circumstances arise’.  
Of course, the concept of such an idealised form of the umma or diaspora must be 
examined through local context, returning again to Schielke (2010) and Mahmood’s 
(2005) emphasis on embodied performance and lived experience. This configuration of the 
global in local terms, or ‘glocalisation’ (Robertson, 1995; 2012), is important in 
underlining that although discourses on a global scale may be employed, they are 
inevitably played out on the local scale. Both notions of diaspora in this sense share an 
awareness of people/places elsewhere and it is the intersection between these two forms of 
identity and belonging which will reveal the specific situatedness of Liverpool-Yemenis 
and how notions of ethnicised/hybridised identity (Chapter 4), constructions of 
‘community’ (Chapter 5), and religious identity (Chapter 6) come together in response to 
and emerge from the local and global contexts in which they find themselves. 
 
1.5 Hybridity and Diasporic Public Spheres 
The notion of a diasporic public sphere describes a diasporic arena with often highly 
localised dynamics which at the same time may invoke ‘transnational political 
imaginaries’ (Werbner, 2002a: 251-252). This again recalls the glocal, as the ‘global-local 
problematic’ hinges ‘upon the view that contemporary conceptions of locality are largely 
produced in something like global terms’, in which such conceptions have both 
heterogeneous and homogeneous tendencies (Robertson, 1995: 31). An important early 
consideration of the diasporic public sphere is dealt with by Appadurai (1996) who brings 
it to light by tracing its genealogy and emergence through the development of the new role 
of the collective imagination in a post-national era, aided by new forms of media and 
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communication. This collective imagination has ‘broken out of the special expressive 
space of art, myth, and ritual and has now become a part of the quotidian mental work of 
ordinary people in many societies.’ (ibid., 5), allowing for new collectivities, solidarities 
and transnational communities. Diasporic public spheres in this way are for Appadurai a 
clear product of the diminishing role of the nation-state as they form ‘crucibles of a 
postnational social order’ (ibid., 22). In a similar vein alongside Appadurai (1996), 
influential scholars such as Bhabha (1994) and Brah (1996) emphasised the role of 
hybridity in the construction of diaspora and diasporic public spheres as being indicative 
of the post-national era. Although diasporas do in many ways occupy a ‘third space’ 
replete with interstitial identities, in many cases the nation state continues to make its 
appearance both in individual articulations of identity and within the diasporic public 
sphere (McLoughlin, 2014; Werbner, 2002a). In this sense, ‘Transnational loyalties, like 
struggles for citizenship, are never finally settled. They are the stuff of debate in the 
diasporic public sphere.’ (Werbner, 2010: 75).  
If diaspora can be understood as a process in which the development of a diasporic 
consciousness (of people and places elsewhere) plays a large, if not the defining, role, the 
existence of a robust diasporic public sphere can in some ways be seen as indicative of a 
‘mature’ diaspora such as the Manchester-Pakistani community which, having gained 
confidence through a sustained diasporic consciousness across generations, opens up an 
arena for debate and argument on ‘shared foci of passionate debate rather than internal 
homogeneity and agreement’ (ibid.).2  Such an understanding of diasporic public spheres 
also helps accentuate the diasporic tension of existing ‘here’ and ‘there’, while also 
                                                        
2 See also Scharbrodt’s (2020) study on the development of Twelver Shia transnational networks in London. 
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recognising that this tension itself allows diasporas to create and exist in their ‘own’ spaces 
– or, in Bhabha’s (1994) terms, the ‘third space’.  
As a concept, hybridity theory finds its origins in the works of Hall (1990), Gilroy (1993), 
Bhabha (1994) who challenge, albeit from somewhat different angles, essentialised notions 
of ethnicity, race, nation, culture and ‘community’. Its impact has been far reaching across 
the social sciences, anthropology, post-colonial studies and literary theory. Indeed, it 
would now seem difficult to talk about diaspora without also mentioning hybridity. In 
many ways it has become an all-encompassing ontology which views the world as 
inherently heterogeneous, multiple, and dynamic. While acknowledging the centrality of 
hybridity theory in allowing a move beyond essentialism, several scholars (Werbner, 2001; 
Hutnyk, 2010; Shih and Ikeda, 2016) have articulated a more critical approach which 
recognises that ‘hybridity’ itself risks becoming normative, such as when Friedman (1997: 
81) notes ‘hybrids and hybridisation theorists are products of a group that self-identifies 
and/or identifies the world in such terms, not as a result of ethnographic understanding, but 
as an act of self-definition’. When ‘celebrating hybridity’ itself becomes the aim, it can 
risk obscuring phenomena which could point at something quite different. As McLoughlin 
(2010: 225) writes ‘For many migrants, then, it is in a selective return to aspects of cultural 
tradition that many have re-discovered the moral resources to restore certainties in the face 
of cultural translation and social exclusion.’ As Hutnyk (2010) highlights, these 
‘traditions’ and identities are themselves never ‘pure’ to begin with, thereby 
problematising the idea that ‘hybridity’ implies the mixing of two previously discrete, 
‘unmixed’ elements. By examining the interplay of dominant and demotic discourses as 
per Baumann (1996; 1999), a more critical understanding can be achieved which accounts 
both for the attempts to reify and fix culture, as well as the organic hybridities (Bakhtin, 
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1981) and multiple identities (Yemeni, Arab, Muslim, Scouse, British) which emerge in 
diasporic contexts (Brah, 1996; Werbner, 2002a; 2017).   
The notion of organic, as opposed to intentional, hybridised identities stems from 
Bakhtin’s (1981) work which concentrates on the processes of hybridisation of language in 
the novel, but his ideas are also applicable to diasporic identities inasmuch as these are 
‘performed’ via communicative acts. For Bakhtin, an organic hybrid is one which does not 
self-consciously make use of its hybrid elements, unlike intentional hybrids which 
expressly use their hybridity to form a ‘collision between differing points of views on the 
world’. (Bakhtin, 1981: 360). Marotta (2007), similar to Werbner (1997), considers 
organic hybridities a largely conservative force in that they do not consciously challenge 
dominant discourses, but nonetheless ‘do begin to render prior structures of authority 
ambivalent’ (Werbner, 2001: 143). Given that the majority of participants in this study do 
not form a group of ‘cultural elites’ or jet-setting cosmopolitans, it is these organic and 
everyday hybrids which remain the primary focus. In brief, Mandaville’s perspective is 
particularly instructive for this study: 
Travelling theory, hybridity and diaspora…all help us to account for the ways in which 
translocal identities ‘[defy] assimilation into conventional political discourses and 
practices...and challenge conventional modes of interpreting the world within specific 
territories.’ (2001: 3, citing Eickelman, 1982: 1) 
 
1.6 Culture as Praxis and the Everyday 
Before discussing the cornerstones of the multicultural triangle, it will be useful to first 
begin by considering how ‘culture’ is understood in terms of human praxis, an idea 
popularised by Zygmunt Bauman in his seminal work Culture as Praxis (1973) in which 
he discusses at length the conceptualisation of culture in modernity. Placing culture as 
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existing between (and emerging out of) two poles: power/powerlessness, 
autonomy/fragility, resourcefulness/lack of resources, as a means to create meaning and 
order in an otherwise chaotic universe, he writes: 
Culture, as we see it universally, operates on the meeting ground of the human individual and 
the world he perceives as real. […] The concept of culture is subjectivity objectified; it is an 
effort to understand how an individual action can possess a supra-individual validity (1999: 94, 
revised edn.) 
Thus, culture in this broadly philosophical sense is not the conglomeration of discrete, 
particular, distinctive ‘cultures’ as a set of practices, beliefs, rituals, or forms of 
knowledge, but the praxis itself; in other words, culture is not ‘a reality preceding the 
action’ (ibid., 125). Such a conceptualisation of culture lends itself well to, and is in many 
ways implied (whether stated explicitly or not) in, ethnography which by its nature 
examines the minutiae of daily life and the performances of culture which, as Gerd 
Baumann notes, ‘can never stand still or repeat itself without changing’ (Baumann, 1999: 
26). While this scholarly conceptualisation of culture as ever-changing praxis is a valuable 
analytic tool for ethnographic studies, everyday performances of culture invariably attempt 
in many instances to reify cultural particulars or invoke essentialised visions of culture(s) 
while simultaneously participating in hybridisation and change. These essentialised 
notions of culture are ‘the armory of all three parties that debate the multicultural riddle’ 
(Baumann, 1999: 25), i.e. ethnicity as understood/articulated in the primordial sense with 
its emphasis on roots and ancestry, the nation-state as a stable entity with clear boundaries, 
and religion as an absolute (moral) system of beliefs and practices. In this way, all three 
elements of the multicultural triangle have ‘culture’ as their foundation, but their 
distinction also lies in how ‘they are about somewhat different things, “culturally”’. 
(Jenkins, 2008: 172).  
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Thus a recurrent theme throughout this thesis is the interplay between the perceived nature 
of ethnic, national, and religious identities as stemming from stable, clearly bounded 
cultural ‘entities’ (which are themselves employed relationally and contextually) and the 
relational, contextual and hybridising processes which occur alongside these reified 
notions. Baumann (1996; 1997) usefully distinguishes these two discourses (the reified and 
the hybrid/organic) as ‘dominant’ and ‘demotic’, both of which are equally deserving of 
study if culture is to be understood broadly as human praxis. 
In his ethnographic study of Southall, Baumann (1996) presents a nuanced account of how 
‘community’ is constructed and demonstrates how both dominant and demotic discourses 
occur simultaneously in such constructions. The dominant discourse is summarily:  
the stylization of ethnic categories into communities defined by a reified culture, the dominant 
discourse can thus progress to a portrayal of minorities as forming ethnic-cum-cultural 
'communities’ (1996: 16)  
Whereas the demotic discourse ‘counteracts the dominant by drawing attention to the daily 
process of 'making culture', rather than 'having a culture' (ibid., 6). From this, it can be 
seen that by beginning with the notion of culture as praxis, it is possible to move away 
from viewing culture as defined solely by the dominant discourse to one in which culture 
encompasses the multiplicity of discourses and embodied practices which may be both 
hybridising and reifying. This being the case, this thesis similarly addresses how 
Liverpool-Yemenis negotiate, (re)create and participate in multiple discourses, challenging 
the notion that ‘“ethnic” minorities must form a “community” based on their reified 
“culture”’ (Baumann, 1997: 214). This study, then, understands that while performances of 
culture and re-traditionalisation may call upon reifying or reified notions of culture, it is 
the context in which these occur, and for whom, which is of interest.  
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I would also like to highlight the ‘everyday’ here as a valuable means of challenging the 
primacy of top-down dominant, normative discourses which take ‘ethnicity’, ‘cultural 
community’, or ‘religion’ to be stable and fixed, by accentuating how these discourses 
exist alongside demotic discourses, painting a more complex and nuanced picture of how 
concepts such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘nation’ and ‘religion’ operate and are negotiated as seen 
through the lives of the participants in question who in many ways form ‘organic hybrids’ 
(Bakhtin, 1981). This concept of the everyday as resisting easy categorisation or 
theorisation into any one model again echoes Bauman’s notions put forward in Culture as 
Praxis (1973), ideas which are expanded upon in Liquid Modernity (2000), which stresses 
how the preoccupation with categorisation (characteristic of modernist projects and 
positivism more generally) ignores the pervasive ‘liquid’ character of modernity. 
Individuals are now cast as ‘consumers’ rather than ‘producers’ continually challenged to 
reinvent themselves in an era where ‘There is change, always change, ever new change, 
but no destination, no finishing point, and no anticipation of a mission accomplished’ 
(Bauman, 2005: 66). For Bauman, in this way, the only certainty is the ‘uncertainty’ of 
liquid modernity. Diaspora in the time of liquid modernity, then, is perhaps a context in 
which this radical transience is keenly felt and observed. While Bauman’s insights concern 
the general condition of modernity, the task here is to examine the everyday negotiations 
of identity and belonging which take place against this backdrop. While we may all now 
be consumers rather than producers, this is not to deny individuals any agency in their 
everyday lives. It is here that de Certeau’s seminal work, the Practice of the Everyday 
(1984), provides a useful counterpoint in highlighting how individuals resist, (re)negotiate, 
and reinterpret the everyday according to their own understanding and needs, often in 
ways which contradict the notions of those in power or the dominant discourses. For de 
Certeau, however minor these transgressions may be, they nonetheless characterise how 
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the everyday is not just a mundane sphere where nothing extraordinary takes places and is 
consequently of little important, but rather: 
As unrecognized producers, poets of their own acts, silent discoverers of their own paths in the 
jungle of functionalist rationality, consumers produce through their signifying 
practices…"indirect" or "errant" trajectories obeying their own logic. In the technocratically 
constructed, written, and functionalized space in which the consumers move about, their 
trajectories form unforeseeable sentences, partly unreadable paths across a space…the 
trajectories trace out the ruses of other interests and desires that are neither determined nor 
captured by the systems in which they develop. (1988: xviii) 
Liquid modernity may be a given, but this does not deny that reactions to this may often 
involve attempts to ‘solidify’ identities and cultural attachment – indeed that such attempts 
to fix culture are often so strongly expressed only further accentuates the underlying 
condition of transience. Taking de Certeau’s notion that investigations into the everyday 
can reveal important insights into how individuals negotiate this ‘liquid modernity’, 
various scholars have made fruitful use of an ‘everyday perspective’. McGuire (2008: 6), 
looking at religion, has accentuated the value of qualitative examination of the everyday in 
that it foregrounds ‘the complexities, apparent inconsistencies, heterogeneity, and 
untidiness of the range of religious practices that people in any given culture and period 
find meaningful and useful’. Taking a similar approach, the edited volume Everyday Lived 
Islam in Europe (Dessing, Jeldtoft, Nielsen and Woodhead, eds., 2013) does not take the 
more traditional approach of viewing Islam from an institutional perspective, but places 
the emphasis on how it operates in people’s everyday lives, underlining the ambivalences 
and (dis)junctures between authority, orthodoxy, institutions, and lived experiences. For 
Dessing (2013: 39-40), the focus on the everyday offers ‘a counterbalance against the 
tendency to privilege religion as principal identity marker of Muslims’ thereby attempting 
to avoid reifying the ‘otherness’ of Islam. This study has taken an approach similar to 
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Dessing (ibid.) in that she prioritises three loci: ‘religious organisations, public places such 
as workplaces and schools, and private homes’ which largely correspond to the areas of 
life examined here. Of course, this approach poses its own methodological issues which 
will be dealt with in the following chapter. Similarly, Wise and Velayutham (2009: 3) 
demonstrate the benefit of an everyday perspective in illuminating ‘how these wider 
structures and discourses filter through to the realm of everyday practice, exchange and 
meaning making, and vice versa’. Concomitant with the everyday expression of organic 
hybridities is the ‘performance’ of culture, in line with the notion of culture as praxis in 
that cultural identities are produced (and recognised by others) through embodied praxis of 
communicative acts which are themselves embedded in (often normative) discourses. If 
modernity is liquid, culture is praxis, and the everyday can reveal how actors navigate the 
many possibilities of identity and ‘community’ making, then it is the situated performance 
of ‘culture’ which our attention must turn towards. Performativity theory will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4 where it more clearly comes into focus. 
Returning again to Bauman, this is echoed when he writes: 
Motility, non-rootedness and global availability/accessibility of cultural patterns and products is 
now the ‘primary reality’ of culture, while distinct cultural identities can only emerge as 
outcomes of a long chain of ‘secondary processes’ of choice, selective retention and 
recombination (which, most importantly, do not grind to a halt once the identity in question 
does emerge). (1999, xiv) 
Thus it is in the everyday performances of culture that a picture can be gained as to how 
certain cultural forms are selectively retained, reproduced, and gain a new significance in 
Liverpool, essentially answering the question of what it means to be Yemeni in Liverpool. 
Indeed, DeHanas (2013a: 82) employs a similar perspective highlighting both the 
‘plasticity’ of liquid modernity and the interplay of dominant/demotic discourses when 
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describing the ‘elastic orthodoxy’ of Bengalis in the East End of London who ‘accept the 
local social consensus on what it is to be a Muslim (‘orthodoxy’) and then work tactically 
within this framework, stretching it to apply to new contexts and situations (‘elastic’).’ 
 
1.7 The Multicultural Triangle 
The above sections have introduced ethno-national and religious diasporas as the 
overarching concepts framing this thesis with particular emphasis on their intersection 
underlined by translocalism and glocalisation. This section now discusses three related 
concepts: the ethnic, national, and religious dimensions of identity, which are in many 
ways constitutive of a diaspora in that they are variously implicated in the formations of 
diasporic identities and diasporic awareness of people/places elsewhere. The relationship 
between and inter-relatedness of these has been characterised usefully by Baumann (1999) 
as ‘the multicultural triangle’. Using the multicultural triangle as a point of reference, this 
thesis prioritises how its elements operate and come together in formations of Liverpool-
Yemeni identities and imaginaries of ‘community’, while noting that they may in many 
ways be shaped by external forces. Of course, as will be clear throughout the ethnographic 
chapters, such a neat schematisation is rarely feasible (nor desirable), but this framework 
roughly illustrates how the concepts are conceived. The following section now discusses 
how ethnicity-nation-religion are understood and examined in the everyday Liverpool-




Much of the literature on theories of ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race’ begin with a discussion of 
primordialist or essentialist notions, why these earlier notions are now untenable, and how 
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constructivist approaches dominate sociological and anthropological models of ethnicity. 
Similar to diaspora, ‘ethnicity’ has spawned a vast amount of literature, with numerous 
differing theories and conceptualisations. Instead of detailing the well-worn genealogy of 
ethnicity as a concept by beginning with the ‘routine beating of the dead primordial horse’ 
(Wimmer, 2013: 2), it will be more expedient to begin by noting, in Brubaker’s (2009: 28) 
words, that ‘we are all constructivists now’. The primordialist notion of ‘fixed’ ethnicity 
(often ‘fixed’ via recourse to biology and kinship) has now largely been displaced by the 
more fluid and contextual constructivist understandings. Despite this general consensus as 
to the socially constructed and mutable nature of ethnicity, debates within a broadly 
constructivist framework are still ongoing.  
It will be useful to begin with a working, if not broad, definition of ethnicity. Antweiler 
(2015: 27) in his overview Ethnicity from an anthropological perspective states ‘The core 
of ethnicity is the consciousness and feeling of individuals that they are members of a 
‘We’-group, and their behavioral actions in light of this feeling.’ As a working definition, 
this is necessarily only a starting point for discussion as it tells us very little about what 
characterises ethnicity as a meaningful group category (the ‘We’-group) and how the 
group is constructed, maintains itself, and is negotiated in the social world, nor does it tell 
us how the term has historically and politically been employed. Nonetheless, establishing 
ethnicity in broad terms as a certain form of group membership with a shared ‘cultural 
identity’ will aid the following discussion.  
 Constructivist notions of ethnicity owe much to the foundational works of Weber as 
Jenkins (2008) highlights the centrality of Weber’s proposal that ethnic identifications 
arise due to subjective belief in a shared ancestry, which is often encouraged due to 
collective action directed towards shared goals. Nonetheless, it is perhaps the seminal 
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work of Barth (1969) which has most greatly influenced constructivist understandings of 
ethnicity as he locates it in the processes of boundary making rather than the ‘cultural stuff 
that it encloses’ (Barth, 1998: 15, reprint of original edn.). By focusing on the processes of 
constructing and maintaining boundaries, the concept of ethnicity gained greater analytic 
scope and flexibility which freed it from the preoccupation, or conflation, with ‘cultural 
stuff’ (Baumann, 1999: 59). Barth’s ideas have since been further refined and re-
examined, as scholars such as Cohen argue that the focus on boundary maintenance risks 
reifying the boundary; in response to this Cohen (1978: 387) stresses that ethnic 
boundaries are in fact ‘multiple and include overlapping sets of ascriptive loyalties that 
make for multiple identities’. In this way, ethnicity and its boundaries are understood as 
always contextual, contingent, and relational and thus this study agrees with Carter and 
Fenton (2010: 4) that one should not begin with the assumption that any population ‘has 
the characteristics of a relatively organized, cohesive group, with shared customs and 
values, and with a distinctive identity deployed both individually and collectively.’  
The ongoing debates regarding how to best theorise ethnicity do not appear to have 
reached a single consensus as the following perspectives from influential scholars 
illustrate. Brubaker (2004) in Ethnicity without Groups argues that ‘ethnicity’ as a 
substantial entity does not exist, instead arguing that emphasis should be placed on the 
contextual and contingent processes involved in producing ‘groupness’. Wimmer (2013) 
takes a sociological-Barthian approach stressing the importance of boundary making, and 
Jenkins (2008) calls for a more fluid understanding based on social-anthropological 
models which incorporate stability and change simultaneously.  
Given the multiplicity of theorisations, the difference in perspectives seem to be in large 
part due to differing points of emphasis and the nature of the questions being asked. An 
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example in point here is when Baumann (1999: 145) questions why studies on topics such 
as ‘the Turks in Berlin’ proliferate and often begin with (false) assumptions on ‘how this 
minority is bounded and which processes proceed inside and which outside that assumed 
community’. Indeed, by problematising ethnicity as a concept, this study asks these very 
questions to better highlight whether and how or when ‘ethnic’ identities matter to 
Liverpool-Yemenis, how these are ‘made’, and the contexts in which they are performed 
and employed. Werbner’s understanding from an anthropological perspective is thus 
instructive as she emphasises that:  
By contrast, in my reading of ethnicity as an expression of multiple identities, such identities are 
positive, creative, dialogical and situational. Hence, for example, to draw once again on my 
research among Pakistanis in Manchester, British Pakistanis belong in a taken-for-granted way 
not to a single diaspora but to several different diasporas – Asian, Muslim, Pakistani nationalist, 
Punjabi – a complex diaspora, each identity pointing to different aesthetic and ethical 
expressions, imaginatively performed. (2017: 8) 
A similar perspective is taken by Staub (1989: 42) in his study of Yemenis in New York 
where ethnicity is seen as emergent, drawing upon a ‘variety of esoteric social identities 
and their associated cultural repertoires in response to exoteric cultural interaction’. In 
many ways, anthropological examinations of ethnicity place greater emphasis on its 
situational, contextual nature. 
While culture as an encompassing concept has been described as human praxis in the 
broadest sense, the notion of the performance of culture is useful when talking specifically 
about performances of cultural difference which are implied in notions of ethnicity. In this 
way, I use the term ‘Yemeniness’ throughout the thesis to point towards the ‘cultural stuff’ 
of ethnicity: kinship, language, wedding rituals, clothing, home decoration, and attachment 
to various Yemeni political and religious discourses to highlight how aspects of these are 
variously invoked or rejected, changed or reified in exploring how the participants 
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themselves articulate what being Yemeni in Liverpool means. Of course, performances 
and expressions of ‘Yemeniness’ in Liverpool also imply their situatedness in the 
Liverpudlian or Scouse context and the co-ocurring processes of hybridisation. In other 
words, Yemeniness in the Liverpool context serves to highlight how ‘roots’ in the past 
influence and combine creatively with ‘routes’ in the present by examining how cultural 
narratives and performances are used and negotiated in the everyday – from the more 
domestic domains of kinship, the translocal family, weddings, and so on, explored in 
Chapter 4, to the more public-facing ‘community’ building strategies and city-wide artistic 
events explored in Chapter 5, and finally in Chapter 6 the relation between a Yemeni 
identity and Islam in Liverpool with reference to the particular historical context of Islam 
in Yemen and notions of a Muslim diasporic identity. Eriksen highlights the importance of 
understanding ethnicity in context when he writes:  
Ethnicity, as a source of cultural meaning and as a principle for social differentiation… can 
only be appreciated through a comparison of contexts, which takes account of differences in the 
meanings which are implied by those acts of communicating cultural distinctiveness which we 
call ethnicity. (1991: 130) 
Thus ‘Yemeniness’ in the thesis is not a normative category pointing to a reified culture 
(although it may be expressed as such by participants), but rather it is used to highlight 
how Liverpool-Yemenis themselves ‘make’ Yemeni identities. In this way, I refer again to 
McLoughlin’s (2005a: 533) notion of ethnicised identities in highlighting that while being 
‘Yemeni’ refers to some sort of belonging in a ‘We-group’ with ‘roots’ in Yemen, the 
ethnographic chapters also explore whether it is employed in ethnicised terms – that is to 
say, whether ethnicised Yemeni identities form the basis of any mobilisation, imaginaries 
of ‘community’, or public engagement in highlighting their distinctiveness or ‘boundaries’ 
vis-à-vis others. Although individual Liverpool-Yemenis share the common factor of 
ancestry in Yemen, the question remains whether this fact itself makes Liverpool-Yemenis 
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a particular ‘group’. As Brubaker (2002: 167) highlights ‘it means taking as a basic 
analytical category not the “group” as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating 
conceptual variable’. I would also add to this that if ‘being Yemeni’ in Liverpool is not 
mobilised in productions of an ethnicised ‘group’ identity, it is equally as illuminating to 
examine the alternative contexts in which ‘Yemeniness’ retains salience – a question 
which a focus on the everyday is well suited to explore. 
 
 
1.7.2 Nation and (Trans)Locality 
In The Multicultural Riddle, Baumann’s (1999) discussion of the nation is primarily 
concerned with demonstrating its constructed and imagined nature, drawing upon 
Anderson’s (1983) Imagined Communities, but also stressing that despite nationalism’s 
‘superethnic character’, the modern nation-state still ‘disadvantages other ethnic categories 
in the same state’ (Baumann, 1999: 39). For Baumann, a radical re-thinking of the nation 
is necessary in order to reach a ‘multicultural future’ which hinges upon a non-
essentialising understanding of culture. Similarly, this thesis also draws upon the notions 
of Anderson (1983) and Taylor (2004) in recognising the constructed nature of the nation 
(both the UK and Yemen) and its social imaginaries. Nonetheless, beginning with the 
‘nation’ (rather than ‘locality’) as a starting point in a study which is primarily concerned 
with everyday subjectivities has been problematised. Therefore while Baumann’s 
understanding provides a useful theoretical basis, the everyday focus of the thesis means 
first determining the contexts in which the ‘nation’ is relevant to the construction of 
Liverpool-Yemeni identities – it will be seen that, perhaps more often than not, 
(trans)locality takes precedence in the participants’ accounts.  
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Rather than assuming Liverpool-Yemenis share an uncontested ‘national identity’ (British 
or Yemeni) as ‘homeland’ has been highlighted as not necessarily equating the ‘nation’, 
Chapter 4 demonstrates the importance of (trans)locality in everyday articulations of 
Liverpool-Yemeni identities. An approach which begins from a smaller unit of analysis 
(the family and street/neighbourhood in this case) allows a more nuanced approach in 
exploring the complicated position which both Liverpool and Yemen occupy with regards 
to the ‘nation state’. Of course, a study which begins from the smaller scales of the family 
and the neighbourhood necessarily requires a move away from methodological 
nationalism. While the ‘nation’ in this study often remains on the periphery in demotic 
accounts which prioritise the (trans)local, the ‘nation’ is also never entirely absent as 
productions of ‘locality’ below the level of the nation are nonetheless implicated in 
national-local power relations. Thus in this thesis, Baumann’s ‘national’ cornerstone of the 
multicultural triangle has been adapted to reflect the context- and scale-sensitive nature of 
the research questions as well as the important dimension of (trans)locality. 
Additionally, it must also be underlined that although ethnicity and nationhood are often 
mutually implicated, nationhood cannot always be explained solely via ethnicity and not 
every ethnic group has produced its corresponding nation (Gellner, 1983; Calhoun, 2000) 
– Yemen’s complex and contested histories of nation-building attest to this.3 Jenkins 
(2008: 148) argues that the key difference separating ‘ethnicity’ from ‘nationalism’ is that 
of ideology – nationalism presupposes a national ideology as espoused in nationalist 
discourses, whereas ethnicity itself is not necessarily ideological. While Yemeni 
                                                        
3 Baumann’s (1999: 31) notion of nation-states as ‘post-ethnic’ and ‘superethnic’ is also illuminating, as it 
underlines how nation-states have variously incorporated different ethnic groups into projects of nation-
building which has often led to the structural exclusion or marginalisation of other ethnic groups, hence the 
‘multicultural riddle’. Yemen (or the Yemeni states prior to unification) is no exception in this regard, with 
Yemenite-Jewish communities being a prominent example, having been valorised and marginalised at 
different periods.  
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nationalist discourses will be seen to play a role in certain contexts, and while (Scouse)-
Yemeni identities will inevitably be shaped by other various ideologies, they are not 
necessarily invoked in an ideological or politicised sense – although of course such 
invocations can be read as containing a ‘political’ dimension. The stress here is that the 
‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘supranational’ also exist in dialogue, sometimes clashing (even 
violently so), sometimes coalescing. With such a view it is possible to examine the ‘wide’ 
circuits of transnational Islam aided by modern communications technology, the impact of 
Britain’s colonisation of Aden, and the more ‘narrow’ circuits of translocal practices and 
activities as seen in the flow of goods between the specific sites of Liverpool and Yemeni 
regions, and the recurring journeys to particular places in Yemen. It is not enough to 
assume that (regional) Yemeni identities are perfectly aligned with Yemen as a nation-
state, nor that Scouse identities are unproblematically subsumed under a ‘British’ identity. 
The role of national discourses such as ‘Community Cohension’ (see O’Toole et al., 2016, 
for discussion of the implications of Community Cohension and Prevent policies on state-
Muslim engagement, also Kassimeris and Jackson, 2012) alongside their local 
implementation and negotiation are explored in Chapter 5 which looks more specifically at 
how the national ideologies, agendas, and discourses of the UK and Yemen have impacted 
Yemeni-led ‘community’ building in Liverpool and whether Liverpool-Yemenis mobilise 
around an ethno-national Yemeni identity or imaginary of ‘community’.  
The everyday focus on the ‘local’ acknowledges the role of the ‘nation’, its ideologies, and 
discourses, but nonetheless emphasises that this dialogic relationship itself produces 
‘local’ modes of being and belonging. Appadurai’s (1996: 186) conceptualisation of 
locality it thus instructive as he traces how locality is both produced by certain contexts, 
and is itself context-generative. The defining point of these contexts is that of social 
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Just as the first section of this chapter explored the possibility of ‘Muslim diasporas’ by 
discussing the emergence and role of ummatic discourses with a possible mythologised 
homeland centred around Mecca and Medina in the making of Muslim diasporas, it will be 
useful to now examine the third part of the multicultural triangle: religion vis-à-vis 
ethnicity and nation. Scholars have variously proposed how religion should be theorised in 
relation to culture, with Geertz (1973: 123) placing the two in an open-ended relationship, 
writing: ‘The importance of religion lies in its capacity to serve for the individual or for a 
group, as a source of general, yet distinctive, conceptions of the world, the self and the 
relations between them’. In many instances ethnicity and religion share a closer, mutually 
reinforcing connection, sometimes with religion representing the main form of ethnic 
distinctiveness, as Mitchell highlights:  
Religion is not just a marker of identity, but rather its symbols, rituals and organizations are 
used to boost ethnic identity. In this version of the relationship, the substantive content of 
religion plays a more significant role in the construction of group identity. (2006: 1140) 
Similarly, many anthropological studies include religion within the ‘cultural stuff’ of an 
ethnic group, with religion sometimes being one of the more obvious sources of cultural 
differentiation, as Antweiler (2013: 27) notes that ‘the main anchors and motivating forces 
for this [ethnic] identity seem to be those of a common language and/or religion’.  
Despite religion playing a clear and significant role in many constructions and processes of 
ethnicity and diaspora, McLoughlin and Zavos (2014: 159) point out a lack of literature 
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which incorporates religion into theories of race/ethnicity or diaspora/hybridity. 
Attempting to remedy this, Knott (2005a: 119) stresses that studies of religion in the 
diaspora should view ‘religion as a dynamic and engaged part of a complex social 
environment or habitat, which is itself criss-crossed with wider communications and power 
relations’. This is to say that religion in the diaspora should not be seen as a minor subset 
of ethnicity (particularly when considering the role of global ummatic discourses and the 
‘travelling’ nature of Islam) but that it exists in a complex relationship with its cognates. 
Werbner highlights this when she notes that:  
Being “Pakistani”, it becomes clear, far from referring to a fixed, reified identity, encompasses 
a historically produced multiplicity created in response to diasporic and subcontinental 
movements: of Islamicisation, Empire, modernism and nationalism, and further embedded in 
religious, regional and linguistic traditions. (2017: 8) 
Accordingly, Chapter 6 of this thesis seeks to examine how Islam is invoked and 
articulated in productions of Liverpool-Yemeni identities by examining the trajectory of 
Islam in Liverpool through the existing Muslim institutions, observations at religious 
events, and participants’ experiences and narratives. This allows for a nuanced view of 
how Islam may be simultaneously used to reinforce a sense of Yemeniness, and also being 
articulated in broader (transnational, de-culturated) terms, while being cognisant that such 
articulations are themselves situated in everyday, lived realities. The trajectory of Islam in 
Britain, and Liverpool more specifically, will be discussed in Chapter 3 and further 
explored in the ethnographic context in Chapter 6, but it will be useful to note here how 
the discourses of (pan-)Islamism, pan-Arabism, and Islamic revivalism further complicate 
the relationship between diaspora-ethnicity-religion-nation. Both pan-Islamism and pan-
Arabism have influenced the trajectory of Yemen and continue to be implicated in the 
current conflict in Yemen which broke out in 2015. While I would like to stress that this 
study is not an examination of pan/post-Islamism or Islamist groups per se in Liverpool, 
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the influence of both (pan)-Islamist and pan-Arabist movements require elaboration given 
their long-lasting impact as well as taking into account the possibility of ‘post-Islamism’. 
As mentioned, the re-conceptualisation (or re-purposing) of the umma in modernity 
emphasising a global Muslim community can be attributed in large part to the early 
Islamist thinkers partly as a reaction to the establishment of nation states in the Arab world 
(Roy, 2004: 59; Mandaville, 2014: 74), but this is not to say that all Muslims who share a 
similar view of the umma are ‘Islamists’ or are affiliated with ‘Islamism’. For Mandaville, 
Islamism refers more narrowly to:  
forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic 
political order in the sense of a state whose governmental principles, institutions, and legal 
systems derive directly from the shari’ah (2014: 72, cf. Bayat, 2013: 4-7 for a similar 
discussion) 
This being the case, it is necessary to distinguish between Islamist groups with decidedly 
political aims such as Jama’ati Islami, and revivalist groups such as Tabligh-i Jama’at and 
the Deobandi tradition, which is particularly well-represented in Britain given its origins in 
South Asia (Siddiqui, 2004: 49). For Roy (2004), pan-Islamism with its focus on a global 
umma and the illegitimacy of the secular nation state as a political ideology is deemed to 
have largely failed, giving rise to new forms of revivalism and/or neo-fundamentalism 
indicative of post-Islamism, in which personal piety and de-culturated forms of Islam take 
precedence, especially in the West. In the supposed post-Islamist era, where Islamist 
movements do arise, they tend to be directed towards the national, not global, context 
therefore ultimately ‘accepting’ the nation state within various forms of ‘Islamo-
nationalism’ now common across the Arab world, including Yemen but notably excluding 
Saudi Arabia (ibid., 65, cf. Chamkhi, 2014 for a discussion on post-Arab Spring ‘neo-
Islamism’).  The role of neo-fundamentalism in post-Islamism hinges on the forces of 
globalisation and Westernisation as Roy (2004: 26) writes: ‘globalisation can be 
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accommodated through a liberal reformist view of Islam, a charismatic and spiritual 
approach…or a neofundamentalist stress of sharia (laws) and ibadat (rituals)’, noting that 
the neofundamentalist approach has been the more successful and visible of the two. 
Nonetheless, the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 have caused scholars to question the 
notion of post-Islamism given the victory of Islamist parties in Yemen and elsewhere 
(Naji, 2015: 253, Mandaville, 2014: 370). What this consideration of the intersection 
between Arab nationalist projects, pan/neo-Islamism, re-Islamisation and post-Islamism 
highlights is perhaps Bauman’s (2000) notion of ‘liquid modernity’, in that the post-
Islamist ‘privatisation’ of Islam and re-Islamisation of the private relate to the construction 
of identities which in the globalising/glocalising world ‘appear to be caught between the 
universalising and particularistic aspects’ (Mandaville, 2014: 408).  
Thus the demographic make-up of Liverpool provides an interesting point of comparison 
with other UK cities in which the Muslim population are largely of South Asian heritage – 
i.e. do we see the same influence of the Deobandi or other traditions associated with South 
Asia in Liverpool? While it may be tempting to draw a neat dividing line between an 
ethno-national diaspora and a de-territorialised Muslim diaspora, the everyday lived reality 
and situatedness of these forms of identification are often ‘messy’, inextricably interwoven 
and draw variously upon dominant and demotic discourses along different scales and 
utilising different cultural ‘languages’.  
 
1.8 Summary of Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
This chapter has introduced the key concepts and framing of the thesis in terms of diaspora 
as the overarching concept; and, its constituents: ethnicity-nation-religion which make up 
the ‘multicultural triangle’. I have foregrounded the importance of the translocal alongside 
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the co-occurring processes of ethnicisation and hybridisation while maintaining awareness 
of scale/context when discussing the dominant/demotic and national/local. The notion of 
‘diaspora space’ as a ‘confluence of narratives’ and journeys (Brah, 1996) has also been 
introduced as a useful conceptualisation providing a perspective which recognises the 
diasporic tension of ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, as well as the ambivalences of the ‘homeland’ 
understood purely in national terms. 
A recurring theme throughout this chapter has been to highlight the need for a theoretical 
perspective which allows concepts such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘ethnicity’ to be used in a way 
which allows for the contingent and mutable nature of these phenomena. If there is one 
unifying point bringing the above concepts together, it is perhaps that they are understood 
as dynamic processes, but nevertheless historically and socially situated processes.  
If a single label were used to describe the framework underpinning this thesis, ‘broadly 
constructivist’ would come close. The encounter between ethnography and theory is often 
a difficult a one when the subject matter is primarily that of such nebulous concepts as 
‘diaspora’, ‘identity’, and their constituents. Fieldwork may reveal surprising or 
contradictory results which are not easily analysed in reference to a single theory but 
nonetheless require conceptualisation. Acknowledging that no ethnographic study can 
provide a complete account of any group or situation, the question ‘what emerges from the 
empirical data, and how does the researcher wish to draw this out in the ethnographic 
narrative?’ must be continually reflected upon. Such reflection has guided the use of 




Chapter 2: Methods and Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the research design for the study and why a qualitative ethnographic 
approach was chosen as an appropriate method to examine the research questions. 
Alongside the research methods, it also considers more broadly anthropological 
methodology and the implications of the previously discussed theoretical underpinning of 
the thesis. It also explores the advantages and disadvantages of using such methods, 
paying attention to questions of access, participant observation and interviews, the 
limitations of the data, and ethical issues.  
 
In summary, the ethnographic data was obtained from twenty-one semi-structured 
participant interviews, and regular participant observation at a number of key fieldwork 
sites from June 2017 to September 2018. These sites included Yemeni-founded 
‘community’ organisations, several of which I had pre-existing connections to through 
volunteering, a number of religious spaces which I attended at regular intervals (weekly, 
fortnightly), and sporadic events such as a Liverpool-Yemeni wedding, events arranged by 
campaign groups, and artistic/cultural projects. An overview of the participants, participant 
information and informed consent forms, an example of interview questions, a research 






2.2 Ethnography for Qualitative Research 
Although ethnography is not an uncontested term, it will be useful to begin with 
Hammersley and Atkinson’s rough definition of ethnography as:  
the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for extended periods of 
time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through 
informal or formal interviews, collections documents or artefacts (2007: 3) 
 
While this definition of ethnography encompasses a range of methods, Bryman (2012: 
431) emphasises that although participant observation in particular overlaps with 
‘ethnography’, the two are distinct in that ‘ethnography’ can often also include the final 
written product. I have preferred to use the term ‘ethnography’ to describe the range of 
methods used in this study, and also to emphasise the overall anthropological approach and 
final written product, highlighting ethnography’s origination as a tool of the 
anthropologist.   
Such a definition of ethnography highlights its qualitative nature, as Atkinson (2017: 65) 
further notes that: ‘For the most part, qualitative research methods help to gain insight into 
the processes involved in co-constructions of meaning, lived experiences, cultural rituals, 
and oppressive practices’. As this study was from its inception concerned with the daily 
lives and experiences of Liverpool-Yemenis, a qualitative ethnographic approach was 
deemed to be suitable in that such a method allows for the collection of a rich body of data 
from multiple sources and contexts to address the key research questions of the three 
ethnographic chapters: 
1) ‘How, when, and to what extent do Liverpool-Yemenis construct, maintain, and negotiate a 
Yemeni identity?’ 
 
2) ‘What is the story of Yemeni-led ‘community building’ in Liverpool, and how does this 
reflect imaginaries of an ethno-national Yemeni ‘community’?’ 
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3) ‘What is the role of (travelling) Islam in the construction of second-generation Liverpool-
Yemeni identities and imagined ‘communities’?’ 
 
Given that these questions are themselves qualitative in nature, i.e. they do not seek to 
quantify religiosity, attitudes, attendance at institutions, etc., it is clear that a qualitative 
study which elicits articulations of identity and experiences in the participants’ own words 
and participant observations at key fieldsites would yield valuable results better suited to 
addressing the research questions. Of course, qualitative and quantitative studies are not 
necessarily mutually-incompatible and indeed scholars such as Morgan (2007) and 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) have proposed integration of both methods (‘mixed 
methods’), thereby avoiding the ‘paradigm wars’ which place quantitative and qualitative 
methods in opposition (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14). Alasuutari (2010) notes that 
the qualitative turn in social science research since the 1990s has in some ways reversed, 
due to quantitative research becoming more prized by policy makers, as he writes:  
The increased demand for quantitative research is especially due to the fact that advanced 
market economies have witnessed a climate of increased accountability in public expenditure 
and a requirement that research should serve policy ends. (ibid., 2010: 139) 
Despite this, I maintain that qualitative research is a valuable means of addressing certain 
types of questions whose value need not be reduced purely to their usefulness for 
policymaking.   
As can be surmised from the previous chapter, this study takes a constructivist approach 
stressing the processual nature of the main concepts examined such that a purely 
quantitative approach would not be suited to examining the historically and socially 
contingent and situated nature of these phenomena. Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 234) 
make a similar point when they note that qualitative researchers ‘tend to emphasize the 
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contingent character of human social life’ in contrast to quantitative approaches which 
often aim to identify key variables from which generalisations can be drawn. Therefore, 
this study is firmly qualitative in its approach with the few (secondary) quantitative data 
presented (e.g. population demographics) used primarily to contextualise the qualitative 
data.  
Despite the popularity of qualitative research and the qualitative turn, anthropology and its 
ethnographic methods have been subject to challenges as Jordan and Yeomans (1995: 391) 
note that ‘anthropology was implicated in a complex historical web of colonial-imperial 
relations that also influenced developments in ethnography.’ These challenges to 
anthropological claims of knowledge arose partly from the long-lasting impact of Said’s 
(1978) Orientalism which critiques the dominant knowledge claims made about the Other 
from a Western hegemonic perspective, even if the work itself does not explicitly deal 
with anthropology, culminating in the ‘crisis of representation’ which the seminal volume 
Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) explores from several angles (see also 
Denzin, 1997; Dirks, 2004; Lewis, 2007). As the previous chapter emphasised the 
contingent and malleable nature of ‘culture as praxis’, it follows that the ‘doing’ of 
ethnography and its ‘written product’ are themselves part of this praxis, embedded in a 
multitude of relations and processes in which both the researcher and the participants are 
situated. Asad (1986b: 163), focusing on the power relations between the researcher and 
the researched, observes that ethnography always becomes a textual construct or ‘cultural 
translation’, written in a language which hinges on the authority of the 
anthropologist/ethnographer provided by his/her ‘conditions of power – professional, 
national, international’. If this is acknowledged, Clifford’s (1986: 7) statement that 
‘Ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial—committed and incomplete’ is important 
in redefining our understanding of what ethnography does.  
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In response to these challenges, the field has been described as having taken a reflexive 
turn (O’Reilly, 2009; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), attempting to overcome the 
notion of ethnography as occupying a privileged position in describing social or cultural 
‘truths’ with little reference to the researcher’s own involvement and position in the 
process. In practical terms, this means continuously thinking about and questioning ‘the 
contexts and the acts of research and writing…thinking about what we write and how; and 
acknowledging we are part of the world we study’ (O’Reilly, 2009: 189). While this 
chapter has a dedicated section discussing my relation to and position as researcher vis-à-
vis the participants, self-reflexivity is not limited only to this chapter: rather, it is woven 
throughout the thesis. Furthermore, Berg and Lune (2014: 212) notes that researchers are 
often encouraged to take a ‘value-neutral position’ but nonetheless the topic and research 
questions are themselves influenced by the researcher’s interests and motivations. Indeed, 
attempts at ‘neutrality’ are misleading in that they imply that the researcher exists wholly 
outside of the social world under investigation, therefore falling into an unreflexive stance 
which has been subject to strong critique by several scholars (Asad, 1979, 1986b; 
Bourdieu, 1977). While the reflexive turn has certainly led to more transparent 
ethnographies, scholars have observed that excessive self-reflexivity is not always 
desirable and can lead to ‘navel-gazing’ (O’Reilly, 2007: 188; Damsa and Ugelvik, 2017: 
2). Thus, I have avoided the extremes of the post-modern aesthetic in which reflexivity 
‘has been taken to the textual extreme, in which the voice of the author is a dominant one’ 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 204).  
In short, the choice of ethnography as a method referring both to the actual methods used 
during fieldwork, and its subsequent writing, fits well with the nature of the research 
questions which require rich and detailed insights into how these phenomena are 
expressed, experienced and understood by Liverpool-Yemenis.  
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Ellen notes that:  
Unfortunately, through a process of conceptual slippage, methodology has also become 
synonymous for many with specific 'methods' or 'techniques’, and in the context of 
anthropology methodology is sometimes reduced to participant observation. (2010: 391) 
Similarly, Brewer (2004: 313) also notes this conflation, in that a set of methods are 
routinely employed while also being ‘closely associated with a particular philosophical 
framework that validates its practice’. Indeed, this chapter itself discusses both methods 
and methodology, but it is useful to consider methodology as referring more narrowly to 
how and why certain methods and theories are applied. A constructivist approach has been 
taken throughout, in the sense of an ontology which posits that: 
social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It 
implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction 
but that they are in a constant state of revision. (Bryman, 2008: 33)  
 
This ontological position is evident from the discussion of the key concepts in the previous 
chapter and guides how they are examined, agreeing with Holstein and Gubrium (2008: 
375) in that ‘If many constructionists retain an appreciation of naturalists’ desire to 
describe “what’s going on,” they combine such interest with decided emphasis on how 
these whats are sustained as realities of everyday life.’  
While a constructivist ontology may be considered broadly a form of ‘theory’ regarding 
social reality, there exist numerous approaches to how specific anthropological 
observations are explained and analysed, e.g. Lévi-Strauss’ (1963) Structural 
Anthropology, or the interpretive or symbolic anthropology associated with Geertz (1973), 
among others. While these theoretical groundings have been influential, this thesis agrees 
with Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 159) regarding the role of such theories in that it is 
often beneficial to use ‘an iterative process in which ideas are used to make sense of data, 
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and data are used to change our ideas.’ That is to say, the thesis is concerned with the 
concepts arising from the research questions and their related conceptualisations which 
provide the basis for the ethnographic chapters. Through these chapters, the thesis sheds 
further light on how these concepts operate in a Liverpool-Yemeni diasporic context, 
thereby contributing new insights from a hitherto under-studied group which provide a 
counterpoint to existing studies on British-Muslim or British-Arab groups. The emphasis 
on the contextually sensitive, contingent and changeable nature of the phenomena in 
question means drawing from a range of theoretical and conceptual approaches appropriate 
to what is being discussed, which can all broadly be labelled as ‘constructivist’ albeit with 
differing emphases. Essentially the thesis agrees with Appadurai writing on the question 
and centrality of ‘place’ in anthropology that: 
The central fact here is that what anthropologists find, in this or that place, far from being 
independent data for the construction and verification of theory, is in fact a very complicated 
compound of local realities and the contingencies of metropolitan theory. (1986: 360) 
Ethnography in a diasporic context is, then, perhaps an area where ‘place’ becomes most 
salient as its members continually negotiate forms of belonging, identities, and flows 
which are simultaneously (or competingly) local and global, or, glocalised. 
Asad (1986b: 163) also raises an important critique regarding the tendency of ethnography 
to become a form of ‘cultural translation’ which allows the ethnographer to ‘uncover the 
implicit meanings of subordinate societies’, thereby becoming perceived as an 
authoritative account, regardless of whether these implicit meanings are acknowledged or 
shared by the group in question. With this in mind, the thesis is less concerned with 
uncovering or interpreting these ‘implicit meanings’ (although of course some level of 
interpretation is always present in an ethnography), but rather has three central goals which 
are progressively and iteratively built upon: a) on a descriptive level, to sketch a picture of 
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Liverpool-Yemeni life, b) to examine the multiple positioned belongings of Liverpool-
Yemenis, and c) to examine how and when these positioned belongings are shaped by, and 
shape, the particular contingent and sited (trans)national/local contexts. 
 
2.3 Ethnographic Methods 
 
2.3.1 Choice of Location 
From its inception, the research was concerned with the specific locality of Liverpool. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, the choice of Liverpool as a site for research arose out of 
my own personal experiences growing up in Liverpool, combined with my academic 
interests in Arabic language and the Arab world. Several other factors early in the research 
process further solidified the choice of Liverpool as a research location. Namely, the lack 
of literature on Liverpool-Yemenis and contemporary Liverpool more broadly, the unique 
dynamic of Yemenis being the largest Muslim group in Liverpool in comparison to other 
UK cities, and Liverpool’s position itself on the ‘margins’ of Britishness. Brewer (2000: 
19) writes that in an ethnography 'the focus is normally on a single setting or group and is 
small scale', while he does not further qualify this 'small scale', the scope of the study was 
restricted to Liverpool. Initially, I had considered widening the scope to include either (or 
both) Manchester and Sheffield for a comparative dimension. However, it became clear 
that a narrower focus on Liverpool only, taking into account travel, financial, and schedule 
constraints, would allow me to build a richer, more detailed picture regarding the questions 
I was asking. Similarly, as much as a multi-sited study in both Liverpool and regions of 
Yemen would undoubtedly have added an extra dimension, the current conflict in Yemen 
made this impossible without significant risk of harm.  
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Within Liverpool itself, the fieldwork largely took place in Toxteth (also often known as 
L8 due to Toxteth falling largely within the L8 postcode region) and adjoining regions due 
to these areas having the largest concentration of Yemenis, Yemeni-owned businesses, 
mosques, and ‘community’ organisations established or accessed by Yemenis. The 
fieldwork took place over the course of fifteen months, between June 2017 and September 
2018. For the first half (June 2017 – January 2018), I was living in the north of Liverpool 
travelling regularly to and from Toxteth and surrounding areas for interviews and to attend 
various events and other settings. While this distance was not unreasonable (approximately 
thirty minutes by public transport), I decided to rent a flat in L8 for the second half of the 
fieldwork (January 2018 – September 2018) to be within walking distance of the relevant 
areas which allowed for greater immersion, and also allowed me to take part more 
spontaneously in various events and activities which transport options and timetables 
might have otherwise made difficult.  
The locations in and events at which fieldwork predominantly took place included Lodge 
Lane with its many Yemeni-owned businesses and Middle Eastern cafés, restaurants, and 
shops; the main mosques in L8; a Yemeni-Sufi Bā ‘Alawī Order weekly gathering; other 
predominantly non-Yemeni mosques; an Arabic Saturday school which I volunteered at 
throughout the fieldwork period; a weekly ‘intergenerational activities’ evening organised 
by Yemenis; various events organised by the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival at which I also 
volunteered; Arabic reading club sessions organised by a Liverpool-Yemeni; and a number 
of other sporadic or occasional events and settings such as a ‘community’ gardens project 
in L8, poetry evenings organised by a Liverpool-Yemeni, ifṭār dinners during Ramadan 
held at the mosques, a Liverpool-Yemeni wedding, and visits to participants homes.  
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Figure 1: Map of L8 with key fieldwork sites. Google Maps, 2020.4 
Figure 1 Legend 
 
Bounded area:  L8 
Red:      Arabic Schools 
Green:    Mosques/Religious spaces 
Blue:     Community centres 
 
The selection of these particular sites reflects the research questions in that they provided 
settings where it was possible to observe performances of culture, the role of ‘community’ 
organisations, and to explore the Muslim landscape of Liverpool. This follows 
Angrosino’s (2007: 30) commonsensical advice to ‘Select a site in which the scholarly 
issue you are exploring is most likely to be seen in a reasonably clear fashion’. While it is 
possible to identify certain sites as being more appropriate for exploring a particular 
research question, and indeed the arrangement of the ethnographic chapters reflects this, 
                                                        
4 Google Maps, 2020. L8, Liverpool. Map Data: Google. [Online] Available from: 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Liverpool+L8/. Reproduced in accordance with Google Terms of 
Service. 
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considerable overlap and ‘fuzzy’ boundaries must be emphasised here given how the 
underlying concepts of diaspora and the multicultural triangle often intersect and are 
mutually-constitutive. 
The majority of these sites had been identified before the fieldwork began, either due to 
my knowledge of their existence from living and growing up in Liverpool or, in the case of 
an Arabic school and the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival, due to my previous involvement in 
a voluntary capacity. Some of the sites were identified through interviews or conversations 
at other events, e.g. an invitation to attend poetry nights, the Arabic reading club sessions, 
or the Bā ‘Alawī gatherings. Furthermore, interviews with participants confirmed that my 
selection of fieldwork sites was largely aligned with those that Liverpool-Yemenis are 
familiar with and view as significant or forming part of the ‘Yemeni landscape’ in 
Liverpool. In summary, throughout the fieldwork period I attempted to participate in or be 
present at as many sites as possible in order to gather a rich body of data relevant to the 
research questions. The fortunate circumstances of the fieldwork period meant that there 
were few major obstacles in gaining access to the majority of the sites, but nonetheless the 
question of access remains an important one for all ethnographic fieldwork which the 
following section will now discuss. 
 
2.3.2 Access 
Before beginning discussion on the importance of gaining access, how this was negotiated, 
and related issues, it should be noted that this ethnography was entirely overt in nature. 
That is to say, I informed all gatekeepers, people with whom I was interacting regularly at 
these sites, and participants in interviews of my role as a researcher and what the research 
entailed before gaining their informed consent regarding my participation/attendance at 
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these sites or for interviews (see Appendices 1, 2, and 5). Covert research has been 
scrutinised due to the ethical implications it carries, particularly given the reflexive turn, as 
Calvey (2019: 248) writes ‘For some covert research is transgressive and violates, offends 
and trespasses against any democratization between the researcher and the researched.’. 
However, arguments have been made regarding the benefit of covert research in certain 
situations where access would be blocked (cf. Calvey’s, 2019, covert study on bouncers in 
the night-time economy of Manchester; Homan, 1980, on the ethics of covert ethnography; 
also Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). I felt that informing gatekeepers of my role as a 
researcher would not create significant obstacles to gaining access particularly as several 
of them were already familiar to me and knew of the study. Moreover, a covert approach 
would not provide any significant benefits while also posing difficult ethical and personal 
considerations, thus an overt approach was taken from the beginning. Of course, 
identifying one’s role as such comes with its own challenges, as Hammersley and 
Atkinson (2007: 63) note ‘people in the field will seek to place or locate the ethnographer 
within the social landscape defined by their experience’ which can affect field relations.  
Negotiating access was an important part of the early research process. Prior to the study, I 
had volunteered for several years at the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival as a general assistant, 
and I had also taught and assisted at an Arabic supplementary school in a voluntary 
capacity. Being familiar with the gatekeepers of these sites and having discussed my 
possible participation in the capacity of a researcher/volunteer meant that I was able to 
begin fieldwork shortly after gaining approval from the university’s ethical committee (see 
Appendix 6) without spending a considerable amount of time searching for suitable sites 
and negotiating access. For both of these sites, I acted as a ‘researcher as participant’ in 
that I had an active role within the organisations as a volunteer alongside research. For the 
Liverpool Arabic Arts Festival, this meant continuing with the usual tasks of a volunteer – 
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greeting attendees, providing directions, leafleting, assisting the performers and artists, etc. 
For the Arabic school, I volunteered as an assistant Arabic teacher which entailed first 
discussing my role with a leader of the centre and gaining a Disclosure and Barring 
Services (DBS) check due to its attendees being primarily children or minors. My role at 
other sites was less active in that I attended as a visitor or guest after invitations from other 
participants (e.g. mosques and religious events) or the setting was less formal without an 
obvious gatekeeper, and/or I was invited by participants (e.g. cafés, Arabic reading club).  
Gaining access to these sites allowed the undertaking of a method central to ethnographic 
research: participant observation, which DeWalt and DeWalt define as:  
a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events 
of a group of people as one means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines 
and their culture. (2011: 1) 
It combines with other ethnographic methods, such as interviewing, providing context out 
of which interview questions can be further refined, or important sites identified. While 
participant observation has a long history as an anthropological method (DeWalt and 
DeWalt, 2011), Bourdieu is critical of the emphasis it often receives, noting ‘the inherent 
difficulty of such a posture’ (2003: 281) and how he perceives the postmodern approach to 
reflexivity as inadequate. Instead, he proposes an alternative in which the ‘conditions of 
possibility’ (i.e. the social world which has generated the anthropologist, the particular 
anthropological tradition in which he/she is working, and his/her position within that 
tradition) should also be taken as points of consideration for a more truly reflexive 
ethnography. It would seem that the British anthropological studies drawn upon in this 
thesis such as those by Baumann (1996), Werbner (2002a), and e.g. McLoughlin’s (2000) 
reflexive account of fieldwork in researching Muslim minorities do indeed make their 
personal and institutional ‘conditions of possibility’ explicit. Similarly, and as I have 
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acknowledged throughout this chapter, my own experiences and academic interests along 
with the works which I draw upon have all undoubtedly shaped this thesis.   
Although access to the majority of the sites identified prior to or throughout the fieldwork 
was largely gained without problem, there were several considerations which should be 
mentioned. Firstly, it was assumed as given that some sites would be inaccessible due to 
cultural considerations of gender, i.e. as a male I would not be able to access female-only 
spaces (such as those in mosques or certain gatherings) nor would it be appropriate to 
attempt to gain access to these. This must be emphasised as a limitation of the study and as 
an area which would benefit from further research, not only regarding female-only spaces, 
but also because as Dewalt and Dewalt (2011: 100) note ‘Differential access to the lives of 
women has resulted in generations of predominantly male-biased ethnography, which has 
often paid little heed to the lives and concerns of women’. Secondly, after interviewing 
participants who work (or have worked) at another Arabic school, it became evident that I 
would not be able to attend in any sustained manner. This was likely due to my outsider 
(non-Arab, non-Muslim) status , although it was not explicitly stated as such. In this way, 
the partial and necessarily limited nature of ethnography must be emphasised. 
Additionally, several of the sites were only open sporadically (e.g. several ‘community’ 
associations discussed further in Chapter 5) and without previous invitations or 
information regarding the occasional events, it was impossible to attend. A further 
example of the ‘messiness’ of doing ethnography also concerned arranging interviews with 
imams or prominent figures associated with religious spaces. In several instances, I had 
arranged an interview but this was repeatedly postponed until it became clear that it would 
not be possible (See section 2.5 for further discussion of researcher positionality). Despite 
these minor challenges and acknowledging the limitations of the study, participant 
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observation was fruitful, especially when viewed in conjunction with the data collected 
from interviews. 
 
2.3.3 Interviews and Participants 
In conjunction with participant observation, semi-structured interviews were also used to 
collect data. These two methods were complementary in that insights gained from the one 
would often inform and corroborate the other. The role of interviews in ethnographic 
research and how participants’ responses are understood and integrated into analysis have 
been examined through various lenses in keeping with the theoretical shifts which have 
influenced the direction of, or arisen from, the discipline (Hammersley and Atkinson, 
2007; Svend, 2013). How interviews are understood and analysed in conjunction with the 
other data is discussed in section 2.6 of this chapter. Interviews in the context of this thesis 
served several functions: to allow the participants’ own voices and articulations to be 
given space and to further illustrate ethnographic descriptions, to gain further clarification 
or insight into phenomena that had been observed, and to collect data which is not readily 
observable (e.g. stories of migration, past experiences and personal attitudes regarding 
‘unobservable’ phenomena such articulations of identification with labels such as 
Arab/Yemeni/Scouse/Muslim). In addition, interviews themselves ‘may be able to tell us 
about the people who produced them and the intellectual and discursive resources on 
which they draw’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007: 98).  
Svend (2013: 18) notes that ‘It is quite common to make a distinction between structured, 
semi-structured, and unstructured interviews’ while also noting that the distinction 
between these should be seen as a continuum, ranging from standardised survey-style 
questions to more open-ended questions. I chose to use semi-structured interviews as the 
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research questions fall broadly into several themes or thematic categories (e.g. ethnicity, 
hybridity, ‘community’, religion) along which lines the questions were formulated, while 
also being flexible in recognising that participants may wish to speak more about one topic 
over another (see Appendix 4 for example of interview questions). This accords with 
Svend’s view that: 
Compared to structured interviews, semi-structured interviews can make better use of the 
knowledge-producing potentials of dialogues by allowing much more leeway for following up 
on whatever angles are deemed important by the interviewee (2013: 21) 
The criteria for selecting participants was designed to not be overly restrictive. The main 
consideration was that the majority of participants should be either born in Yemen and 
currently residing in Liverpool, or, be born in and/or have resided in Liverpool for a length 
of time and identify as being Yemeni. In doing so, I hoped to interview Liverpool-
Yemenis from across a broad range of age groups with a roughly equal number of male 
and female participants which would allow for a more holistic examination of the concepts 
in question, rather than only examining a subsection of Liverpool-Yemenis. Ultimately, I 
interviewed twenty-one participants, with females being slightly more represented in the 
sample (thirteen females and eight males, see Appendix 1 for a full overview of 
participants). 
This approach was partially pragmatic in that gaining access to participants, arranging and 
completing interviews is often a time-consuming process which is not always guaranteed 
success. By limiting the pool of participants from the outset to a particular demographic 
group within the already relatively limited Liverpool-Yemeni category, there would have 
been the risk of too few participants. A further consideration regarding the selection of a 
broad range of participants is that a small, homogeneous group of participants would 
considerably narrow the scope of the research questions. As the thesis aims to explore 
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diasporic processes and identities from multiple positioned belongings, a heterogeneous 
group of participants (albeit within a ‘Liverpool-Yemeni’ dimension), is better suited for 
this purpose. In addition, the research questions, and thus the types of interview questions, 
explore concepts which are applicable across the demographic range within the Liverpool-
Yemeni category. This is not to say that these concepts do not intersect with age, gender, 
class, etc. but rather the thesis explores the multiple ways and contexts in which they 
operate as seen through the participant observations and interviews. Of course, the attempt 
to ‘interview as many people as possible’ within the limited timeframe naturally led to its 
own biases and gaps in the final list of participants. The implications of these gaps for the 
study will be discussed in section 2.3.5. 
 
2.3.4 Sampling Methods 
The selection criteria described in the above section was used to determine a sample which 
was hoped to be representative of Liverpool-Yemenis in a broad sense. O’Reilly notes 
(2009: 194) that ‘ethnographers rarely appear to worry about sampling for 
representativeness in this way and talk little in their ethnographies of their sampling 
procedures’. A key concern here is that of the ability to generalise based on any given 
sample. However, while selecting a sample which fits with the research questions is 
desirable, a constructivist position (as is taken in this thesis) has an uneasy relationship 
with the attempt to make broad transferrable generalisations. Indeed, the anthropological 
and ethnographic literature which this thesis draws upon has a firm focus on the 
contextual, contingent and situated dynamics of a given field. This is similar to what 
Denzin (2001: 41, 2nd ed) notes regarding qualitative research as ‘intepretivism’ in that 
‘They (interpretivists) reject the nomothetic, etic impulse to abstract and generalize’ but 
instead ‘offer explanations of how certain conditions came into existence and why they 
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persist.’ (ibid., 43). Taking a similar position, the thesis stresses that any ‘explanations’ 
must be placed within their contextual environment.  
While sampling methods in ethnography may often not be as rigorous or precisely focused 
as they are in more quantitative based studies, it is useful nonetheless to consider how the 
sample was arrived at while also bearing in mind that in ethnographies, ‘sampling is 
addressed in an ongoing process as ideas are developed and analyses shaped’ (O’Reilly, 
2009: 196). Similarly, in qualitative research it is often unfeasible to rely on an inflexible 
pre-determined sample, as Gobo (2007: 406) notes that ‘the sampling plan needs to exist in 
dialogue with field incidents, contingencies and discoveries.’ This approach which 
recognises the ongoing nature of sampling in qualitative research was particularly useful as 
it allowed me to adjust priorities according to observations in the field, previous interviews 
and the overall balance of the sample as it progressed. The main method of gaining and 
broadening the pool of participants was via snowball sampling (Bryman, 2008: 202-203; 
O’Reilly, 2009: 198) in which further participants are identified from an initial group with 
whom the researcher may also be familiar or have access to. In addition, I employed what 
may be considered a form of ‘convenience sampling’ in that I would seek participants for 
interviews during participant observations due to these being locations where many 
Liverpool-Yemenis were often present.5  
 
2.3.5 Limitations of the Data 
The overall spread of the interview participants allowed a multiplicity of perspectives 
regarding the topics addressed by the research questions and allowed for a rich body of 
                                                        
5 ‘A convenience sample is one that is simply available to the researcher by virtue of its accessibility’ 
(Bryman: 2008: 201) 
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ethnographic data from which several key themes emerged. Nonetheless, there were 
several biases which should be noted in addition to the previously mentioned gaps 
regarding women’s spaces. Notably, young men (between 20-30 years of age) are absent 
in the sample of interview participants. The reasons for this are multiple – the fieldwork 
sites were predominantly attended by those over thirty years of age, participants tended to 
suggest people of a similar age with whom I could arrange interviews, and the general lack 
of (public) spaces in which young Liverpool-Yemeni men are well represented. 
Additionally, only two Liverpool-Yemeni women under the age of thirty are present in the 
sample.  
More generally, the thesis has been framed as a study of second-generation (or post-
migration) Liverpool-Yemenis whose parents were born in Yemen. For those under the 
age of thirty, a large portion are expected to be third- or later- generations as the next 
chapter will detail that the arrival of first-generation Yemenis to Liverpool grew 
predominantly during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s (Halliday, 2010: 55). 
Indeed, one of the ‘under thirty’ participants expressed confusion regarding which 
generation she considers herself.  
In terms of class background, all Yemeni participants, excluding a small group of 
‘community leaders’ discussed in Chapter 5, share similar backgrounds, with their fathers 
having largely worked in the steel works or other industry in cities such as Sheffield, 
Birmingham, and Warrington, before moving to Liverpool in the 1980s or 1990s when 
they set up newsagents. While individual employment and educational background is 
varied across the sample, all (excluding the abovementioned ‘community leaders’) grew 
up in strongly working-class neighbourhoods of Liverpool which have high levels of 
deprivation and unemployment. Thus, the thesis is by no means limited to a group of 
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educated, professional ‘élites’ – indeed the strongly Scouse inflection of many of the 
participants’ narratives of growing up in working-class Liverpool will be familiar to the 
city’s inhabitants. By more narrowly focusing on the second-generation, most of whom are 
now above the age of thirty, this thesis allows a fruitful examination of the diasporic 
tension of ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ as this group perhaps most clearly exemplifies the ‘dual 
orientation’ of diaspora (Werbner, 2010: 74). 
 
2.4 Ethical Considerations 
Many ethical issues arise in and from anthropological research due to human participants 
and activity being the primary source. Ethical considerations range from questions on the 
level and type of involvement the researcher should have during fieldwork, to questions of 
anonymisation and consent. As has been stated, a principal ethical consideration is that of 
overt versus covert research, with this study taking an overt approach as detailed. Another 
is that of harm, i.e. would the research (the process or publication of) pose risk of harm to 
the participants (or the researcher)?  Hammersley and Atkinson (2007: 214) note regarding 
potential harmful consequences of publication that ‘these can come about in a variety of 
ways and may affect both the public reputations of individuals and their material 
circumstances’. The implications of this and how gaining informed consent and 
(pseudo)anonymisation can partially mitigate such consequences will now be discussed. 
Many of the issues also require reflexivity regarding the field relations and positionality of 
the researcher. Of course, not all social research poses an equal level of risk or harm; an 
ethnography in present-day Yemen given the conflict and surrounding circumstances 
would be fraught with ethical issues and a high level of risk for serious harm to 
participants and the researcher. While the research questions and concepts addressed in 
this thesis could be considered sensitive (e.g. attitudes towards/perceptions of ethnicity, 
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religion, politics), the fieldwork period in itself did not pose any risk of harm in that the 
majority of the sites were ‘everyday’ places visited by a large number of people regularly, 
and additionally my presence in these places would not put others at risk. 
Before beginning fieldwork, it was necessary to gain ethical approval from the University 
of Leeds ethical committee (see Appendix 6). This process of gaining ethical approval was 
relatively involved requiring a significant amount of time to prepare and was in itself 
valuable in prompting me to consider the ethical issues of, or arising from, the research. 
The most important of these was ensuring participants were aware of the research and its 
aims before giving informed consent. Indeed, informed consent is in many ways an ethical 
issue central to social research as Hammersley and Atkinson note: 
It is often argued that people must consent to being researched in an unconstrained way, making 
their decision on the basis of comprehensive and accurate information about it; and that they 
should be free to withdraw at any time. (2007: 210) 
For interview participants, this was relatively straightforward. After making initial contact 
regarding the possibility of an interview, I provided potential participants with an 
information sheet (either via email or in person) giving a brief summary of the research, 
the types of questions I was likely to ask, and that they were free to withdraw at any time 
or to choose not to respond to questions during the interview.6  
Gaining informed consent for participant observation required a somewhat different 
process of negotiation, as many of the sites were attended by large numbers of individuals 
over the course of the fieldwork period, nor was there always a single, clearly identifiable 
‘gatekeeper’ making it impossible to inform every individual present of the nature of my 
                                                        
6 The information sheet (see Appendix 2) also highlighted that they could withdraw their data from the 
study as long as this occurred within three months of the interview, as it would then be anonymised, and 
therefore unable to be withdrawn due to removal of names and other identifying data from transcripts. 
 74 
attendance. My approach to maintaining transparency regarding the research, while also 
being aware that it would be impossible to inform every individual present at public spaces 
attended by large numbers of individuals, was to first seek consent from those likely to be 
gatekeepers, many of whom were also interview participants. After this initial consent was 
gained, I would introduce myself to others at the site with reference to my research, e.g. at 
the Arabic school I often had the chance to speak with the teachers who would regularly 
ask about my studies. Although my role at the Arabic school was that of an assistant 
teacher, none of the observations from this site were made regarding minors or indeed the 
behaviours or practices of any particular individuals. In many cases, the gatekeepers had 
informed others of my presence, but in other sites this proved more difficult given the 
circumstances. This was particularly so in the larger mosques where although I informed 
leaders and board members of my research, it would have been impossible to inform all 
congregants present for many reasons: the unpredictability regarding who would be 
present at any given time, the impossibility of speaking to each congregant given the 
numbers, and so on. This being the case, my approach was to inform those with whom I 
had direct conversation of my research. Nonetheless, these issues are perhaps less 
problematic than would appear in that my observations at such sites were not directed 
towards any specific individuals, behaviours, or institutional management and practices; 
but were rather directed towards gaining a clearer understanding of the surrounding 
context or ‘ambiance’ (Werbner and Fumanti, 2012) which diasporas create and inhabit. 
Reflecting on how notions of the ‘third space’ are often invoked as challenging state 
hegemony, Werbner and Fumanti (ibid.) highlight that the creation of ‘diasporic cultural 
milieus’ does not always represent a challenging of state hegemony, or other hegemonies, 
but rather:  
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In this respect, encapsulated diasporas are not concerned primarily to assert multicultural rights. 
They do not necessarily want to enter into a dialogue with the state. They do not only wish to 
challenge narratives of nation or try to insert themselves into them. Their (self) recognition 
happens in the sensually saturated spaces of community halls, family meetings, and devotional 
and religious events. (2012: 15) 
In this way, the fieldwork sites are not taken as objects of study per se, but present 
different ‘sensually saturated’ arenas in which to explore processes of ethnicisation and 
hybridisation in translocal Liverpool-Yemeni life. Although many illuminating 
conversations and interactions took place during the fieldwork period which add to the 
overall context and texture of the ethnographic material, for the reasons stated above, I 
have only included direct quotes from individuals who consented to one-to-one interviews 
and the use of verbatim quotes as stated on the consent form. 
Anonymity and confidentiality present the other main ethical consideration. It will first be 
useful to consider Walford’s (2018: 517-20) assertion that no ethnography in the digital 
age can ever guarantee complete anonymity, despite the (often) default assumption that all 
possible steps will be taken to ensure anonymity of participants and sites. This assertion 
rests upon Walford’s ease of identifying ‘anonymised’ sites from previous studies via 
online resources (cf. Yuill, 2018 for a similar case). Despite these concerns, a 
constructivist approach often relies on as full a contextual understanding as possible. 
Given the importance and salience of locality in this thesis, removing ‘Liverpool’, 
‘Toxteth’, ‘L8’ or ‘Lodge Lane’ would render much of the surrounding context 
meaningless. Nespor highlights this view, writing:  
It [non-anonymisation] requires us to rethink the very idea of sites, settings, and places and to 
see them as produced by as well as producing social relations. Anonymizing a place suggests 
that the identities and events that happen there float, so to speak, above or outside specific 
historical and geographical moments. (2000: 557) 
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Nonetheless, I have avoided directly naming specific research sites (other than the 
Liverpool Arab Arts Festival which is a public event) in connection to particular 
individuals or in the verbatim quotes of participants, instead replacing names of mosques 
and other institutions with anonymised ‘invented’ names, or using the more generic terms 
of ‘(multi)ethnic mosque’, ‘Arabic school’, and so on. As the research questions highlight 
that the focus is on how participants relate to these spaces in constructing identities and 
imagining ‘community’, rather than the specifics of the sites themselves, direct 
identification was felt to be unnecessary.  
Participants themselves have all been pseudo-anonymised. The question of anonymisation 
is perhaps now even more keenly felt given the recent introduction of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 in accordance with EU law, which has sparked a 
number of responses from anthropologists regarding how it may impact the field 
(Sleeboom-Faulker and McMurray, 2018; Dilger et al., 2018; Yuill, 2018). While ethical 
approval for this research was gained before the introduction of the GDPR, the process 
was nonetheless robust and covered Yuill’s points that:  
Complying with the GDPR and archiving anthropological research require a more thorough 
consent process, which must now detail exactly what participants are giving consent for and 
must encompass participation, personal data usage and future information usage by others. 
(2018: 37)  
Of course, the motives for seeking consent and maintaining transparency with participants 
are not only due to compliance with the GDPR, but have been a central ethical question in 
anthropology.7 The anonymisation of participants is now generally accepted as the default 
position (Saunders, Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2015: 618). While some scholars have 
                                                        
7 See Appendices 1-5 for Information Sheets and Informed Consent forms, which detail how the data is 
used and stored. 
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challenged this position this thesis agrees with Saunders, Kitzinger and Kitzinger (2015: 
618) in ‘the need for a contextually-contingent approach to anonymising data’.8 Giordano 
et al. (2007: 264-5) note that by maintaining anonymity as the default position, there is a 
risk of denying participants autonomy or obscuring their ‘voice’. Indeed, this is a question 
which arose several times through interviews, as some participants explicitly stated that 
they were happy to be identified despite the informed consent form noting that data would 
be pseudo-anonymised. I did, however, decide to pseudo-anonymise all participants as the 
default position due to this being stated on the information sheets and informed consent 
forms, as well as the use of verbatim quotes throughout.9 
 
2.5 Positionality and Reflexivity 
Hufford writes:  
Observations are all made from somewhere. This recognition may either lead to a pessimistic 
debunking of all knowledge, or it may help to rehabilitate and broaden our appreciation of the 
subjective. (1999: 294) 
This study takes the latter perspective. Since the reflexive turn of the 1980s in 
anthropology, considerations of one’s own positionality as researcher, often discussed in 
terms of the insider/outsider debate, are now commonplace. Knott (2005b: 246) writing 
within the frame of religious studies provides a useful diagram which illustrates the two 
extremes of ‘complete observer’ (outsider/etic) and ‘complete participant’ (insider/emic) 
                                                        
8 See Yuill, 2018, for a discussion on the implications of ‘unnaming’ participants, also Walford, 2005; 
Giordano et al., 2007. 
9 The informed consent forms alert participants to the possibility of self-identification via verbatim quotes. 
All interviews were digitally audio-recorded, except for one which was recorded by note-taking, and were 
saved onto a secure password-protected device without identifying information in the file name. After 
transcription, audio files were destroyed. Identifying material was removed from the transcriptions which 
were then associated with a pseudonym. In addition, I have chosen to further ‘split’ a group of potentially 
identifiable ‘community leaders’ into several pseudonyms to reduce the chance of identification with a 
single individual. 
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positionalities, as well as the possible intermediate points of ‘observer-as-participant’ and 
‘participant-as-observer’. Given that multiple positioned belongings are emphasised in this 
study, I also consider my own positionality as insider/outsider along several axes, not only 
the religious (Muslim vs Non-Muslim) but also the local (Scouse vs Non-Scouse), and the 
ethno-national (Yemeni vs Non-Yemeni). 
Both positionalities of ‘complete participant’ and ‘complete observer’ pose their own 
challenges and complexities when undertaking ethnographic research. As Knott (ibid., 
247) highlights, the case of Fatima Mernissi reveals that ‘complete participant’ 
perspectives can be complex and plural as although she is an ‘insider’ to Islam, her 
position as a scholar on Islam is ‘contentious’: ‘Although she has not received the training 
associated with the ulama, she draws on the same sources of authority, though 
emphasising different stories and offering variant readings’. (ibid. 248). Similarly, 
‘complete observer’ perspectives also pose methodological challenges, notably in that it is 
difficult ‘for even the most determined observers to remain uninvolved, impartial and 
scientific’ (ibid., 250). While my own positionality is, overall, closer to Knott’s (2005b: 
250) notion of ‘observer-as-participant’ in that as a non-Yemeni, non-Muslim I 
participated in various aspects of Liverpool-Yemeni life, I also emphasise various 
intersections between my identities and that of the participants. As this study is not an 
exploration of subjective ‘religious experience’ or particular beliefs, I stress multiple 
positionalities which at times intersect, and at others differ.  
As a Liverpudlian from a working-class neighbourhood, this identity was shared with the 
Liverpool-born participants who make up the majority of the sample. Within this category, 
I am a ‘complete participant’. In many ways, this shared pool of knowledge was an 
advantage in that I was already familiar with the neighbourhoods in question, the overall 
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landscape of Liverpool, Scouse colloquialisms, and other aspects of Liverpool life which 
participants discussed. I am, however, an ‘outsider’ to the categories of ‘Yemeni’ and 
‘Muslim’. This necessarily means relying on observations and participants’ emic accounts 
which are placed in dialogue with the scholarly, etic understandings. My identity as a non-
Yemeni, non-Muslim also made my presence in certain spaces more conspicuous, 
particularly in religious spaces. In several instances, due to my knowledge of Arabic, it 
was assumed that I was either partly of Arab heritage, or, wishing to convert. Although I 
informed all individuals that neither was the case, having knowledge of the Arabic 
language and an interest in the Arab world proved to be a useful starting point for many 
conversations. It also allowed me to contribute a service in an Arabic school as a volunteer 
assistant/teacher such that my observer-as-participant role meant I could ‘give something 
back’. Although the categories of ‘Yemeni’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘Scouse’ are the most salient 
points of reference in this study, they represent only a number of the many positionalities 
social actors possess – as has been highlighted, one’s gender identity can have significant 
impacts on which spaces can be accessed (see also Dessing, 2013, for discussion regarding 
how one’s age can also impact negotiations of access). 
The above has highlighted the complexities of positionality, particularly in the context of 
this thesis which takes multiple positioned belongings as its primary object of study. 
Positionality understood here cannot be adequately described by a single perspective; 
instead I have emphasised remaining attentive to context and the various ways in which 
identities can intersect and differ. In brief, although this thesis is by no means an auto-
ethnography, my own identity and experiences as a Liverpudlian have shaped this study 
and the types of question it is asking; but the emphasis is nonetheless on the multiple 
voices of second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis. Such an approach concurs with 
Werbner’s notion of ‘dialogic identities’ that  
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the dialogical necessarily alludes to a far more pervasive condition of sociality and cultural 
creativity through argument than that which the individual encounter across cultures can 
capture. (2002a: 8) 
 
2.6 Analysing the Data 
Transcripts of interviews and fieldwork notes constituted the primary data for this study. 
An iterative process to analysing the data was employed. This allowed me to consider the 
data alongside theory, emerging themes, and developments during the fieldwork period. 
No specialist software was used to analyse the data. Instead, all transcripts and notes were 
continuously read and referred to throughout the process. I employed a ‘manual’ form of 
coding, in which transcripts and fieldwork notes were highlighted and relevant 
quotes/sections selected according to several themes which correspond to main concepts of 
the research questions. These themes can be broadly stated as: ethnicity and its cognates 
(language, kinship); translocality, the ‘nation’ and ‘community’; Liverpool, L8 and the 
neighbourhood; and religious identity.  
These themes will all be seen to emerge in participants’ narrations of identity, but identity 
itself is also situated and performed in various places, spaces, and events while also being 
informed by, and forming, part of broader discourses. Thus, the approach to analysing the 
data is informed by Werbner’s (2002a: 7) view that ‘It is only by analysing specific social 
situations…that we can grasp the contingency of culture and identity’. While the iterative 
process of data analysis has meant drawing from a range of theories and bodies of 
literature to explore these specific social situations, historical and contemporary, the 
overall approach was to place individual narrations and embodied cultural performances in 
dialogue with discourses and social imaginaries of culture, ‘community’ and 
(trans)locality. Although ‘discourse’ and ‘social imaginaries’ can be mutually constitutive, 
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it is useful to distinguish them conceptually. Discourse here is understood in Baumann’s 
terms of dominant/demotic discourses of ‘culture’ and ‘community’: 
Where the dominant discourse views ‘culture’ as the reified possession of ‘ethnic’ groups or 
‘communities’, the demotic  discourse questions and dissolves this equation between ‘culture 
ethnos and community’. (1997: 209) 
Or, on a more fundamental level, the dominant discourses of ‘culture’ are those which 
dominant institutions and bodies employ, while the demotic reflects the everyday 
negotiations which are often more ambivalent, complex, and multifaceted than the 
dominant allows for.  
The concept of ‘social imaginaries’ draws upon Taylor’s (2004) and Werbner’s (2013a) 
use of this term. Taylor writes that: 
I speak of imaginary because I’m talking about the way ordinary people “imagine” their social 
surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms…the social imaginary is that 
common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of 
legitimacy. (2004: 106) 
While discourses of culture are constructed, contested, and employed strategically and 
tactically by institutions and individuals, social imaginaries speak to the pervasive 
attachments to localities (physical or otherwise) which are always not easily discussed in 
terms of a specific discourse. Although Liverpool-Yemenis are the focus of the research, it 
is also important to note Jacobsen’s (2010: 106) point from a study on Muslim youth in 
Norway that diasporic social imaginaries can also include ‘trans-ethnic communities that 
are imagined within, rather than across, the boundaries of the nation state’. Indeed, 
Toxteth’s multi-ethnic character will be seen to be an important element in articulations of 
second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni identities, sometimes more so than a narrowly 
Yemeni ‘community’. Participants’ narrations and fieldwork observations are thus 
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analysed with respect to the specific social situations out of which they arise, the 
dominant/demotic discourses of culture and ‘community’, and how these reflect social 























Chapter 3:  Liverpool, Yemen, and Liverpool-Yemenis in Context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter historically and socially situates Liverpool-Yemenis by exploring the existing 
relevant literature, thus providing necessary context for the following ethnographic 
chapters. It is divided into three sections: the first introduces Liverpool and Scouse 
identities, the second introduces salient aspects of Yemen’s history and its social 
imaginaries, and third looks more closely at Yemeni migration to Britain. 
 
The first section introduces Liverpool, focusing on its history as a port city, subsequent 
immigration, and the resulting sectarianism to give a clearer picture of the context in 
which a ‘Scouse’ identity can be seen to emerge, and into which context Liverpool-
Yemenis also arrived. It pays particular attention to the construction of non-white 
identities in the city. The history of Islam in Liverpool and Abdullah Quilliam (himself a 
white convert) as a notable figure, as well as the more local histories of Toxteth which has 
long been associated with the city’s non-white groups are also considered. Locality-
making in the context of Liverpool is framed as ‘oppositional’, often being constructed and 
articulated ‘against’ the nation-state, highlighting what has been termed ‘Liverpool 
exceptionalism’ (Belchem, 2006a, 2006b).10 
 
The second section introduces Yemen with a focus on two main currents which run 
through Yemeni discourses of nationalism: one with a focus on Yemen as representing an 
ethno-national social imaginary of a unifying ‘locality’ which draws upon its unique 
                                                        
10 Credit must also be given to Belchem, whose book Irish, Catholic and Scouse (2007) provided inspiration 
for the title of this thesis. 
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geographic and historic position within the Arabian Peninsula, its integral role in the 
advent of Islam, the role of genealogies and hierarchies, and the shared cultural-linguistic 
heritage; and another which focuses on the North-South divide, sectarian differences and 
the political make-up of Yemen with reference to Aden and the surrounding region’s 
experience of British colonialism. It also contextualises the more specific areas of 
emigration or areas of particular relevance to Liverpool-Yemenis (Radā’, Malāḥ, al-Baydā, 
Aden) as represented in the data sample. While religion plays a central role throughout 
much of Yemeni history, this chapter also historicises Islam in the Yemeni context to 
move away from the notion of Islam and Muslimness as forming a single, monolithic bloc. 
The current ongoing conflict in Yemen is also outlined, while noting that such a conflict 
inevitably contains many contingencies and therefore the outline presented here does not 
cover events which occur after the time of writing (2019). 
 
After establishing the local contexts and histories of Liverpool as the place of immigration, 
and Yemen as the place of emigration, the third section looks at the available literature on 
British-Yemenis. Yemeni migration to Britain is described as having occurred in two 
waves: pre-world war and post-war, as well as a possible third wave. Given the relative 
lack of literature on British-Yemenis, and the almost total absence of any works dealing 
with Yemenis in Liverpool in particular, the chapter will also draw upon studies which 
highlight similar themes from other British-Muslim diaspora groups.  
 
Thus the overall thrust of the chapter is to historicise and contextualise ‘Scouse’, 
‘Yemeni’, and ‘Muslim’ identities and the related locality-making processes, again 
drawing upon Bauman in comprehending that:  
sociological hermeneutics demands that the continuous and changing aspects of life strategies 
alike be traced back to the social figurations they serve (in a dialectic process of reciprocal 
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3.2.1 Liverpool: A Port City 
 
A useful starting point for discussion of Liverpool is the notion of ‘Liverpool 
exceptionalism’ (Belchem, 2006a), which highlights the unique position Liverpool and its 
history occupies in the broader context of the UK (see Belchem’s works on various aspects 
of historical and contemporary Liverpool, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2014). Of course, 
beginning with such a notion may belie my own experiences and perceptions as a 
Liverpudlian, but it is a sense which has nonetheless been echoed by participants in this 
study, and by others more generally. While much of Liverpool’s history is not unique in 
global terms, there are certain elements particular to the Liverpool (or more broadly, 
Merseyside) context which set the city somewhat apart.11 My aim here is not to 
demonstrate that Liverpool exists wholly outside of the UK context, but rather to highlight 
a set of histories and contingencies which are either unique to, or, have arguably had a 
much greater impact upon Liverpool than elsewhere. Brown (2005: 147) in her 
ethnography of Black Liverpool writes: ‘Liverpool never occupies a middle position on 
any scale through which British society is understood. The precise means through which 
Liverpool is made to exemplify Britain also sets the city apart from it.’ 
  
                                                        
11 i.e. port cities with high levels of immigration which develop their own distinctive identities is not in itself 
a unique phenomenon, as will similarly be seen in discussion of Aden. 
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This understanding allows the thesis to then explore how the resulting context has shaped, 
or been shaped by, Liverpool-Yemenis. In brief, the main contributing factors to 
‘Liverpool exceptionalism’ explored here can be summarised chronologically in terms of 
the history and high prevalence of recusancy in South-West Lancashire post-Reformation, 
Liverpool’s involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, high levels of immigration 
(particularly from Ireland but also China, Africa, and the Caribbean), sectarianism, the 
development of the Scouse accent and identities, the political climate of Liverpool 
(particularly Toxteth, see map in previous chapter) during the 1980s, and more recently 
Liverpool’s Capital of Culture 2008 award and the ensuing urban boosterism. Despite 
there being much written about each of these individual topics, there appears to be no 
single published comprehensive history of Liverpool (Pooley, 2008, although Belchem’s, 
2006, edited volume Liverpool 800 has remedied this somewhat), and much less regarding 
the history of its non-white inhabitants despite their long and established presence (see 
Frost, 1996, 2000, 2011; Uduku, 2003; Brown, 2005 for discussion of Liverpudlian Black 
identities, also Bunnell, 2016 for the Liverpool-Malay diaspora). 
 
It will be worth noting at this point that I use the terms ‘Scouse’ and ‘Liverpudlian’ 
interchangeably. While ‘Liverpudlian’ is a more neutral term, ‘Scouse’ is more value-
laden and has sometimes been used derogatorily by non-Liverpudlians or can perceived as 
such when used by non-Liverpudlians. Despite this, ‘Scouse’ is the more usual and 
colloquial term of self-designation for those from Liverpool, and therefore as both I and 
the participants frequently use it in this manner, my usage of it here reflects this. 
Nonetheless, the association of ‘Scouseness’ with whiteness has been mentioned by Frost 
(1996, 2000, also explored in an unpublished thesis by Peschier, 2018) who highlight that 
representations of ‘Scouseness’ do not typically include the city’s non-white groups. While 
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this is the case on a representational level, this thesis seeks to explore how everyday 
Liverpool-Yemenis creatively combine ‘Yemeniness’ and ‘Scouseness’, thereby 
demonstrating how the lived reality of ‘Scouseness’ is not a homogeneous form of white 
working-class Liverpudlian culture/identity.12 Instead, I draw attention to how it is 
(re)constructed alongside positioned belongings, such as Yemeni and Muslim, returning 
again to Baumann’s (1996) notion of demotic discourses which occur below the ‘radar’ of 
official or highly public-facing representations. This is not to say that Liverpool-Yemenis 
or other non-white Liverpudlians do not face marginalisation or are excluded by others 
from the category of ‘Scouse’, but rather that framing ‘Scouseness’ narrowly as only 
referring to a white working-class identity ignores that ‘Scouse’ as a unique identity itself 
arose during or shortly after a period of intense migration (Crowley, 2012: 87).13 
Therefore, at their root, Scouse identities have an element of hybridity comprising of 
multiple groups and the subsequent intermingling. Seen this way, it is difficult to discuss 
Scouse identities without also acknowledging their hybrid nature. Thus I challenge the 
assumptions of ‘Scouseness’ as equating to white working-class culture and instead argue 
that ‘Scouse’ is best understood as a broad label within which multiple positionalities are 
contained, albeit all sharing an attachment to the social imaginary of Liverpool. Any 
discussion of Scouse identities must take into account the various and intertwining 
histories from which they emerge. Indeed, even within white working-class Scouse 
identities, divides can be seen e.g. along sectarian (Catholic and Protestant) lines, although 
                                                        
12 Peschier’s (2018: 93) unpublished thesis explores Liverpudlian identity as represented in twelve theatre 
plays in the city, only one of which is reported to have had a non-white actor in a major role. More recent 
developments may also suggest that greater representation is being partially achieved due to projects such 
as the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival with a largely Liverpool-Yemeni board, and an increased number of 
BAME councillors. 
13 Crowley (2012) notes that interest in the distinctive Liverpudlian varieties of English began to grow from 
the late 1800s (corresponding with the influx of Irish immigrants), before when it was typically described as 
a rather un-noteworthy variety of Lancashire and/or North-West Midlands speech. Surprisingly, Crowley 
(2012: 63) also notes that although the cultural category of Scouse was established, the term did not gain 
widespread usage until the 1950s. 
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less so nowadays, along geographic lines within the city (Northender vs Southender), 
along linguistic lines (particular dialectal features), and so on. The important point here is 
that Liverpool-Yemenis (re)create Scouseness in ways both similar and dissimilar to other 
Liverpudlians. Therefore, the thesis also adds to the literature by examining new dynamics 
of the construction of non-white Scouse identities. 
 
The purpose of the following brief overview of Liverpool’s history is to foreground the 
production of locality as ‘relational and contextual’ (Appadurai, 1996: 178). This again 
highlights that although the cross-border or transnational aspects of diasporas are often 
emphasised, the notion of the glocal concerned with reimagining the local in terms of the 
global is equally as important. In essence, this section first highlights locality on the scale 
of the city in which Liverpool-Yemenis are embedded, before discussing more narrowly 
the neighbourhood of Toxteth while also being aware of the broader national contexts 
which are necessarily implicated in a relational understanding of locality-production. 
Naturally, many of the histories and contexts involved in this production of locality 
occurred long before the arrival of Yemenis, but given that production implies a process, 
the presence of a diaspora embedded in a certain locality itself generates a new context. 
For a diaspora group, locality takes on an even more complex role as both the ‘lived’ 
locality (i.e. Liverpool/Toxteth and all its implied associations) and the localities of the 
homeland are negotiated, interwoven, and separated. In other words, translocality cannot 





3.2.2 Liverpool Exceptionalism 
 
I argue that the core of ‘Liverpool exceptionalism’ is essentially a form of locality 
production characterised by its various histories being positioned relationally against or in 
comparison to the broader narratives of English national history. For Appadurai, this 
oppositional nature is perhaps always present in productions of locality on the scale of 
‘neighbourhood’, but his point below can also be applied to Liverpool as a city region.  He 
writes:  
Neighbourhoods are ideally stages for their own self-reproduction, a process that is 
fundamentally opposed to the imaginary of the nation-state, where neighbourhoods are 
designed to be exemplars of a generalizable mode of belonging to a wider territorial imaginary.  
(1996: 191) 
 
The point here is that Liverpool (at least since its rapid growth throughout the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries) has been positioned both by the dominant, outside and demotic, 
inside discourses as somehow apart from other English cities, resulting in a social 
imaginary which is in some ways ‘exceptional’. Its physical geography facing the Irish Sea 
almost directly across from Dublin, and its imagined position within national discourses 
locate Liverpool at a geographical and metaphorical fringe of the ‘nation’. Of course, 
locality can operate on various scales and therefore this section will first consider the city 
as a whole, and then Toxteth as a sub-locality.  
 
While the history of pre-eighteenth century Liverpool may seem to be of little significance 
given that the city owes much of its current state to the major role it played in transatlantic 
slavery (Morgan, 2007:15), I would like to highlight that elements contributing to 
‘Liverpool exceptionalism’ can be traced back further by looking at the context of South 
West Lancashire in the post-reformation period. The predominance of Catholicism in 
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Liverpool and surrounding regions is often attributed to the influx of migrants from Ireland 
escaping the famine conditions, leading to a rapid population growth throughout the mid to 
late 1800s.14 While this is certainly the main contributing factor to Liverpool’s association 
with Catholicism and one aspect of the city’s history which sets it apart, the existence of 
large numbers of recusants in the vicinity of Liverpool (making up the majority in some 
areas) predating the Irish influx should not be overlooked (cf. Blackwood, 1976; Haigh, 
1981).15 Taking this into account, it can be argued that the ensuing and entrenched conflict 
between anti-Catholics and recusants began to lend the Merseyside region a distinct 
dynamic which was less pronounced or absent elsewhere in England. 
 
Although the region was characterised by its entrenched recusancy, Liverpool itself does 
not appear to have been of major importance until its rapid growth in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Honeybone (2008: 112, Table 1) illustrates the growth from a 
population of approximately only 690 in 1561, to 493,405 by 1871.  Belchem (2007: 30) 
notes that by 1841, the Irish-born population was 49,839, or 17.3% of the population, and 
by the 1870s this had risen to a reported 180,000 or just over one third of the population, 
most of whom  were reported as engaged in some form of 'unskilled manual labour' (ibid., 
39). This is important to note as the majority of migrants who arrived in the city were 
labourers rather than ‘cosmopolitan élites’ (although Belchem’s, 2007, study does also 
reveal that not all Irish arrivals were unskilled labourers) thus contributing to Liverpool’s 
strongly working-class demographics. It was also during this period of rapid growth that 
migrants from elsewhere began to arrive in Liverpool primarily due to their employment 
                                                        
14 Morgan (2007: 15) notes that between 1801 and 1807, slave ships leaving from the Mersey accounted 
for 79 percent of the total leaving Britain. 
15 Blackwood (1976: 1) notes: ‘apart from Monmouth, Lancashire was the most Catholic shire in 
seventeenth- century England, and that in response to the challenge from Rome Puritanism gained in 
strength between 1600 and 1642’. He (ibid) notes: ‘In 1643 a Parliamentary newspaper portrayed 
Lancashire as a region where a small Puritan population struggled heroically against hordes of 'papists'.’ 
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aboard ships. Brown (2005: 19) notes regarding the early twentieth century that ‘Shippers 
based in Liverpool and other ports also hired Afro-Caribbeans, Lascars, Chinese, Liberian, 
Arab and Somali seamen in large numbers’ while also noting the difficulty in specifying 
how many settled in Liverpool. Indeed, as the following sections will discuss, Yemenis do 
not appear to have settled in Liverpool in any significant amount until the late twentieth 
century. 
 
3.2.3 Sectarianism in Liverpool 
 
Although sectarianism arising from the presence of recusancy in the region has a long 
history, it took a different trajectory following the large influx of Irish escaping the trauma 
of the famine between the years 1845-9 and its aftermath (Neal, 1988: x). Indeed, Belchem 
(2007: xii) notes that the dynamics of sectarianism changed greatly in that ‘Irish and 
Catholic became synonymous in Liverpool, an ethno-sectarian formulation which served 
to exclude the considerable number of Protestant migrants’. The impacts of this 
sectarianism have been long-lasting, as Neal (ibid., ix) highlights:  
Anyone born and raised in working-class Liverpool in pre-slum clearance days could not fail to 
be aware of religious differences within that society and, in many instances, these had 
deleterious consequences for friendships and families (1988: ix).16  
 
This sectarianism can be summarily described as stemming from continued animosities 
between Irish Catholics and Orange Protestants leading to periods of sectarian violence 
and conflict, ultimately producing sub-localities within Liverpool divided along these lines 
(see Crowley, 2012: 115-43 for further discussion, also Belchem 2007: Chapter 2 for ‘The 
Spatial Dimensions of Irish Liverpool’). Despite this, sectarian conflict and violence has 
                                                        
16 The slum clearances began in the late 1960s continuing through the early 1970s. 
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largely disappeared from Liverpool although many still continue to identify with their 
(Irish) Catholic or (Orange) Protestant heritage. It is, then, unsurprising that Liverpool 
during the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was variously portrayed as a 
prospering hub of international trade, and, a city characterised by its sectarianism and poor 
living conditions – both of which set it apart in the popular imagination. 
Although tempting as it may be to imagine a cross-ethnic working-class solidarity existing 
between the Liverpool-Irish and other groups in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, it seems that an Irish identity did not necessarily mean extending sympathies to 
those of other ethnicities, as exemplified by the observation that towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Irish-dominated north end of the city ‘had become no-go territory 
for blacks.’		(Belchem, 2005: 151). Therefore, although ‘Scouse’ as a relatively recent term 
typically refers to a city-wide form of identity, a closer and more nuanced examination 
reveals that various localities below the city-wide scale were being produced, each 
according to its own histories and contingencies, albeit many sharing the common 
experience of migration.  
 
3.2.4 Abdullah Quilliam 
Another significant aspect of Liverpool’s Victorian-era history is the figure of Abdullah 
Quilliam (1852-1932), a Liverpudlian convert to Islam formerly known as William Henry 
Quilliam, who founded the Liverpool Muslim Institute and British Muslim Association 
(Geaves, 2010: 3).17 Geaves’ (2010) book-length study Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life 
and Times of Abdullah Quilliam, alongside others such as Gilham and Geave’s (2017) 
                                                        
17 Geaves (ibid.) notes that this was two years before the opening of the Woking Mosque, and ‘there is no 
doubt that the first attempt to promote Islam publicly from within a mosque and an Islamic centre in 
Britain took place in Liverpool over the following twenty years’. 
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edited volume Victorian Muslim: Abdullah Quilliam and Islam in the West, provide a 
thorough account of Quilliam’s life and activities which need not be reproduced in full 
here. Rather, I would like to highlight that Islam in Liverpool (as with many other aspects 
of the city’s history) has a rather unique story which has only recently resurfaced on a 
larger scale, as evidenced by the increasing number of studies on Quilliam and the re-
opening of the Liverpool Muslim Institute in 2007 (see Gilham, 2015; Gilham and Geaves 
eds., 2017; Kindermann, 2019).  
Geaves (2010: 131) describes Quilliam as the first ‘multiculturalist’, noting that ‘He was 
not a new migrant struggling to overcome economic and class disadvantages, but a highly 
respected and successful lawyer belonging to the city’s elite class’ who became recognised 
as ‘the Sheikh al-Islam of Britain’ by the Ottoman Sultan (ibid., 75), thereby placing him 
in a much more influential position to advocate on behalf of the city’s Muslim population. 
While Quilliam’s congregations were likely largely made-up of the city’s seafaring men 
arriving from the Arab world and Pakistan, it is notable that Quilliam reportedly oversaw 
the conversion of over 500 British men (ibid., 6) leading to what has been termed 
‘Britain’s first indigenous Muslim community’ (Gilham, 2015: 39). Although Quilliam’s 
efforts and the founding of the Liverpool Muslim Institute enabled the flourishing of Islam 
in Victorian Liverpool, after his death the Institute closed and there is little to suggest a 
direct continuation between Muslim migrants (including Yemenis) who settled in 
Liverpool several decades later and Quilliam’s legacy. Indeed Gilham (2015: 37) writes 
that after Quilliam’s death ‘lacking an institutional base, the majority of Liverpool 
converts appear to have either lived out their days as nominal Muslims or drifted from 
Islam’. Nonetheless, in line with the growing interest in Liverpool’s Muslim heritage, the 
Abdullah Quilliam Society acquired the Bougham Terrace premises in 2005, which was 
home to Quilliam’s Liverpool Muslim Institute, and, re-opened in 2014 as a mosque with 
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plans for further renovation (Gilham 2015: 39). Geaves (2010: 284) notes that ‘the Mosque 
and Islamic Centre at Bougham Terrace remain a ruin after many years of service as 
Liverpool’s Registry of Birth, Marriages and Deaths.’ This is, however, no longer the case 
as my fieldwork visits to mosque were greeted by a renovated and fully-functioning prayer 
hall, as well as ambitious renovation plans for a wuḍū’ area (used for ritual purification) 
and a restoral of the Victorian-style kitchens.  
Before looking more closely at Toxteth in the next section, it is worth considering that 
despite Liverpool’s recent history being so closely bound up with Irish immigration, 
‘Irishness’ in Liverpool has largely been absorbed into the fabric of the city, now most 
explicitly visible through its expression in Catholic churches, schools, and the Liverpool 
Irish Centre. The decline in consciously asserted Irish identities in Liverpool has been 
attributed in part to the miserable inter- and post-war socio-economic conditions, increased 
scrutiny of the Liverpool-Irish during the years leading up to and following Ireland’s 
independence, post-war slum clearance, and perhaps most importantly that ‘the Liverpool-
Irish slummy, emblematic of the Liverpudlian struggle against adversity, misperception 
and misrepresentation, came to be inscribed as the prototypical ‘scouser’.’ (Belchem, 
2007: 11). This trajectory of ‘Scouseness’ seen through a more diaspora-oriented lens 
would suggest, then, that a Scouse identity is firmly rooted in the diasporic experience, 
albeit having now largely cast off its diasporic attachments and becoming reconfigured in 
the social imaginary of Liverpool. Indeed the production of a (white) Scouse identity can 
be described in terms of how the multicultural triangle and the ensuing tensions have 
unfolded in a diaspora context: ethnicity (Irish vs. English), nationhood (Ireland vs. 
England), religion (Catholic vs. Protestant). 
 95 
This being the case, I argue that although (white) ‘Scouseness’ with its roots in the Irish 
diasporic experience has become the mainstream or even normative one, it is not the only 
one. This recalls the point that diaspora and its associated identities is processual, 
continuously negotiating a myriad of histories and reimagining itself. The following 
section will therefore look at Toxteth more closely given that this is the area of the city 
with the greatest concentration of Yemenis, as well as a particular set of histories closely 
connected to non-white Scouse identity- and locality-making. I will then discuss why the 
Scouse accent can be considered a powerful identity marker which transcends ethnic and 
religious differences.  
 
3.2.5 Toxteth 
Nationally, Toxteth (more often known simply as L8 locally) is perhaps best known for a 
series of riots which took place there in 1981, garnering much media attention (see Butler, 
2020, for an analysis of 496 newspaper articles on the topic). This lead to the popular 
image of Toxteth as a lawless inner-city ‘racial hotspot’ in a city already facing high levels 
of deprivation and stigmatisation (Uduku, 2003: 126). First, however, it will be useful to 
consider Toxteth during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As has been 
suggested, the high levels of migration to Liverpool during this period led to various areas 
throughout the city being divided along ethnic or religious lines, with the north end being 
predominantly Catholic and Irish. The south end, where Toxteth lies, was where the 
majority of the city’s black population and, to a lesser extent, other non-white ethnic 
groups settled. The image of this area as a ‘no go’ zone, distinct from elsewhere in the city, 
was already firmly in place by the early twentieth century. Belchem (2007: 59) reports that 
the local Catholic press from the early twentieth century ‘sought to redirect the critical 
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public gaze [from the poor living conditions of the Irish northern end of the city] to 
“darker” aspects of urban morphology in the south end of the city’.  
While the Irish migration to Liverpool was precipitated by the famine, migration from 
elsewhere (particularly West Africa, the Caribbean, China, Malaysia, and Yemen) during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was predominantly characterised by seafaring men 
employed aboard ships arriving in Liverpool and subsequently settling (Belchem, 2007: 
316; Boland, 2008: 357). Brown (2005: 1-3) recounts that although Toxteth (or L8) later 
became a synonym for ‘Black people’, one of her participants emphasised that the early 
seafaring community was actually centred around Pitt Street, slightly outside of what is 
usually considered Toxteth.18 Nonetheless, Toxteth became an area characterised, and set 
apart, by its divided yet heterogeneous nature and which became increasingly important as 
a site of locality making for the Liverpool-born black community.19 Toxteth today is still 
an area of contrasts and diversity which provide visual clues to its history – wide 
boulevards and grand houses attest to Liverpool’s prosperous past, with adjoining narrow 
streets of tightly-packed terraces evoking the working-class history of the area. While the 
area still has a Liverpool-born Black presence, more recent demographic developments 
have led to visible changes in Toxteth: the Granby area once associated strongly with the 
Liverpool-born Black community is now characterised by its Somali and Middle Eastern 
inhabitants (see Uduku, 2003: 141 for fuller discussion on demographic changes in the 
Granby area).   
 
                                                        
18 The area around Pitt Street is still, however, home to Liverpool’s China Town. It is also no coincidence 
that a nearby street is named ‘Jamaica Street’. 
19 Brown (2005) further demonstrates how locality operates on various scales, as within Toxteth particular 
neighbourhoods such as Granby were identified as significant to constructions of Liverpool-born black 
identities. 
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The Toxteth riots themselves were almost universally portrayed negatively, emphasising 
the area’s ‘criminality’ and social problems without addressing the underlying causes. 
Butler (2020: 1) notes that in her analysis of many hundreds of articles on the riots, less 
than ten percent featured Liverpool-born black voices. This dominant discourse has been 
challenged in particular by scholars such Brown (2005), Frost (2011) and Butler (2020) 
who reveal through the residents’ voices how the riots were motivated by the socio-
economic hardships and lived realities of those from the area. The discourse of the riots 
framing Liverpool-born Blacks as causing unnecessary disruption in the region has also 
met with strong criticism, as Brown notes: 
 
Black people’s pent-up anger over everyday forms of racism as well as their second-class 
citizenship was directed at the police, for being both perpetrators of racist abuses and visible 
embodiments of the state. And as in other demonstrations, here, too, Blacks and Whites joined 
in common cause against the police.20 (2005: 65) 
 
The extent to which Liverpool-Yemenis participated in the riots is unclear, although 
Halliday (2010: 55) notes that 'the Yemeni shops were largely left alone'. Yemeni 
participation in the riots notwithstanding, it is contextually important that Toxteth was 
already a focal point in the construction of non-white Scouse identities before any 
significant number of Yemenis settled in the area. Toxteth plays a complex and 
multifaceted role in relation to Scouse identities and locality making – it is at once set 
apart culturally from other Liverpool regions, while simultaneously representing a highly 
localised microcosm of Liverpool’s migrant and class histories. While authors such as 
Frost (2000: 214) clearly demarcate ‘Black’ and ‘Scouse’ identities, writing ‘Black 
                                                        
20 Brown (ibid.) traces the eruption of the riots to the attempted arrest of a young Liverpool-born Black 
man amidst the general atmosphere of frustration and anger which had been building in the area, resulting 
in three days of intense riots in which several buildings were burnt down. Uduku (2003: 126) notes there 
were also riots in the area in 1973 and 1985. 
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identity in Liverpool has historically been created by a number of processes, including the 
exclusion of black people from ‘Scouse’ identity and the positive assertion and 
construction of black identity by the community itself’, I agree with Boland’s (2010: 13) 
counter point that in more recent years ‘Frost’s generalization that Scouse is exclusively 
White is not universally held amongst different ethnic groups in the city.’ The role of 
Toxteth in the construction of non-white Scouse locality and identity is, therefore, 
multifaceted and ambivalent. Indeed, Frost and Catney (2019: 7) have more recently 
emphasised the role of the multi-ethnic landscape of Toxteth in the formation of identities, 
noting: ‘Alternative narratives from interviews with residents emphasised belonging as 
rooted in a history and culture around diversity and local struggles that imbued a strong 
sense of pride of place.’ The idea that Toxteth has become re-imagined as multi-ethnic 
locality in which diverse friendships and solidarities take place, particularly since the 
demographic shifts of the late 1990s and 2000s, will be returned to throughout the 
ethnographic chapters. The particular legacy of multicultural and ‘race relations’ policies 
in the aftermath of the 1981 riots will be considered more closely in Chapter 5 which 
explores Yemeni-led ‘community’ building. The rise of a dominant discourse of 
‘Liverpool Cosmopolitanism’ amidst efforts to rebrand the city from the mid-2000s 
concurrent with the European Capital of Culture award alongside national agendas such as 
‘Community Cohesion’ will also be seen to impact the trajectory of Yemeni-led 
‘community’ building in Toxteth. 
 
3.2.6 Language and Locality 
Having briefly surveyed important moments of Liverpool’s history with reference to the 
construction of Scouse identities, this section will consider the role of the Scouse accent as 
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a salient marker of Scouse identities, white and non-white. Belchem (2006a: 33) notes 
‘Their [Scouse] identity is constructed, indeed it is immediately established, by how they 
speak rather than by what they say.’ Many of the processes involved in creating Scouse 
identities are inextricably linked with the city’s working-class history such that the Scouse 
accent can be considered to index a working-class background (see Grant and Grey eds., 
2008). Nonetheless, Boland (2010: 8) notes that despite its working-class connotations, 
Scouse itself contains various nuances such as ‘Posh Scouse’ or ‘Scally Scouse’. Accent, 
or dialect, is thus an important aspect of locality and identity production, as Keating (2015: 
249) notes that: ‘People create a sense of localness through certain forms of speech and 
ways of speaking dialects or language varieties.’  
The direct link between local varieties of a language and specific locations is, however, 
increasingly blurred in the globalising age as transnationalism and translocality give rise to 
complex multilingual environments. It has also been noted that younger speakers in many 
European countries are now using less distinctively regional forms of language (ibid.). 
This is not the case for Scouse which remains an important (if not the most important) 
marker of Scouse identity with some studies suggesting that it is ‘getting Scouser’ 
(Rookwood, 2012: 99; see also Grant and Grey eds., 2008) There is also evidence to 
suggest that rather than declining in usage or distinctiveness, the Scouse accent is 
influencing or even displacing the accents of younger generations in peripheral towns such 
as Ormskirk, concurrent with the positive rebranding of Liverpool and ‘Scouseness’ 
(West, 2015, unpublished thesis, Accent variation and attitude on the 
Merseyside/Lancashire border). 
Given Liverpool’s history, it is not surprising that the Scouse accent stands out markedly 
from its surroundings – indeed, it rapidly disappears as one moves not even 20 miles 
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outside of the city. Boland (2010: 6) highlights the importance of Scouse in constructions 
of Scouse identities which are often defined along accent-lines by those from within the 
region, making a clear geographical ‘Scouse’ region difficult to define as the accent is not 
only confined to the relatively recently created Liverpool City Council region. Brown’s 
(2005) work also highlights that Liverpool-born Black participants consider the Scouse 
accent an important marker of identity, e.g. she quotes a participant who says: ‘We only 
know one language, that’s Liverpudlian’ (ibid., 157). As the production of the social 
imaginary of Liverpool has been framed as oppositional to other ‘English’ or ‘British’ 
localities and identities (and indeed echoes as such by several participants as seen in the 
ethnographic chapters), the continued strength and importance of the accent in Scouse 
identities can also be said to operate similarly.  
 
3.2.7 Liverpool the Signifier 
As identity is constructed through a range of social processes and experiences, including 
language, it is clear that multiple Scouse identities exist within the city and to suggest there 
exists a single unified form of ‘Scouseness’ would ignore the often highly-localised 
dynamics and histories through which non-white Scouse identities are constructed. At the 
same time, however, it is important to acknowledge shared experiences and histories on 
the city-wide scale. That is to say, the city region and Scouse identity are often not 
perceived as subsets of an overarching British identity (although the national context 
nonetheless exerts influence as locality is produced relationally), but are placed in direct 
opposition to it by both the dominant and demotic discourses – a clear example being the 
‘Scouse Not English’ banners at many football games. Similarly, Rookwood (2012: 100) 
highlights that ‘Particularly during Thatcher’s conservative governance, many amongst the 
local population came to feel a sense of alienation, increasingly defining their local Scouse 
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identity against Englishness.’ Such an oppositional framing is, however, not completely 
unique to Liverpool as England’s North-South divide is also often expressed similarly. 
Nonetheless, the unique histories of Liverpool also set it apart somewhat from the rest of 
England’s ‘North’, as Frost summarises thus:  
it can be distinguished by the facts that it did not share the same industrial history as many other 
northern towns…that ‘Scouse’, the local vernacular, is not north-sounding, and that, unlike its 
northern neighbours, there was little domestic internal migration, most of its ‘immigrants’ 
coming from outside (2000: 196) 
My point is, then, to highlight that in Liverpool ‘place’ is experienced and constructed 
with a particular intensity for many people, standing in an uneasy relationship with the 
‘nation’. I argue that it is this relationship to the social imaginary of Liverpool which 
allows the notion of ‘Scouse identities’ rather than ‘a’ Scouse identity; each constructed 
out of its own unique histories, but nonetheless sharing an intense connection to the 
signifier ‘Liverpool’. Brown’s (2005) ethnography demonstrates this, in that constructions 
of locality in Liverpool which emphasise (and arise out of) its ‘apartness’ are also drawn 
upon by Liverpool-born Blacks, leading her to conclude (rather dramatically) that: 
Perhaps the people of Liverpool do not live in a city after all. Rather, they seem to live in an 
elaborate signifier. In contrast to Britain, evoked through the white cliffs of Dover, Liverpool’s 
physicality is satanic (perhaps like its people?). Liverpool is a place apart. (2005: 130) 
 
The notion of the particular (and oppositional) social imaginary of Liverpool, and its 
importance as a broad ‘signifier’ not limited to only one ethnic group or set of histories 
will be a theme running throughout the ethnographic chapters. While ‘oppositional’ 
Scouse identities reflect demotic, often highly localised, discourses and articulations, this 
is not to say that Liverpool exists outside of the nation. Indeed Belchem’s (2014) study 
Before the Windrush: Race relations in  20th-century Liverpool highlights pervasive 
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experiences of racism and exclusion of non-white Liverpudlians which were not only due 
to local factors, but must also be placed in the national context of ‘Britain’s uneasy (and 
incomplete) transition to a post-colonial (and post-industrial) multi-cultural society’ 
(Belchem, 2014: xviii). Thus this section has highlighted that the role of the state in 
Liverpool has, since the city’s dramatic growth and high levels of immigration, also been 
characterised by confrontation of ‘difference’ – initially marginalised, Liverpool-Irish have 
become incorporated into the nation-state and in many ways came to represent the 
dominant and/or normative ‘Scouse’ identity. This process was not unproblematic, 
however, as the ‘oppositional’ nature of Scouse identities attests to the ambivalent 
relationship between Liverpool and nation. Belchem (2014) and others such as Frost 
(2000, 2011) highlight that for the city’s non-white inhabitants, national ‘racial ideologies’ 
contributed to further and longer-standing forms of marginalisation and therefore ‘The 
apparent uniqueness of Liverpool has to be seen in the wider contexts of national and 
international influences’ (Frost, 2000: 196). This being the case, Chapter 5 in particular 
considers how the more recent national agendas of ‘Community Cohesion’ and ‘Prevent’ 










3.3.1 Yemen: Arabia Felix and its Social Imaginaries 
Ethnographic studies which explore innumerable facets of contemporary life in the UK are 
abundant, the same is not true for Yemen, however. Now considered one of the poorest 
parts of the Arab world with an especially tumultuous history throughout the last 
millennium, and currently facing a conflict with devastating impacts, it nonetheless 
occupies a unique place geographically and historically in the Arabian Peninsula. Conflict 
and political turmoil have undoubtedly limited ethnographic research in the region, but a 
number of scholars have contributed to a body of literature which allows a glimpse, albeit 
somewhat fragmented, into everyday Yemeni lives. While much of the literature on 
Liverpool cited in the above section resonated on a personal level given my own 
experiences, this section relies entirely on the literature, guided by participants’ own 
articulations, to contextualise Yemen. Nonetheless, I would like to highlight that an 
overarching sense of Yemen as a unique yet often overlooked corner of the Arab world 
emerges from this literature. Although I am wary of over-stating both Liverpudlian and 
Yemeni ‘exceptionalism’, Bidwell (1983: 7) notes regarding pre-Islamic Yemen that ‘For 
a brief while it appeared that Yemeni particularism might prove too strong to accept a faith 
from outside its own borders’, highlighting Yemen’s historical and geographical 
separateness from elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula shortly before Islam was fully 
embraced. Dresch (1989: 1) also notes ‘Until recently, Yemen was distinguished from the 
rest of the peninsula by mountain ranges and by its place in the Arabic tradition, not by the 
boundaries of nation-states’. 
While the above section is firmly rooted in Liverpool as a city region, given that this 
research began without prior knowledge of which parts of Yemen would become salient, 
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this section now provides an overview of some important aspects of Yemen’s history and 
position in the Arab world before looking more closely at Radā’, Malāḥ and Aden – 
regions which were particularly significant to Liverpool-Yemenis. While a more narrowly-
focused social history of Radā’ (which represents the main region of emigration among the 
sample of participants, discussed in the next section) would be beneficial, the very limited 
amount of literature on this region means a broader focus has been taken in this section. 
The main themes discussed here nonetheless emerged as relevant to the ethnographic 
chapters and analysis and will be discussed further in the relevant chapters alongside the 
ethnographic material. 
As Yemen is one of few parts of the peninsula which, owing to its geography and 
topography, support agriculture to an extent not found further north (Varisco, 2009: 382-
3), it has a rich civilisational history pre-dating Islam; so much so that the Romans gave 
the area the epithet ‘Arabia Felix’ (Happy Arabia) due to its prosperity. Yemen is also 
often credited with being the ‘birthplace of the Arabs’, a statement which many 
participants also echoed, and although it may not be entirely accurate, the early history of 
the Arabs invariably includes Yemen as an important location (Dresch, 1989: 3). In short, 
according to Arab genealogies, Arabs ultimately descend from the semi-legendary figures 
of Qaḥṭān or ‘Adnān, with Qaḥṭān being considered ‘the father of Yemen’. (Dresch, 1989: 
3). Mahoney, writing on the construction of genealogies in medieval South Arabia, 
highlights the importance of the Arab genealogical tradition, noting: 
Genealogy was a key concept and practice for the wider tribal community of Arabia in the early 
medieval period. Its diverse manifestations offered a distinct view of the deep past through 
constellations that structured the relationships among the various nomadic and sedentary groups 
who resided in the broad expanse of the peninsula. (2016: 165) 
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Of course, ascertaining the veracity of such genealogies (nasab in Arabic) which 
emphasise an essentialist notion of an Arab ethnicity reaching into the ancient past is not 
the question in focus here; rather I include it to demonstrate that Yemen within the Arab 
historical tradition occupies a specific position. From one angle, such genealogies can be 
understood as powerful forms of (ethnic) boundary-making within an Arab context which 
seek to fix boundaries in the remote past via a form of biological determinism, but which 
are nonetheless constructed, (re)produced and continually reasserted as part of the lived 
present (Mahoney, 2016; see also Nevola’s, 2015, unpublished ethnographic thesis). 
However, while some accounts suggest that Yemenis are able to recite their entire 
genealogy dating to the early or even pre- Islamic period, Dresch highlights that this is not 
the case, thereby emphasising how these genealogies are creatively re-imagined to situate 
the present in the past, and vice-versa: 
The men of the tribe speak of themselves as “from one forebear” (min jadd wāḥid)…Men do 
not, on the whole, take this idiom to describe personal descent…The idiom of shared ancestry is 
not elaborated with detailed descent lines, and it is unusual to meet a tribesman who can, 
without consulting old land-deeds and the like, name any more distant forebear than his great-
grandfather. (1989: 78) 
Relatedly, social hierarchy in Yemen has also received scholarly attention, with Bidwell 
(1983: 2) writing ‘The social stratification, which was almost a caste system, also 
survived…practically intact’, locating its origins in the Himyarite period. Furthermore, 
Nevola’s (2015) unpublished ethnographic thesis on social hierarchy in Yemen 
demonstrates that individuals continue to link their personal genealogies to these macro-
genealogies of Qaḥṭān and ‘Adnān, highlighting how they are used to (re)produce and 
legitimise the division of labour. The next chapter considers when or how Liverpool-
Yemenis draw upon these genealogies and social hierarchies in articulating Yemeni 
identities and whether such genealogically-based systems of hierarchy have any bearing on 
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the Liverpool context. As these genealogies are highly culturally-embedded, holding little 
meaning for people unfamiliar with Arab history, they represent a form of an ethno-
national imaginary which, given their nature as describing and re-imagining social 
relationships, can only continue to hold relevance if a diasporic consciousness is present. If 
diaspora entails connections to people and places elsewhere, then placing oneself firmly 
within such a genealogy despite birth or residence outside of Yemen can reveal the extent 
to which Liverpool-Yemenis negotiate strategies of identity articulation in maintaining a 
diasporic consciousness and/or how such constructs may lose relevance or adopt new 
meaning. 
It will now be useful to briefly discuss the trajectory of Islam in Yemen which forms an 
important part of its social imaginary. It is worth noting that although Yemen’s geography 
separates it somewhat from the peninsula, South Arabian tribes had active trading 
connections with tribes further north, including the Quraysh of Mecca, the Prophet 
Muhammad’s own tribe, before the arrival of Islam. So much so, that King notes: 
While the painted decoration of the Ka’ba covered much or all of the interior of the building, 
the exterior was without paintings, adorned instead with the kiswa, a cloth cover. Its origins are 
said to be Yemeni, the first kiswa brought to Mecca by the Yemeni Tubba’ Asad Abu Karib 
Himyari some time before the advent of Islam (2004: 220) 
I emphasise this point as unlike areas which were conquered or embraced Islam later, 
Yemen was already embedded in and formed part of the continuum of the social networks 
in the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula, the context out of which Islam arose (see also 
Bashear, 1989, Yemen in Early Islam: An Examination of Non-Tribal Traditions). The 
region also contributed significant amounts of its population to newly conquered areas of 
the Islamic world, e.g. Bidwell (1983: 7) notes ‘parts of the Hadhramawt were almost 
depopulated: families claiming Yemeni origins may be still be found on the Atlantic coast 
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of Morocco’.21 Nonetheless, after the rapid expansion of Islam which led to it becoming a 
dominant force across much of the Middle East, North Africa, Iran and South Asia, and as 
the centres of political power moved further from the central-southern part of the Arabian 
Peninsula, Yemen became regarded as ‘a distant province of the vast Arab Empire’ (ibid.).  
The religious landscape in Yemen today is characterised by the existence of a roughly 
equal number of Sunni (of the Shāfī’i madhhab in particular) and Zaydi Muslims 
(Salmoni, Loidolt and Wells, 2010: 285). The divide is not even throughout the country, 
however, with Zaydism being concentrated in the North and Sunni Islam in the South (see 
also Vom Bruck, 2010; King, 2012).22 
Despite this split, Dresch (1989, 2000) has noted that Yemen’s main axes of divide rarely 
centre on theological or purely sectarian disputes, but are more clearly due to competition 
of resources as evidenced by a long history of incursions from the northern (and majority 
Zaydi) arid parts of the region into the more agriculturally-rich regions of the central and 
southern highlands resulting in animosity and mistrust (Dresch, 1989: 11-12). Dresch 
(2000: 6) notes that ‘the natural ecologies of these regions [the Zaydi north and Sunni 
south]…are different, and the relation of ecology to power is perhaps a key’. A more 
thorough discussion of the implications of the contemporary landscape of Islam in Yemen 
will be discussed alongside the ethnographic material in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                        
21 Ḥaḍramawt is located in the Eastern half of Yemen with a long history of emigration. It will be seen to be 
significant in Chapter 6. 
22 This split originates in Islam’s early history as part of the broader Sunni-Shi’i divide stemming from 
disputes over succession after Muhammad’s death. Summarily, Zaydism is distinguished from Sunni Islam 
and other Shī’a sects by the belief that: ‘the son of the fourth Imam was the true successor based on his 
argument that the Imamate can be claimed by any descendant of Ali and Fatima who is pious, learned and 
who comes out openly to make his bid’ (Geaves, 2010: 28).  
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3.3.2 The North/South Divide and Colonial Aden 
While the social imaginary of Yemen outlined above is rooted in the region’s ancient past 
with discourses stressing Yemenis’ shared cultural and genealogical histories, Yemen’s 
more recent histories of nation building are complex, conflicted, and contested. Although 
Wedeen (2008: 25) notes that this social imaginary (or ‘imagined unities’ in her words) 
was drawn upon particularly from the 1920s in various Yemeni nationalist movements, 
there were ‘processes leading to the formal creation in the 1960s of two separate and 
independent nation-states’ (ibid., 27). Therefore it is important to place these ‘imagined 
unities’ in the context of Yemen’s pervasive North/South divide.  
Between the rise of Zaydism in the ninth century until Britain’s occupation of Aden in 
1838, Yemen was ruled by various dynasties contesting for power with Zaydi rule 
becoming increasingly solidified in the north with smaller dynasties ruling in the south, 
although both were marked by continuous clashes and conflict. While Upper and Lower 
Yemen already had apparent divergences due to the differing geographies, availability of 
resources, religious splits, and political situations by the time of British colonial rule, 
Cause (1988: 34) notes that ‘British Colonialism in South Yemen, dating from 1839, 
created and solidified the political split between North and South Yemen’. Nonetheless, 
Upper and Lower Yemen were not necessarily felt as entirely separate entities due to the 
common cultural and linguistic background(s) shared by the Yemen region as a whole. 
This highlights that despite political dis-unity, there were ‘Important historical antecedents 
to Yemen’s twentieth-century “imagined unities”’, including the mention of Yemen in the 
Qur’an, ḥadīth, and its overall location and conception within early (South) Arabian 
history. (Wedeen, 2008: 25) 
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The British ‘rebranding’ of Aden as a commercial port city dramatically altered its course 
as it moved from a cluster of small villages, to a major urban centre with nearly 150,000 
inhabitants by the mid twentieth century (Carapico, 1998: 23). The Aden Protectorate ‘was 
the only place in what is now called the Arab world to have been governed as part of the 
Bombay Presidency and the government of India, a status that it held until it was 
transferred to the British Colonial Office in 1937’ (Willis, 2009: 24). Indeed, Willis (ibid.) 
goes as far as to characterise colonial Aden as being far more closely aligned to India in 
terms of the politico-legal system and its incorporation into the Indian colonialist project.23 
Aden, with a newly imposed legal system and increasingly policed borders designed to 
prevent migration from the hinterlands (Wedeen, 2008: 29), developed an identity not 
shared with the wider Yemen region.24 This is important as it will be seen in the following 
section that while the majority of Yemeni migration to Britain occurred via Aden due to it 
being a colonial metropole, most Yemeni migrants were not Adeni themselves. Bujra 
(1970: 191) notes that Aden’s large non-Arab population consisting mostly of other 
commonwealth citizens (i.e. Muslim Indians, Pakistanis, Iranians, Egyptians and Somalis) 
were absorbed into an Adeni identity, adopting ‘all the diacritical marks and style of life of 
the Adenese’. Nonetheless, it will be seen that North Yemenis who migrated to the UK via 
Aden largely did not adopt Adeni identities. 
                                                        
23 While the Aden-India connection was certainly identified as a strategic trade route by the British, it is also 
important to acknowledge that the connection between Yemen and India pre-dates colonial rule as the 
ports of al-Mukha and Surat were linked by the coffee trade (Willis, 2009: 23).  
24 Wedeen (ibid.) notes ‘The Aden Act of 1864, in turn, created a court system, inspired by Indian legal 
procedures, restricting religious laws to issues of inheritance and personal status.’ The hinterlands refer to 
the British authorities designating Aden as separate from the surrounding region  
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Ultimately, after escalating tensions and a growing sense of nationalist sentiments 
resulting in the Radfan Uprising in 196725, Yemen was split into two states: the Yemen 
Arab Republic in the North and the People's Republic of South Yemen, which included the 
former Aden Protectorate.26  
In brief, the important points of this section thus far are: a) the existence of a social 
imaginary or ‘imagined unities’ of Yemen which look towards the region’s (semi-
mythologised) past in creating discourses of unity, b) a political and geographic divide 
most clearly exemplified in the creation of the North and South Yemeni States while 
noting other intersecting lines of division, and c) the colonial history of Aden and its 
distinct cosmopolitan, port-city milieu. The majority of Yemenis in Britain arrived prior to 
the unification of the two states in 1990, and it will be seen that the contested national 
histories of Yemen remain an important factor in considerations of a Yemeni ethno-
national ‘community’ in Liverpool. The following section provides a brief outline of post-
unification Yemen and the impact of the current crisis. 
 
3.3.3 Unified Yemen: A State in Crisis 
Discussion of Yemeni national politics in the post-unification (post-1990) period 
inevitably notes the pervasive instability and the far from smooth transition to unification; 
this is encapsulated in the title of Phillip’s (2011) book Yemen and the Permanent State of 
Crisis. A thorough examination of the history and political context behind the unification 
                                                        
25 This uprising was the culmination of the emergence and development of nationalist sentiments in South 
Yemen throughout the 1960s, with parallels elsewhere in the Arab world, ultimately resulting in the South 
achieving independence from Britain.  
26 Phillips (2008: 45) notes that Egypt's pro-republican stance aided South Yemen in achieving 
independence. The Yemen Arab Republic in the North was established several years earlier in 1962 after a 
revolution which overthrew the Zaydi Hamid al-Din Imamate. Unlike the South Yemeni state (a self-
proclaimed socialist state), the Yemen Arab Republic was 'a system of theocratic, hereditary, and absolutist 
rule, with the Imam controlling all aspects of judicial, administrative, and legislative authority' (ibid. 43).   
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of the two Yemen’s cannot be covered here; rather the point I wish to highlight is modern 
Yemen’s condition as a conflicted state. Thus the starting point of discussion of an ethno-
national Yemeni ‘community’ in this thesis recognises that: 
political order in Yemen is characterized by the systematic involvement of multiple non-state 
actors. The Yemeni state has never had the ability to enforce rules or held a monopoly over the 
means of violence based solely on rational-legal logics in any part of Yemen. Its statehood, in 
other words, has historically been a ‘limited’ one. (Clausen, 2018: 562) 
 
To highlight, president Ṣāliḥ of unified Yemen (previously president of the North Yemen 
Arab Republic) retained power for over thirty years, from unification until his ousting in 
2012. Furthermore, Wedeen (2008: 70) notes that ‘northern’ control of the unified Yemen 
became solidified, leading to oppositional groups questioning Yemen’s ‘ornamental 
democracy’. After unification, civil war broke out in 1994 primarily due to unresolved 
North/South disputes and animosities, some of which are now resurfacing in violent 
struggles for power.  
 
The current situation in Yemen is bleak. Lackner (2017: 33) notes ‘By mid-2017 Yemen 
faced total humanitarian disaster, its first famine since the 1940s and the world’s worst 
cholera epidemic’, and at the time of writing (late-2019) the situation has not greatly 
improved. Beginning in 2010 and continuing with increasing intensity, Yemen 
experienced a wave of demonstrations and protests which called for the resignation of the 
president ‘Alī Abdullāh Ṣāliḥ (ibid., 35). Similar protests and uprisings were seen 
throughout the Arab world in 2011, giving rise to what has been termed the ‘Arab Spring’. 
While the Arab Spring led to periods of intense political conflict and uncertainty in 
countries such as Egypt, the impacts of which are still tangible, for Yemen, 2011 marks the 
beginning of what was to become a devastating conflict. By 2015, the 2011 protests had 
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escalated into what can only be described as a ‘civil war dramatically worsened by 
international intervention’ (ibid., 33, for a fuller overview of the situation see Brandt, 
2013; Juneau, 2016; Brehony, 2015; Kendall; 2019, see also Darwich, 2018, for Saudi 
intervention in Yemen). 
 
The current conflict in Yemen means recognising that the national status of a unified 
Yemen is still very much in dispute, with older and more entrenched north/south, tribal, 
political, sectarian and personal alliances and disputes continuing to resurface in response 
to the ever-changing political climate; now with consequences which have embroiled 
Yemen into an international geopolitical contest, as Brehony outlines:  
The Saudis were reported to be supplying money and arms to tribes in Mahra, Al-Jawf, Shabwa 
and Hadhramaut from January 2015 to counter the Huthi advance. This suggests that Riyadh 
and its coalition partners will seek to stir up and exploit tribal groups in many parts of Yemen to 
fight the Huthis – with the help of Saudi Arabia and its allies. (2015: 246) 
This section has emphasised two main points which will be drawn upon in the 
ethnographic chapters: any discussion of national Yemeni identities or ‘communities’ are 
necessarily challenged by the turbulent histories of pre- and post-unification Yemen and 
the lack of strong national institutions, and that the current conflict has now taken on a 
global dimension. The role of Saudi Arabia in the current conflict as well as the historical 
and geographic connections between Saudi and Yemen are of particular note as it will be 
seen how participants variously assert Yemeni identities against what is perceived as Saudi 
antagonisms, contemporary and historical.  
For Liverpool-Yemenis however, the current conflict is not only a distant or abstract 
geopolitical contest. The scale of devastation, loss of life, and causalities must be 
highlighted, the impacts of which are felt across the Liverpool-Yemeni population. A 
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report made by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(UN OCHA) in 2019 highlights the severity of the situation: 
An estimated 80 per cent of the population – 24 million people – require some form of 
humanitarian or protection assistance, including 14.3 million who are in acute need. Severity of 
needs is deepening, with the number of people in acute need a staggering 27 per cent higher 
than last year. Two-thirds of all districts in the country are already pre-famine, and one-third 
face a convergence of multiple acute vulnerabilities.27 (UN OCHA, 2019: 4) 
 
 
3.3.4 Yemen and its Diasporas 
Emigration from Yemen is not a new phenomenon, but a fundamental and characteristic 
aspect of Yemen’s history with roots in pre-Islamic times. The North and Western parts of 
Yemen have historically been orientated towards the Red Sea and the Mediterranean as is 
evidenced through historic trade links, the appearance of Yemeni mythical figures in the 
Bible, and indeed the Roman epithet of ‘Arabia Felix’ (Thiollet, 2014: 268).   
In contrast, the South-Eastern half of Yemen, Ḥaḍramawt in particular, is orientated 
towards the Indian Ocean, as is evidenced by the Ḥaḍrāmī diaspora. Ḥaḍrāmīs are noted as 
playing ‘a prominent role in proselytisation from the fifteenth century AD onwards’ 
(Alatas, 1997: 29) in and around Malaysia, with a resulting diasporic identity centred on 
the legacies and experiences of migration.28 Ḥaḍramawt will be seen to be of importance 
in the Liverpool context in Chapter 6 due to its importance as a centre of Yemeni Sufism.  
                                                        
27 Available from: https://yemen.un.org/en/11690-yemen-2019-humanitarian-needs-overview 
28 Ḥaḍramawt continues to occupy a distinct place in terms of culture and identity within Yemen owing to 
its early implication in migratory networks. Thiollet (2014: 267) notes: ‘Between 1914 and 1945, around 30 
per cent of Hadramaut’s population lived in India, Singapore, Indonesia or East Africa, and the island of Java 
was home to 70,000 Yemeni residents.’  
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In the more recent context, labour migration from Yemen has been examined by scholars 
such as Birks, Sinclair and Socknat (1981) and Chalcraft (2011) who focus on ‘oil 
migration’ of Yemenis to Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Gulf states in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Others such as al-Jumly and Rollins (1997: 39) have noted the 
cultural expressions arising from Yemen’s experience with migration, writing ‘emigration 
and its attendant alienation and dispossession had become a dominant theme in Yemeni 
poetry in response to harsh social and economic conditions’. Not only is Yemen’s history 
so closely bound up with emigration, but immigration to Yemen has also played a 
significant role, particularly from the Horn of Africa. Somali migration to Yemen is 
noteworthy as Toxteth is now also home to a sizeable Somali population (see Uduku, 
2003), many of whom are in frequent contact with Yemenis or have themselves lived in 
Yemen. Betts (2013: 160) notes that Yemen ‘hosts an estimated 220,000 Somalis’, many 
of whom arrive in Yemen as a ‘transit country’ or gateway to the wider Middle East and 
Europe  
It is notable, and a remarkable conjunction of contingencies, that the long-standing shared 
connections between the people of Yemen and the Horn of Africa now also find 
themselves within the same neighbourhood of Liverpool. In light of this history, the more 
recently established Somali population alongside Yemenis in Liverpool does not represent 
an entirely new dynamic, but is rather one which was already present within Yemen and is 
now being (re)produced in a new context. The following sections will now look more 
closely at Yemeni migration to Britain, with section 3.4.6 examining the main areas of 




3.4 Yemenis in Britain 
 
3.4.1 Yemeni Migration to Britain: An Overview of the Literature  
 
Despite Yemenis being present in the UK since at least the nineteenth century, there is 
only a small body of work which discusses the early migrations and settlement of Yemenis 
in the UK. Studies looking at contemporary contexts are even fewer. It is unsurprising then 
that British-Yemenis have been dubbed an ‘invisible community’ in the literature. 
  
In summary, there are four book-length studies which focus on different aspects and areas 
of British-Yemeni life, with the historical conditions of migration and the early 
experiences of British-Yemenis being predominant. Halliday’s Arabs in Exile: Yemeni 
Migrants in Early Britain (1992, second edn., 2010, renamed Britain’s First Muslims: 
Portrait of an Arab Community) provides a broad account of the history of Yemenis in the 
UK up until the 1980s. This is not an ethnographic account, however, as personal 
narratives detailing everyday Yemeni culture, life and identities were largely not covered, 
focusing instead on the organisational structures, e.g. religious, political, and ‘community’ 
organisations. Lawless’s (1995) From Ta’izz to Tyneside gives a detailed history of 
Yemenis in South Shields, ultimately painting a rather bleak picture for the continuity of a 
British-Yemeni identity in South Shields, as ‘the Arab population and their descendants 
have gradually “dissolved” into the general population of South Tyneside’ (ibid., 245), 
citing reasons such as the loss of life during the Second World War, a lack of further 
Yemeni migration to the region, and high levels of intermarriage. Turning to Sheffield, 
Searle’s (2010) From Farms to Foundries, using life-story narratives, focuses on the 
former Yemeni steelworkers in Sheffield highlighting injustices and racism faced by these 
men throughout their careers. More recently, Seddon’s (2014) The Last of the Lascars 
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gives a broad history of Yemenis in the UK, with a focus on how British-Yemenis are 
becoming more ‘visible’.  
In addition to these book-length studies, there are also several articles and unpublished 
theses which relate to British-Yemenis. Seddon’s (2010) article discusses aspects of 
British-Yemeni-Muslim identities in Eccles in the post-migration context, framed against 
studies which in which ‘identity constructions are viewed almost entirely through the 
prism of the migration process’ (ibid. 558). This article perhaps comes closest in its subject 
matter to this thesis, asking similar questions regarding ‘religious, cultural and national’ 
identity constructions, and therefore deserves some attention. The article concludes that: 
Clearly, being a British Yemeni is not simply a hybrid or hyphenated identity experience, and it 
cannot be expressed or represented through generalizations or approximations based on 
dominant discourses on minority ethnicities and cultures. This study has observed that what it 
actually means to be a ‘‘British Yemeni Muslim’’, beyond the collective aspects of communal 
identities, is usually expressed as a personal experience, an individual narrative or as a new 
‘‘Britishness’’ of the new Britons. (ibid., 569) 
Although this article is useful in presenting rare ethnographic material on contemporary 
British-Yemeni identities, it is limited by its length and lack of clarity in several aspects. A 
clearer distinction between the categories and scales of ‘nation’ versus ‘locality’ would 
have allowed more nuanced insights, as Seddon at once asserts new forms of British 
identities, while also noting that ‘this research indicates that a regional or local identity is 
more pronounced and assimilated than any notions of ‘‘belonging’’ to a British national 
identity’ (ibid., 566). Although the article mentions that generalisations based on dominant 
discourses cannot be made, ‘the Yemeni community’ and ‘British-Yemenis’ are frequently 
invoked as a single group without reference to the specific histories of migration and local 
context of Eccles. While I agree with Seddon in that a study of the second-generation or 
the ‘post-migration’ period opens news avenues and challenges notions of reified 
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‘Yemeniness’ or ‘Britishness’, I also recognize the importance of situating these within 
(but not only) the historical context of the migration process. Additionally, as much as 
being a ‘British-Yemeni-Muslim’ is a personal experience, this is not to say that the 
construction of these multiple positioned belongings cannot shed light on broader 
dominant and demotic discourses of culture and ‘community’, their interrelatedness with 
productions of locality, and the surrounding social imaginaries in which they are 
embedded.  
An early article on British-Yemenis is Dahya’s (1965) Yemenis in Britain: An Arab 
Migrant Community which provides a brief overview of Yemeni migration to Britain 
touching upon motivations for migration and elements of religious life in the UK. C. 
Searle and Shaif (1991) have also published a dialogic article in which Searle interviews 
Sheffield-Yemeni, Shaif, discussing many of the themes which are elaborated in K. 
Searle’s (2010) book (Searle, 2010).  
Nagel and Staeheli (2008, 2010) have also published articles regarding Arab activism in 
the UK. In their 2008 study, several Liverpool-Yemenis were interviewed alongside other 
British-Arabs, leading to their conclusion that:  
Interviewees consistently reason that British Arabs cannot engage in a meaningful exchange 
with British society unless their culture—their practices, beliefs and outward appearance— is 
recognized and positively evaluated. (2008: 425)  
These findings again hint at the ‘invisible’ nature of British-Arab communities in that 
recognition and representation of ‘Arab’ culture in the broader public sphere is lacking, 
and indeed several of the activists in their study state that one motivation for their activism 
is ‘to raise awareness of Arab issues partly in terms of fostering an alternative 
understanding of Arabs and the Arab and Muslim world to a wider British audience.’ 
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(ibid., 426). They (ibid.) emphasise a shared British-(pan-)Arab identity across the UK 
centred around social networks, consumption of Arabic products, and shared interest in 
Arab political causes. While Nagel and Staeheli’s studies are illuminating, the broad pool 
of participants from within the category ‘Arab’ across localities and the particular 
emphasis on ‘activists’ may lead to rather different conclusions from a study such as this 
with a narrowly local focus on ‘everyday’ or ‘ordinary’ subjectivities. There is also a need 
to recognise that in such a fine-grained study, the label ‘British-Arab’ could misleadingly 
imply a sense of intra-Arab connections across the whole ‘British-Arab’ population. 
 Finally, a number of studies on British-Muslims such as Ansari’s (2004) ‘The Infidel 
Within’ do mention Yemenis, albeit briefly and with much of the same historically-focused 
material that Halliday (1992) presents.  
This section has highlighted the lack of literature on British-Yemenis: not only are there 
very few works on the subject, but Yemenis are also largely absent within the broader 
literature on British-Muslims, and more narrowly, within the literature on Liverpool.29 
Thus this thesis aims to address this gap while being cognisant of the contexts and scales it 
addresses: what can be said regarding Liverpool-Yemenis may not hold true elsewhere. 
Further, locally-focused, studies in other cities with a sizeable Yemeni population such as 
Birmingham, Sheffield, and Cardiff are necessary before any comparative analysis can be 
made, and a body of such studies would enrich discussion of diaspora and Islam in the UK. 
Indeed, given that much literature on ‘British-Muslims’ and British-Muslim identity is 
rooted in the South-Asian context, this thesis provides an alternative and sometimes 
                                                        
29 A striking example of this lack can be found in Uduku’s (2003) chapter Ethnic Minority Perspectives in 
Reinventing the City: Liverpool in Comparative Perspective, which focuses on Toxteth with reference to the 
Black, Somali, and Chinese communities, while Yemenis are afforded only a single passing mention (ibid., 
130). Indeed, even Frost and Catney’s (2019) study on multi-ethnic L8 makes no mention of Yemenis or 
Arabs. 
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contrasting view of how such identities are constructed. The following section will now 
look at the histories of Yemeni migration to Britain before exploring the data available on 
Yemenis in Liverpool. 
 
3.4.2 The First Wave 
 
The first wave of Yemeni migration to Britain is characterised by Yemeni men being 
employed aboard ships leaving from Aden to the UK, and subsequently settling in port 
towns. Migration to the UK began in the late nineteenth century, when 'many Arabs took 
up employment as stokers and donkeymen on British vessels...and formed communities at 
places like Liverpool, Manchester, South Shields, Hull, Cardiff and London' (Dahya, 
1965: 180). Seddon (2014: 61) notes that 'Lascars' (an earlier term used for sailors coming 
from Aden and other Eastern ports) have been present in London since the 1780s. Lawless 
(1995: 10) also gives an account of a sailor having settled in South Shields as early as 
1894.  
 
Given Aden’s Protectorate status, only Adenis were considered British subjects and hence 
able to gain employment, but there was nonetheless a large migration to Aden from within 
Yemen for this same purpose (Lawless, 1995: 32). Yemenis from the Northern highlands 
were attracted by opportunities for employment and Arab sailors were able to gain 
employment on British ships from this port. Dresch (2000: 10) reports that in 1890 ‘half of 
Aden’s population was Arab, mainly from Ḥugariyyah and al-Baydā’. Al-Baydā’ will be 
seen to be an important area of emigration in the following sections.  
 
Lawless (1995: 41) notes that ‘the vast majority of Arab seamen at South Shields claimed 
to have been born at Aden and therefore to be British subjects...In fact very few Arab 
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seamen were born in Aden'. Dahya (1965: 181), recalling the earlier point that Aden had 
developed a unique identity, makes a distinction in his article between the 'Adenese' and 
the 'Yemenis', but he does not state whether the participants themselves made use of such a 
distinction. Although it is unclear whether 'Adeni' vs. 'Yemeni' was perceived as a 
meaningful distinction amongst Yemenis at the time, Lawless (1995: 249) notes that the 
early seafaring migrants would primarily identify themselves with one of the major tribal 
groupings, i.e. Shamiri, Jubani or Dalali before 'Yemeni'.30 Demonstrating an apparent 
distancing from tribal-based identity, Shaif (a Sheffield-Yemeni) says in the published 
dialogue between himself and Searle (1991: 78) that ‘we always saw ourselves and our 
identity as simply Yemeni. We came from the same country with the same culture and 
language, the same religion, family structure and attitudes.’ This again recalls the point 
that despite Yemen’s political disunity, the social imaginary of a ‘single’ Yemen is one 
which finds its origins in Yemen’s remote past and continues to be employed in demotic 
articulations. 
 
Other characteristics of this first wave are that it was exclusively men who settled, many of 
whom would return to Yemen periodically and thus maintained a 'sojourner mentality'. 
Many of this first wave of migrants eventually returned to Yemen, although a number also 
moved elsewhere in the UK during the 1980s due to high unemployment (Halliday, 2010: 
135). Those who remained and did not find employment elsewhere are reported to have 
been living off pensions in houses shared with other men who had presumably lost contact 
with their families (ibid., 53). Liverpool does not feature prominently in accounts of the 
first wave of Yemeni immigration.  
                                                        
30 The notion of the ‘tribe’ or qabīla, as discussed earlier with reference to genealogy and kinship, will be 
discussed alongside the ethnographic material in the following chapter.  
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The characteristics shared between early Yemeni and South Asian migration to the UK are 
not overlooked by Halliday in a recent addition (2010:134) to his original 1992 study. The 
'sojourner mentality' of both groups was present, particularly among the seafaring men 
who viewed their time in the UK as temporary. Both groups were also initially 
characterised by their being employed in jobs at the very bottom of the industrial hierarchy 
(Halliday, 2010: 136). The sojourner mentality appears to have persisted for longer among 
the seafaring Yemeni men. Although Islam was a uniting feature for Yemenis and South 
Asians in some respects, Halliday (2010: 137-138) finds that a fissure occurred along 
ethnic lines, with particular brands of Islam travelling from the village or region of origin. 
British-Yemenis, nonetheless, were relatively homogeneous in being largely Shāfī'ī, with 
the charismatic Sufi leader al-Ḥakīmī playing a major role in influencing the development 
of different forms of Islam in British-Yemeni life (ibid., 138). The role of Yemeni-based 
Sufism in Liverpool will be examined more closely in Chapter 6. 
 
3.4.3 The Second Wave 
 
The second wave of migration from Yemen occurred during the post-war period when 
demand for labour in factories was high, especially during the 1950s in the industrial 
North. This was further motivated by migration to Aden given its position as a booming 
port-city in the 1950s and as a gateway to employment in Britain (Halliday; 2010: 61).  
While a form of ‘chain migration’ linking the first wave to the second would seem likely, 
it appears that no strong link between the two waves can be established. The earlier 
seafaring group did not appear to have forged or maintained strong links to the later 
arrivals of this second wave. Dahya (1965: 180) notes that 'The earlier migrants who spent 
long periods at sea were denied the fellowship of their migrant countrymen and corporate 
group life'. In this way, despite the seafaring forebears, it will be seen that it was the 
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second wave of migration which largely paved the way for future generations of British-
Yemenis. A small number of participants did note, however, that either their parents or 
grandparents had arrived with this first wave, or they had known Yemeni seafaring men 
who settled in the UK (not necessarily Liverpool at first), the majority of whom have now 
passed away. Halliday (2010: 61) makes a similar observation, noting that only a small 
number of the sailors in his study ‘forged a link between the two waves of Yemeni 
emigration’, but then later seems to contradict this statement, writing that ‘During the 
Second World War and afterwards they [the Yemeni sailors] began to find 
employment…they thereby formed the nuclei of the later communities’. Neither Searle 
(2010) nor Lawless (1995) indicate a strong connection between the two waves, with the 
majority of those in Searle’s study arriving to work in the steelworks in 1950s Sheffield, 
and those in Lawless’ study being seamen who were not followed by a post-War wave of 
migration. Similarly, as will be discussed, although the memory of the earlier seafaring 
community forms a part of Liverpool-Yemeni’s narratives, the majority arrived in the 
post-war period, with Liverpool becoming a later destination. Although the earlier 
seafarers do not form a ‘direct’ link to Yemenis in the UK today, I wish to highlight that 
this does not mean they are irrelevant – instead I argue that they form part of the multitude 
of stories of migration and criss-crossing paths which Yemenis weave into their own 
articulations of Toxteth as a multi-ethnic locality. 
A further motivating factor for the second wave was the passing of the British Nationality 
Act of 1948 which proposed that ‘each unit of the British Commonwealth should have its 
local nationality law’ (Wade, 1948: 67). However as Aden retained colony status until 
1967 (and did not subsequently join the Commonwealth), Adeni citizens would have 
become a citizen of ‘the United Kingdom and Colonies’ allowing them to work and settle 
freely until the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962 (Searle, 2010: 
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27). It should be noted, however, that the majority of Yemenis migrating to the UK both 
pre- and post-war were not Adeni but from the North-Central region. (Searle, 2010: 25; 
Lawless, 1995: 16-20) and thus had somewhat precarious conditions of migration. The 
1962 act effectively banned migration of Commonwealth citizens and citizens of British 
colonies not currently holding a UK passport to the UK, causing a surge in migration in 
the years prior, i.e. to ‘beat the ban’ (ibid.). It has been noted that migration initially 
comprised exclusively of Yemeni men, and Halliday (2010: 73) exemplifies the extent of 
this emigration when he writes that there were villages in North Yemen whose remaining 
male population was only elders and children. Unlike South Asian families, however, 
Halliday asserts (2010: 132) that Yemeni men did not begin bringing their spouses to 
Britain until the 1980s. Another important point of consideration is that Aden was at some 
distance from the colonial centres, being administered via India for most of its colonial 
history, and having far weaker immediate ties with Britain. Indeed Mawby (2005: 64) 
notes: ‘Since its capture by Haines in 1839, the purpose which Aden served within the 
British imperial system had been ill-defined. Its future rarely concerned British imperial 
strategists’. This is in contrast to, for example, Afro-Caribbean migrants, some of whom 
saw themselves as ‘a part of Britain’ (Searle, 2010: 28). As the majority of this second 
wave arrived primarily as employees in heavy industry in the post-War economic boom, 
only later bringing their families, the conditions of high unemployment and the closure of 
steelworks from the 1970s onwards meant that many of the steelworkers turned elsewhere 
for employment.  
 
3.4.4 A Third Wave?  
 
Liverpool has had little mention in the literature concerning both the first and second wave 
of migration, and only a small number of Yemenis seem to have settled in the city in these 
 124 
periods – a likely explanation being that Liverpool’s decline as a port city in the early 
twentieth century made it less attractive as a place of settlement for the first wave of 
seafarers, and high rates of unemployment with no large scale industry such as in Sheffield 
meant few employment opportunities for those arriving in the post-war period. Halliday 
(2010: 50-57) does, however, note a possible ‘third wave’ of mostly UK-internal migration 
beginning in the 1970s and that ‘By the early 1990s, the Liverpool grouping had become 
one of the largest Yemeni communities in Britain.’, with Ansari (2004: 156) also noting 
that ‘By 1992…Liverpool’s Yemeni community flourished, and with about 3,500 
members was perhaps the largest such settlement in Britain.’ 
 
While Yemeni groups in other areas such as South Shields and Sheffield saw a gradual 
decline in numbers, Liverpool has seen a rapid growth. The main contributing factor for 
this shift was the closure of the steelworks and other industries, particularly in Sheffield, 
leading to high levels of unemployment among Yemenis. So much so that the number of 
Yemenis in Sheffield shrank from an estimated 8,000 in 1972 to 2,000 by 1990 (Searle: 
2010: 142). The decrease in numbers of Yemenis in cities such as Sheffield followed by 
the increase in Liverpool is not a coincidence, however. Looking outside of the ex-
industrial towns for employment opportunities, Yemenis were able to find a niche opening 
in Liverpool – namely, newsagents and corner shops. Elsewhere in the UK, this sector had 
already been filled by British and South Asians but ‘precisely because Liverpool was not 
an area of large-scale immigration from South Asia and the West Indies the Yemenis were 
able to find an opening which was less available in other towns.’ (Halliday, 2010: 55). 
While the corner shop owned by a South-Asian family is a familiar trope in many 
Northern English cities or towns, in Liverpool it is firmly a Yemeni enterprise, although 
this is beginning to change somewhat. Indeed, the corner shop across from my childhood 
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home was owned by a Yemeni family, and many Liverpudlians throughout the city know 
or have known a local Yemeni shopkeeper. It has been reported that there are now around 
400 Yemeni owned businesses across the city (The Liverpool Echo, 2008).31 It is also 
important to note that although L8 has the largest concentration of Yemenis, Yemeni-
owned businesses are found throughout the region in areas such as Anfield, Bootle, 
Garston, Knotty Ash, and Wavertree. 
 
3.4.5 Arabs in Liverpool: Population Data  
 
Accurate population data for Yemenis in Liverpool (and more generally Arabs in Britain) 
has proven difficult to obtain for several reasons. Prior to the 2011 Census, there was no 
option for respondents born in the UK to define their ethnicity as 'Arab', and as such Arabs 
born in the UK do not appear under any formal grouping before 2011 (Seddon, 2014: 248). 
It was only after the National Association of British Arabs’ lobbying that the category 
Arab was added (ibid., 251).32 Ansari (2004: 170) writes regarding the difficulty in 
estimating the Arab population of the UK that 'The uncertainty about the size of the 
Arab/Middle Eastern Muslim community in Britain is related to questions about whether 
they remain “transient”’, i.e. the distinction between 'settled' communities such as 
Yemenis and more recent arrivals whose 'main country of residence and work remains in 
the Middle East' (ibid.).  Nonetheless, it is possible to reach an estimate for Liverpool.  
 
                                                        
31 The Liverpool Echo (author unspecified). 2008. Tribute to newsagent gunned down in Huyton. The 
Liverpool Echo. [Online]. 2 June. Available from: https://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-
news/tribute-newsagent-gunned-down-huyton-3482574 
32 Seddon (ibid.) also highlights some discrepancies in the figures between country of birth and ethnicity. 
This discrepancy can be partially accounted for by people born in Arab countries who do not identify as 
'Arab', such as the Kurdish populations as well as individuals choosing ‘Other’. 
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A report on the 2011 Census published online by Liverpool City Council illustrates 
population by ethnicity, with ‘Arab’ at 5,629 making up just over 1% of the total 
population of the city.33 In addition, data from the 2011 Census provided by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) via the NOMIS Official Labour Market Statistics website notes 
that there were 2,272 people born in Yemen, and 723 from ‘Middle East not otherwise 
specified’ living in the North West in the 2011 census.34 However this cannot be further 
specified for regions within the North West. The data for Liverpool specifies only ‘Other 
Middle East’, excluding Iran, for country of birth with 4,653 people in this category.35 
 
Participants most often stated figures between 7,000 and 10,000 for the Yemeni population 
in Liverpool, but according to the above data it would seem that there are significantly 
fewer. Assuming that the 5,629 people listed as ‘Arab’ in the 2011 Census are not all 
Yemeni, and also taking into account that a number of Liverpool-Yemenis may have 
responded as ‘Other’ or ‘Mixed Other’, a reasonable estimate would likely be around 
5,000. A number of those listed as ‘Arab’ may also be refugees from countries such as Iraq 
and Syria having arrived more recently, nonetheless these did not seem to form any large 






                                                        
33 Liverpool City Council. 2015. 2011 Census: Liverpool Summary. [Online]. Available from: 
https://liverpool.gov.uk/media/9900/full-report.pdf  
34 Office for National Statistics. 2011. NOMIS QS213EW dataset. [Online]. Available from:  
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/QS213EW/view/2013265922?cols=measures 
35 Office for National Statistics. 2011. NOMIS QS203EW dataset. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/QS203EW/view/1946157104?rows=cell&cols=rural_urban  
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Table 1: Collated population data for ethnicity and country of birth in Liverpool/North 
West. 
 
Category Region Number Source 
Ethnicity: Arab Liverpool 5,629 LCC Census Report 
Ethnicity: Mixed Liverpool 11,756 LCC Census Report 
Ethnicity: Other Liverpool 2,648 LCC Census Report 
Country of Birth: 
Other Mid. East 
Liverpool 4,653 ONS NOMIS Dataset 
Country of Birth: 
Yemen 
North West 2,272 ONS NOMIS Dataset 
 
The Liverpool City Council website also provides ward profiles which are broken down by 
ethnicity and other categories according to the 2011 Census.36 According to these, the 
wards in and surrounding Toxteth which include Princes Park, Picton, Central and 
Riverside account for the majority of Liverpool’s Arab population: 
Ward      Arab Total 
Princes Park     1,335 
Picton      1,003 
Central      710 
Riverside     468 
Greenbank     259 
Kensington & Fairfield 258 
Tuebrook & Stoneycroft 190 
Everton      153 
St Michaels     145 
Old Swan     114 
Wavertree     96 
Kirkdale      86 
Anfield      83 
Woolton      78 
Mossley Hill    72 
Church      66 
Speke Garston    56 
Warbreck     55 
Total       5,227 
 
The remaining wards each have less than fifty people listed with ‘Arab’ ethnicity. Lodge 
Lane, often considered the Yemeni ‘hub’, is within Princes Park ward. Notably, however, 
                                                        
36 https://liverpool.gov.uk/council/key-statistics-and-data/census/ward-census-summaries/ 
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outside of these areas the Arab population is quite evenly dispersed throughout the city 
with each ward having between approximately 200-300 people listed as ‘Arab’. This 
agrees with Halliday’s (1992) observation that Yemenis settled throughout the city, which 
was also later confirmed by participants as a number live or lived outside of L8. 
Additionally, some participants noted that increased social mobility has led to a number of 
families moving to more middle-class suburbs such as those in St Michaels, Greenbank, 
and Woolton wards. While the number of Arabs in Princes Park ward is small in absolute 
terms at 1,335, it is proportionally significant as this accounts for 7.8% of the total Princes 
Park population indicating a relatively high density of Arabs in the area.37 Furthermore, 
4,444 in Princes Park ward are listed as being born in a non-EU country which accounts 
for 26% of the total ward population. Additionally, according to Liverpool City Council’s 
‘Index of Multiple Deprivation 2015’ report (2015: 7), Princes Park ward in L8 (the area 
of the city with the highest number of ‘Arabs’) is within the 1% most deprived nationally, 
with Liverpool itself being the ‘fifth most income deprived district in England’ (ibid., 
14).38 In summary, this data reveals a smaller number of Arabs in the city than is 
commonly thought, but Toxteth nonetheless remains ethnically diverse and in line with my 






                                                        
37 Similarly, the number of those listed as ‘Black’ in Princes Park ward is 2,751 representing 16.1% of the 
population which accords with this area being most closely associated with Liverpool-born Blacks. There 
are also 1,702 (or 10%) listed as ‘Mixed’. Those listed as Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi in Princes Park 
total 580, or 189, 217, 174 respectively. This also confirms that the area has a higher population of ‘Arabs’ 
in comparison to these groups. The total of those listed as ‘White’ accounts for 53% of Princes Park’s 
population. 
38 Liverpool City Council. 2015. The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2015: A Liverpool analysis. [Online]. 
Available from: https://liverpool.gov.uk/media/10003/2-imd-2015-main-report-final.pdf 
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3.4.6 Radā’ and Malāḥ in Liverpool 
 
Although a full survey of region of origin within Yemen for the entirety of the Liverpool-
Yemeni population would not have been feasible, the majority of participants noted that 
they or their families come from one particular region in Yemen. They also perceived this 
region as accounting for most of Liverpool-Yemenis’ region of origin. This region is 
Radā’ (sometimes alternatively romanised as Rada’a), in al-Bayḍā Governorate in the 
Central Region of Yemen. Participants further specified the village of Malāḥ in al-‘Arsh 
district, a few kilometres from the city of Radā’. Indeed, one author with whom I 
corresponded noted that she had met several Liverpool-Yemenis in Radā’ during the 
1980s. A smaller number reported other regions of origin with the Central Region, such as 
Damt. This is in contrast to Lawless’ (1995) Searle’s (2010) and studies who note Ibb and 
Ta’izz as the main regions of origin for Yemenis in Sheffield and South Shields. Radā’ is 






Figure 2: Location of Radā’ in al-Bayḍā Governorate. Google Maps, 2020.39 
 
The district of al-‘Arsh in which Malāḥ is located, and the neighbouring Riyāshiyya 
district  have also been a source of emigration to the United States (New York especially, 
but also Detroit), and according to one 1980 census forty-six percent of the total male 
population of Radā’ were emigrants (Staub, 1989: 78 citing Steffens, 1979: 108 ). This is 
an important point since one pervasive characteristic of diaspora is ‘awareness of co-
                                                        
39 Google Maps, 2020. Al-Bayḍā Governorate, Yemen. Map Data: Google. [Online] Available from: 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Al+Bayda'+Governorate,+Yemen Reproduced in accordance with 
Google Terms of Service. 
 131 
ethnics elsewhere’ – even more so when Yemenis in both Liverpool and New York share a 
point of origin in a cluster of villages/towns in and around Radā’. As was mentioned, in 
the late nineteenth century al-Baydā’ experienced significant emigration to Aden (Dresch, 
2000: 10) and has continued to be one of Yemen’s main regions of emigration. Birks, 
Sinclair and Socknat (1981, 57: Table 5) note that out of all Yemeni regions al-Baydā’ had 
the highest rate of emigration in 1974, with an emigration rate of 11.4% of the male 
population. Not only is the outward flow of migration significant, but the impact of 
emigration and diaspora groups on the ‘homeland’ also accentuates how such processes 
impact the ‘here’ and the ‘there’ as they become implicated in the translocal flow of 
remittances, goods, ideas, and people. Yemen has been particularly shaped by its long 
history of emigration, with the consequence that remittances from its diaspora groups now 
form an important part of the region’s economy, as Fergany (1982: 760) notes that from 
the 1970s onwards, ‘It [emigration] grew to dominate the economy and the very essence of 
life in the country’. 
 
While Radā’ is located more or less in the centre of present-day Yemen in purely 
geographical terms, during the period of the two Yemeni states, Radā’ and al-Bayḍā 
Governorate as a whole were both situated within the borders of the (North) Yemen Arab 
Republic, although al-Baydā’ town, the capital of al-Baydā’ Governorate, lay just on the 
border between the two Yemeni states (Dresch, 2000: 139; Dresch, 1989: 23). Radā’ is 
located at the approximate boundary between Upper and Lower Yemen (or the Northern 
and Southern Highland regions respectively) on the eastern edge of the Eastern Highland 
Plateau (Dresch, 1989:4). This intermediate area has given rise to what has been termed 
loosely as the ‘Central Areas’, or, al-Minṭaqa al-Wusṭā (Dresch: 1989: 14). Therefore, in 
relation to the previously discussed North/South divide, Radā’ is ‘Northern’, but only 
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marginally so as the fuzzy boundary of the Central Areas was reflected in interviews when 
participants from Radā’ were asked whether they considered themselves as being from 
Upper or Lower Yemen, with the most common response being ‘somewhere around the 
middle’. Dresch (1989: 14) also illustrates the ambiguous position the region around Radā’ 
occupies, stating: ‘The areas directly south of San’a and Dhamar…are readily assimilated 
to Upper Yemen by southerners, and to Lower Yemen by northerners’, in other words 
Radā’ may be seen as Northern by Southerners, and Southern by Northerners.  
 
Also attesting to Radā’s intermediate position within Yemen is its ambiguous Zaydi/Sunni 
split in not having a clear Zaydi majority in comparison to ‘truly’ Northern areas such as 
Ṣa’dah, Amrān, and Ṣan’a. Halliday (2010: 11) highlights that ‘The Yemenis themselves 
refer to the Shafei areas of the North, quite accurately, as “the middle region”’. Dresch 
(2000: 242) gives a contrasting view indicating a prevalence of Zaydism in Radā’, thus 
exemplifying the ambiguous nature of the region in terms of the Sunni/Zaydi split. 
 
Disputes concerning the exact nature of the Sunni/Zaydi split in the Central Regions 
notwithstanding, this section has highlighted the region’s particular context characterised 
by its ambiguous position within Yemen’s North/South axes of divide. Chapter 6 explores 
how the religious landscape of Yemen complete with the ambivalences and ambiguities of 
the Central Areas has ‘travelled’ to the Liverpool context.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Having contextualised Liverpool, salient aspects of the national Yemeni context and areas 
of emigration, and Yemeni migration to Britain, the following chapters build upon this 
context to produce a rich ethnographic account which is structured loosely around the key 
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concepts of multicultural triangle in Liverpool-Yemeni life: ethnicity, nation and 
(trans)locality, and travelling Islam. This chapter has paid particular attention to the 
literature on Scouse identities which reveal their construction as oppositional within the 
social imaginary of Liverpool, and Yemeni identities which variously invoke a semi-
mythologised Yemeni past into the present against the highly contested national politics of 
‘unified’ Yemen. It also identified a unique Adeni identity which, as a once prosperous 
port city, shares some similarities with Liverpool. The chapter has also aimed to 
demonstrate that emigration from Yemen is not a new phenomenon, but one which has a 
long history giving rise to networks across the Indian Ocean and beyond. In this way, 
Yemeni migration to the UK is not seen as an isolated event; instead, emigration from (and 
migration to) Yemen is better understood as an intrinsic dynamic in Yemen’s history. 
Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais write:  
 
Contemporary patterns of migration and settlement, citizenship and exclusion, status and 
discrimination can best be understood by grasping the historical connections between places of 
origin and places of arrival and the influence of political and social structures at both ‘ends’ of 
the migration process, as well as the complex mix of resources, cultures, and identities of the 
migrants themselves. (2015: 3) 
 
It is perhaps clear by this point that the thesis takes a similar perspective, albeit limited by 
the fact that a multi-sited approach was not possible. Nonetheless, it would be impossible 
to fully grasp the various dynamics of Liverpool-Yemeni life without reference to the 
context and connections from the ‘Yemeni side’ of migration. The historicisation of 
migration in both the Liverpool and Yemeni contexts has also reinforced the concept of the 
glocal: although both regions have been shaped, sometimes dramatically, by cross-border 
flows (and conflitcs) throughout the past centuries, the very localised histories and 
dynamics of Toxteth and Radā’ are equally as important as wider-scale analyses. A third 
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wave of UK-internal Yemeni migration to Liverpool has been discussed, highlighting a set 
of histories and circumstances which allowed a flourishing of Liverpool-Yemeni business. 
Having established the context of ‘here’ and ‘there’, Part Two of the thesis will now 



















Chapter 4:  (Re)constructing Yemeniness in Liverpool 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the research question: ‘How, when, and to what extent do 
Liverpool-Yemenis construct, maintain, and negotiate a Yemeni identity?’. In terms of 
scale, this chapter is focused primarily on the family network and the local neighbourhood 
(i.e. Toxteth/L8). The main argument running throughout this chapter is that the second-
generation experience strong translocal connections, albeit decreasingly so with the current 
conflict, primarily through the translocal family network. This is where Yemeni identities 
are most clearly constructed and performed, and the context in which they retain salience. 
Nonetheless, this chapter also reveals that these identities remain largely ‘encapsulated’, 
rarely being employed as ‘ethnicised’ in a fetishised fashion, but existing alongside 
hybridised Scouse-Yemeni identities which are foregrounded in other contexts which 
extend beyond the family network.  
 
Moving away from ‘institutional writing’ which typically emerges from a focus on ‘sites 
of governance and mass media communication’ thereby prioritising ‘influential or 
authoritative narratives’ (McLoughlin, 2014: 2), the everyday Liverpool-Yemeni 
‘diasporic tension’ arising from attachments to roots ‘there’ in Yemen and routes ‘here’ in 
Liverpool is highlighted throughout this chapter to reveal a world which exists largely 
beyond the gaze of institutions. This tension gives rise to multiple private and public 
performances of identity which are each contextually and relationally situated. These 
multiple positioned identities can be configured along the lines of the ethnicisation, 
hybridisation, and ‘religionisation’ of identity, which variously coalesce and compete 
according to their situated and contextual nature. The chapter also demonstrates that 
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ethnicised Yemeni identities are not reproductions of an uncontested, essentialised 
‘Yemeniness’ – elements of Yemeni kinship and social hierarchy become contested in the 
diaspora, and Yemeni identities are re-configured in relation to Liverpool/Toxteth as a 
locality through processes of everyday ‘organic’ hybridisation (Bakhtin, 1981; Werbner, 
2001).  
 
Chapter 1 outlined the difficulties in delineating ‘ethnicity’ as a concept, and indeed 
whether it can be delineated at all. Nonetheless, it will be useful to restate the approach 
taken in this chapter. As the research question highlights, this chapter does not presuppose 
the existence of a single homogeneous Yemeni ethnicity or community, rather, in Aly’s 
(2015: 1) words: ‘Arabness, like all other categorical labels is best understood not as a 
form of authentic “being” but as repertoires of “doing”.’ Such an understanding underlines 
that ethnicity is always relational, contextual, performative, embodied and materialised  – 
it is always in the process of becoming, however reified and static individuals may 
perceive it as being. I also make the distinction between ethno-cultural/national and 
ethnicised Yemeni identities to highlight that while Liverpool-Yemenis may (re)create an 
(ethno-)cultural Yemeni identity in certain contexts, these do not always take place as a 
form of boundary-making vis-à-vis wider society. Similarly, the Appadurian approach 
views locality as ‘primarily relational and contextual rather than as scalar or spatial’ 
(Appadurai, 1996: 178) – neighbourhoods and localities are thus both ‘contexts’ in 
themselves, and simultaneously ‘context-producing’. While both of these notions leave 
‘ethnicity’ and ‘locality’ in open-ended processes, this does not mean that they exist only 
as theoretical concepts. Any study which takes ethnicity or locality as its primary subjects 
presupposes that processes behind them can, in some way, be observed in the social world. 
This dialogical approaches recognises that such (etic) theorisations and abstractions exist 
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not only in dialogue with the scholarly literature, but are also informed by and in dialogue 
with the participants’ (emic) understandings and experiences of them. As Werbner (2002a: 
8) states, both the etic and emic perspectives ‘are unfinished arguments debated from 
different vantage points within two relatively autonomous epistemic fields of discourse’. 
While the etic and emic stem from different concerns and perspectives: one scholarly and 
highly theorised, the other everyday and lived, this does not mean they are mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, a dialogical approach gives space to the idea that emic understandings 
of (ethnic) identity, often perceived as fixed and solid, must come before an etic 
understanding – while discussions of hybridisation, fluidity, and processes of 
(re)construction occupy much of the literature (and indeed this thesis), providing important 
vantage points, they nonetheless arise out of ‘dialogue’ with the empirical data in which 
emic perspectives might contrast sharply with such notions.  
 
4.2 The Translocal Family 
This chapter primarily looks at constructions and performances of Yemeni identities from 
the perspective of second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis who make up the majority of 
participants in this study.40 This presents a fresh and contemporary contribution to the 
literature on Yemenis in the UK, most of which has focused only on earlier Yemeni-born 
generations, and thereby explores the changing dynamics of a diaspora in the post-
                                                        
40 I use ‘second generation’ to refer to participants born in Liverpool/the UK to Yemeni-born parents. All 
second-generation participants are between the ages of twenty and fifty. As Yemeni settlement in 
Liverpool occurred primarily following the decline of industry in cities such as Sheffield, Birmingham, and 
Warrington, it is unsurprising that none of the participants had parents born in Liverpool. Participants 
overwhelmingly gave accounts of their parents’ arrival in Liverpool which closely followed Halliday’s (2010: 
55) observation of relocation to Liverpool from the industrial areas and subsequently ‘setting up shop’. 
Only Sheffield, Birmingham, and Warrington were noted as previous areas of residence/employment, with 




migration period as its second generation enter adulthood. That Yemeni identities are 
primarily constructed and performed in/via family networks is not unusual – the family is, 
after all, one of the most enduring social institutions and one through which we gain many 
of our formative experiences. It is also the location of many ‘everyday’ interactions, 
including transnational/local practices which this thesis emphasises.  
 
Instead of assuming a linear progression from migration to settlement and loss of 
attachment to the homeland, the notion of ‘transnational/translocal families’ or translocal 
lives is useful for the following sections (see Bryceson and Vuorela, 2002; Rubel and 
Rosman, 2009; Madianou and Miller, 2012, for further examples of a ‘translocal/national 
family’ perspective). Such a notion highlights that modern travel capabilities and 
communication technologies allow real attachments across borders to persist, blurring the 
line between where one locality ends and the other begins. Bryceson and Vuorela (2002: 
4) make the point that ‘Migration and diaspora studies provide valuable insights into 
transnational families vis-à-vis national borders as well as the positions of individuals and 
minorities within states’. Thus a focus on the (everyday) family provides an alternative 
viewpoint to discussions which rely primarily on institutional representations or narratives 
(cf. McLoughlin, 2014). From an institutional perspective, it would be difficult to identify 
specific performances or constructions of Yemeni identity in Liverpool. Indeed, authors 
such as Halliday (2010: 131) assert that Yemenis are ‘Britain’s invisible Arabs’ precisely 
due to the lack of any major national/regional ‘official’ representation. Of course, 
construing Yemenis and Yemeniness as invisible is a question of position and scale – the 
following sections will demonstrate that Yemeniness continues to be performed and 
(re)created within the private sphere of family networks, while simultaneously becoming 
hybridised alongside notions of Liverpool/Toxteth which operate as an ‘elaborate signifier’ 
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of locality (Brown, 2005: 130-131). Nonetheless, McLoughlin (2014: 3) also highlights 
that an everyday, demotic perspective must also ‘not lose sight of multi-local connections 
elsewhere as a property of all dwelling spaces’.  
 
Many participants noted uncertainty over whether they were first, second, or third 
generation as the pattern of migration and settlement was often not linear, and with their 
parents’ or themselves having extended stays in Yemen. Only one Yemeni participant had 
a UK-born parent – her father, who I was also able to interview, although notably her 
grandfather had previously settled in Britain as part of the early seafaring wave of Yemeni 
migrants and moved to Liverpool in the 1970s where he set up a corner shop. This 
participant herself was born in Yemen, moving to Liverpool at a young age. Her family’s 
story of migration is particularly colourful as the multi-generational journey included 
residence/employment/settlement in Madagascar, France, Sheffield, and ultimately 
Liverpool, continuously interspersed with periods of stay in Yemen. This particular story 
of migration itself begins to reveal the multi-generational, multi-local journeys and lives 
which many participants articulated and which problematises a neat categorisation of 
first/second/further generations. Her father, Maḥmūd (40s, born in another North West 
town, moved to L8 as a child, self-employed), noted that he moved to Yemen around the 
age of ten, where he then spent several years, spending a further stay in Yemen during his 
twenties when he married. Similarly, Ṭāriq (40s, born in Merseyside, various employment 
including community work) noted that he moved to Yemen around the age of eight or 
nine, returning to Liverpool to begin secondary school by which point he ‘could barely 
speak English’. Zahra (20s, born in Liverpool, student) notably also mentioned that her 
father and grandfather moved directly to Liverpool from al-Ḍhāli’ Governorate when her 
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father was a child.41 Also, several participants born in Liverpool had Yemeni-born 
spouses. In addition, all Yemeni participants had travelled to Yemen at least once, often on 
a semi-regular basis, although generally for shorter periods of duration than Ṭāriq and 
Maḥmūd. One memorable trip was described by Rīm (30s, born in Liverpool, various 
employment): her father had arranged a trip to Yemen in the 1990s for the extended family 
in which they drove the entirety of the route in a mini-bus, crossing through Europe, into 
Syria and Saudi Arabia until reaching Yemen where they stayed for three months. Regular 
contact with family members in Yemen was also discussed by most participants, for 
example Zahra noted that she would regularly speak to her grandmother in Yemen via 
telephone or internet.  
 
These translocal circulations of people and family networks are not only visible in 
Liverpool, but can also be seen at ‘the other end’ of the migration chain in Yemeni towns 
which have seen migration to Liverpool. Rīm illustrates how Liverpool is also present in 
her family’s village. Using typical Liverpudlian colloquialisms, she describes how it was 
common to see people wearing ‘trainees’ (trainer shoes) donated by Liverpool-Yemeni 
families, as well as support for Liverpool Football Club (LFC). The sending of regular 
remittances to family members in Yemen was similarly reported by most participants.42 
Nāṣir (50s, born in Yemen, community leader) also mentioned that he knew of Liverpool 
                                                        
41 While the data on specific patterns of migration is limited to the accounts given by participants and 
available city demographics, Zahra’s account indicates an additional, albeit smaller, element of Yemeni 
migration to Liverpool which has been little discussed. In this case, it appears a smaller number of families 
from the 1970s onwards arrived directly from Yemen to Liverpool, not having previously been employed in 
the industrial cities. This was also further partially confirmed at other events such as a Yemeni wedding in 
which several men mentioned that they had come directly to Liverpool. 
42 Only Maḥmūd noted that he did not send remittances, as his family had either all moved to Liverpool, or 
those in Yemen had now passed away. Although the sending of remittances now extends to recipients 
beyond the family for some second-generation participants. 
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before moving to the city in the late 1980s due to widespread support for LFC in his town, 
as well as knowing Yemenis who had worked or had family in Liverpool. 
 
Despite some differences in the particular routes of migration of their forebears, second-
generation Liverpool-Yemenis overwhelmingly share first-hand experiences of ‘Yemeni 
life’, or as was commonly articulated, ‘village life’ in Malāḥ and its environs. McLoughlin 
(2010: 225) writes that for many born ‘in the diaspora’, the valency of homeland 
attachment may lessen, leading to new forms of belonging, such as those centred around 
religion. However, for second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis, frequent travel to the 
‘homeland’, sometimes for long periods, reinforces the presence of Yemen in Liverpool. 
This translocal presence is further reinforced by those arriving directly from Yemen, either 
seeking employment or, as was predominantly represented in the sample, as spouses of 
those born in Liverpool, presenting a continual cross-border flow of people. These flows 
strengthen the construction of an ethno-cultural identity ‘rooted’ in the homeland, but it 
will be seen that it is often specific localities within Yemen, such as Malāḥ, which take 
precedence in these constructions and performances.  
 
Maḥmūd (40s, born in the North West, moved to L8 at a young age, various employment) 
further highlights the importance simply being ‘in’ a specific Yemeni locality in providing 
a physical link to family histories: 
The name of the local city is Radā’. So, what I found out was, whenever there would be a 
burial in the village, people would ask about the graves that were around, the graveyards, so I 
was asking the same questions too. I wanted to know where my grandfathers and 
grandmothers were actually buried in Yemen and people pointed out to me where they were… 
all in the same place, like you had grandfathers and grandmothers, their sisters too, whether 
the grandfather had brothers, things like that. 
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Rīm also highlights that ‘Arabic culture’ was predominantly experienced within the 
family: 
Our only Arabic [language] and culture was only at home or when family come to visit, or if we 
met up [with family], we still knew who we were and what we were. 
 
Hayfā (30s, born in Liverpool, social worker) has visited Yemen several times. She 
notably does not express her experiences in terms of ‘difference’, but rather emphasises 
the close-knit nature of the village:  
I think when going to the village, that was an experience because in Yemen the village is very 
secluded and everybody knows everything, but because we're from Liverpool we don't really 
get that sense of community [here in Liverpool], but when I was there it was like people 
coming round to visit every day and it was like you were on a pedestal and everyone was 
watching you. That was an experience, because I'd never seen that before...They were fine 
[regarding my identity as a British-Yemeni] but it's just language is a big part, because I wasn't, 
like, fully fluent and sometimes I could speak and but sometimes I couldn't understand bits, so 
that was a bit hard but when I was in Yemen I always felt welcomed. Where it's different when 
you're here.  
 
Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment and activism) also noted that growing 
up, she and her family would visit Yemen every two years with further visits as an adult 
until the war broke out in 2015. She also notes that growing up in a largely white 
neighbourhood of Toxteth in comparison to other areas of L8 with a higher concentration 
of Yemenis, her contact with other Yemenis was primarily through the family.  
 
In several visits to participants’ homes, the presence of Yemen was also notable in the 
furnishings such as low-seated sofas with ornately-decorated cushions, delicate sets of 
Arab coffee/tea cups (finjān), an oud (a stringed instrument) hung on the wall, and 
photographs or objects depicting Yemen’s landscape. I was also informed that the very 
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distinct Yemeni-style coffee and bukhūr (incense wood chips) could be purchased on 
Lodge Lane, among other Yemeni/Arab objects. The living room or dīwān was also 
highlighted in several interviews as an important space of sociality, particularly for men as 
Aḥmad, Rīm, and Zamīla noted that it would be common for their fathers’ relatives and 
friends to gather on a weekend in the living room where they would discuss Yemeni 
affairs.  
 
Rīm (30s, born in Liverpool, social worker, family owns newsagents) also highlights the 
importance of such spaces for women’s socialisation via the family network, as well as 
further connections in the US:  
There were two aunties, you know, the Arab women’s get togethers for coffee and tea and 
dances and that, and we'd only go to those two houses and there'd be all these other Arabs 
there. And that's where we met them, but we didn't hold them kind of things [in our house]. 
[…] 
Yeah, or like, we had family in America and they'd visit every year. You need to visit America, I 
felt like it was Bāb al-Yaman, the market and that, it's just like Yemen, the men are strict with 
religion.43 
                                                        
43 Bāb al-Yaman, literally ‘the Gate of Yemen’, refers to the large entrance in the old walls of Ṣan’ā. 
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Figure 3: Photograph of objects from a Yemeni home. David Harrison, 2018. 
While the translocal flow of objects between Liverpool and various localities within 
Yemen does not occur on any great scale given the small population size, it is nonetheless 
significant. The importance of material objects and materiality in studies of diaspora and 
migration has been recognised by scholars such as Crang (2010), Werbner (2011), and 
Turan (2004, 2010). Crang (2010: 139) writes that ‘diasporic identities and processes are 
forged through the production, circulation and consumption of material things and spaces’. 
In a study of the Palestinian diaspora, Turan (2010: 45) found that objects were important 
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in providing ‘shared connections to the pre-migratory landscapes with post-migratory 
memories’, while also making a distinction between the role of objects in public and 
private constructions/performances of identity. The flows of goods and Yemeni objects 
present in Liverpool are, however, largely limited to domestic spaces and the Yemeni 
‘hub’ of Lodge Lane rather than representing forms of ‘intellectual high culture’. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean they are less important. Zahra (20s, born in Liverpool, 
student) notably mentioned during an interview that she consciously chooses to wear 
distinctively Yemeni clothing, such as scarves and wristbands to publicly emphasise her 
‘Yemeniness’ in the face of intra-Arab stereotyping of Yemenis. Indeed, Werbner (2011: 
471) makes the point that all of ‘intellectual creativity, diasporic quotidian popular culture, 
subjective consciousness and political action’ are mutually-constitutive of diaspora. In this 
way, the role of these objects can be understood as part of ‘diasporic homemaking’ – 
‘They help to constitute a diasporic home that complicates and enriches sense of 
residential location’ (Crang, 2010: 142). Thus the presence of these objects and how 
spaces are demarcated as specific areas of (Arab) sociality contributes to the construction 
of a Yemeni diasporic aesthetic which is largely hidden from public view. However, 
‘recreating’ Yemen in this sense is not only a ‘reproduction’, but ‘It emerges from 
dialogical forging in the here and now, of shared canons of taste among diasporic 
producers and consumers who collectively define what makes for social distinction’ 
(Werbner and Fumanti, 2012: 150).  
The above highlights that seen through the lens of (translocal) family networks, Liverpool-
Yemenis’ relationship to Yemen is in many ways still deeply diasporic, continually 
reinforced by these transnational/local flows. However, the current crisis and its impact on 
travel was also a key point in many interviews as it has greatly disrupted these translocal 
flows. Participants also pointed out that Yemenis in Britain did not arrive as refugees, and 
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nobody knew of any Yemeni refugees in Liverpool fleeing the current crisis. The inability 
to travel to Yemen since at least 2015 was also discussed, with some participants such as 
Munīra lamenting that the younger generations have not had the chance to experience 
Yemeni life, articulating worries that this will lead to a loss of Yemeni identity in the city.  
While this deeply diasporic aspect of Liverpool-Yemeni life was articulated through 
interviews and observable at events such as the wedding (see section 4.3), there also exists 
a tension which problematises discussion of a coherent or unified ‘Yemeni diaspora’ in 
Liverpool. The following quotes illustrate the primacy of the family for participants when 
narrating their relation to other Liverpool-Yemenis.  
For example, both Rīm and Zamīla (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment including 
shop work) noted that although events were occasionally organised for ‘the community’, 
such as day-trips to Wales, these often ended up being ‘groups of families going off and 
doing their own thing’. Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment and activism) 
also noted that it was not until she had finished secondary school that she began to form 
connections with Yemenis outside the family. For Munīra, these connections were not 
mediated by any imagined Yemeni ‘community’, articulating that although she feels a 
strong connection to Yemen, she enjoys a diverse circle of friends and acquaintances. To 
illustrate the importance of the family in creating and maintaining intra-Yemeni 
connections, she says: 
There is lots of connections in the Malāḥī community, so if I ask my mum: “Who’s that lady?”, 
she’ll say: “Her aunt’s uncle is your dad’s this”, so it’s like these threads that bind the 
community, and they’re quite strong those threads. You don’t have to be sister or brother, but 
if there’s one small link that’s literally enough for them to be family. 
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Similarly, Aḥmad speaking on the changing demographics of Liverpool’s Arab 
populations also spoke in terms of ties between extended families and the central role of 
the dīwān as a (masculine) social space: 
You had less diversity of Arabs back then [1980s-1990s], it was very Yemeni heavy, now you've 
got some more from the Levant and Libya but then it was very Yemeni, but I've seen a lot of 
change. When I was younger the number of Yemenis was like, certain families, you'd know 
them all, and my father was involved in a Yemeni community centre in different positions as 
an elder, and he had one of the biggest living rooms, or diwān, so every Saturday they'd sit 
and do Yemeni stuff and chat about all the issues, but literally in our shop when someone 
went past we'd go “Are they Yemeni? Do you think they're Yemeni?” but now it's more like 
“Are they Arabic?” so it's been a lot of...diversified... 
 
Most participants echoed similar views in that although they were aware of a wider 
Yemeni presence in Liverpool, the primary social networks tended to be structured around 
the extended family rather than perceiving themselves as part of a wider ‘community’. 
Also to contrast these views from an Arab but non-Yemeni perspective, Dālyā (30s, born 
in Liverpool, artist) noted that despite their sharing a common Arabic language, she had 
come into little contact with Liverpool-Yemenis who she perceived as being ‘closed off’ 
and ‘conservative’, highlighting that broader labels such as ‘Arab’ must also be understood 
as contextual – in this case holding less significance at the scale of family networks. The 
above seemingly agrees with Bruneau’s (2010: 43) point that for transnational migrants (or 
‘transmigrants’), as compared to diasporans, ‘The family structure, more than the village 
community of origin, is essential in explaining the cohesion of these networks.’ However, 
by using a multi-scalar approach I also contend that Liverpool-Yemenis are diasporans in 
the sense that they maintain awareness of people and places elsewhere, e.g. through the 
translocal family connections to Yemen and the USA, and thus cannot be described merely 
as ‘transmigrants’. In addition, a focus on the everyday and the ‘hidden’ demotic 
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discourses reveals a more complex picture of diasporic tensions and multiple belongings 
which cannot be neatly contained within any single diaspora. While performances of 
Yemeni identities in Liverpool may remain encapsulated in the family network, this is not 
to say that second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis are themselves ‘encapsulated’ or limited 
to these networks. In this way, the tension of ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ can be more clearly seen. 
Munīra and Aḥmad themselves articulated being conscious of this tension during 
childhood, noting that growing up they thought of themselves as ‘White’ or ‘Scouse’ in 
some contexts, such as during their school years, and as ‘Arab’ at home and in Arab 
spaces.  
 
4.3 Performing Yemeniness: A Liverpool-Yemeni Wedding  
The notion of performativity is perhaps now most associated with the works of Judith 
Butler (1988, 1993, 2006) which address the performance of gender; however, the concept 
is also useful when examining ethnicity. Butler (1993: 3) writes that ‘performativity must 
be understood not as a singular or deliberate “act,” but, rather, as the reiterative and 
citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names’. In this sense, 
speech and embodied communicative acts are performative in so much as their repetition 
produces subjectivity. Valkonen (2014: 212) in her study on the construction of Sámi 
ethnicity draws upon performativity theory to highlight that through this understanding of 
performative acts, ‘Attaining subjectivity ensures the position of agency and socially 
recognized existence’. Or, as Werbner (2002a: 11) notes, ‘These [diasporic identities] can 
only be achieved through ‘doing’ or, more broadly, through performance’. In a way 
similar to gender, but not completely analogous, ethnic/cultural identities are also 
produced through embodied performances of ‘doing’ (Butler, 2006: xvi). Additionally, 
ethno-cultural identities are not constructed and performed as stand-alone phenomena, but 
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are also be embedded in other matrices – Butler herself recognises this when she (2006: 4) 
says that ‘gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical 
contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual and regional 
modalities of discursively constituted identities’. Thus this section also pays attention to 
how such spaces as the wedding can be read as producing intersecting masculine Yemeni 
subjectivities. Given that the thesis has emphasised ‘becoming’ over ‘being’, the idea that 
identity (be it ethnic, gender, sexual, etc.) is performed as part of this dynamic process is 
fundamental.  
The following draws upon observations at a Liverpool-Yemeni wedding which I was 
invited to attend in February 2018 by Maḥmūd. I was also able to watch several other 
Liverpool-Yemeni weddings via online livestreaming which confirmed that the structure 
and content of this wedding was largely typical of Liverpool-Yemeni weddings. Central to 
both the performance of Yemeniness during the wedding and also implicated in Yemeni 
kinship/social hierarchies discussed in the section below is the notion of qabīla.44 Indeed, 
the wedding itself can be read partly as a performance of qabīla and by extension 
Arab/Yemeni masculinity. Eid (2007: 122) notes that ‘families of the Arab diaspora often 
find in traditional gender relations a cultural buffer delineating symbolic boundaries 
                                                        
44 The Arabic term, qabīla (pl. qabā’il), is often translated as ‘tribe’ but I have preferred to use the Arabic 
term throughout this section. It is important to note that ‘tribe’ here should not be understood in the 
earlier anthropological sense with its (now much criticised) preoccupation with ‘remote/primitive tribal 
society’, but rather as an important part of societal organisation in parts of the Arab world, particularly 
within the Arabian Peninsula. For this reason, I use qabīla over ‘tribe’ to underline that the qabīla as seen 
through Arab history is a specific construct, operating within specific Arab contexts. The tribal-urban (qabīlī-
ḍa’īf) division within Arab society has been long noted, especially so in Yemen, as Weir (2007: 2) notes 
‘Much of Yemen is divided into mostly sedentary tribes, and has been since antiquity; the only major region 
which seems never to have been tribally organised surrounds the towns of Ibb and Ta’izz in “Lower 
Yemen”.’  Another important division within Arab society which has long been recognised is that of 
nomadic peoples (badū) versus settled peoples (ḥaḍar) (Dresch, 1989: 6-7). However, the qabīla is not only 
a bedouin phenomenon, but also occurs in some settled regions, such as Yemen with its long history of 
organised agriculture (Weir, 2007: 2; Dresch, 1989: 6-7). For purposes of the following discussion, I have 




between Us and Them’. While this thesis is not an examination of masculinity per se, 
gender norms in Yemeni/Muslim society (partially) reproduced in Liverpool mean that in 
some circumstances, such as the wedding which has a separate male and female 
celebration, my observations were limited to a ‘masculine’ perspective.45 It will first be 
worthwhile exploring Maḥmūd’s articulations on the ‘bedouin ideal’ of (masculine) 
‘Arabness’ during an interview some time before the wedding: 
I think there’s lots of divisions [between the various Arab groups], you know, Arabs rely 
heavily on bedouin values and also on Islamic values too, and I think that sometimes bedouin 
values can actually clash with the religious values, right, sometimes they can be compatible, 
but often they clash too…Some of the traits of bedouin values among the Arab people may be 
similar among any other people in any other parts of the world, but some of the bedouin 
values of the Arabs are based on pride, and revenge, and aggression also, and unfortunately 
self-centredness… 
[…] 
‘…[if] I want to put myself in a mental state where I can become Arabian outwardly to others, 
how would I begin that? What would I do to be more Arabian? I may have to include bedouin 
traits, being more diversely friendly…I would have to have that outward attitude of being 
cosmopolitan within the Arab community at large. 
 
This discussion can be read as a communicative performance of (masculine) Arabness, 
which for Maḥmūd is centred around adopting and integrating the ‘bedouin values’ which 
he views as positive into his everyday life. Indeed, the notion of hospitality 
(cosmpolitanness or being ‘more diversely friendly’ in Maḥmūd’s words, karāmah in 
Arabic) was also emphasised in Maḥmūd’s invitation to the wedding, stating that it was an 
open, ‘city-wide’ invitation.46 The notion of ‘demotic cosmopolitans’ will be discussed 
                                                        
45 This being the case, the discussion of the wedding should be understood in terms of performance of 
gendered (masculine) Yemeniness. Performances of Yemeniness in similar contexts from women’s 
perspectives would greatly add to the literature on British-Yemenis and provide a counterpoint to this 
study.  
46 However, I appeared to be the only non-Arab present at the wedding. 
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further in the following chapter. While Maḥmūd’s own narration of bedouin ideals appears 
to draw upon an imaginary which is not only Yemeni, but more broadly related to Arab 
notions of masculinity, the wedding allowed a clearer view into how Yemeniness (or 
Malāḥiness) is performed within the context of the family network, and how forms of 
qabīlī masculinity are (re)produced. It will first be useful to note that Radā’, Malāḥ and the 
surrounding regions which account for the majority of the participants’ region of origin 
within Yemen are located within Yemeni ‘tribal territory’ which Dresch (1989: 8) 
elaborates upon, noting: ‘the tribes occupy the poorer, semi-arid part of the country toward 
the north and east’. Thus it will be seen that the wedding is perhaps more accurately 
described as a Liverpool-Malāḥi wedding, underlining the importance of the local rather 
than the nation in this interdomestic sphere (see Werbner, 1990, who discusses the role of 
the interdomestic sphere in British-Pakistani life). 
 
This section is not intended to demonstrate some sort of essentialist ‘qabīlī nature’ of 
Liverpool-Yemenis, but rather highlights how (translocal) ‘roots’ in the qabīlī areas of 
Malāḥ and surrounding regions play a role in constructions and performances of 
(masculine) Yemeni identities.47 It will be seen in this and the following section, however, 
that the qabīla and Yemeni social hierarchies are both (re)produced, performed, and 
contested. In this instance, the wedding is read as an encapsulated performance of Yemeni 
masculinity rooted in a specific locality in Yemen rather. That is to say, its performance 
takes place within the largely closed-off world of the interdomestic sphere (Werbner, 
1990) rather than a more public form of boundary-making. Nonetheless, such ritualised 
                                                        
47 Nevola (2015: 9, unpublished thesis) notes in his ethnography of Yemeni social hierarchies that the 
dominant discourse within Yemen reifies the concept of the qabīla with essentialist notions, writing: ‘The 
principle that lies at the core of the Yemenite social hierarchical system is an essentialist representation of 
genealogical origins’.  
 152 
performances are important in understanding how embodied subjectivity is attained with 
regards to ethno-cultural identities. As Werbner (2017: 8) notes, ethnicity is ‘an expression 
of multiple identities’: it is not enough to assume that (diasporic) Yemeniness equates to a 
single, fixed culture, but rather its performances are contextual, sometimes being 
intertwined with other identities. On the scale of the family, being ‘Yemeni’ is too broad a 
term; rather, the wedding celebration which I attended provides a glimpse of how the 
interdomestic space is important in producing qabīlī-Malāḥi-masculine identities in a 
diasporic context.   
While the wedding followed the structure of a ‘traditional’ wedding in north Yemen quite 
closely, it is also important to note that this performance of Yemeniness should not be 
understood as evidence regarding an essentialised ‘true/authentic Yemeniness’. Rather, I 
emphasise that it should be seen in relation to how Yemeni identity operates in Liverpool 
as a whole. That is to say, while performances of Yemeniness as seen during the wedding 
may represent reproduction of ‘traditional’ cultural forms or ‘scripts’, it is equally 
important to note that these scripts have ‘travelled’, gain new significance, and take place 
in particular context. Indeed, writing on Muslim religious subjectivities, McLoughlin 
(2015: 42) highlights that: ‘Not least in a late modern age of glocalisation, all social actors 
are positioned by multiple and sometimes paradoxical “lived structures” from religious 
revivalism to consumer capitalism.’	 
The wedding itself followed quite closely the structure of what Caton (1993: 363) 
describes as a North-Eastern qabīlī wedding: 
 
1) Luncheon 
2) Groom’s zaffah (procession) 
3) Qāt chew 
4) Dinner 
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5) Samrah, or evening entertainment 
6) Rifd, or gift-giving 
7) Bride’s zaffah 
8) Consummation of marriage 
9) Morning shooting match 
 
Excluding the elements which could not practically be performed in Liverpool and the 
absence of the bride’s zaffa,48 the wedding roughly followed these steps: 1) Lunch was 
served,49 2) the groom was introduced with a zaffa wearing the janbiyya (ceremonial 
dagger), 5) entertainment or samra in the form of music, dancing, and poetry was 
provided, 6) gifts and donations were made, concluding with a car parade. While the 
absence of the Yemeni landscape of the flood plains where the zaffa would take place 
leading to a nearby mosque inevitably means the wedding structure is re-created to suit the 
new context, the presence of Yemen throughout the wedding was tangible. Malāḥi-
accented Arabic could be heard throughout the hall, Yemeni food was served, donations 
and messages from Yemen were received via the internet and announced, dress was for the 
most part qabīlī,50 the hall was furnished by Yemeni-style low-seated cushions spread 
across the hall, and traditional forms of Yemeni poetry were recited.51 Regarding the gift-
giving (rifd), Caton (1993: 363) notes that: ‘the assembled guests have the amounts of 
their contributions publicly disclosed and presented to the groom’s family by the town-
                                                        
48 I was informed that there was a separate celebration only for the bride and groom’s immediate family, as 
this celebration was an all-male event. 
49 Big plates of mandi, a dish of rice and meat, were placed on the floor lined with plastic, where all of the 
men present sat to eat in a relaxed, informal setting. 
50 Maḥmūd noted that different parts of Yemen and different qabā’il have different styles of dress. Most of 
the men were wearing what he termed ‘shālah’ (headdress), distinct from the ghutra worn in the Gulf 
States and parts of Saudi Arabia, and that approximately ’80-90%’ of the attendees were related and all 
Malāḥi. There was a mix of ages, with both young and older men present. A number of the older men 
noted that they had arrived in Liverpool relatively recently, having limited English ability. While the younger 
men spoke Scouse-accented English (or with accents from nearby towns such as Warrington) to myself and 
among themselves, most also seemed comfortable conversing in Arabic. 
51 The wedding took place in a community centre hall with little in the way of elaborate decoration, 
furnishings or formality.  
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crier (dōshān).’ This mirrors the Liverpool wedding, except that the amounts were read out 
over a microphone by an attendee, not a designated dōshān – although as will be seen, this 
term of social status is known and discussed by several participants. In this way, the 
wedding was very much a translocal event, illustrating the translocal family: many of the 
donations were received from family members of the groom in Yemen (Malāḥ in 
particular), there was a constant streaming of congratulatory messages to the groom from 
Yemen, streaming of music which Maḥmūd informed me was particular to Malāḥ, and 
styles of dress particular to qabīlī regions of Yemen. 
 
Caton (1993: 367) also comments on the importance of zamīl (praise) poetry in the 
wedding ceremony, noting that ‘one group of men chants the first line and the other 
alternates with them in delivering the second line, and in this fashion they march in the 
flood plain until they reach the mosque or decide to begin another poem’. Many of the 
poems in the Liverpool wedding were composed in Arabic and recited by Maḥmūd 
himself, having verses ending in a rhyme of -ah or -ā which were echoed by the attendees. 
The use of poetry is also related to notions of masculinity in the qabīla, as Caton (1990: 
26) in his ethnography of north-eastern Yemen gives the following anecdote when asking 
a qabīlī shaykh: 
‘How would I raise my son to become a gabīlī?’  
‘You must teach him four things: the dictates of Islam, how to shoot a gun, how to dance and 
how to compose poetry.’52 
 
Dancing was also a major element of the wedding, at times formal and ritualised, at others 
more informal and celebratory. The dances were mostly led by older, Yemeni-born men 
with the younger men joining in after it had gathered some momentum. Maḥmūd noted 
                                                        
52 Gabīlī, rather than qabīlī, represents the usual Yemeni pronunciation of the letter qāf (q) as ‘g’. 
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that three main dances were performed: bara’, thulāthī and nafarayn. In qabīlī Yemen, 
dance in such situations is another performance of masculinity, particularly the bara’ with 
its intricate steps and competitive nature which alludes to ‘key virtues of tribal personhood 
such as courage, stamina, self-possession, and martial prowess’ (Caton: 1993: 366).53 
After the wedding I also asked Maḥmūd and other participants about how Yemeni 
weddings usually proceed in Liverpool. It was noted that ‘Western-style’ weddings with a 
formal dinner and attendees sat around tables are considered to be against the spirit of the 
qabīlī ethos for some segments of the population, or, only suitable for the women’s 
celebration. This highlights the importance of diasporic aesthetics and ritualised 
performance in constructions of Yemeni-Malāḥi identities – to substantially move away 
from the aesthetics of a qabīlī wedding to a ‘Western-style’ wedding would be to cross a 
boundary, calling into question one’s qabīlī masculinity. Nonetheless, this performance 
was largely an ‘internal affair’, being reproduced within the encapsulated interdomestic 
sphere rather than representing a construction of a boundary vis-à-vis others. 
 
In many ways the wedding exemplifies the metaphor of ‘roots and routes’ which 
characterise diasporas: the wedding and other intimate events such as informal gatherings 
in the home provide a space to perform (masculine) ‘Yemeniness’ which is perhaps more 
informed by ‘roots’, but is nonetheless shaped by its ‘routes’ (metaphorically and literally) 
into the present. The new, non-Yemeni physical location where it takes place, the presence 
of Scouse-accented English, the use of modern communication technologies and the 
renegotiation of certain pragmatic concerns highlight the ‘multi-local’. Additionally, 
although the wedding provides a largely encapsulated space for performances of Malāḥi-
                                                        
53 In the bara’, dancers gradually stop as they become exhausted with the increasing tempo (cf. Caton, 
1993). In this wedding, Maḥmūd himself was perhaps the most competitive, being the final man in the 
dance a number of times. 
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qabīlī-masculinity according to the travelling and ritualised ‘scripts’ of Yemeni weddings, 
broader considerations such as choice of spouse will be seen to be more contested in the 
following section which more clearly exemplify ‘routes’ into the present. Related to this 
idea is that Yemeni ideologies of kinship and genealogy continuously reimagine the past 
into the present. Chapter 1 noted that while diaspora, ethnicity, and culture can be 
conceived as a process or a ‘becoming’, outside of academic discourse ethnicity/culture 
are still often felt to be relatively solid entities. In a globalising world where ‘liquid 
modernity’ increasingly disrupts and fragments deep and long-held attachments between 
people and places, such performances of culture can be understood as an attempt to fix an 
identity, inasmuch as all such performances are instances of reification. Nonetheless, this 
section has shown that the wedding itself represents a particular socio-cultural context – 
one in which the primarily older, Yemeni-born men direct its structure, such as by their 
leading of dances, making announcements, and ensuring certain norms such as the removal 
of shoes and seating arrangements were adhered to, thereby inducting the younger 
generations into a form of Malāḥi (or North Yemeni) male socialisation. This point also 
highlights that within this particular context, it is the local which takes precedence – the 
translocal connections, traditions and performances were discussed in localised terms as 
being ‘Malāḥi’ rather than simply ‘Yemeni’. However, it is also the case that such 
performances take place alongside more ambivalent, hybridised articulations of identity. 
McLoughlin (2005a: 535) writes ‘Depending on the dynamics of any context, then, and 
who one might be interacting with, people both hybridise and ethnicise their identities’. 
Applied to the Liverpool context, such examples of ethnicisation of a Yemeni identity are 
more clearly an internal affair – performances of Yemeni ethno-cultural identities for the 
second generation take place predominantly within the domestic/private sphere. Within 
this, Yemeniness is also not a single homogeneous construct, but is also localised, 
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gendered, and classed. The next section will now look more closely at Yemeni ideological 
discourses of kinship and hierarchy from interviews with both male and female 
participants. While the wedding paints a picture of largely uncontested performances of 
qabīlī-Malāḥi ethnicity, discussions with participants reveal multiple perspectives on how 
such structures come to be re-negotiated. 
 
4.4 Contested Social Hierarchies 
Kinship being a powerful marker of ethnicity and belonging, the qabīla allows an 
individual to insert oneself into Yemen’s past, situating themselves genealogically and 
historically within this framework (cf. Caton, 1990, 1993). Thus the qabīla within Yemen 
operates on both a personal, genealogical level, influencing marriage choices and 
(re)producing kinship networks, while also operating on a wider scale in terms of political 
alliances and qabīla-state relations. As the qabīla is much broader in scope than a narrow 
genealogical tree, having roots in the remote past, it must be continually reimagined to 
hold present relevance, and as Dresch (1989: 78) notes that, for example, Yemenis cannot 
routinely trace their entire family history back to an eponymous qabīlī ancestor. Indeed 
Nevola (2015: 26) demonstrates that a narrower unit of analysis, the bayt (house), holds 
more immediate relevance than macro-groupings such as the qabīla.54 In this study, the 
focus is less concerned with fine-tuned genealogical groupings, and indeed this would 
likely be impossible as much of Nevola’s (2015) work demonstrates the close connection 
of the reproduction of the qabīla to Yemen’s physical and metaphorical geography; 
whereas in the diaspora, knowledge routinely fragments becoming reconstructed according 
                                                        
54 ‘People belonging to the same beyt clearly acknowledge a common eponymous ancestor at the macro-
genealogical level. However, they also share a common ancestor who is 3 to 5 generations removed’. 
(Nevola, ibid.) 
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to new contexts. Therefore the focus of this section is to examine how the qabīla/bayt is 
narrated in constructions of Yemeni identity, further adding to the point that such 
performances of Yemeni identity which rely heavily upon transmitted knowledge and 
translocal connections occur primarily within the family network.  
 
The following quotes illustrate how some participants narrated their lineage in terms of 
qabīla. 
 
Maḥmūd (40s, born in North West, self-employed): 
So you’d mention locality or region, so I’d say I’m Radā’i, from Radā’. I think they are regional 
alliances and partially family as well. You can break that down into the family unit, so you’d 
say Radā’ī, then from the village, Malāḥī…and in Malāḥ because you’re derived from one tribe 
in the village and that village has four tribes, you’d be under that category after that. For 
example, ‘Awbalī. You’d name the local tribe from that village.’ 
 
Rīm (30s, born in Liverpool, social worker, family owns several newsagents): 
Yeah, we are qabāyil. My dad is like everyone's granddad, everyone's uncle. Even in a court 
room, the judge will highly respect him. If he was a bad man, they probably wouldn't, but he's 
like a noble man. He was in Yemen one time with a family and they were trying to have my 
dad off [colloquialism meaning ‘to fool’ or ‘to trick’], and the judge said “Whatever [granddad] 
wants”, because he was fair.  
 
While membership in and genealogical ties to a qabīla are most often discussed in terms of 
patrilineal descent, and indeed participants also most often spoken in such terms as Rīm, 
noting that an older male family member of the father’s side was like ‘the village leader’, 
Nevola (2015: 334) nonetheless demonstrates that knowledge of the matrilineal line (both 
its male and female members) is not ignored in Yemen. Similarly, Zamīla (30s, born in 
Liverpool, various employment including shop work) spoke exclusively of her maternal 
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grandfather, noting that he was a ‘big shaykh’ in his village, with reference to his bayt and 
its importance in the region, indeed his bayt was also mentioned as being the name of the 
village itself. 
While such transmitted knowledge is maintained, its significance in the Liverpool context 
was contested. When asked if qabīla had any impact on marriage choices, Rīm noted: ‘I'm 
just me. In this country it's more relaxed but in Yemen people would know your story, but here 
everyone is more or less the same’. Similar responses were echoed, with some noting that 
while their elders sometimes had strong opinions regarding who would be an appropriate 
spouse, expressed in terms of qabīla/bayt and Yemeni social hierarchies, second-
generation participants rejected that such considerations would be a barrier for them. For 
example Layla (20s, born in Yemen, moved to L8 at a young age, student) notes:  
The fact that some girls couldn't get married to other people from other tribes because of 
their status. But it used to be quite strong like ten years ago, but not now.  
Somewhat related to the notion of the qabīla, but nonetheless distinct, is that of social 
hierarchies in Yemen which Rīm also expanded upon. She made an explicit distinction 
between qabāyil families and what she termed as dawāshī families who were described as 
‘lower-class gypsies’. The word dawāshīn is the plural of dawshān, a term referring to 
individuals of a lower status in undesirable professions. Weir (2007: 59) notes that in 
Rāziḥ (far northern Yemen), this term is used both by qabīlīs to refer to anyone below 
qabīlī status, but also by: 
those who actually slaughter animals for a living, or who farm or trade, or regard themselves as 
socially superior to tanners, cuppers, circumcisers, and musicians, whom they refer to by the 
derogatory terms dawāshīn or muzāyinah. (ibid.) 
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Confirming the use of the term from a qabīlī perspective, Rīm noted that butchers are 
considered lower class or dawāshīn, and that while a man from a higher-class status may 
marry a woman of a lower-class, the reverse is discouraged.55 While one’s qabīla or bayt 
was not considered to hold significance for marriage choices, participants held different 
perspectives on the how Yemeni social stratification operates in Liverpool. Aḥmad (30s, 
born in Liverpool, education sector) noted that that a qabīlī would be very unlikely to take 
a dawshān spouse, even in Liverpool. However, Rīm contested this, citing the example of 
her now ex-husband whose mother was considered dawshān leading to several elder male 
members of her family discouraging the marriage the between the son of a dawshān 
women to a daughter of a qabīlī father. While such social hierarchies and their 
implications are known to, and sometimes directly experienced by participants, they are 
nonetheless now open to contestation, losing or changing significance as they travel. In the 
private sphere of the family, such ethnically-defined forms of kinship and hierarchy are 
known and may be felt as tangible, reinforced by trips to Yemen and the presence of 
(older) first-generation Yemenis to whom they still hold significance. However, they were 
more often evoked in an ‘imagined’ sense, connecting individuals to the places and 
histories of their forebears, rather than felt as exerting ‘real’ influence on second-
generation participants’ choices of spouse or friendships in the Liverpool context. In this 
travelling context, ansāb (genealogies), qabīla/bayt, and social hierarchies are re-imagined 
by second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis, but simultaneously transformed as the 
surrounding context of their social function (i.e. Yemeni society) is no longer present, 
further compounded by the relatively small number of Yemenis in Liverpool.  
                                                        
55 This accords with the literature on social stratification in Yemen, where it is noted that such divisions of 
social class seem to play a lesser role in the more rural areas such as Rāziḥ in the far north were ‘There is no 
evidence that sharecroppers or wage laborers ever constituted a dependent and subservient economic or 
social class…as in regions with major and enduring inequalities in landownership such as the Tihāmah and 
the Ta’izz-Ibb region’ (Weir, 2007: 33). 
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The above sections have explored Yemeniness in Liverpool and how localised Yemeni 
identities are produced/performed within family networks, aided by translocal connections 
to Malāḥ and other regions. It is necessary to take into account that these performances are 
situated, physically and discursively, in this new diasporic context. Performances such as 
the wedding and narratives of qabīla/bayt reveal that Yemeniness in Liverpool retains its 
connections to a specific territory in certain contexts: customs and traditions being noted 
as specifically Malāḥi, kinship being discussed with reference to the Yemeni village, 
sustained family connections and regular travel to Malāḥ, the translocal flows of people 
and goods, and the importance of language discussed further in this chapter. The following 
sections now broaden the scale to the neighbourhood, exploring how Yemeni identities 
among second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis are produced alongside hybridised Scouse-
Yemeni identities in which the social imaginary of L8 and Liverpool are important. 
 
4.5 Lodge Lane: Bāb al-Yaman 
This section presents an ethnographic tour of Lodge Lane, highlighting the physical or 
‘visual’ reality of the Arab/Yemeni presence in Liverpool. As has been noted, the physical 
presence of objects, foods, aromas, clothing, and so on are important in the production of 
‘aesthetic’ diasporas (Crang, 2010). Werbner and Fumanti (2012: 3) similarly highlight 
that for many encapsulated diaspora groups, such aesthetically-rich spaces enable ‘worlds 
of alternative cultural celebration within the nation; these too constitute liminal, “third” 
spaces’. Thus these aesthetic productions also take place in the physical spaces of 
diaspora, not only its imaginaries. Situated ‘diasporic spatialities’ are equally as important 
as the migratory journeys and ‘spaces of identity’ (Knott, 2010: 81). This section now 
highlights Lodge Lane’s importance as Liverpool’s main ‘multi-ethnic’ locality which has 
an increasingly visible Arab presence. Rather than being simply a ‘Yemeni’ locality, the 
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social imaginary of L8 for Liverpool-Yemenis will be seen throughout the ethnographic 
chapters as resting on its multi-ethnic nature – the layering of these histories are visible as 
Caribbean and African shops stand alongside Arab/Yemeni and Somali businesses.  
Lodge Lane in many ways presents a microcosm of Toxteth’s multi-ethnic histories but 
also stands as a metaphor for Liverpool-Yemeni life more generally. Located in the heart 
of L8, it is invariably considered the ‘hub’ of Liverpool-Yemeni life. Hayfā (30s, born in 
Liverpool, social worker) memorably noted that she and her friends would refer to Lodge 
Lane as Bāb al-Yaman (‘The Gate of Yemen’), alluding to one of the entrances in the wall 
surrounding Old Ṣan’ā, painting a vivid picture of Lodge Lane as an ‘entrance’ into 
Liverpool-Yemeni life (reminiscent also of Rīm’s earlier description of an American city 
as Bāb al-Yaman).  
 
Figure 4: Lodge Lane. David Harrison, 2019. 
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Despite the general acknowledgement of Lodge Lane as a Yemeni hub, there are very few 
visual clues as to a specific Yemeni presence; rather the many shops and businesses present 
themselves as variously ‘Arab’. The lack of establishments marketed as explicitly 
‘Yemeni’ on Lodge Lane could stem from a number of reasons: an increase in non-
Yemeni Arabs in the area meaning more ‘generically’ marketed establishments reach a 
wider audience, Yemeni cuisine being associated with family life and the home, and the 
relative popularity of Levantine cuisine throughout the Arab world which is well 
represented on Lodge Lane (Hammond, 2007: 134).  
 
Beginning at the southern end, the multi-ethnic histories of Toxeth are immediately 
present: neighbouring Malaysian and Caribbean eateries stand opposite Fardowsa’s 
Boutique which displays various Middle Eastern-style items of clothing in the window. 
Next door is the Somali Women’s Group and Abdallah’s Newsagents – one of the many 
Yemeni owned newsagents in and around Lodge Lane. Moving further up, a number of 
generically-named ‘Middle Eastern’ restaurants such as ‘Marrakech’ and ‘Eastern’ stand 
among newsagents and the Merseyside Sudanese Community Centre. While many of these 
restaurants are Yemeni-owned as participants mentioned and as trips to them revealed, 
very few are visibly designated ‘Yemeni’. Participants spoke of there being an increase in 
restaurants and cafés over the last several years which were visibly Yemeni, and which I 
also observed. One which has only recently opened in the latter half of 2019 is called 





Figure 5: A Yemeni Restaurant. David Harrison, 2019. 
While a specifically Yemeni element remains hidden among a more generalised Arab or 
Middle Eastern atmosphere, the many shop signs written in English and Arabic, the sounds 
of Arabic and Somali spoken along the street, and the many people wearing Yemeni, other 
Arab or Islamic dress, set it apart from other areas of the city and contribute to a multi-
ethnic aesthetic which does not point clearly to any single diaspora.  
Further up again is Green Mountain, a general store which stocks Arabian products, such 
as traditional Yemeni coffee, shisha pipes, Arabian incense, and so on. There are also 
various newsagents advertising ‘cheap international calls’ and ‘money transfer services’. 
In among the various Middle Eastern-styled restaurants is also Rehoboth International 
African Market, reminding passers-by of Toxteth’s other non-Arab groups and histories. 
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Towards the top of Lodge Lane are Sakoon and Coffee Lodge, both popular with local 
Arab residents.56  
 
Figure 6: An Arabic shop sign. David Harrison, 2018. 
The Arabic sign reads: ‘Abdul-Bāsiṭ al-Ṣūfī, Quick Money Transfers, Yemen and Across the 
World’ 
                                                        
56 Another point that requires underlining is the general lack of Yemeni-oriented (or even Arab-oriented) 
spaces for casual socialisation, for men or for women. Aly’s (2015) study on young Arab-Londoners relied 
upon shisha cafés and similar establishments as they provided a space for young Arab-Londoners to 
socialise in a culturally traditional ‘Arab’ environment, without the presence of alcohol or other cultural 
taboos. However, even Lodge Lane as a Yemeni hub has no such spaces. The city-centre does have several 
shisha cafés, but these are largely frequented by students, Arab and non-Arab, rather than a clearly 
Liverpool-Yemeni base of customers. The lack of such spaces inevitably made it more difficult to recruit 
participants, especially young men as discussed in Chapter 2, as well as limiting observations to events-by-
invitation and other institutions which have a high Yemeni presence, but are not exclusively ‘Yemeni 
spaces’ such as the community centres and mosques discussed in the following two chapters. Rather than 
this being simply a lack, however, understanding why it is so is telling in itself, as Hall (2012: 35) writes 
reflecting on Brah’s cartographies ‘the absent/presences are key parts of the “data” too’. 
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This brief tour of Lodge Lane underlines the approach of this thesis which emphasises the 
importance of scale and context in such a study. Although a specifically Yemeni presence 
may not be ‘visible’ to an outsider, I wish to move away from discussions of 
‘(in)visibility’. Indeed, Yemenis are not invisible to each other, and Lodge Lane is 
nonetheless recognized as Liverpool’s Bāb al-Yaman by second-generation participants. 
From an institutional and/or etic perspective, authors such as Halliday (2010: 131) and 
Seddon (2014) characterise British-Yemenis as historically ‘invisible’ with later 
generations achieving greater ‘visibility’. Of course, institutional representation may be 
desirable or important in some contexts, but prioritising such accounts risks equating 
essentialised notions of (ethnic) ‘community’ with particular institutional portrayals, 
thereby becoming a dominant discourse. That is to say, such a focus prioritises an etic 
account or the accounts of ‘community leaders’, telling us little about the multiple, 
everyday negotiations/productions/performances of positioned identities in which 
‘visibility’ may be of no great concern.  
This tour of Lodge Lane has highlighted that although localised Yemeni identities are most 
clearly produced and performed in family networks, many Liverpool-Yemenis nonetheless 
live in the broader context of a multi-ethnic neighbourhood. This is important in the 
context of Liverpool as L8 continues to be produced, physically and in its social 
imaginary, as a locality of ‘difference’. Although the road now has a more distinctly Arab 
presence, a participant from Brown’s ethnography highlighted how it stood for an enforced 
‘boundary’ for Liverpool-born Blacks in the 1960s and 1970s:  
It’s funny–up by Lodge Lane there’s a pub called the Boundary. And it actually was a 
Boundary for black people as far as I was concerned…Cops would actually say, “What are you 
doing going out of your area?” (2005: 49) 
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While such (literal) policing of boundaries has disappeared, participants often spoke of L8 
and Lodge Lane as ‘home’ or an area in which the threat of racism was far less. Maryam 
(50s, grew up outside of Liverpool) noted that after visiting other regions of the city or 
other UK cities, returning to L8 felt like ‘coming home’. Rīm, having grown up in North 
Liverpool before moving to L8, recounted an experience of the family shop being severely 
vandalised after 9/11, noting that incidents of racism were far fewer in L8. Frost and 
Catney’s (2019: 9) article on place-indentity in L8 makes a similar finding, albeit without 
mention of Yemenis, noting: ‘Neighbourhood belonging in L8 has assumed a more 
meaningful and elevated position in relation to residents’ simultaneous attachments to 
Liverpool and the UK’.  
Characterising L8 (and Lodge Lane) as ‘multi-ethnic’ is not to diminish the distinctiveness 
of each of its groups, but rather highlights that Liverpool-Yemenis do not routinely employ 
‘ethnicised’ identities in a fetishised sense. That is to say, such boundary making occurs 
within the largely invisible (to a public/institutional gaze) but nonetheless richly textured 
world of the (inter)domestic sphere, and rests more clearly upon specific localities and 
groups of families rather than assertions of a national Yemeni identity vis-à-vis wider 
society. As Liverpool-Yemenis form a relatively small population, and in the absence of 
an established public diasporic sphere as discussed in the following chapter, attention must 
be given to the neighbourhood in which many everyday trans-ethnic encounters take place, 
and as the space where organic hybridisation occurs. Although the older generations may 
be more encapsulated, the physical and spatial reality of L8 means that for the second 
generation who have grown up in Liverpool, broader engagement in the neighbourhood 
means moving beyond purely Yemeni networks. Indeed, on an everyday neighbourhood-
level Munīra spoke positively of the many inter-personal connections between her family 
and non-Yemeni neighbours. In this way, while the (encapsulated) translocal connections 
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and aesthetic production of a Yemeni diaspora contribute to the multi-ethnic landscape of 
L8, it is this landscape itself which is important in articulations of identity which extend 
beyond the family.  
 
4.6 Scouse-Yemenis 
Referring again to Brown’s (2005: 130-131) words, Liverpool can be understood as an 
‘elaborate signifier’ which the city’s many (and historically, mainly) migrant groups have 
come to invest in and inscribe upon with their own productions of identity and locality. 
Rather than envisioning Liverpool as a single homogeneous ‘city locality’, Liverpudlian 
localities and Scouse identities are defined by the inhabitants varied migratory/diasporic 
histories and relations to the city as well as (and sometimes more clearly) sub-localities 
within the city, all ultimately combining to form this elaborate signifier. While the 
historical contingencies which presented the opportunity for the participants’ parents’ 
generation to open shops and become established as the largest Muslim group in the city 
are not exceptional per se, second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis incorporate the social 
imaginary of Liverpool into their own hybridised identities which emphasise Liverpool’s 
‘fringe/marginal’ position within England/the UK, geographically, demographically and 
historically. Thus I argue that Liverpool’s position within the UK fosters forms of 
belonging and attachment which are strongly felt across the city’s various groups. In this 
way, ‘Scouse’ identities can be understood as multiple, ethnicised, localised, gendered, 
classed, and so on; but it is above all a strong sense of attachment to ‘Liverpool’ (or a 
locality therein) as a signifier, rather than any particular (dominant) discourse or history, 
which allows such seemingly fluid hybridisation. The following quotes illustrate how 
Liverpool-Yemenis creatively combine ‘Scouseness’ with ‘Yemeniness’ in conscious and 
unconscious forms of hybridisation. 
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A memorable example was when Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment and 
activism), unprompted, asked me whether I was going to ask why ‘Yemenis feel so 
comfortable in Liverpool’, to which she added: 
Yemenis, they are the Scousers of the Arab world, and the ‘Scouse’ term, I don’t know how it’s 
interpreted by other people, but when you look at the Liverpool people and the Yemeni 
people they really get on and that’s why Yemenis identified with the people of Liverpool. 
There were so many interracial marriages in Liverpool, especially because they set up corner 
shops: they set up community hubs as well…So you know, when I speak to people they go: ‘do 
you know the Yemeni family at the top of my street?’ and more often than not I will. And 
Yemenis have had such an impact on Liverpool, so you know the families of my L8 
neighbourhood saw my family grow up, they know my dad from when he came over. They 
really have connected in such a way and when you see Yemeni deaths happen, non-Muslims, 
Liverpool people come to the mosque and they go to their marriages and children’s marriages. 
That’s such a beautiful thing. Liverpool’s so unique in that respect and it’s not until you do go 
to other cities like Bradford or Birmingham which have issues, you know, it’s not like that here 
in Liverpool. The Yemenis did an amazing job when they came over, they persevered, and 
Liverpool found the Yemenis to be just like them and vice-versa. 
 
Similarly, Zahra (20s, born in Liverpool, student) says: 
I think they [Scouse and Yemeni] go together really well, I genuinely think a lot of people 
would say they are just as proud to say they are Scouse as Yemeni. I don't know, I feel 
Liverpool has a large part to play in this, like how friendly they are, well South Liverpool at 
least, how friendly they are to other ethnicities and that, so I think that played a large part and 
its really nice and you can't not be proud being from here especially with everything Liverpool 
has gone through like government cuts and I think there's just a sense of solidarity and it's 
very nice. It's a really good city to be honest. 
 
Aḥmad (30s, born in Liverpool, education sector) noted that although he considers himself 
Scouse, there were several racist incidents in his majority-white North Liverpool 
neighbourhood: 
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I had a really strong Scouse accent when I was younger, I don't think you could get more 
Scouse than being born in my neighbourhood, so it was all like 'me ma, me da', but that was in 
conflict with 'no you're Arab, you're Muslim' but there wasn't really anything to pull it 
together so it was difficult at times. And then, after growing up there as well, it became a base 
for the National Front, and we were subjected to their attacks… Scouser is a really strong 
identity and Yemeni is a really strong identity and Arab was in there so it was quite complex. 
 
While Maḥmūd (40s, born in the North West, moved to L8 at a young age, self-employed) 
articulated the diasporic tension inherent in being both ‘there’ and ‘here’: 
Me as an individual, I'm split between organic roots in Yemen and also organic roots here in 
Liverpool, so in order for me to exercise my attitude and my way of thinking, this society at 
large, I'd have to be able to adapt, say for example, to society here and to be interactive with 
society at large here. And if I go to Yemen I have to fit in with the people there too. 
 
The idea that ‘Scouse and Yemeni’ are so readily hybridised was repeated on many 
occasions, summed up in Layla’s (20s, born in Yemen, student) comment: 
Yemeni-Scousers are double trouble: we have the Yemeni confidence and the Scouse 
confidence.  
 
This strong sense of attachment to Liverpool can be readily felt from the above quotes. Of 
course, this is not to simply paint a picture of Liverpool as a utopia of ‘multiculturalism’ 
(indeed Aḥmad’s quote highlights this), but participants nonetheless discussed their 
identification with Liverpool in a manner reminiscent of Brown’s (2005) Liverpool-born 
Black participants. I would further add that this attachment to locality is a sentiment 
familiar to most Liverpudlians. Thus, to paraphrase Brown’s (ibid.) reflection on 
Liverpool-born Blacks’ relation to the city: to understand Yemeni-Liverpool, you’ve got to 
understand the historical and contemporary production of ‘Liverpool’, the signifier.  
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What this section has attempted to delineate is not simply that Liverpool somehow has an 
exceptional ability to unproblematically incorporate its diaspora groups, but rather that the 
production of Liverpool as a locality-signifier and its social imaginary are deeply 
embedded within notions of a Scouse identity which is foremost predicated upon 
attachment, in whichever form, to the city (or its neighbourhoods). This does not exclude 
ethnicisation of identities, but given the specific historic, social, and demographic contexts 
which have shaped Liverpool-Yemeni life, I argue that this relation to Liverpool and/or L8 
presents an alternative, demotic, discourse by which Liverpool-Yemenis assert hybridised 
identities. It is also important to note that these hybridised Scouse-Yemenis identities were 
not articulated as being in conflict with the more encapsulated world of the domestic 
sphere and spaces such as the wedding, but rather that ethnicised performances of 
Yemeniness were recognized as taking place in particular contexts, especially those where 
the older generation were likely to be present or assert authority in ‘ethnic’ matters. 
 
Frost (2000) argues that ‘Scouse’ has historically been an insular white working-class 
identity which has excluded Liverpool-born Blacks despite their long presence in 
Liverpool. It is important to highlight the histories of systemic and everyday racism 
towards Liverpool-born Blacks and the many injustices faced, but I argue that Frost’s 
(2000) account is somewhat reductive in not allowing for a more nuanced understanding 
of hybridised identities. Indeed, Brown’s (2005) ethnographic account highlights the 
experiences of racism in Liverpool, but also delineates a much more complex and 
ambivalent reading of Black-Scouse identities in which attachment to Liverpool is very 
real, but is also a particular, lived, and historically sited attachment which necessarily 
differs from that of the city’s white inhabitants. Frost herself recognises this, writing: 
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black people in Liverpool are every bit as ‘Scouse’ as white-working class Liverpudlians in that 
they speak with the same accent, they have a love of football and support one of the local teams 
(Liverpool), and they share the struggles of hardship, of unemployment, of stigma through their 
attachment to Liverpool. Indeed the belligerence and militancy that Liverpool became 
(in)famous for in the 1970s and 1980s finds expression in the more radical black organizations 
in Liverpool (2000: 214) 
 
Thus I argue that the notion of multiple positioned belongings allows a more fluid view in 
which second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis are ‘every bit as Scouse’ as other 
Liverpudlians, while also acknowledging that Scouse identities themselves are contextual 
and relational, and can be embedded in various forms of exclusion and marginalisation. 
Scouse-Yemeni and Scouse-Irish identities certainly share some commonalities expressed 
primarily through attachment to Liverpool, but each is also constructed according to the 
specific historical and contingent contexts. It is also important to note that Scouse 
identities also operate on various scales: those who grew up outside of L8, while still 
emphasising Scouse identities, also noted experiences of racism which they felt would 
have occurred less in L8. Similarly, while those who grew up in L8 articulated Scouse 
identities as closely connected to their experiences in the neighbourhood, the following 
section will also show how participants also (contextually) employ Scouse identities in a 
broader city-wide sense vis-à-vis other areas of England and negative stereotyping of 
Liverpool. 
 
Hybridised Scouse-Yemeni identities have been seen exist alongside constructions and 
performances of Yemeniness which are aided by translocality and the translocal family. 
Sometimes, such as in the wedding, these performances may emphasise the maintenance 
of tradition, and at other times creative negotiation and hybridisation were emphasised. 
However, as has been noted, several participants raised concern that with the current crisis 
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in Yemen the younger generations are increasingly less able to participate in or become 
familiar with Yemeni culture. This also highlights that the experience of simply being in 
Yemen for extended periods of time plays an important role in shaping the second-
generation participants’ constructions of Yemeni identities. In this way, second-generation 
participants’ Yemeni identities are not formed through any form of ‘formal’ teaching, but 
rest upon organic, everyday and familial translocal modes of living. Future events may 
make the presence of Yemen in Liverpool much less tangible, and possibly lead to a loss 
of the strong translocal ties to Yemen which currently characterise the diasporic nature of 
Liverpool-Yemenis. The next section will now discuss the role of language (Scouse-
English and Yemeni-Arabic) in the production of Yemeni and Scouse-Yemeni identities. 
 
4.7 Language in the Diaspora: Arabic and Scouse 
Language, like kinship and religion, can also often be a powerful marker of ethnicity. 
Suleiman (2011: 1) writing on the role of Arabic language in Arab (national) identities 
notes that: ‘Under normal circumstances, the symbolism of language blends into a banal or 
quotidian view of identity that is hardly noticeable in everyday life.’ However, in a 
diasporic context language gains extra significance as a powerful symbol of belonging (or 
anxiety) in the construction/performance of ethnic identities. In the Liverpool context, the 
importance is twofold: Yemeni-Arabic being a marker of ethnicity and ‘difference’ from 
non-Yemeni groups within Liverpool, but Scouse-English also being a marker of identity 
and ‘difference’ at the scale of the nation, and sometimes even within the city, as Chapter 
3 noted. Language in the diaspora is often a bi- or multi-lingual phenomenon which can 
become very literally hybridised (Hall, 1990: 236). Canagarajah and Silberstein emphasise 
the importance of language in the diaspora:  
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Part of that negotiation [of the intra- and intergroup relations] can entail multilingualism—a 
phenomenon that can complicate diaspora identity by moving the community from its heritage 
language—and it can simultaneously become a strategic resource as it helps members negotiate 
their layered identities and group relationships. (2012: 82) 
Language can therefore play an important role in both the ethnicisation and hybridisation 
of identity, but it can also be a source of anxiety, sadness or nostalgia if proficiency in the 
‘homeland’ language begins to fragment. All participants noted that they had competence 
in (Yemeni/Malāḥi) Arabic to varying degrees, with some such as Maḥmūd, Ṭāriq and 
Aḥmad considering themselves native speakers of Arabic, and others such as Layla and 
Hayfā expressing regret over their limited Arabic ability.57 That Yemeni-Arabic continues 
to be spoken and/or understood by second-generation participants further reveals the real, 
translocal presence of Yemen/Malāḥ in Liverpool through the transnational family: to 
speak Yemeni (or Malāḥi) Arabic in certain contexts continues a linguistic and 
communicative connection to the ‘homeland’. However, as connections to the homeland 
fragment and diasporas become more established, language proficiency can become lost.58 
This also emphasises the diasporic tension of second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis in that 
Yemeni/Malāḥi-Arabic is anchored in these territorial ‘roots’ most clearly visible within 
the family (i.e. in such statements as ‘My parents speak in Arabic, but I reply in English’), 
but Scouse-English is the preferred ‘lingua franca’ demonstrating ‘routes’ into the present. 
Language perhaps most clearly exemplifies that second-generation diasporans occupy a 
unique ‘third space’ (Bhabha, 1994) in that they continuously negotiate and experience 
                                                        
57 Indeed these three participants would frequently switch to Arabic depending on whom they were talking 
to. Most Participants, excluding the above who were fully comfortable using Arabic, also stated that their 
parents’ generation would speak in Arabic and they would reply in English. 
58 See Mills (2001) for a discussion on language ability among third-generation British-South Asian children, 
which notes ‘All children…noted their lack of proficiency in their Asian languages’. See also Alba, Logan, 
Lutz and Stults (2002) for the ‘three-generation model of linguistic assimilation’. Also Sofu (2009) for 
discussion on language shift in the three-generational model in Turkish-Arabic speaking families. 
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both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, leading to multiple ‘positioned belongings’ (Brocket, 2020: 3). 
For third and later generations for who become further distanced from the language of the 
‘homeland’ and as transnational ties decrease as attachments to the new locality become 
more solid, these ‘roots’ can become more metaphoric and re-imagined: it is perhaps this 
re-imagining of a collective diasporic consciousness which allows a diasporic identity to 
continue.  
 
Understood in terms of a single language, Arabic also presents a complex situation. While 
Standard or Classical Arabic is the ‘official’ language of Arab nations and the most usual 
form of the written language, the Arab world is better characterised by multiple Arabics 
which exist alongside a codified and standardised language. Suleiman (2011: 106) writes: 
‘Arabic speakers do conceptualise their language situation in a more or less dichotomous 
way, ascribing different values to the fuṣḥā [Classical Arabic] and the ‘āmiyyas [dialectal 
Arabic]’. Language itself can also become the subject of national ideologies and language 
planning; Ferguson (2013: 124) in his study on language practices among Sheffield-
Yemenis notes differing perspectives on the Yemeni-Arabic of the home, and the 
Standard/Classical Arabic of the school.59  
 
                                                        
59 A full account of the complex language situation in the Arab world is not within the scope of this thesis, 
but see Suleiman (2011) for a nuanced account on the interaction between fuṣḥā and ‘āmiyya in 
productions of Arab identity. In brief, the Classical Arabic of the Qur’ān provides a basis for Standard Arabic 
which has been ‘promoted and protected vigorously in the twentieth century’ (Brustad, 2017: 42), but this 
form of the language, enshrined in the Qur’ān, exists alongside contemporary Arabic varieties which have 
diverged considerably from the language of 7th century Arabic – so much so that some varieties are no 
longer mutually intelligible. Whether these contemporary Arabics are considered ‘dialects’ or ‘languages’ 
has been the source of much ideological debate (see Brustad, 2017). For this thesis, ideological debates 
aside, it is important to simply note that Arabic speakers negotiate a complex situation moving between 
multiple forms and registers of language, and that these forms of Arabic are also associated with their own 
spheres of usage.  
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Participants discussed a plethora of views and perspectives, with some regarding 
Yemeni/Malāḥi-Arabic as an important part of ‘Yemeniness’, while others prioritise 
Classical Arabic as a means to engage in religious learning and interact with other Arabic 
speakers. Nonetheless, the participants’ articulated attitudes to Arabic and its role in 
producing Yemeniness as contextual and relational: speakers reported freely mixing or 
code-switching between varieties of Arabic. When amongst other Yemenis or Malāḥis (i.e. 
in family contexts), these dialects were felt as important, but in mixed-Arab settings, code-
switching and/or hybridisation was predominant.  
 
The following excerpt from an interview with Zahra (20s, born in Liverpool, student) 
gives a strong sense of how Yemeni-Arabic is felt to be an important element of Yemeni 
ethnic identity, while also simultaneously becoming hybridised in the context of multi-
ethnic L8:  
Researcher: That's brought us to the question of Arabic language, how does that feature in a 
Yemeni identity in Liverpool? 
 
Zahra: Very strongly, I feel like people, especially with the dialect and [being] so proud to be 
Yemeni…because it's so strong, the Yemeni dialect is enhanced. And I feel like that's another 
way I'm being separated from them [due to lack of fluency]. But I've noticed with some 
Yemenis their Arabic is starting to mingle with other dialects, so some Yemenis and Somalis 
are friends, especially the lads, their dialect is getting mixed in with Somali too which is quite 
cool, but this might be why it's difficult to have an Arabic which is not like the standard. 
 
Researcher: Do you speak Arabic at home? 
 
Zahra: They [my parents] speak to us in Arabic and we reply back in English. I can understand a 
lot more than I can speak. It's annoying because I could speak it when I was young but I just 
lost it somehow. Most people I know my age can speak Arabic, the only people who can't are 
me and my older and little sister, but my brother can speak Arabic because he got left in 
Yemen for a year. 
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Researcher: So what are your feelings on learning Arabic in Liverpool? 
 
Zahra: I think it would influence the community in a positive way, especially the dialect, it 
would make you feel more Yemeni, and Arabs who speak another dialect you'll know you're 
not from the same place, that proves, engrains that you are Yemeni. 
 
 
Zahra’s account that Liverpool-Yemeni Arabic is becoming hybridised with Somali also 
again highlights the close connection, historically and geographically, between Yemen and 
Somalia and its re-creation in the Liverpool context. Her comment also demonstrates that 
hybridity can occur on multiple levels, not only as a result of the diasporic group’s contact 
with the language/culture of the majority population, but also between minority groups. 
Further to the emphasis I place on a multi-scalar perspective, the language practices 
expressed regarding Arabic also operate on different scales. Whereas Yemeni/Malāḥi 
Arabic is located in and oriented towards ‘roots’ in Yemen and the family, other forms of 
Arabic are prioritised when moving to the scale of neighbourhood (Toxteth/L8) where 
Liverpool-Yemenis are increasingly in contact with non-Yemeni Arabs or Arabic 
speakers, and on a global scale where Liverpool-Yemenis situate themselves vis-à-vis the 
broader Arab and Muslim world. 
 
Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment) further illustrated this when I asked 
whether the Yemeni dialect was important to her: 
Definitely, one-hundred percent. Like my sister can speak with different dialects and it can 
really help her in different situations. So if you’re with all Malāḥis there’s no point speaking 
fuṣḥā [Classical Arabic] because you can’t interrelate with them and, you know, it can even be 
seen as snobbery and when you’re with, like, Adenis or people from Syria or al-Khalīj [the Gulf] 
you really do need to have their slang or dialect to feel like you’re almost accepted. But saying 
that, on Lodge Lane, there is this wonderful women’s group with people from all different 
places, and they all change their accent depending on who they’re sitting with. They could be 
sitting with a number of women in one room and even if they move around and sit with 
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different people, they change accents. It’s mostly Yemenis, but there is Somali and Libyan and 
Algerian. It was Yemeni heavy, but it’s a nice mix now. But that’s for my parents’ generation, 
but for my generation we are completely mixed. There’s no issue with having an African friend, 
a Latvian friend, everyone is mixed… 
 
 
Maḥmūd notes that formal Arabic learning in his experience in Liverpool is centred 
around the Qur’ān, which does not necessarily allow heritage speakers of Arabic to engage 
with wider (non-religious) literature and participation in the language. Indeed, Maḥmūd 
was very passionate about encouraging opportunities for Arabic speakers in Liverpool to 
improve their Arabic literacy beyond religious scripture: 
Because I actually lived in Yemen for many years, the language that I learnt is actually Arabic, 
but it's an accent isn't it, it's derived from the classical Arabic language and when I actually 
explored how it is actually spoken in Morocco and Egypt, it gave me more confusion, so it 
became really off-putting if the accent in Yemen is different so far and different again in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
What also I've noticed is that a lot of the communities, whether its Yemeni or any other 
community, the only time they put in an effort to learn Arabic is when they exercise the rote-
learning. So they memorise verses from the Qur'ān and sometimes a lot of the people actually 
learn quite substantial amounts by memorisation. That's a good thing, memorisation in 
general, whether its verses from the Bible or Qur'an things like that, but the question is that if 
your language skills are going to be hindered and you're just going to memorise, you're just 
doing half the job. 
 
The Scouse accent has also been mentioned as forming a salient element of Scouse 
identities, as Boland notes that:  
an effective understanding of a Scouser is not only spatial – someone born in Liverpool – 
because the sonoric landscape of spoken Scouse, and thereby Scouse identity, extends beyond 





As Chapter 3 argued, Scouse identity is constructed in terms of attachment to ‘Liverpool 
the signifier’, and its performance is perhaps best encapsulated in the Scouse accent. As a 
quote from Brown’s (2005: 107) ethnography showcases the idea that the Scouse accent is 
an important marker of identity for Liverpool-born Blacks, quite apart from other English 
identities (‘We only know one language, that’s Liverpudlian’), this section will show that 
Liverpool-Yemenis have also inscribed the accent with significance. While Arabic in its 
multiple forms is maintained via the family, becoming further associated with broader 
forms of transnationalism (e.g. as a means of communication when traveling to other Arab 
countries, consuming Arabic literature/media), attachment and attitudes to the Scouse 
accent highlight the multiple positioned belongings of Liverpool-Yemenis: within 
Liverpool, Yemeniness is contextually ethnicised and hybridised, however participants 
noted that outside of Liverpool or among non-Liverpudlians ‘difference’ was also 
construed in relation to ‘Scouseness’.60 When asked about the important of the Scouse 
accent to her own identity, Zahra (20s, born in Liverpool, student) noted: 
This conversation has actually come up a lot recently. I would say I'm Scouse because I want to 
represent Liverpool, but it comes with the downside of the class issue because I find a lot in 
uni, they think if you're Scouse you're not that smart, like they thought they were smarter 
than me and I couldn't tell if it was because of race, sex, or class so I softened my accent a bit 
which was really frustrating. But if I'm around people who aren't Scouse and I don't like them, 
I go really Scouse. 
[…] 
I actually think it's partly because Liverpool is a port city that we distinguish our accent from 
everyone else, like ‘you aren't part of us’, other British people, like our accent has got stronger, 
I know it got stronger when people came over from Ireland. 
 
 
                                                        
60 For example the reading-group set up by Maḥmūd, the aim of which was to encourage broader literacy 
skills in Arabic to be able to read non-religious material, or the role of Arabic as a means to enjoy popular 
Arabic culture such as songs. However, most participants mentioned that they did not actively follow any 
Arabic news channels or newspapers noting that this was something their parents’ generation were more 
likely to do. 
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Similarly, Munīf (60s, born in Yemen, community leader, living in Liverpool since the 
1980s and has children raised in Liverpool) noted regarding the Liverpool-born 
generations that: 
There is a lot of positive things between the new generation, and if we can utilise that and 
nurture it, because the new generation feel so proud being Scouse, especially with their 
dialect, you know, they’re Scousers. 
 
The manner in which Liverpool-Yemenis articulate their relationships to Yemeni/Classical 
Arabic and Scouse provides a clear context for these ‘multiple positionings’ in this 
interstitial space: Yemeni-Arabic continuing the ‘sonoric landscape’ of the homeland and 
the family, Classical Arabic providing a link to the broader Arab and Muslim world(s), and 
Scouse in the production of (hybridised-localised) Scouse-Yemeni identities. These 
contexts are not, however, always completely ‘separate’; language also combines in 
processes of hybridisation as exemplified by the regular use of Arabic greetings and 
formulaic Islamic phrases amidst otherwise Scouse-accented conversations.  
 
4.8 Travelling Imaginaries of Yemen 
Vertovec notes that: 
Compounding the awareness of multi-locality, the ‘fractured memories’ of diaspora 
consciousness produce a multiplicity of histories, ‘communities’ and selves – a refusal of fixity 
often serving as a valuable resource for resisting repressive local or global situations. (1999: 
450) 
This chapter thus far has highlighted that (ethnicised) Yemeni identities and ‘Yemeniness’ 
are constructed and performed largely within the hidden world of the interdomestic sphere 
indicative of an encapsulated aesthetic diaspora. In these constructions, specific localities 
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within Yemen, particularly Malāḥ, have been seen to be more salient than reference to the 
‘nation’, but this is not to say that there is a lack of ‘national belonging’. This section will 
now explore these ‘fractured memories’ in how second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis 
produce/articulate imaginaries of Yemen which draw primarily upon Yemen’s ancient 
histories and its broader position within the Arab world. In this way, Yemen is ‘re-
imagined’ against two main antagonisms; one being internal divide, and the other being 
outside stereotyping and interference. 
Some participants spoke about the civilizational histories of Yemen, mentioning that they 
were a source of pride strengthening their emotional connection to Yemen. While these 
articulations draw upon imaginaries of Yemen stemming from the region’s ancient past 
rather than referencing Yemen as a contemporary nation state, Wedeen (2008: 37) 
nonetheless notes that ‘Like most nationalist discourses, Yemeni ones stress the people’s 
antiquity, their continuous occupation of a territory coincident with unified Yemen’. 
Although such imaginaries have been popularised by nationalist discourses, it was notable 
that the participants used these in response to the current crisis and intra-Arab stereotyping 
of Yemenis as ‘poor’ or ‘backwards’. 
 
Aḥmad (30s, born in Liverpool, education sector) contrasts Yemen’s history with that of 
the Gulf States: 
Yemen had existed as a civilization way before Islam, didn't it. So you've got like Ma'rib, Sheba 
and Ḥimyar, and the Jewish rulers, and the frankincense trail, and the great ports and the idea 
of having a great civilization. Some of them in the Arabic Peninsula are intent to bomb these 
sites which is a political thing...but I think there's some jealousy there, they place it in the Gulf, 
and you know...the deserts were all just backwaters and they feel challenged by that. 
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Maḥmūd (40s, born in Merseyside, self-employed) notes that greater emphasis on these 
histories would strengthen a specifically Yemeni identity: 
I think one of the reasons why we are at a greater loss of becoming more Yemeni-identifiable 
is because the majority of the Yemeni population, they're rejecting to know the historical 
roots of Yemen. So I think if people were given the opportunity to learn more about the 
historical factors and combine that with religious belief, it would make us a much more 
positive civilization for years to come. 
 
Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment and activism) relates them to the 
current crisis: 
When I think of those times there is a sense of pride, but on the other hand it’s so unfortunate 
the state Yemen finds itself in now, even before the war, there’s been a massive hindrance in 
the education of Yemenis and how that’s actually impacted Yemen as a country. And I blame 
things like women not being given enough freedom and the mass cultivation of qāt which you 
know, anaesthetises Muslim men. 
 
Rīm (40s, born in Liverpool, social work) draws upon them situationally in broader Arab-
contexts:  
I think we are the root of the Arabs. We were the first Arabs on earth. Like when I went to 
Morocco. You know the Berbers, they were like original bedouins, from the Yemen and Saudi 
area, so when we were like ‘We're from Yemen’, as soon as they knew that, they'd do that 
[places hand on head] to show respect and we'd be like ‘We're your ancestors!’ [laughs] And 
there would be a bit of banter. Any Arab country that I've been to, once they know you're 
Yemeni they're just lovely to you. It's bizarre. Yeah...except Saudi. Maybe Dubai as well, it's so 
mixed now, but there's a lot of Yemenis in Dubai. Some Emiratis think they're better than 
Yemenis, but Dubai was just built up, there wasn't even such a thing as Dubai. 
 
While participants were very much aware of these histories, they also remind us of Brah’s 
(1996: 186) point that ‘Since all these markers of “difference” represent articulating and 
performative facets of power, the “fixing” of collectivities along any singular axis is 
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seriously called into question’. In this case, these histories of Yemen disrupt the notion of 
a single ‘Arab’ identity by accentuating Yemen’s position within the Arab world as an 
often overlooked, marginalised region despite its important place within broader Arab 
history. Similarly, ‘fixing’ a Yemeni national/cultural collectivity with such a discourse 
also requires recognising that these are continually performed and re-made in creating a 
sense of ethno-cultural unity. While these imaginaries may indeed stem from and be 
reinforced by nationalist discourses popularised and propogated in the two Yemens from 
the 1920’s, they are notable in that they do not invoke Yemen with reference to the 
modern-day state or in its political context. Like the qabīla and its genealogies, they bring 
Yemen’s past into the present in a semi-mythologised form which transcends modern 
notions of ‘nation’ and ‘state’, instead asserting Yemen’s continuity as a cultural and 
geographical space. Such a romanticised or idealised re-imagining of the parents’ 
‘homeland’ has also been recognised in other studies, such as Bhimji’s (2008) study on 
‘cosmopolitan belonging’ among second-generation British South-Asians. In addition, 
while such ‘re-imaginings’ of Yemen are persistent in situating participants in Yemen’s 
‘collective’ past and also the broader historical Arab context, they are not the source of any 
mobilisation. Indeed, in contrast to other participants, two community leaders (discussed 
more thoroughly in the following chapter) noted that they find notions such as ‘Yemenis 
are the root of all Arabs’ as unhelpful and possibly detrimental in that they ‘create 
divisions’ being antithetical to notions of ‘inclusivity’ and ‘diversity’.  
 
While most participants were aware of Yemen’s ancient histories, an emerging concern 
was also the lack of access to education regarding Yemen and a broader lack of knowledge 
of Yemen’s history. This lack can be seen as partially reflecting the fragmentation of 
knowledge in the diaspora as well as the approach taken by the ‘community’ centres, but 
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as Munīra’s quote highlights, it also reflects the incapacity or underdevelopment of 
Yemen’s (national) educational infrastructure, particularly in regions such as Malāḥ which 
are far from the more developed areas of Ṣan’ā and Aden.  
 
Although these social imaginaries of Yemen are influenced by nationalist discourses, I 
contend that second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis do not collectively re-imagine Yemen 
primarily as a political entity, but rather draw upon romanticised visions of Yemen which 
emphasise its cultural continuity as a means to cement their own identities in Yemen’s 
collective past without becoming embroiled in the political and geographical divides 
which continue in Yemen. These discourses can be read as simultaneously dominant and 
demotic: in some ways they are ‘dominant’ and ‘nationalist’ in the Yemeni context in that 
they present an essentialised imagining of Yemen and Yemenis as a single ethno-cultural 
group connected by kinship and the collective past, but they are nonetheless employed 
demotically by participants in the diaspora, countering the idea of a monolithic ‘Arab’ 
identity and de-emphasising political divides. In addition, I argue that Yemen is re-
imagined in this way precisely due to the country’s turbulent and traumatic experiences of 
nation-building post-unification, but such an imaginary has not transferred into 
mobilisation around Yemeni political issues on any great scale in Liverpool as the 
following chapter will explore. Many participants noted that they did not actively follow 
Yemeni politics or news, did not feel a North/South divide as relevant to their everyday 
lives in Liverpool, and responded to the current crisis with more reference to the ensuing 
humanitarian disaster than discussion of political alliances. Wedeen (2008: 66) herself 
notes the ambivalent nature of ‘national belonging’ in Yemen in which visions of a unified 
Yemeni culture/ethos rooted in the region’s past exist alongside ‘specifically regional and 
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denominational identities, as well as conflicting views about the importance of piety’, 
arising from resistance to ‘predatory’ regimes.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored two key themes: the production and performance of  
(Liverpool-) Yemeni identities in the interdomestic sphere (Werbner, 1990), alongside 
more hybridised articulations and performances of identity which are centred around the 
multi-ethnic neighbourhood of Toxteth and the social imaginary of Liverpool. Strong 
attachment to both Malāḥ/Yemen and Toxteth/Liverpool was clear throughout 
observations and interviews; sometimes combining, sometimes separate. While 
constructions and performances of ‘Yemeniness’ (or Malāḥiness) continue to root second 
generations in Malāḥ/Yemen, aided by translocal flows and practices, they also negotiate 
their identities in the context of a diasporic tension. I argue that second-generation 
diasporans perhaps feel this tension most keenly as they are at once looking towards 
‘roots’ as represented by the older generations of their (Yemeni-born) parents and 
extended family, while simultaneously looking towards ‘routes’ in Liverpool. Third-
generation diasporans, being born to those already born and raised in the diaspora, present 
a new stage where the pull towards ‘roots’ may not be as intensely experienced. The 
current crisis in Yemen has accentuated this as second-generation participants discussed 
how it could lead to a loss of Yemeni identity in the city as their (third-generation) 
children have little connection to Malāḥ/Yemen. This highlights the importance of the 
lived experiences of being in Yemen which underscores much of the second-generation 
participants’ accounts. Additionally, while performances of ‘Yemeniness’ or ‘Malāḥiness’ 
in the family are more clearly centred on the (trans)local, second-generation participants 
also re-create and articulate an imaginary of Yemen which allows for a sense of national 
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belonging, but it is nonetheless somewhat distanced from the turbulent national politics of 
Yemen. In this way, the ‘homeland’ is not just a physical location, but also the continuous 
negotiation of the past into the present and vice-versa which does not necessarily take the 
nation state as its primary unit of reference. In this way, this and the following chapter are 
cognisant of Werbner’s point that: 
A late modern analysis of diaspora should aim to reveal the dialectics between diaspora 
aesthetics and ‘real’ political mobilization. Exclusive attention either to diasporic organization 
and transnational connections or to the aesthetic products of diaspora leads to the false 
assumption that one is in some sense predictive or epiphenomenal of the other. (2011:472). 
 
This chapter has also emphasised a view in which hybridity is not merely a romanticised 
vision which unproblematically unifies multiple identities and resolves these tensions, but 
rather a view which acknowledges these tensions as central to identity-production in a 
diaspora. Hutnyk (2010) in a critical appraisal of ‘hybridity’ asserts that hybridity theory 
should not be understood as referring to the mixing of two discrete ‘purities’ but instead as 
‘a process rather than a description’ (ibid., 60). Thus far the thesis has emphasised that 
both Scouse and (regional) Yemeni identities are produced contextually and relationally, 
embedded in their own confluence of narratives and contingent histories, rather than being 
a singular pre-fixed given. This being the case, this chapter has also attempted to delineate 
how ‘hybridised’ Scouse-Yemeni identities are not the result of the combination of two 
essentialised ‘pure’ identities – both non-white Scouse identities in L8 and other 
neighbourhoods and regional Yemeni identities emerge out particular sets of sited 
contingencies and confluences, the intersection of which reveals a much messier, more 
complex and ambivalent picture. Therefore the emphasis on contextual identities remains 
an important analytic lens in discussing participants’ multiple belongings. While these 
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identities may at times be separated, their construction and performance are not simple re-
productions. A Yemeni wedding performed in Liverpool, while partially reproducing 
Yemeni cultural and aesthetic performances, is also being performed in a new context, 
gaining new significance.  
Bauman writes that:  
The image of the world generated by life concerns is now devoid of the genuine or assumed 
solidity and continuity which used to be the trademark of modern “structures”. The dominant 
sentiment is the feeling of uncertainty. (1997: 50) 
In some ways, the (re)-ethnicisation of identity can be read as seeking to anchor oneself 
against this radical uncertainty which diasporans encounter directly. A (re)-ethnicised 
identity anchored in the family provides a potent form of belonging, maintaining a link to 
people and places elsewhere. Bauman’s notion of ‘liquid modernity’ captures the 
uncertainty of the postmodern, but nonetheless ethnic/cultural/local identity is still felt as 
‘something’, as Hall (1990: 226) writes ‘The past continues to speak to us. But it no longer 
addresses us as a simple, factual ‘past’, since our relation to it…is always-already “after 
the break”’. 
Finally, according to DeHanas (2013a: 73) useful table of ‘theorised styles of second-
generation youth self-identification’, the material in this chapter has explored how second 
-generation Liverpool-Yemeni identities contain elements of both ‘continuity’ and ‘hybrid 
or situational’ identities when examining these on the scale of everyday families and 
neighbourhoods. For this reason, I have avoided generalising any single category of ‘self-
identification’ to characterise participants, instead placing the emphasis on multiple 
subjectivities and collective (cultural) identities which can, and do, occur depending on the 
scale, context, and relations involved. In contrast to DeHanas’ (ibid.) study which 
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concludes that de-culturated (Muslim) identities provide a strong form of attachment for 
East End Bengalis, sometimes taking preference over ethnicised/localised identities, this 
chapter has demonstrated that ethnicised (culturated) Yemeni identities continue to hold 
relevance for second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis, being constructed and performed via 
the transnational family, but also becoming hybridised alongside Scouse identities. Further 
to this, I add that DeHanas’ (ibid.) category of ‘between cultures’ with theorised language 
such as ‘It’s hard to be Bengali here…’ was expressed ambivalently in the Liverpool 
context. Some participants noted this tension between ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ growing up in 
that they would be ‘Scouse’ outside the family, but ‘Yemeni’ inside the family (see e.g. 
Aḥmad and Munīra’s quotes). However, participants also spoke positively of ‘being 
Yemeni here’, emphasising the perceived similarities between Liverpudlians and Yemenis 
which have allowed organic hybridisation and more confidently asserted outward-facing 
Scouse-Yemeni identities, such as when Maḥmūd noted his ‘organic’ roots ‘here’ and 
‘there’. The notion of de-culturated (Muslim) identities will be discussed more thoroughly 
in Chapter 6 which examines how the forms of identification explored in this chapter 
interact, combine or conflict with religious identity. The next chapter will now discuss 
whether Liverpool-Yemenis imagine and/or mobilise around an ethno-national 
‘community’, and how both the national contexts of the UK and Yemen have impacted the 







Chapter 5: Contesting an Ethno-National ‘Community’ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Building upon the findings from the previous chapter, this chapter now broadens its scale 
of focus from the family and neighbourhood to notions of an ethno-national ‘community’. 
While this chapter refers to Baumann’s (1999) ‘nation’ of the multicultural triangle, such a 
starting point has been problematised. Thus this chapter discusses the national contexts of 
both the UK and Yemen from several angles. Not beginning with assumptions that 
Liverpool-Yemenis form any single ‘community’ organised around a Yemeni national 
identity, this chapter explores whether Liverpool-Yemenis organise/mobilise around such 
an ethno-national imaginary, and if not, what alternatives exist. Remaining sensitive to the 
notion of multiple positioned belongings, the dominant (national/local) discourses and the 
roles of a particular set of ‘community leaders’ are juxtaposed with the second-generation 
participants’ more demotic articulations and forms of social engagement. In so doing, it 
also assesses whether an ethno-national diasporic public sphere has emerged in the 
Liverpool context. While the salience of (trans)locality has been noted in the previous 
chapter, localities are nonetheless embedded in broader circuits of power, therefore this 
chapter also explores the national ideologies, agendas, and contexts of the UK and Yemen 
which have impacted Yemeni-led ‘community’ building in Liverpool. 
 
In the popular usage of the term, ‘community’ is notoriously under-specified referring to 
collectivities along various scales: an ethno-national ‘community’, a religious 
‘community’, a regional ‘community’, down to the level of a neighbourhood ‘community’. 
Here, ‘community’ is understood in Anderson’s (1983) terms as a discursively created and 
imagined collectivity which goes beyond the regular, and usually face-to-face, contact 
 190 
sustained in family networks.61 While Baumann’s (1996) study begins with an already-
identified dominant discourse in the context of Southall which equates reified cultures with 
a ‘communities’, such a starting premise was much less clear in the Liverpool context 
given the relatively small number of Liverpool-Yemenis and lack of institutional 
‘representation’, the reasons for which are discussed in this chapter. Instead, this chapter 
begins by detailing the history of Yemeni ‘community building’ in Liverpool as seen from 
two perspectives: that of the earlier first-generation who largely moved to Liverpool from 
the late 1970s and early 1980s following high unemployment in regions such as Sheffield, 
and that of a particular group of Yemeni-born ‘community leaders’ whose social capital 
differs markedly from others of the first-generation, and whose ‘community’ building 
projects have become consolidated in playing a prominent role in the ‘community’ 
landscape of Liverpool. It will also be seen how national and local discourses/agendas 
such as ‘Community Cohesion/Prevent’ and Liverpool City Council’s dominant discourse 
of ‘Liverpool: World in One City’ (which itself is influenced by the neo-liberal 
restructuring of the economy and efforts of ‘civic boosterism’) have affected the trajectory 
of such community building projects. 
 
Related to the notion of ‘community’ and its various institutions is that of a diasporic 
public sphere, which for Werbner (2002a: 262) is ‘a space in which unrelated individuals 
meet to debate broader civic and political issues’ (italics mine). The existence of a 
diasporic public sphere is in some ways indicative of a ‘mature’ diaspora which has 
sustained a diasporic consciousness, and established an arena for debate not limited to 
family networks. In this way, diasporic identities and positionalities are not homogeneous 
                                                        
61 Although in a diasporic context, face-to-face contact for translocal families may instead be mediated by 
new communications technology, or occur only semi-regularly during trips to the family’s region of origin. 
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or uncontested, but are exemplified in the diasporic public sphere ‘as the product of shared 
foci of passionate debate’ (ibid., 252), reflecting internal heterogeneity and conflict, but 
sharing national and/or local concerns. Nonetheless, this chapter argues that studies of 
diaspora must be attentive to the context both ‘here’ and ‘there’ in order to better 
comprehend the dynamics behind the emergence (or non-emergence) of such a public 
sphere. Whether or not the Yemeni ‘community’ landscape in Liverpool evidences an 
ethno-national diasporic public sphere will be considered throughout this chapter. 
 
5.2 (Dis)junctures in Community Building  
Prior to the 1980s, given the small number of Yemenis in Liverpool (estimated around 100 
in 1976 according to Halliday, 2010: 54), there appears to have been a limited amount of 
‘community’ building, as Halliday (ibid., 56) notes, without giving a precise date of its 
establishment, the existence of a ‘Yemeni school funded by the council’ alongside plans to 
‘set up a community association’. From the 1980s and 1990s onwards as the number of 
Yemenis in Liverpool began to increase, a number of small-scale ‘community’ 
centres/associations were established which represented various Yemeni groups along 
differing axes (North, South, Adeni, religious, secular). During this phase, these centres 
were more clearly ‘Yemeni’ spaces as is clear from their names, such as the Aden 
Community Centre (formerly the Aden Community Association, and Aden Management 
before that), the Merseyside Yemeni Community Association (formerly the Yemeni 
Community Association Liverpool), and the Liverpool Yemeni Arabic Club, among 
others. It has been difficult to ascertain specifically which of these was the earliest to be 
established, as participants noted attending various Yemeni-Arabic schools/centres during 
the 1980s and 1990s which have subsequently changed names, location, or leadership. 
Nonetheless, the important point is that during this first phase of community building, 
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these associations had a clearly Yemeni orientation, were small-scale and somewhat 
fragmented. It was only during the early-to-mid 2000s that a phase of consolidation began 
in which two earlier associations came to dominate the contemporary ‘community’ 
landscape, although it will be seen how their focus has shifted from a more ‘Yemeni’ 
orientation to one which places greater emphasis on ‘inclusivity and diversity’ in line with 
several dominant discourses and the particular positionality of a group of community 
leaders. The trajectory of Yemeni-led community building will be seen to exemplify 
Werbner’s outline of the two stages of community associations and/or social movements 
which move from ‘fission’ to ‘fusion’, albeit with its own particular contingencies in the 
Liverpool context: 
During the initial stage…associations remain relatively discrete and often compete with 
one another, both for state allocations and on ideological grounds. […] The second stage 
of a social movement, ideological convergence, involves the formulation of a common 
discourse and set of objectives in relation to the state or local state, and with regard to the 
contemporary condition of the group within the larger society (1991a: 13) 
 
Of the above mentioned centres/associations, the Aden Community Centre and the 
Merseyside Yemeni Community Association continue with a specifically ‘Yemeni’ 
orientation as evidenced in their names, but are now only open sporadically and operate on 
limited budgets which appear to rely largely upon charitable giving, a small number of 
awards from the National Lottery, as well as a small number of grants from Liverpool City 
Council.62 This is in contrast to the consolidation of the main ‘community’ centres/schools 
which have access to greater sources of funding discussed below.63  
                                                        
62 Although the Merseyside Yemeni Community Association now also provides services which are accessed 
by other groups in L8, such as Somalis and Sudanis, further highlighting the many connections between L8’s 
various ethnic groups as well as the earlier establishment of Yemenis in the city.   
63 These larger organisations perform various functions, including Arabic supplementary schools, organising 
various events and workshops, providing services such as translation/interpreting, assisting in navigating 
welfare bureaucracy, and other projects which will be discussed further in this chapter. 
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During the fieldwork period, I volunteered at a larger-capacity Arabic school in the city 
which emerged out of an earlier Yemeni ‘community’ association and is now led by a 
particular set of Yemeni community leaders whose social capital differs (see Bourdieu, 
1986, for his theorisation of cultural and social capital as distinct from economic capital) 
from that of the first-generation migrants. It will be useful to first discuss the positionality 
of these actors whom I characterise as ‘urban Yemeni community leaders’ before 
discussing the trajectory of Yemeni-led ‘community building’ and ‘cultural’ projects in 
Liverpool which, owing to a confluence of factors, has moved away from a purely ethno-
national Yemeni focus and instead has come to incorporate Liverpool City Council’s 
motto of ‘Equality, Diversity, and Integration’ which aligns with national discourses of 
‘Community Cohesion’. 
 
Although this thesis is not only concerned with ‘community leaders’, it is important to 
recognise the conditions by which such ‘leadership’ and the representations of 
‘community’ they produce come about. In Werbner’s (1991b: 92) terms, community 
leaders function as ‘ethnic brokers’, acting as intermediaries for those who they claim to 
represent and the state or local state in obtaining resources and providing services – this in 
some ways presupposes that such leaders either possess the social capital necessary to 
navigate the state-‘community’ interface, and/or, their status is internally recognised as 
such (see Werbner, 2002a, who discusses the role of patronage, charitable giving, and the 
politics of ‘honour’ among Manchester-Pakistani community leaders). In this sense, the 
construction of ethnic boundaries may also be directly impacted by relations with the state 
due to competition for the allocation of resources and the necessary strategic negotiations 
to secure these (Werbner, 1991b: 78). Nonetheless, the representativeness of such leaders 
has also been critically questioned by scholars such as Gilliat-Ray (2010: 107, citing 
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Kundnani, 2007: 181) who notes regarding ‘Muslim community leaders’ that ‘the state 
selectively supports those individuals “who are chosen on the basis of their effectiveness 
in containing dissent and serving strategic interests, often as much linked to foreign policy 
as domestic affairs”’, and Werbner (1991b: 97) who notes that in comparison to ‘invisible 
leaders’ (such as those who were the focus of her 2002a study) of the diasporic public 
arena, such ‘state-sanctioned’ leaders ‘usually lack widespread internal legitimation and do 
not consult group members regarding policy questions’. Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
here that while on the one hand, these particular community leaders negotiate the dominant 
discourses, navigating council bureaucracy and funding bodies in presenting outward-
facing ‘inclusive’ establishments, on the other hand they also participate to varying 
degrees in ‘everyday’ Liverpool-Yemeni life, sensitive to questions of religion and culture. 
Therefore two main  arguments run through the following sections: that a) this particular 
group of community leaders align the respective organisations to state/local discourses on 
‘community’ and ‘culture’, evidenced by funding sources and the orientations of the 
various associations/centres/schools, but their positionalities also arise out of a particular 
cosmopolitan Yemeni milieu, and in contrast, that b) the ‘everyday’ second-generation 
participants are largely not invested in imagining a single ethno-national Yemeni 
‘community’ as a basis of ethnic mobilisation or boundary making; instead I characterise 
these as ‘demotic cosmopolitans’ who engage in various other forms of ‘organic’ activism 
in the neighbourhood. Additionally, they will be seen to articulate the role of such 
‘community centres’ with greater ambivalence more often highlighting pragmatic 
concerns, such as the provision of Arabic-language and Islamic education rather than 
viewing the centres as providing ‘tactics’ (in de Certeau’s, 1984, sense of the term) for 
negotiating a specifically Yemeni identity. The role of Yemen’s complicated and contested 
national politics is also important in understanding why the second generation, and indeed 
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even these particular community leaders, do not mobilise around or prioritise a single 
ethno-national Yemeni identity in imaginaries and constructions of ‘community’.  
 
5.3 Urban Yemeni Community Leaders and Demotic Cosmopolitans 
These community leaders are distinct from the rest of the participants in terms of their 
region of origin in Yemen, educational background, and motivations for moving to 
Liverpool. Although they can be considered ‘first-generation’ having been born and raised 
in Yemen, I wish to highlight their differing social-cultural capital and educational 
background in comparison to that of the first-generation who arrived in the post-war 
period and were employed largely in manual labour, such as the steelworks (cf. Searle, 
2010). All of these leaders discussed are male and aged between fifty and seventy. They 
stated in interviews that they were born and grew up in small Yemeni towns or villages 
where their families largely depended on agriculture for income. Crucially, however, they 
later moved to Aden, or Ṣan’ā for a smaller number, for secondary or higher education or 
employment, with some gaining Masters Degrees in the UK or other EU countries. While 
Aden and Ṣan’ā differ in many respects, I emphasise that both reflect an urban, 
cosmopolitan Yemeni milieu. Of these two places, the social history of Aden will be seen 
to play a prominent role. This is unlike the majority of participants who do not associate 
themselves with nor have family ties to the urban centres of Aden or Ṣan’ā.64 Their 
professional life also differs significantly in that they are/were predominantly employed in 
‘skilled’ positions outside of their ‘community work’, not arriving as shop-keepers or to 
work in the industrial towns. They can also in many ways be considered ‘activists’ in that 
a lot of their work and efforts are undertaken in a voluntary capacity, being primarily 
concerned with improving youth education, broader societal representation of 
                                                        
64 Several interview participants noted a small number of Adeni families in Liverpool. 
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Arabs/Yemenis, raising awareness of the current conflict in Yemen, and the local 
provision of services such as translation/interpretation and assisting in navigating welfare 
bureaucracy. They also share a broadly secular outlook incorporating elements of ‘pan-
Arabism’ or Arab nationalism(s). Nāṣir (50s, educated in Aden, community leader) 
highlights this: 
I find myself with a lot of energy and commitment to do what I do in a voluntary capacity…it’s 
a belief that we are contributing back to our community to give them a safer outward going 
community, fantastic facilities to learn. And also, we invite anybody to come and help, we 
don’t ask if you are Muslim, Communist, Arab or non-Arab…everyone is welcome. Some ask 
me ‘Why can’t I organise trips for women?’. I said we are not a ‘women-only’ 
community…Bring your mum, your grandmum, granddad. 
 
At first glance, this group of urban Yemeni community leaders appear to come close to 
Hannerz’ conceptualisation of ‘cosmopolitans’ characterised by ‘a willingness to engage 
with the Other’ (1990: 239), in comparison to ‘transnationals’ who are characterised by 
greater ‘encapsulation’ (ibid., 245). Nonetheless, Hannerz’ particular notion of 
cosmopolitanism has been challenged by scholars such as Werbner (2008: 16) who contest 
its Eurocentric approach which denies that cosmopolitanism can occur in multiple forms, 
not only limited to an élite set of jet-setting intellectuals. Fardon (2008) also raises the 
point that cosmopolitanism understood only as a form of ‘transcending’ the nation itself 
belies an element of Eurocentric methodological nationalism: ‘Nations did not become 
diverse only through receiving culturally distinctive immigrants; in a loose sense, all were 
cosmopolitan at their inception’ (ibid., 238). While these community leaders will be seen 
to emphasise plurality and diversity, they are also very much rooted in the local context, 
taking part in everyday Liverpool-Yemeni life to varying extents, as well as maintaining 
strong ties to Yemen – in this sense they are characterised by ‘rootedness’ both ‘here’ and 
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‘there’, rather than ‘rootlessness’ (Hannerz, 2006: 7). Nagel and Staeheli’s study on 
British-Arab activists, including a Yemeni respondent from Liverpool, highlights their 
‘rootedness’, noting:  
our participants situate their obligations to the host society within a broader set of commitments 
and geographical affinities that link ‘here’ and ‘there’. They argue that integration reflects a 
commitment to participation in the places where they live, but does not require residential 
mixing, assimilation, or denial of connections to their homeland. (2008: 417) 
Similar orientations were articulated by the group of urban Yemeni community leaders 
discussed here. Additionally, they (ibid., 427) conclude that ‘British Arab activists argue 
that the requirement to integrate in the host society stems from the simple fact that, 
regardless of their transnational affinities and linkages, Britain is where they live, work, go 
to school, and raise their families.’ This idea of moving towards ‘greater cultural 
integration’ was repeated on several occasions by a number of the community leaders, and 
indeed that these leaders are able to articulate such visions itself marks their positionality 
as distinct. Nāṣir (50s, born in Yemen, educated in Aden) notes regarding one of the 
‘community’ projects established by this group: 
We tell them [it] is a community organisation trying to enable young people to have a strong 
identity plus a strong Britishness because they live here, that’s their country, that’s where they 
end up becoming doctors or shopkeepers. 
 
To further illustrate the differing positionalities between this group and that of other first-
generation Yemenis, Ḥāmid (50s, born in Yemen, educated in Ṣan’ā, involved in several 
community associations and projects) himself notes: 
To be honest, the first wave of Yemenis, they came here, they were illiterate. Most of them 
worked in the steel industry, the coal industry, they worked in really hard conditions and 
environments, they did not enhance their education even here when they arrived, and for 
many years their children were affected because of their parents [who] weren’t educated or 
really interested in education, so they did not encourage their children, not like me, I came 
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from Yemen, and I was very well educated and I came for the purpose of education and this is a 
barrier for the Yemenis, advancing their education…but lately we did research on the 
[educational] attainment and we found they [Liverpool-Yemeni youth] are very low attainers 
due to lack of [English] language [ability] in the family, the help that they don’t get from their 
families, the lack of role models from the community; there is no one, very few, who finished 
university. 
While the notion of ‘cosmopolitanism’ itself has been the source of much debate, 
Werbner’s (2016, drawing upon Bhabha, 1996) notion of ‘vernacular’ or ‘demotic’ 
cosmopolitanism is useful for this chapter in understanding how both the community 
leaders and second-generation participants can be described as ‘cosmopolitans’, albeit with 
somewhat differing orientations. Indeed, rather than using Western-centric ideas to define 
who may be considered ‘cosmopolitan’, it is possible to draw upon ideas of ‘tolerance’, 
‘hospitality’, and ‘openness’ present in non-Western cultures to broaden the analytic frame 
which challenges notions of Muslims in particular (but also other non-Western 
ethnic/cultural/religious groups) as somehow inherently ‘intolerant’ or ‘closed off’. As 
Werbner (2016: 239) writes ‘cosmopolitanism as an ethical outlook enables us to explore 
ideas and values that spread beyond national boundaries or little communities, and to 
recognise the qualities of tolerance and open-mindedness that people beyond the West 
foster in their own terms.’ This group of community leaders comes close to Vertovec and 
Cohen’s (2002: 1) conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism as embodying ‘middle-path 
alternatives between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism’ and 
thus they advocate for a form of pluralistic multiculturalism which emphasises both 
‘integration’ into British society alongside fostering a ‘positive’ vision of Yemeni/Arab 
identities, rather than ‘assimilation’. The context of diaspora life means that ‘everyday’ 
diasporans also inevitably become ‘cosmopolitan’ to a certain extent in that bi-culturalism, 
bi-lingualism, and hybridisation are readily observed and experienced, particularly in 
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second-generation diasporic life. Indeed, the previous chapter saw various examples of 
such ‘demotic cosmopolitanism’, such as when Maḥmūd drew upon the Arab notion of 
karāmah (hospitality) in describing the wedding celebration as open to all local 
inhabitants, or Munīra’s articulations of her and her family’s engagement with their white 
neighbours, the many instances of generous hospitality which I was shown throughout the 
fieldwork period in invitations to participants’ homes and events, as well as the multi-
ethnic friendships and other forms of social engagement discussed later in this chapter.  
 
5.4 Dominant Discourses: Arab Nationalism(s) and Community Cohesion 
Throughout the interviews and during time spent volunteering at several of the 
organisations, the commitment of this group of community leaders to a broadly secular 
vision in establishing and running community centres and events was emphasised, often 
contrasting with another main Yemeni-founded centre in the city which has a more clearly 
religious focus. This secular outlook of these actors must be underlined. All emphasised 
that spaces and events such as the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival and this particular Arabic 
school had no religious underpinning. This is not to be confused with any anti-religion 
sentiment, as in indeed several explicitly stated that they are practicing Muslims. Rather, I 
contend that this outlook reflects a set of personal experiences and orientations which are 
informed by the cosmopolitan milieu of Yemen’s urban centres, as well as the influence of 
Liverpool’s dominant discourses and the national ‘Community Cohesion’ and ‘Prevent’ 
agendas.  
While the community leaders described in this chapter may ultimately trace their roots to 
rural villages outside of Aden and Ṣan’ā, they were notable in discussing their own, 
sometimes strongly held, positions vis-à-vis Yemeni national politics which emerge out of 
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these urban milieus. Nonetheless, a common theme was the desire to move away from 
political divisions and fragmentation rooted in Yemen, some of which are still visible in 
Liverpool to a certain extent.  
Qays (50s, born in Yemen, educated in Aden, community leader) highlights how his own 
life experiences in Aden have left a lasting impact: 
During the British time in Aden I wasn’t in Aden, I came in about ‘72, so three to four years 
after the event, so I was familiar with seeing the South Yemen at the time as a country that 
was trying to do its best for its people, in terms of education and health for all, and that was 
under the Yemeni Socialist Party. One is to pick up from where the British left and to spread 
education and health and welfare to the countryside, and there were massive gaps between 
someone from Aden and somebody the villages of Ḍhāli’ or Shabwa and sometimes people 
forget what the Yemeni Socialist Party did for the South. They did improve education and 
health and welfare, so I became a big fan or at least familiar with that kind of revolutionary 
approach. 
[…] 
The ideals of the people in charge was a socialist-Marxist approach in line with what was going 
on in the 60s and 70s with liberation movements from all over the world, from Vietnam to 
Cuba to Nicaragua and you know, all over the world. 
Qays was perhaps the most explicit out of the group in stating his views on Yemeni 
politics, particularly in regard to the educational and economic level of development he 
witnessed in Aden, which he attributes to the effort of the Yemeni Socialist Party as 
compared to elsewhere in Yemen. Instead of emphasising Britain’s colonial past as a 
disruptive and/or destructive force in Yemen, he (and others) place the spotlight on the 
material development which the independent Republic of South Yemen later saw.65 Indeed 
                                                        
65 It must also be stressed that although Aden was a colonial ‘metropole’ occupying a strategic position in 
South-West Arabia, it was nonetheless peripheral, as Mawby (2005: 64) highlights: ‘Since its capture by 
Haines in 1839 the purpose which Aden served within the British imperial system had been ill defined. Its 
future rarely concerned British strategists’. Mawby (ibid.) also further highlights its peripheral nature noting 
that ‘lines of authority ran from Aden to Bombay to Calcutta and then back to the India Office in London’.  
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Müller (2015: 266) notes that ‘After South Yemen’s new constitution was launched in 
1970, the early decision to expand the British administrative system all over the country 
served as a solid base of state building’. In the above extract, Qays refers to colonial rule 
as ‘The British time in Aden’ – similar phrasings were used throughout the fieldwork 
period. This was exemplified by several talks, workshops, events and projects which took 
place at or in conjunction with the Arabic school established by this group. For example, 
language such as ‘the British occupation of Aden’ was explicitly discouraged in the 
production of a short documentary-film regarding the experiences of British armed forces 
who had served in Aden, and which was later screened for a Yemeni and non-Yemeni 
audience. The aim of the film was stated roughly as to celebrate Britain and Yemen’s 
shared history and connections. Additionally, the community leaders’ vision for the centre 
as aiming to foster greater ‘integration’ into British society while also promoting a 
‘positive’ vision of Yemeni/Arab identity was evidenced by the regular events and 
workshops organised, such as talks by individuals from higher education institutions to 
encourage the youth to further their education, visits from the Lord Mayor and other city 
officials, workshops promoting health for older individuals, engagement with volunteers 
from local universities in providing GCSE exam support, various events/projects centred 
around Arab culture such as art and music, as well as workshops aimed at discouraging 
youth from radicalisation. The Liverpool Arab Arts Festival, discussed further in this 
chapter, which was established by and has input from several members of this same group 
of community leaders is perhaps the clearest example of the aim to promote a ‘positive’ 
secular vision and representation of Arab culture which de-emphasises what was perceived 
as the negative impact of de-culturated forms of Islam. This was highlighted in several 
interviews when a number of the community leaders mentioned the introduction of the 
ḥijāb in the rural village life of their families as occurring due to an unwanted Saudi 
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influence. Although second-generation participants have somewhat differing orientations 
from the community leaders regarding religion, the following chapter will explore the role 
of perceived Saudi antagonisms on religious identities. 
While the national/local discourses of ‘community’ and agendas such as ‘Community 
Cohension’ and ‘Prevent’ will be seen to play a role in the trajectory of the two main 
Arabic schools, it is first worth exploring the social and political milieu during the end of 
colonial rule in Aden and the subsequent establishment of the People’s Democratic 
Republic of South Yemen (PDRSY). Briefly, despite a growing division between ‘native’ 
Adenis and non-Adenis who made up the majority of Aden’s population towards the end 
of colonial rule, (Bujra, 1970: 192), Müller demonstrates a change of tides in which the 
dominant Adeni ruling class ‘joined forces’ with the larger working-class non-Adeni 
population in response to British colonial rule, forging a common identity which cut across 
class boundaries:  
“The urban Adeni” could have been a religious blue-collar worker, one of the first teachers of 
Yemeni origin teaching in Arabic and English, or an atheist intellectual who brought home new 
ideas from his studies in Cairo or Damascus. (2015: 204) 
The developments in Aden were not isolated however, being influenced by the 
development of Arab nationalism from the 1950s onward as a reaction to colonialism, as 
Mawby notes that:  
Just at the moment when the British were beginning to stress the value of their only Middle 
Eastern colony as a territory from which Britain could continue to exercise its global 
responsibilities, a doctrine virulently hostile to British imperialism began to flourish. (2005: 9) 
In addition, under a British-influenced system of administration and education, Aden had 
developed an infrastructure allowing higher levels of education at that point unattainable 
elsewhere in Yemen. This led to higher literacy rates and the large-scale circulation of 
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printed materials which together ‘granted the Adenis access to alternative ways of political 
organization and enabled them to share their opinions.’ (Müller, 2015: 220). While Ṣan’ā 
in the north may not have experienced the same level and rapidity of development, nor was 
it a British colony, its urban environment nonetheless contrasts sharply with the smaller, 
agriculture-dependent environments of Malāḥ and similar towns/villages which were the 
focus of the previous chapter. Dresch notes that Ṣan’ā’ eclipsed Aden as Yemen’s largest 
city due to rapid development during the 1980s, writing:  
What even ten years before had been a Zaydī city became cosmopolitan. Africans, Europeans, 
Arabs from elsewhere, were all highly visible, and shopkeepers, taxi-drivers, day-labourers had 
moved in from both Upper and Lower Yemen in enormous numbers. (2000: 176) 
It is thus in the context of these milieus which the positionality of these community leaders 
must be placed. Qays (50s, born in Yemen, educated in Aden, community leader) also 
highlights his secular outlook which does not reject religion entirely, but rather de-
emphasises its role in community associations: 
The centre is more secular, and our mission statement is more clear, we don’t actually 
segregate because of religion, we aren’t a religious school, some of the teachers do 
[incorporate religion], but that’s part of the culture to make the children aware, but we are not 
forcing ṣalāh [prayer] on anyone or asking the girls to cover their hair, or this or that, and we 
will challenge that you know…so people can choose. 
As I was unable to gain access to the more religiously-focused Arabic school, it must be 
emphasised that this chapter explores a specific group of leaders who exist among others.66 
Nonetheless, both schools, attitudes towards the role of religion notwithstanding, share a 
similar trajectory in that they began as more explicitly ‘Yemeni’ before moving towards a 
broader multi-ethnic focus. This is clear from the change in names of these schools which 
                                                        
66 Although I was able to interview several individuals who are either involved in or have connections to this 
school. 
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previously included a Yemeni element, but now have more generic names. In the case of 
one school, this change occurred around 2006 according to the schools’ founders. I 
contend that this shift in many ways reflects a confluence of factors: namely, the already-
existing orientations of the community leaders in the case of the secular Arabic school who 
emphasise pan-Arabism over regional fragmentation, the changing demographics of 
Liverpool which saw an increase in arrivals from Somalia and other areas of the Arab 
world from the early 2000s onwards, the turbulent political situation in Yemen, and 
importantly, the national discourses of  ‘Community Cohension’, and Liverpool City 
Council’s local discourse of ‘Equality, Diversity, and Integration’. Thus the earlier point 
that the state can impact the construction of ethnic boundaries in certain contexts is 
relevant here, but its particular impact is that rather than leading to assertions of narrowly 
ethnicised boundaries, the ‘Community Cohesion’ discourses from the 2000s which stress 
‘”equality” at the expense of “difference”’ (McLoughlin, 2005c: 56) have instead lead to 
emphasis on ‘diversity’ in the Yemeni-led ‘community’ landscape. 
As McLoughlin (2005c: 56) notes, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, ‘By the end of the year 
the New Labour government had articulated a concern for “community cohesion” in a 
series of its own reports’. While the urban Yemeni community leaders are not ‘Muslim 
leaders’ per se, McLoughlin’s (ibid., 58) point is relevant here that ‘since the late 1990s, 
government has periodically leant unelected Muslim bodies and their leadership public 
legitimacy, mainly through consultation but sometimes by channelling resources in their 
direction’. Indeed, the main Yemeni-founded centres (secular and religious) which came to 
dominate the ‘community’ institutional landscape from the mid-2000s have variously 
received funding from the Home Office’s ‘Prevent Youth’ programme and the counter-
terrorism ‘Building a Stronger Britain Together’ programme – a programme which the 
government website describes as:  
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The counter-extremism strategy encourages partnership between the government and people 
involved in projects that counter extremism and build stronger communities.67 68 
This programme has notably generated controversy, and even led to several authors 
backing out of Bradford’s Literature Festival in 2019 due to it being a source of funding 
(Wolfe-Robinson, 2019, The Guardian).69 While there has been a blurring of the 
distinction between the earlier Community Cohesion policies and Prevent (O’Toole et al., 
2016: 167, see also O’Toole, DeHanas, and Modood, 2012), the Prevent agenda in 
particular has been criticised for promoting Islamophobia and creating an atmosphere of 
suspicion as Alam and Husband (2013: 236) note that ‘government policies facilitated a 
discourse and practices that promoted anti-Muslim sentiments among the majority 
population, and significantly alienated large sections of Britain’s Muslim populations.’70  
Nonetheless, that both the secular and religious Yemeni-founded centres have 
implemented elements of these agendas, and receive funding for their implementation, 
again requires recognising the importance of both the local and national contexts. Indeed, 
despite its problematic implications, O’Toole et al. (2016: 165) highlight that the 
implementation of Prevent has been idiosyncratic across contexts and localities, contesting 
‘the view that Prevent can be seen straightforwardly as a form of discipline given its 
contradictory, incoherent, and contested practice.’ (ibid., 174). Although this thesis is not 
an exploration of the specific implications of Community Cohesion and Prevent agendas in 
                                                        
67 To protect the anonymity of these organisations, I have not included the direct sources where they are 
explicitly listed. The information regarding funding is available in the public domain.  
68 UK Government. 2019. Guidance: Building a Stronger Britain Together. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/building-a-stronger-britain-together 
69 Wolfe-Robinson, M. 2019. Six Pull out of Bradford festival over counterextremism funding. The Guardian. 
[Online]. 20 June. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jun/20/six-pull-out-
bradford-literature-festival-counter-extremism-funding 
70 O’Toole et al. (2016: 162) note that: ‘The Prevent strategy that was unveiled in 2007 in response to the 
2005 London bombings was framed as a ‘hearts and minds’ approach to countering al-Qaeda-inspired 




the Liverpool-Yemeni context, it is important to note the significant impact which these 
national agendas have had on the consolidation of the main ‘community’ centres – indeed, 
it is possible that they were able to grow in scope and eclipse the earlier smaller-scale 
more fragmented associations by receiving greater funding for projects which coincided 
with the ‘inclusive’ rebranding of the schools from the mid-2000s in line with this 
discourse. This can also be seen on the city-scale, as evidenced by Liverpool City 
Council’s  (LCC) recently (2019) launched ‘Community Resources Grant’ (CRG, 
previously the ‘Community Resources Unit’) which is part of its ‘Inclusive Growth Plan’ 
(IGP) – the CRG/CRU is a source of funding for the main Yemeni-founded centres which 
requires that recipients help LCC ‘achieve its Inclusive Growth Plan aims’.71 Priority 3.4 
of these aims according to a document produced by LCC (2018: 56) is listed as 
‘Maintaining community safety and cohesion’, with further points such as ‘Supporting 
activities to increase community cohesion and inclusion in neighbourhood’ and ‘To reduce 
hate crime and improve community cohesion’.72 
Given the particular orientations of the community leaders discussed in this chapter as 
activists who emphasise greater ‘integration’ into British society though the various 
centres and projects while also maintaining a ‘positive’ Yemeni/Arab identity (see 
discussion of the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival below), I emphasise the confluence of 
narratives which have resulted in the current ‘community’ landscape of Liverpool. I also 
wish to emphasise Nagel and Staeheli’s point that ‘integration’ for this group is not 
‘assimilation’ but more clearly recognition of difference, as they write: 
                                                        
71 Liverpool Charity and Voluntary Services (LCVS). 2019. Liverpool City Council Resource Grants. [Online]. 
Available from: https://www.lcvs.org.uk/liverpool-city-council-community-resource-grants-now-open/ 
72 Liverpool City Council. 2018. Inclusive Growth Plan: A Strong and Growing City Built on Fairness. [Online]. 
Available from: https://liverpool.gov.uk/media/1356877/mayoral-growth-may-2018-a3-spreads.pdf 
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Integration as conceptualized by our study participants represents a two-way relationship that 
requires change on the part of both British Arabs and the British majority. In this sense, it is 
quite different from the version of multiculturalism that has guided public policy toward 
immigrants and racial minorities in Britain since the early 1970s. (2008: 426) 
While these actors do align the respective organisations with the dominant discourses of 
‘Community Cohesion’ in many respects, it is also important to recognise that they too 
have multiple positioned belongings being at once Yemeni, Aden/Ṣan’ānī, Arab, pan-
Arabist, inhabitants of Liverpool, and community leaders. While Prevent in particular has 
met with strong opposition from Muslim organisations and leaders in various British 
localities, the more local context of Liverpool may reveal why these agendas and 
discourses have generally been met without strong opposition. 
The projects, workshops, and events which variously deal with inter-generational relations, 
anti-extremism programmes, health and education programmes, and encouraging wider 
societal engagement which the community centre I attended organises also accords with 
O’Toole, DeHanas and Modood’s (2012: 382) point that ‘Prevent and cohesion are 
operationally difficult to separate, we found actors nationally and locally expressing 
scepticism that Prevent and cohesion can be separated.’ These perhaps also reveal that 
Kundnani’s (2009: 18) point from a decade earlier still holds in the Liverpool context, in 
that many local councils used or continue to use Prevent funding for ‘community 
cohesion’ or ‘community development work’. Kundnani (ibid.) writes ‘The manager of a 
youth work project in the north of England told us that all of the Prevent projects he had 
seen ‘were “bread and butter” youth training, community engagement, consultancy work 
or advocacy work’.’ The type of workshops and events organised by the Arabic school 
which I attended fall more clearly into this category. 
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Although Prevent itself remains controversial and contested, this section has emphasised 
that in the Liverpool-context, it has been incorporated into the main ‘community’ 
centres/schools alongside various other ‘cohesion’-type activities, albeit with one centre 
advertising its affiliation more explicitly. Projects such as anti-youth extremism training 
were portrayed as having a positive influence by both the community leaders, and some 
second-generation participants. Of course, it is also important to consider that the 
relatively small number of Yemenis and Muslims overall in Liverpool might contribute to 
how Prevent has been perceived (or even its general lack of perception). Kundnani (2009: 
12) highlights that ‘There is a strong correlation between the amount of Prevent funding 
provided and the number of Muslims in that area.’, providing a figure (ibid., 13) for the 
nineteen local authorities which received the highest amount of Prevent funding in 2008/9-
2010/11 – Liverpool is absent from this list (see also Kundnani, 2009: 14, fig. 4, which 
shows Liverpool in the lower end of Prevent funding allocation). 
Thus this section has emphasised that the particular social capital of these urban Yemeni 
community leaders alongside their own, often secular, orientations positions them 
favourably to navigate the dominant discourses and government agendas. The shifts in 
national policy towards ‘Community Cohesion’ mean that this particular centre, along with 
other Yemeni-founded centres which share a similar trajectory (albeit with religion having 
differing emphases), have come to dominate the ‘community’ landscape of Liverpool.  
 
While other northern English cities such as Bradford have had a large Pakistani-Muslim 
presence since the 1960s and thus the history of ‘race relations’ in such regions has taken 
its own sited trajectory (McLoughlin, 2006), Liverpool is notably different in that Yemenis 
were the first ‘large’ Muslim group to arrive predominantly shortly before or just after the 
Toxteth riots in 1981 which prompted the establishment of a short-lived and highly 
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contested ‘Race Relations Liaison Committee’ under Militant (Belchem, 2014: 268). The 
approach of Militant was criticised as being ‘colour-blind’ within ‘a “workerist” ideology 
of absolute class solidarity, denying any “divisive” concession to ethnic, sectional or 
voluntary groups’ (ibid., 267). Nonetheless, Belchem (ibid., 272) notes that from the mid-
1980s, the historically Liverpool-born Black area of the Granby Triangle in L8 has now 
become predominantly inhabited by more recently arrived ‘Muslim’ groups (see also 
Uduku, 2003). Indeed, Bunnell (2016: 99-100) highlights that in the wake of the 1981 riots 
and the creation of a ‘race relations industry’ (Brown, 2005: 247), L8’s other minority 
groups were largely overlooked, and ‘By 1997, a few race relations bodies had 
disappeared’ (ibid.) giving way to a new landscape in which the urban Yemeni leaders 
who arrived from the 1980s onwards alongside policy shifts towards from the 2000s have 
been seen to be influential. Thus it is in the new context of the post-1981 riots that 
Liverpool-Yemeni community building must be situated – being a relatively small, 
initially somewhat encapsulated and institutionally ‘invisible’ group, Liverpool-Yemeni 
community leaders from the mid-2000s have in many ways played an important 
intermediary role in shaping how the Council interfaces with L8’s multi-ethnic Muslim 
groups.73  
 
                                                        
73 See also Jones’ (2015) article on Muslim participation and dimensions of multicultural policy in Leicester 
which reveals many similarities with the Liverpool context in that ‘The new national emphasis on cohesion 
fitted well with the city’s pre-existing emphasis on collaboration between religious groups, but also 
facilitated a more explicit focus on unity – on “One Leicester”’ (ibid., 1981). The timing of the shift towards 
what Jones’ calls ‘consultative multiculturalism’ (ibid., 1976) from the early 2000s also has parallels in 
Liverpool, and was similarly ‘heavily reliant on the emergence of a system of patron-client politics that saw 




In order to provide services which reach a large section of Liverpool-Yemenis/Arabs 
and/or Liverpool-Muslims, and to secure funding, community leaders have deliberately 
disengaged the political turmoil and fragmentation of Yemen’s recent past. Indeed, given 
the conflicted and fragile nature of unified Yemen coupled with the majority of Liverpool-
Yemenis having left Yemen before unification, to portray any single organisation as the 
Yemeni ‘community centre’ would invariably mean also becoming embroiled in 
arguments over which group can legitimately ‘represent’ such a turbulent (dis)unity.  
While the earlier phases of community building evidence ‘fission’ or ‘factionalism’ along 
internal Yemeni lines, the contemporary landscape has now given way to one 
characterised by ‘fusion’ – critically, however, this ‘fusion’ has not taken Yemen as its 
centre-point due to the aforementioned considerations which hinge on the personal 
orientations of the community leaders, dominant discourse and sources of funding, as well 
as Yemen’s contested (dis)unity. Instead, the secular organisation has come to embody a 
discourse of multi-ethnic (or multi-Arab) ‘diversity’ which emphasises greater 
‘integration’ into British society, while other organisations are based around a shared 
Muslim identity not limited to any single ethnic group. While, for example, debates on 
‘transnational political imaginaries’ can take place in the Manchester-Pakistani diasporic 
public sphere (Werbner, 2002a: 252), the political issues at stake within a Yemeni context, 
in which the ‘political imaginaries’ of Yemen itself are highly contested, are laden with far 
greater risk for fragmentation, particularly so under the current circumstances.  
To highlight these processes of fusion, attitudes towards language are also revealing in that 
the Arabic language itself is articulated as a means to de-emphasise local/regional divides. 
The following quotes from the urban Yemeni community leaders illustrate these points.  
Qays: 
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My accent, because I’ve moved around Yemen, I don’t have a local strong Yemeni accent, I 
have a pan-Arab approach to it, plus I studied Arabic in Yemen and I was very good at it, so if 
you hear my accent, it’s not as local…I have almost near Standard Arabic with Yemeni 
influence, of course, and I kept it because I was trained as an interpreter and had a 
qualification in the area to a degree level as well, so my Arabic Standard is good written and 
spoken…not as good as my English [laughs]. 
 
Munīf: 
Because I was raised in Aden, so my Arabic dialect is Adeni dialect, and still probably very 
strong 
[…] 
I think that it was one of the best decisions we made [to focus on Standard Arabic in the 
school], we said forget about all the curriculum that was either Yemeni, Egyptian, Moroccan, 
or Syrian because many people could not identify themselves with that curriculum and I chose 
a curriculum developed in Europe for second-generation Arabs born in Europe, so they can 
have a common Arabic language. 
 
‘Umar (community leader, born in Yemen, educated in Ṣan’ā) similarly emphasises the 
role of Standard Arabic as a ‘unifying’ language, albeit with more emphasis on its role 
within Yemen and its importance for Liverpool-Yemenis: 
 
Most of us have different dialects, in each province we have a different dialect, but the fuṣḥā 
[Classical Arabic] united us. 
[…] 
Arabic language is very essential for us and our kids as well, it’s our identity and belonging, we 
tend to, you know, we established the school in 2002 when we first applied for funding and it 
was established and we were encouraged…and then because we feel it is important for us to 
learn the language, because when they go back [to Yemen] they can’t communicate in Arabic 
and also the language broadens their knowledge and increases their opportunities locally and 
internationally.74 
                                                        
74 The reference to funding here likely refers to such bids standing a greater chance of success if such 
‘community’ centres can be seen to have a large reach, i.e. to provide services for all of Liverpool’s Arab or 
Arabic-speaking inhabitants in line with ‘Community Cohesion’ policies. 
 212 
 
The above concerns are also implicated in the emergence of an ethno-national Yemeni 
‘diasporic public sphere’. Of course, alternative diasporic public spheres not centred 
around the nation also exist, as Werbner’s (2009) and Scharbrodt’s (2020) explorations of 
Muslim diasporic public spheres reveal. While the community centres and associations 
discussed thus far more clearly reflect the interface between ‘community’ (the discourse 
and representation of which has been seen to stress multi-ethnic ‘diversity’) and state, a 
diasporic public sphere represents the ‘hidden, invisible public arenas’ diasporans create 
and participate in (Werbner, 2009: 20). Appadurai (1996:22-23) also highlights the role of 
mass media and communications technologies in diasporic public spheres which are often 
internally diverse and reflect a ‘postnational order’. Nonetheless, during the fieldwork 
period I found little evidence for a robust (ethno-national) Yemeni diasporic public sphere 
and thus argue that it’s non-emergence in Liverpool owes to a confluence of factors, 
namely: the small size of the Yemeni population in Liverpool, earlier internal 
fragmentation, the fragile and highly contested context of Yemeni national politics, and the 
orientations and positionalities of the second generation who are less concerned with 
debating or mobilising around national Yemeni concerns, and are instead better 
characterised as ‘demotic cosmopolitans’. Additionally, although second-generation 
participants can be said to evidence the notion of ‘co-responsibility’ for co-ethnics 
elsewhere, this was also more clearly articulated in terms of the (extended) family, such as 
family links to the USA. Thus the final sections of this chapter will explore alternative 





5.5 Liverpool: ‘World in One City’ 
Before discussing the development and implications of the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival, 
this section will first examine what I propose as the ‘dominant discourse’ surrounding 
ethnic minority ‘community’ and ‘culture’ in the Liverpool context which will be seen to 
be influential. It is first worth noting that this discourse began to increase in prominence 
particularly in the run up to Liverpool’s European Capital of Culture (ECoC) award in 
2008, after a long period during which post-war Liverpool had experienced high levels of 
unemployment and negative media portrayals throughout the Militant-led years of the 
1980s. Of course, the development of such a discourse itself is not unique to Liverpool as, 
for example, McLoughlin (2006) describes a similar trajectory in Bradford. For this 
reason, I emphasise that Liverpool’s dominant discourse reflects (institutional) ‘models of 
neoliberal multiculturalism promulgated around the UK and the EU’ which became more 
prominent in the lead up to and after the ECoC (Bullen, 2016: 111). O’Brien (2010: 119) 
notes that despite difficulties in creating and implementing ‘cultural policy’ in Liverpool 
owing primarily to the legacy of Militant which was reluctant to establish art and cultural 
programmes as well as severe financial constraints, the notion of  Liverpool as a unifying 
‘signifier’ is nonetheless prominent in any discussion of ‘Liverpool culture(s)’: ‘Thus the 
narrative of Liverpool culture is one grounded in the mythology of place created by the 
intersection of class and ethnicity found in an Atlantic seaport’.75 (ibid., 117)  
This discourse, as perhaps is clear from the slogan ‘World in One City’, can be summarily 
described as centred around the notion of ‘unity-in-diversity’. A memorandum by 
Liverpool City Council from 2004 exemplifies this: 
                                                        
75 See also Belchem, for discussion on the failures of multicultural and ‘race relations’ policies of the 1980s. 
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The aim for Liverpool is therefore about raising awareness and developing greater 
understanding in order to break down barriers within and between diverse communities. 
Approaches taken must be about positively embracing our diversity and promoting equality of 
opportunities. After all, Liverpool is "The World in One City", European Capital of Culture 
2008.76 
This discourse is less concerned with drawing boundaries between groups, and more 
clearly orientated towards efforts of ‘civic boosterism’ and ‘city branding’ (Boyle, 1997; 
Bonakdar and Audirac, 2019) which continually assert Liverpool’s multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural ‘legacy’ in an attempt to harness it for economic development. In contrast to this, 
while demotic discourses share much in common with the dominant in that ‘Liverpool’ as 
a locality takes centre stage in both, the demotic discourses emphasise organic, multi-
ethnic connections and solidarities at the neighbourhood (Toxteth) level which are not 
mediated by council-funded initiatives, as discussed further in this chapter. 
For Baumann (1996: 108), the dominant discourse describes ‘communities’ as ‘a self-
evident grouping held together by a unified culture.’ However, it is difficult to locate a 
discourse in Liverpool which fixes a Yemeni ‘community’ along ethnic lines either 
imposed by the outside or by Liverpool-Yemenis themselves. Instead of beginning with a 
discourse which fixes a specific (ethnic) group with a reified culture, Liverpool City 
Council’s discourse reifies ‘diversity’ itself, as Bullen in a study of urban regeneration in a 
deprived North Liverpool neighbourhood highlights: 
Narratives celebrating the city's diversity foregrounded in the ECoC bid and the importance of 
“community cohesion” promulgated within national and international spheres became central to 
the work of the BME team. (2016: 109) 
                                                        
76 Select Committee on Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the 




And in the memorandum by Liverpool City Council in 2004 which also emphasises 
‘community cohesion’, citing projects such as Black History Month Group:  
The aim of the Group is to celebrate the histories of the African Diaspora in Liverpool…It is 
intended that this will be achieved by developing an understanding with and between all of 
Liverpool's different cultural and racial communities, by ensuring that all communities are 
informed of and welcomed to events.77 
 
These ‘celebrations of diversity’ have remained prominent, reflected in Liverpool City 
Council’s current motto ‘Equality, Diversity and Integration’, also being evidenced in the 
dramatic growth of the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival post-2008, and the continued support 
and promotion of other large-scale ‘cultural festivals’ throughout the city such as Africa 
Oyé and Chinese New Year celebrations.  
 
In the absence of a dominant discourse which attempts to fix a ‘Yemeni community’, it 
also becomes more difficult to distinguish the dominant from the demotic, especially as 
both emphasise ‘diversity’ albeit in different ways, and for different purposes. Thus I 
propose that in the Liverpool context, the dominant discourse of the local state regarding 
‘community’ and ‘culture’ is influenced by national concerns of ‘cohesion’, and is 
predominantly concerned with ‘equality and diversity’ (further exemplified by the 
predominance of language such as ‘ethnic minority’ and ‘BAME’ rather than ‘Yemeni’), 
as well as a more local focus on ‘boosterism’ and the rebranding of Liverpool.78 The 
demotic discourse is, as to be expected, much more ambivalent, reflecting the everyday 
realities of a multi-ethnic neighbourhood and ‘demotic cosmopolitanism’ as will be seen.  
                                                        
77 Select Committee on Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local Government and the 
Regions. 2004. Memorandum by Liverpool City Council. SOC67. [Online]. Available from: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmodpm/45/45we09.htm 
78 While the community leaders discussed in this chapter emphasise ‘diversity’ in the positioning of the 
respective organisations, one of them also mentioned campaigning for the inclusion of ‘Yemeni’ on census 
forms, rather than the broader label of ‘Arab’. 
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5.6 Liverpool Arab Arts Festival: From Tactics to Strategy 
This section now delineates the history of the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival (LAAF) from a 
small-scale, local event in its beginnings during the late 1990s to a large, highly publicised 
city-wide festival, embodying the type of civic boosterism promoted by Liverpool City 
Council’s dominant discourse. Bonakdar and Audirac (2019: 148) note that the emergence 
of city rebranding is linked to the restructuring of global economic systems: ‘The 1990s 
ascent of financialization….has made city branding and city marketing integral economic 
development strategies for urban growth and for competitively repositioning the city in 
global urban hierarchies’. Liverpool from the mid-2000s is a clear example of these 
processes as the city sought to rebrand itself during the ECoC 2008 after decades of high 
unemployment, urban deprivation, and a generally unfavourable image of the city. 
Nonetheless, Platt (2011) has also noted that the rebranding of Liverpool during the ECoC 
2008 led to a heightened sense of local identities for many of her participants, thus 
exemplifying the notion of the ‘glocal’. 
In this section, by exploring the development and implications of the festival, I argue that 
the festival’s trajectory can be understood in de Certeau’s (1984) terms as moving from 
(everyday) ‘tactics’ of its founders, to becoming co-opted into (institutional) ‘strategies’ of 
civic boosterism and rebranding. LAAF in its current state can be considered an example 
of what Baumann (1999: 122) describes as ‘multicultural parades’, typically including 
events such as ‘folk dancing, cultural festivals and ethnic restaurants’. These parades are, 
according to Baumann (1999: 122) bound up with the notion of ‘celebrating diversity’ and 
other such slogans which civic boosterism projects frequently employ, but often producing 
instead a ‘difference “multi”-culturalism’ while ignoring the complex forms of relations, 
or ‘multirelational thinking’ (ibid., 125) which take place between inhabitants of a multi-
cultural city. Indeed, Liverpool’s dominant discourse exemplifies this ‘difference “multi”-
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culturalism’. The role of cultural festivals in processes of locality-production has been 
examined by Johansson and Kociatkiewicz (2011) who highlight that they primarily 
function as a means to market and promote city ‘distinctiveness’. While the festival is 
arguably the most visible representation and performance of ‘Arab’ culture in the city, it is 
also recognised that such performances are more clearly orientated for ‘outside’ 
consumption (at least since the festival’s dramatic growth) rather than reflecting the 
everyday lived realities of the second-generation participants.  
Shortly before the official launch of the 2018 festival, I was invited to attend a pre-launch 
talk by the founders (Yemeni and non-Yemeni) of the festival, who described the initial 
idea, the challenges they faced in setting up the festival, and how it has grown since. The 
following are fieldwork notes from this talk to provide a background to the festival, as well 
as highlighting several themes which echo the dominant discourse.  
 
LAAF 2018 Pre-Launch Talk Notes: 
One Yemeni founder noted that a key point in encouraging him to set up such an event was 
when he learnt that several Yemeni children began expressing disappointment in their 'Arabic-
sounding' names due to teasing from their peers at school. Upon learning this, he decided that 
Yemeni and Arab culture must become more ‘visible’ in the city, and that there should be 
opportunities for children to connect with their cultural heritage, leading to the creation of a 
Yemeni ‘club’ in the early/mid-1990s. This was a small gathering of Yemeni parents who 
initially used houses as spaces to teach children the Arabic language. In 1998, a small-scale 
event organised by some members of the same group was advertised as an evening of Arabic 
food, music, and dance. In 2002, this ‘festival’ broadened in scope when it was officially 
launched in partnership with the Bluecoat.79 He spoke about the difficulties faced around this 
time, predominantly due to 9/11, which led to negative reactions as supporters and funders 
believed it would be impossible to publicise such an event amidst fears of terrorism and 
negative media coverage of Arabs. He commented how he was determined to make the 
                                                        
79 The Bluecoat is one of the ‘Big Eight’ cultural institutions in the city. (O’Brien, 2010: 124) 
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festival a success, and in 2002 the festival was successfully launched. The festival was initially a 
Bluecoat managed event, but eventually became an independent project led by a largely Arab 
board.80 It was also mentioned that the festival really ‘took off’ when Liverpool won the 
European Capital of Culture award in 2008.  
 
He also described a point of contention, after a reporter from the Jewish Chronicle allegedly 
questioned why the festival was labelled ‘Arab’ and not the more broadly inclusive ‘Middle 
Eastern’. The reason given for remaining as the ‘Liverpool Arab Arts Festival’ was that the 
festival had already identified itself as promoting Arab arts by this stage, and that a great 
degree of inclusivity was built into the festival with artists and performers coming from across 
the Arab League countries. 
 
Cultural festivals such as the Liverpool Arab Arts Festival have been labelled by various 
scholars (Boyle, 1997; Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 2004) as part of ‘civic boosterism’ projects 
which aim to promote a city and, ultimately, in order to attract investment and accumulate 
capital. The coincident timing of the festival’s establishment with Liverpool winning the 
ECoC award in 2008 would point to the festival being within the type of urban project 
which Boyle (1997) terms ‘Urban Propaganda Projects’. Given the inception of the festival 
as a localised grass-roots project which went on to gain funding from Liverpool City 
Council and Arts Council England, it is somewhat atypical of ‘Urban Propaganda Projects’ 
in that it was co-opted into ECoC projects and advertised more widely only after it had 
already gained some recognition within the city.  
During the prelaunch talk, it was mentioned that the festival is a ‘typical Liverpool thing’ 
in being both international in its scope while also ‘rooted in the community’. These 
assertions highlight two main points of argument: that a) the dominant discourse of ethnic 
minority ‘communities’ in Liverpool reifies diversity by placing these within the 
                                                        
80 The members of the board share a similar background to the community leaders discussed in this chapter 
in having high levels of education and/or being employed in ‘skilled’ professional positions. 
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imaginary of Liverpool as a ‘World City’– a facet of the city’s history further promoted by 
the Capital of Culture award 2008, and b) that although the festival was established 
primarily by Yemenis, and continues to assert its ‘roots’ in the community, participants 
responses were more ambivalent. Ṭāriq (40s, born in Merseyside, various employment 
including community work), for example, noted that he would ‘go along if the kids were 
bored on a Saturday’ but did not feel it held any particular relevance to everyday Yemeni 
life in Liverpool. Similarly, Rīm (30s, born in Liverpool, social work) noted: 
For me personally, I've got a big family, so I can't be dealing with another 50 kids on top of 
that, we just do our own thing. Like at the Arabic Festival, I just popped in because it [Family 
Day] was there, my daughter didn't even want to go. 
 
Layla and Zahra (20s, both students), although not regularly attending the festival, 
mentioned how it has impacted ‘visibility’. Layla comments: 
I feel like the Yemenis are quite invisible and neglected. If you look up online about Yemeni L8 
you won't find much, maybe only recently with the Arab Arts Festival, but not much before 
that, especially since Yemenis have played a big role in shaping L8. 
 
LAAF similarly demonstrates the importance of recognising that while such official 
celebrations of ‘diversity’ may enjoy great success or claim ‘representativeness’, they must 
also be located in their specific contingent contexts. In this case, its establishment and 
growth were the result of several factors – most notably the social capital and particular 
positionalities of its founders, Liverpool’s ECoC award, and its overall success in the city. 
Its relevance for many second-generation participants was limited.81 Admittedly, LAAF 
does not advertise itself as representative of Liverpool-Yemeni ‘culture’ or ‘community’, 
                                                        
81 See Boland (2010) for a discussion on how the European Capital of Culture Award 2008 was not felt as 
necessarily benefitting much of the city’s working-class populations. He (ibid., 640) notes: ‘Although several 
events were free, the real beneficiaries were salaried groups able to enjoy the cultural spectacle on offer, 
while the residents of impoverished communities faced the uncomfortable reality of everyday life’.  
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but a closer examination nonetheless reveals how its ‘roots in the community’ are 
emphasised despite these ‘roots’ belonging to a very specific, and not necessarily 
representative, group. Of course, the festival is a success on its own terms, and is 
celebrated as a positive achievement by its founders who emphasise its ability to provide 
the younger generations with opportunities to engage with their Arab ‘roots’ through 
artistic projects. Despite its visibility, the festival exists outside of the largely hidden world 
of the (interdomestic) aesthetic diaspora discussed in the previous chapter. 
Although LAAF began as a Yemeni ‘club’, it has been seen that Liverpool’s dominant 
discourse of ‘World in One City’ meant that the festival was co-opted and came to reflect 
this. Additionally, the festival itself can also be read as an antagonism against which 
religious leaders in the city assert its non-representativeness – this was exemplified by the 
community leaders noting how certain sections of the Liverpool-Yemeni population 
circulated leaflets highlighting the festival’s ḥarām nature due to dancing, the mixing of 
men and women and so on. Finally, in the language of de Certeau’s (1984) institutional 
strategies and everyday tactics, the co-opting of such festivals can also be understood as 
part of strategic locality-production which has little in common with the everyday, 
demotic tactics. Indeed, the festival’s initially limited, localised scope can be read as 
‘tactics’ of its founding group in (re)creating an aesthetically Arab space of ‘fun’ divorced 
from conservative religious spaces (Werbner, 1996). Nonetheless, and perhaps due to its 
very cosmopolitan (and non-religious) outlook which incorporates cultural and artistic 
forms from across the Arab world, such a space was more readily co-opted as a ‘sanitised’ 
representation of Arab culture rather than evolving as part of an (organic) ‘lived-in cultural 
world’ (Werbner, 1996: 54; 2009). The mixed reactions of second-generation participants 
(or more generally, the lack of reaction) to the festival also further emphasises the point 
that diasporas are internally heterogeneous, and that such public events and institutional 
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fictions of ‘community’ are also characterised by and become embedded in particular, 
situated forms of power-relations.  
 
5.7 Long Distance Nationalism or British Activism? 
This section explores a local campaign group which was formed in response to the 
ongoing conflict in Yemen since 2016, and more recently, the UK government’s sale of 
arms to Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 3 for an overview of the crisis). At least one community 
leader was a proponent of its formation and is active in its running, with several others 
having some degree of involvement. It was also a point of contestation in several 
interviews. Groups which ‘leverage transnational communities to participate in homeland 
politics’ (Lyons and Mandaville, 2010: 127) have been termed an ‘ethnic lobby’ or ethnic 
‘interest groups’, but this section will discuss how this group is perhaps better conceived 
of as a local, British grassroots campaign group rather than a form of transnational 
(diasporic) politics. The campaigning takes the form of vigils held every few months with 
several local MPs regularly attending, occasional seminars including a moderately large-
scale seminar which a variety of notable speakers attended in 2018, and various 
fundraising campaigns such as raising money for a hospital in Ṣan’ā. Since its formation 
and considerable growth, a new group with similar aims but slightly different scope has 
also recently been created. While the two are still closely affiliated ‘sister’ groups, they 
operate and co-operate in somewhat different spheres. The earlier group continues to 
organise vigils and local talks, retaining more of its origins as a local grassroots campaign 
group, while the newer group, being affiliated with the Labour Party, makes use of the 
more ‘official’ political channels to enact change. By engaging with local political actors 
to establish such a group under the umbrella of an existing political party, it becomes 
possible to engage in a more officially sanctioned form of politics. For example, in May 
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2019 a meeting was held with the Minister of Information for Yemen, the Yemeni 
Ambassador to the UK, and a number of UK MPs and Yemeni government delegates. The 
group is also expected to take part in the Labour Party’s annual conference in 2019. 
Both groups, while operating in different spheres, share the common aim of advocating for 
peace in Yemen and frame the conflict as a humanitarian crisis. It is important to note that 
neither group aligns itself with or condones the actions of the conflicting parties currently 
operating in Yemen, namely the Yemeni government and the Ḥūthī armed movement. By 
avoiding becoming embroiled in the politics and divisions of the conflict as seen from 
within a Yemeni context, and by having an explicit focus on ‘peace’ while emphasising 
the devastating effects of war, the two groups are able to generate a more receptive 
response from among local political actors as they are not required to endorse or criticise 
the existing factions in Yemen. Additionally, it was notable during the vigils and events I 
attended that the majority of attendees were not Yemeni or Arab. 
 
Turner (2010: 100) notes that members of a diaspora often become perceived as ‘tolerant, 
democratic cosmopolitans that can help put an end to violent identity politics’. In this 
sense, these groups are an example of ‘long-distance nationalism’ in which migrants 
contribute to peacemaking processes in the ‘homeland’. As they are focused towards 
enacting change in Yemen by primarily putting pressure on the UK government, these 
groups are less clearly ‘transnational’ in that they do not represent (direct) participation in 
‘homeland’ politics, nor can they be considered as representing a diasporic public sphere. 
As they are not primarily Yemeni spaces, and given the explicitly non-factional stance, 
these groups do not present a ‘public sphere as an arena of conflict, argument and 
imaginative creativity’ (Werbner, 2002a: 252) which characterises a diasporic public 
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sphere. For Werbner, such internal conflict and lively debate are possible in a diasporic 
public sphere due to their not ‘having direct impact on world affairs’ (ibid., 256).  
Thus while the two are political campaign groups led by Yemenis with elements of long-
distance nationalism, I argue that they are better understood as ‘British’ grassroots 
campaign groups rather than ‘diasporic’ or ‘transnational’ in the sense that the groups’ 
efforts in the political sphere are more focused on putting pressure on the UK to cease its 
arms trade with Saudi Arabia and to raise awareness of the situation, rather than engaging 
directly with Yemeni national politics. Very few participants had connections to these 
groups, with some also noting that they did not participate, contesting its orientation. 
Nonetheless, these spaces were not arenas for debate, but have a pre-defined political 
stance.  
The lack of a diasporic public sphere and the primacy of the family network shares many 
similarities with the conclusions of Alunni’s (2019) study on the Libyan diaspora. She 
concludes:  
belonging to Libya is primarily conceived as the result of deeply entrenched kinship relations 
developed in the family and semi-private diasporic spaces  
[…] 
Political and ideological divisions in the diaspora together with the regime’s policies at home 
and persecutions abroad were overall detrimental to the establishment of an all-Libyan 
diasporic public space.  (ibid., 2019: 257-258) 
The example of the Liverpool-Yemeni and the British-Libyan diasporas require being 
attentive to the context ‘back home’. In both cases, the extremely unstable and conflicted 
national contexts coupled with the second generation’s relatively apolitical stance mean 
‘national belonging’ in the diaspora is not reflected in a diasporic public sphere of open 
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engagement. This does not mean, however, that ethnicity is absent or unimportant, but 
rather that the contexts in which it matters are limited largely to the interdomestic sphere 
(see Werbner, 1990).  
 
The following section now discusses second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis’ narrations of 
their experiences at various Arabic schools and centres during the earlier, more fragmented 
phase of ‘community’ building. Notably, participants highlighted what they felt as 
inadequate education regarding what being ‘Yemeni’ meant and how to be ‘Muslim’, 
further revealing a generational divide. While the earlier generation are portrayed as more 
encapsulated, reproducing internal Yemeni divides, the second generation articulate and 
take part in alternative forms of engagement in the neighbourhood which emphasise L8’s 
‘multi-ethnic’ character, and which are not mediated by ‘national’ or ‘civic’ 
discourses/initiatives/agendas, but instead demonstrate examples of ‘demotic 
cosmopolitanism’. In this way, the construction and performance of Yemeni identities as 
discussed in the previous chapter often looks towards the older generation as a source of 
‘Yemeni’ authority, but nonetheless the lack of specifically Yemeni spaces outside of the 
home means the second generation find new, often hybridised, ways of engaging and 
negotiating their multiple positioned belongings. The role of Islam in providing an 
alternative imaginary of ‘community’ in many ways connected, but not limited, to Yemeni 
(family) networks will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
5.8 Demotic Discourses and Grassroots Engagement 
It will now be useful to examine the second generations’ more demotic articulations of 
‘community’ and their experiences with various community associations. As the majority 
of participants in this study are over the age of thirty, their experiences reflect the earlier 
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phase of community building which saw various smaller-scale Arabic schools, including 
the precusors to those which later became consolidated as the main schools discussed in 
this chapter. Most participants noted that they attended various Arabic schools growing up, 
without making a strong distinction between them. Owing to their small size, fragmented 
nature, and limited resources, these schools/centres which were set up during the early-mid 
1990s onwards have not provided to any great extent ‘tactical capacities’ for second-
generation participants to negotiate their multiple identities. Instead, participants more 
frequently noted the lack of education regarding Yemen’s history, and the lack of easily-
accessible Islamic education.  
 
Munīra (30s, Yemeni, born in Liverpool, various employment and activism) comments 
that although the school she attended helped her learn the language, she would have 
benefitted from a more holistic approach to studying Islam.  
I attended an Arabic School and an afterschool Arabic class in a school. It was just purely to 
learn alif-bā, the alphabet, reciting the Qur’an. I remember bits of Islam from it, but I sort of 
turned off when it came to those classes, I didn’t learn any Islam in Arabic school. That’s what 
affected me most of my life, I really needed the Islamic and spiritual aspects to help strengthen 
my identity, but instead I was being taught this language in quite a ‘bitty’ way, it didn’t 
connect to anything to do with my life outside. Having the religious element would have made 
sense of a lot of stuff that was going on at home, but the Arabic language…my parents still 
speak to me in Arabic, but I answer in English. 
 
She further highlights ‘fission’ or factionalism along Yemen’s North/South divide being 
primarily (re)produced by the older generation, but contests its importance in the 
Liverpool context, instead highlighting how Scouse identities can be stigmatised in the 
UK: 
I didn’t understand the whole North/South divide when I was younger and didn’t feel it. My 
parents’ friends would all be from the North…most Liverpool-Yemenis are from the North, but 
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it’s not until you start hearing about marriages that can’t go ahead because of the North/South 
divide. I remember the first comment that was made to me: ‘You don’t like look someone from 
Malāḥ?’ and then I realised that there’s a…it’s almost like you’re looked down upon for being 
from the North [of Yemen] which is so mad because we’re in Liverpool now and you feel that 
for being from Liverpool too, like when you go to London, you do feel that. And we do 
stereotype ourselves too, like this is what people from the South are like, this is what people 
from the North are like. And then so I’d hear these things first-hand but I’m not too bothered. 
It’s OK for me, but for the older generations there’s still those real grudges.82  
 
Layla (20s, born in Yemen, raised in Liverpool, student) mentions that she switched 
between various schools, but did not feel that they strengthened any sense of Yemeni 
identity: 
From a young age I went from one centre, and then to another school, and then to the 
mosque. I only went to study language and Qur'an. There wasn't nothing there about teaching 
us who we are. I only found out Yemenis were among the most famous sailors in the UK two 
years ago. 
 
Aḥmad (30s, born in Liverpool, works in education) highlights the differing orientation of 
two Arabic schools, the first of which he attended as a child: 
It was totally the same as in Yemen, so they had tarbiyya Islāmiyya [Islamic education], which 
involved Quran and fiqh, understanding Qur'an and sīra and tajwīd, how to read, everything. 
So there was like citizenship and humanities education which was more like propaganda about 
the glories of the Yemen and the Arabs. 
 
While noting regarding another centre that: 
It was established to learn Qur'an. They're more interested in ensuring that the youth don't 
lose their culture and reinforce that, it's a nuanced difference but there is a difference. 
 
                                                        
82 It is also important to note that this political dis-unity does not mean that the category of ‘Yemeni’ itself 
is contested – indeed, the social imaginary of a unified Yemen despite this disunity is pervasive as Müller 
(2015: 188) notes: ‘before unification, the leaders of both Yemens always considered the North and South 
as shaṭrayn – as two halves of one country that were supposed to unite one day’.  
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Observations at the Arabic school and a weekly ‘community’ evening also revealed that 
while these organisations may draw upon certain representations or fictions of (multi-
ethnic) ‘community’ when interfacing with the local state, they are experienced somewhat 
differently on a demotic level – primarily as an extension of the interdomestic sphere. For 
example, Yemenis who attended the Arabic school were often known to each other via 
family ties or due to living in proximity, in comparison to other non-Yemeni Arabs or 
Arabic speakers who would travel from further out. Additionally, the weekly gathering 
was more often attended by clusters of Yemeni families – usually first-generation Yemeni 
parents, a number of older first-generation individuals, and very few second-generation 
adults. In interviews, both the secular and religious schools/centres were emphasised as 
being ‘inclusive’ and not narrowly ‘Yemeni’. This itself was met with ambivalence, as 
second-generation participants have noted the lack of tactical capacities provided by the 
earlier institutions established by the first-generation in negotiating their Yemeni 
identities, while at the same time also speaking positively of inclusivity and diversity. For 
example, Rīm (30s, born in Liverpool, social work) frames the different orientations of the 
secular/religious Arabic centres in terms of the North/South divide in Yemen, while 
nonetheless noting that both are ‘inclusive’: 
They all [the Arabic schools] have debates but you know what it is, they're divided North and 
South, like all the Adenis will be like 'no we don't want that'. But they’re not just Yemeni kids, 
it's all Arab kids.  
 
In contrast to the dominant discourse of Liverpool which I argue promotes a sense of  
‘difference “multi”-culturalism’ (Baumann: 1992: 125, see also Bullen, 2016), the 
everyday grassroots engagement of the second-generation participants was more often 
directed towards Toxteth as a multi-ethnic locality in which ‘diversity’ is a facet of 
everyday life, rather than something to be ‘promoted’. Munīra’s quotes from the previous 
chapter spoke of the organic connections between her family and multi-ethnic neighbours, 
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while other participants frequently mentioned that they enjoyed diverse friendship circles. 
Although such examples were most often spoken of in positive terms, the demotic can also 
reveal conflict and hostility, such as Aḥmad’s quote which revealed his struggle of 
maintaining two (Scouse and Yemeni) identities growing up, and racist attacks on his 
family’s property.  
 
Throughout the fieldwork period, I also attended various events and activities organised or 
attended by participants in the neighbourhood. These included a series of local poetry 
evenings organised by Layla with poets from various ethnic backgrounds. One of these 
evenings was focused on the attendees producing poetry recalling experiences of living 
and/or growing up in L8. Another example was an Arabic reading club in Toxteth, set up 
by Maḥmūd with the aim of helping Arabs and (non-Arab) Arabic-learners enjoy Arabic 
literature. I was also invited by Munīra to help out at community gardens in Toxteth run by 
a group of volunteers, Yemeni and non-Yemeni. At one point, the gardens invited a family 
of Palestinian farmers to share their expertise and the group eventually opened a 
‘community’ café. In addition, many of the participants have been or are involved in 
various grassroots initiatives focused towards providing services to elderly Yemenis or 
Muslims in the city, such as Rīm discussing her experiences in providing meals to the 
older generation, or Aḥmad and Ṭāriq’s involvement in various ‘community’, Yemeni and 
non-Yemeni, projects such as one which aimed to strengthen inter-generational 
relationships. The lack of a diasporic public sphere and Yemen’s turbulent political sphere 
mean the ‘nation’ remains a peripheral point of reference beyond the family, but second-
generation participants are not ‘encapsulated’ – instead, broader forms of engagement in 
the multi-ethnic locality of Toxteth and beyond were emphasised. Often, these forms of 
grassroots engagement were motivated by a sense of Muslim ‘communities of co-
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responsibility’ as discussed in the following chapter, but this section has shown that they 
are not limited to Muslim spaces, also revealing a strong sense of attachment to the local 
neighbourhood as an arena in which demotic multi-ethnic and multi-faith friendships, 
solidarities, and connections can occur.  
 
The following quote from Munīra also reveals the importance of this multi-ethnic context 
in that everyday demotic interactions at the neighbourhooud level played a significant role 
in the changing dynamics of performances of Muslim identities in her family’s area: 
I didn’t learn how to pray in Arabic school or anything. And then, so I was still in school, and I 
remember the Somali community coming in because they arrived a bit later, but they came 
over with their religion and the girls came in with ḥijābs on, and one of the older boys had a 
beard and that was in the heart of a white area of L8…and they just came in, so even my mum 
she didn’t used to wear the scarf when she first came over. They dressed like Western people, 
and then slowly my mum would put the ḥijāb on, but these came over like, flaunting their 
Islam, so even though Islam came into this part of L8 through the Somali community so to 
speak, it was too quick, it was too much with no explanation. My parents had already started 
praying by then, but we were still quite free to dress how we wanted and I’d cover more as I 
grew but not the hair, but when the Somali girls came it was like ‘OK, you need to get a scarf 
on’. The pressure was from them even though they didn’t say anything, it was because my 
parents would look at these Somali families and think these young ones who’ve just come in 
are all wearing ḥijāb but our kids…there were a few Yemenis earlier on, Malāhis as well, who 
wore the scarf, but we didn’t see them that much. But the Somalis, visually, my parents would 
see them every single day, so every day it was a reminder. But the Malāhi girls, we didn’t see 
them often enough [for it to be a pressure]. 
 
Thus for second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis, the language of organic hybridisation 
alongside notions of ‘demotic cosmopolitanism’ best captures these demotic discourses 
and lived experiences in that while ‘Yemeniness’ remains important in certain contexts, 
articulations and examples of outward-facing broader societal engagement are rarely 
centred around any single ethnic Yemeni ‘community’ but instead emphasise ‘organic’ 
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diversity in L8. The quote above also highlights that inter-relations between migrant 
groups and the confluence of these journeys can also be an important factor which should 
not be overlooked at the expense of a purely national focus. This chapter has focused on 
non-religious imaginaries of ‘community’, delineating why a Yemeni diasporic public 
sphere has not emerged and the alternative ways in which Liverpool-Yemenis engage in 
the neighbourhood, but it will be seen in the following chapter that Islam also plays an 




This chapter has addressed the research question ‘What is the story of Yemeni-led 
‘community building’ in Liverpool, and how does this reflect imaginaries of an ethno-
national Yemeni ‘community’?’  By delineating the story of Yemeni-led ‘community’ 
building, it has been possible to trace the trajectory of an earlier phase during which 
community associations had a more clearly ethno-national Yemeni focus, to the 
contemporary landscape which has moved towards a greater emphasis on multi-ethnic 
‘diversity’ in Liverpool. The reasons behind this shift have been seen to be the result of 
multiple, interlinking factors. As the particular group of urban Yemeni community leaders 
arrived in the post-1981 Toxteth riots period, which saw demographic shifts in the L8 
region, and as the main Yemeni-founded community associations were consolidated after 
this point, the Militant-led council’s highly contested ‘race relations’ policies appear to 
have had little impact on or concern with the earlier phases of Liverpool-Yemeni 
community building. It has been seen that Yemenis are almost entirely absent in the 
literature which examines this period, pointing towards a more encapsulated, 
institutionally ‘invisible’ group. Instead, turning to the ‘national’ cornerstone of the 
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multicultural triangle, this chapter has highlighted that developments in national policy 
from the 2000s, particularly ‘Community Cohesion’ and ‘Prevent’, as well as the 
rebranding of ‘cosmopolitan’ Liverpool amidst efforts of civic boosterism, have played an 
important role in shaping these contemporary fictions of ‘community’.   
 
A key argument of this chapter has been that despite Yemeni community leaders playing a 
significant role in shaping the ‘community’ landscape of L8 and also acting as official 
‘representatives’ of Liverpool’s multi-ethnic Muslim and Middle Eastern groups when 
interfacing with the council and funding bodies, neither the community leaders themselves 
nor the second-generation participants organise or mobilise around any single ethno-
national Yemeni identity. Attention has been paid to the particular positionalities and 
social capital of these leaders in order to gain a clearer view of how they are favourably 
positioned to navigate the dominant discourses and secure sources of funding. Notably, 
this dominant discourse has been discussed as not fixing ‘Yemenis’ as a single community, 
but instead employs a form of ‘difference’ multi-culturalism which more often speaks 
simply in terms of ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘diversity’. It has also been noted that these 
urban Yemeni community leaders are not necessarily ‘cosmopolitan élites’, but are 
perhaps better characterised as activists who emphasise a conceptualisation of ‘integration’ 
into multicultural British society which does not mean rejecting an Arab/Yemeni/Muslim 
identity. The impact of Yemen’s highly conflicted national politics in the post-unification 
period has also been highlighted as a further cause for lack of such mobilisation. However, 
this is not to say that second-generation participants lack a sense of national belonging – 
indeed the previous chapter discussed how imaginaries of Yemen are (re)produced, but 
crucially, this chapter has shown that these do not form the basis of an imagined 
‘community’ or mobilisation in the context of Liverpool.  
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The lack of a robust ethno-national Yemeni diasporic public sphere in Liverpool has also 
been discussed. I contend that the reasons behind its non-emergence require looking at the 
turbulent political context of Yemen, as well as the orientations of the second generation 
who are largely not invested in debates regarding national Yemeni politics, but instead are 
positioned as ‘demotic cosmopolitans’. Both the urban Yemeni community leaders and 
second-generation participants emphasised the need to move beyond regionalised disputes 
and factionalism rooted in Yemen. Distancing themselves from such fragmentation, this 
chapter has also shown that second-generation participants are not ‘encapsulated’ or 
limited only to the family networks discussed in the previous chapter, but also take part in 
various forms of grassroots engagement centred in the neighbourhood which emphasise 
multi-ethnic connections and diverse friendship circles over an ethno-national Yemeni 
‘community’.  
 
Thus while the ‘nation’ (both ‘here’ and ‘there’) remains important in understanding how 
dominant discourses and national contexts and policy can impact the trajectory of 
‘community’ building, it is also important to recognise that these fictions of ‘community’ 
are sited in a particular context and produced according to particular sets of power 
relations. This being the case, this chapter also portrayed a more demotic account of how, 
despite the dominant discourse of ‘diversity’ and ‘cohesion’, these ‘community’ spaces are 
more often accessed in such a way that can be considered an extension of the 
interdomestic sphere. Not being limited only to the interdomestic sphere, however, the 
second generation also ‘take part’ in the neighbourhood revealing how ‘everyday 
multiculturalism’ (Werbner, 2013b) can lead to forms of engagement which are not 
necessarily mediated by the nation or local state. Experiences of racism, exclusion, and 
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marginalisation, all often bound-up with or (re)produced by national ideologies and 
discourses, must be not be overlooked; however, this chapter has emphasised shared 
identities across difference, i.e. the neighbourhood-based identity of ‘inhabitant of multi-
ethnic L8’, which are produced through organic, demotic interactions and experiences 
rather than being produced according to the dominant discourse’s reification of ‘diversity’. 
These shared, ‘demotic cosmopolitan’ identities can be a source of active engagement, 
participation, and solidarity. The next chapter now discusses how Yemeni Islam has 
‘travelled’ to and become institutionalised in Liverpool, and how religious identities are 
articulated alongside or against ethno-national Yemeni identities, while also considering 




























Chapter 6  Travelling Islam: ‘Roots’ and ‘Routes’ 
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter now addresses the question ‘What is the role of Islam in the construction and 
performance of second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni identities?’. Necessarily, this 
question cannot be adequately addressed without consideration of several interlinking 
elements. Ethnicity, nation, migration, and (trans)locality are all implicated in and 
interrelate with ‘travelling’ Islam in the diaspora (see Mandaville, 2001; Knott, 2010; 
McLoughlin, 2010, for ‘travelling religion’). The previous two chapters have advanced 
two main arguments, i.e. that a) ethnicised Yemeni identities and ‘Yemeniness’ retain 
most relevance and are most salient in the translocal family network, and that b) second-
generation Liverpool-Yemenis do not routinely imagine nor participate in any single 
‘community’ centered around Yemen as a modern nation state. Both of these points have 
noted that while dominant discourses, ideologies, and agendas and political contexts of the 
nation (UK and Yemen) do exert influence, in the everyday demotic articulations and 
performances of identity the (trans)local is often more salient than the nation. Sometimes 
these identities are articulated consciously ‘against’ the nation such as in productions of 
oppositional Scouse identities, and in other contexts, such as the more encapsulated world 
of the interdomestic sphere, the specific localities of Malāḥ and other Yemeni regions are 
more salient than reference to the nation state. Nonetheless, these points also remind us 
that localities and their associated identities are produced relationally, embedded in 
complex webs of historically situated power relations – thus the local (and ‘local 
identities’) must be considered alongside the broader national, and global, contexts. 
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As the previous chapters have proceeded with a broadening scale of reference, i.e. from 
ethnicity and its cognates to ‘community’ and its relation to the nation, this chapter now 
turns towards religion as the final corner of the multicultural triangle. It explores a further 
element of the ‘diasporic tension’ expressed in terms of ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ in that Muslim 
identities ‘rooted’ in ‘ethnic’/territorialised Islam may nonetheless forge new ‘routes’ in 
the diaspora as it travels, expanding beyond the family network, and possibly becoming 
articulated in de-culturated/de-territorialised/globalising terms. Thus, Islam as a 
universalising religion presents a further and important element to the discussion of 
diasporic identities in that it can both reinforce and transcend ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’. On 
the one hand, Islam in the diaspora can be experienced and articulated as closely bound up 
with ethnicity and (trans)locality, i.e. through its presence and transmission in family 
networks, translocal connections to the ‘homeland’ and institutions which are organised 
around a certain ethnic group. However, McLoughlin (2005a: 538, citing Knott 1992: 12) 
points out the limitations of viewing religion as merely a subset of ethnicity in the 
globalising age where ‘in the diaspora, many second- and third-generation youth are 
disentangling what they see as “universals of religion” from the “localised custom” they 
associate with their parents’ and grandparents’ homelands’ (McLoughlin, 2005a: 541). 
This disentanglement has led to what some scholars have termed ‘de-culturated’ or ‘de-
ethnicised’ Islam’ (see Roy, 2004; 2013; Bendixsen, 2013; DeHanas, 2013a) which in 
some cases provides a powerful sense of belonging especially for those who are 
increasingly at distance from the ‘homeland’. As McLoughlin (2010: 224) writes, while 
‘religions indigenize and often reinforce territorial identifications, it is the ability to trump 
such processes with extraterritorial imaginings which is both especially salient and 
peculiarly well enabled in a globalizing world’. 
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This ‘de-culturated’ Islam has also been framed in terms of ‘de-territorialisation’ in 
contrast to the more homeland-orientated (or ‘territorialised’) Islam of the earlier 
generations. Such considerations also form part of a broader debate concerning whether 
religion can in some contexts accurately be considered a type of ‘de-territorialised 
diaspora’ (Cohen, 2008: 18). Nonetheless, I have preferred to use the term ‘de-culturated’ 
over ‘de-territorialised’ to emphasise that although imaginaries such as the global umma 
may be articulated in de-territorialised terms, the study of Islam in the everyday means 
studying its sited, local context as well as the sited contexts from which it has travelled. 
Bauman’s (1973) theory of ‘culture as praxis’ highlights that no human activity or practice 
exists outside of ‘culture’, and in this way there is a need to be mindful of the distinction 
between ‘discourse/ideology’ and how this is reflected in embodied, lived practice. Indeed, 
although Islam became widely territorialised after its spread from the Arabian Peninsula in 
the seventh century and saw many subsequent fractures, its universalising core and 
capacity means that it is simultaneously territorialising and de- (or re-)territorializing 
(McLoughlin, 2005a, 2010). While the previous chapter discussed the ambivalences and 
disjunctures in imagining ‘community’ along Yemeni national lines, the introduction of 
Islam to this discussion adds a further dynamic. That is to say, while modern nation states 
do employ a symbolic language of ‘imagined communities’, the symbolic, travelling, and 
universalising language of Islam and its religious imaginary are not completely analogous 
to that of a nation state. McLoughlin (2010: 227) highlights that despite the pluralisation 
and internal fractures within Islam, ‘Travelling scholars, Sufis and pilgrims integrated 
diverse populations into shared universes of meaning across tribal, agrarian and urban 




As Chapter 2 stated, ‘Islam’ in this thesis is understood in Asad’s (1986a) terms as a 
historically sited and internally heterogeneous discursive and practical field. Similar to 
previous chapters which, drawing upon Brown’s (2005) work, envision ‘Liverpool’ as a 
unifying signifier, this chapter thus agrees with Mandaville’s view that ‘Islam can be most 
usefully viewed as a master signifier’ (Mandaville, 2001: 55 drawing upon Sayyid, 1997, 
italics original) under which this discursive field takes place. This view is particularly 
useful in the study of everyday Islam, as it recognises that while individual Muslims may 
hold differing views, beliefs, practices and relationships with Islam, the vast majority 
nonetheless ‘see themselves as adhering very firmly to a single Islam’ (ibid.). Nonetheless, 
more recent developments in the debate of the anthropology of Islam (e.g. Mahmood, 
2005; Schielke, 2015; Schielke and Debevec, 2012) have highlighted the need to explore 
how ‘grand schemes’ such as religion are enacted, embodied and performed in the 
everyday. Indeed, the very notion of ‘religion’ has become a contested category within 
anthropology due to the tensions between ‘the complex duality of religion as an everyday 
practice and a normative doctrine’ (Schielke and Debevec, 2012: 1; Asad, 1993).83 In this 
way, performativity theory is useful as a means to explore how a highly theorised 
understanding of Islam as a discursive field is lived and articulated. Schielke and Debevec 
(2012: 2) highlight this, noting that grand schemes are in important in the everyday 
precisely because of ‘their being posited above and outside the struggles and manifold 
paths of everyday life’ and that their employment in the everyday ‘is only possible through 
the actual little practices of evoking authority, searching guidance, exercising power – 
                                                        
83 Asad (1993), rejecting Geertz’s (1966) conceptualisation of religion, argues convincingly that a 
‘transhistorical definition of religion’ (Asad, 1993: 30) as a category is, in fact, untenable. He writes: From 
this it does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and utterances are to be sought in social 
phenomena, but only that their possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as products of 
historically distinctive disciplines and forces. The anthropological student of particular religions should 
therefore begin from this point, in a sense unpacking the comprehensive concept which he or she 
translates as "religion" into heterogeneous elements according to its historical character.’ (ibid. 54).  
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practices that are always also informed by the lifeworld they are embedded in’ (ibid.). This 
also highlights that the focus here is on everyday Muslim subjectivities, rather than 
ascribing to individuals any kind of essentialising ‘Islam’. With the emphasis on multiple 
(everyday) Muslim subjectivities, this chapter also draws upon Mandaville’s (2001) notion 
of the politics of everyday identities in translocal space. In this understanding:  
The ontological dimension of the political is related to one’s assertion of a particular identity 
because that assertion is, in effect, a claim to ‘be’ – to exist according to one’s construction of a 
particular identity – and, furthermore, to have that existence recognised by the other. 
(Mandaville, 2001: 10). 
These identities and multiple positionings are constructed in relation to a host of local and 
global concerns, as well as being articulated against several antagonisms, and therefore, in 
Mandaville’s terms, acquire a political dimension. Alongside individual articulations of 
Muslim identity, this chapter will also consider how the multi-ethnic character of Toxteth 
has shaped the notion of a Muslim ‘community of co-responsibility’ (Werbner, 2002a: 
252). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is, then, a) to examine how Yemeni forms of Islam have 
‘travelled’ and become embedded in the landscape of Islam in contemporary Liverpool, 
and b) to explore how (second-generation) Liverpool-Yemeni-Muslims narrate and 
perform Islam and Muslim identities vis-à-vis their other multiple (i.e. Yemeni, Scouse, 
Arab, British) positioned belongings. Although fieldwork took place in several of the 
city’s Muslim institutions, this chapter does not examine the specific practices, 
management or day-to-day affairs of individual mosques and institutions, nor does this 
chapter prioritise accounts of religious leaders.84 Instead, these institutions are 
                                                        
84 Although the research prioritises ‘everyday’ accounts from participants, I did attempt to arrange 
interviews with number of imams and religious leaders. Several declined to participate in interviews, 
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foregrounded as spaces which represent how travelling (Yemeni) Islam has become 
institutionalised in Liverpool and, on a practical level, as spaces in which it was possible to 
make acquaintance with potential participants. Therefore, it is the overall landscape and 
texture of Islam in Liverpool as well as the everyday articulations/performances which are 
prioritised. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of several main currents which shape Islam in 
Yemen to better contextualise the subsequent sections which explore how these forms of 
Islam have travelled to the Liverpool context, becoming re-shaped and re-negotiated along 
the way. This is important as it highlights that although ‘British-Muslim’ is a useful 
category when considering, e.g., the extent to which ‘Muslim’ has become ‘a primary 
public identity and form of political mobilisation’ (Birt, 2009: 215), or considerations of 
state policy vis-à-vis Muslims (see Abbas, 2005; Birt, 2005), it is equally as important to 
locate the manifestations of Islam in Britain in their historical, locally-sited contexts of 
migration. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, ethnicised (Yemeni/Malāḥi) and 
hybridised (Scouse-Yemeni) identities and their performances remain an important part of 
second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni everyday life. While Muslim identities may be 
prioritised and narrated in de-culturated terms in certain contexts, they are nonetheless 
                                                        
stating their inability to meaningfully discuss topics concerning everyday Liverpool-Yemeni life. This was 
either due to their not being Yemeni, and therefore at a distance from Liverpool-Yemeni social networks (in 
comparison to the community leaders of the previous chapter who are embedded in a number of 
interpersonal Liverpool-Yemeni networks), or in the case of one Yemeni imam, due to his short amount of 
time spent in Liverpool. However, I was invited to attend the mosques during prayers or other events after 
brief discussions with the imams/leaders/members of the mosque boards. It is also possible that this 
reluctance was in part due to my positionality as a non-Muslim researcher, although this was not explicitly 
given as a reason (see e.g. Dessing, 2013 for a discussion of similar issues in gaining access to religious 
spaces). I was able to interview a board member of one mosque, who preferred to give institutional 
histories which, while valuable in providing context, do not necessarily add to the discussion of everyday 
(Liverpool-Yemeni) Muslim identities. Nevertheless, a study which takes a more institutionally-based 
approach to Islam in Liverpool would be complementary to this thesis. Furthermore, several non-Yemeni 
Muslim participants’ voices are also included in this chapter to better accentuate how Muslim identities in a 
multi-ethnic neighbourhood compete with, conflict with, or complement ethnicised/hybridised identities.  
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lived and experienced in locally (or ‘glocally’) constructed contexts. Indeed, as the title of 
the thesis ‘Yemeni, Muslim, and Scouse’ highlights multiple, interlinking identities and 
positioned belongings, this chapter does not assume that ‘Muslim identities’ exist in 
isolation, nor that belonging to a Yemeni diaspora precludes participation in a 
transnational ‘Muslim diaspora’. This recalls Werbner’s (2002a, 2002b) notion of the 
‘chaorder’ characteristic of diasporas, in that ‘What is subsumed under a single identity are 
a multiplicity of opinions, “traditions”, subcultures, lifestyles or, to use Avtar Brah’s apt 
terminology, modalities of existence’. (Werbner, 2002b: 123; Brah, 1996). 
 
6.2 Sunni/Zaydi? Sufi/Salafi? 
While Islam in Liverpool has a history pre-dating the arrival of Yemenis in the 1970s and 
1980s onwards it was only during the 1970s that Liverpool saw the establishment of a 
purpose-built mosque, with other mosques and institutions becoming established after this 
point.85 This mosque will be referred to as Masjid al-Salām. Although this particular 
mosque, located in Toxteth (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2 for map), was the result of a joint 
effort by a small number of Pakistanis and Yemenis (Halliday, 2010: 56), the landscape of 
Islam in Liverpool differs significantly from other areas of the UK in which the trajectory 
of Islam has been greatly influenced by migration from South Asia and religious 
movements which developed in this region (see e.g. Gilliat-Ray, 2010).86 Unlike areas 
such as Bradford and across the M62 corridor where the South Asian Deobandi, Barelwi 
and Tablighi Jama’at movements are well represented, Liverpool’s largest mosque, Masjid 
                                                        
85 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4 for discussion of Abdullah Quilliam and the Bougham Terrace mosque which 
later fell into disuse, only recently being re-opened. 
86 Given that ‘the 2001 census showed that 68 per cent of the Muslim population [in Britain] was of South 
Asian origin’ (Peach, 2005: 20), it is to be expected that the majority of studies on ‘British-Muslims’ 
concentrate on South Asian groups.   
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al-Salām, as well as another smaller Muslim institution in Toxteth, are both more clearly 
‘Yemeni’ or ‘Arab’ in their orientation. Timol (2019: 11) writing on the Tablighi Jama’at 
in Britain highlights the ‘Arab’ orientation of Masjid al-Salām, noting that a number of  
other ‘Arab’ mosques in the UK ‘make a point of sending only Arab TJ groups…as the 
usual groups of South Asian origin are more readily objected to’ (italics mine), of which: 
The cosmopolitan […] mosque in Liverpool may be cited as another example. Founded (and 
still managed) primarily by Muslims of Yemeni and Somali extraction, it can in no way be 
considered Deobandi, yet it has a long history of allowing TJ groups to visit and stay, 
permitting them to deliver their talks after the daily prayers. (2019: 11) 
While this chapter is less concerned with delineating institutional affiliation or 
organisation of specific Islamic movements, the above nonetheless highlights a significant 
‘Arab’ or ‘Yemeni’ orientation of Islam in Liverpool. Thus the following section will now 
discuss the particular histories of Islam in Yemen paying particular attention to how these 
have become incorporated into discourses and articulations of Yemeni (national) identities. 
Despite Yemen’s Sunni/Zaydi split, the complex political and social interrelations of these 
two denominations demands moving beyond ‘madhhab essentialism’ (Wedeen, 2008: 157, 
Messick, 2005: 161). As Islam is understood here as a discursive terrain, madhhabs 
(schools of thought or schools of jurisprudence) must similarly not be treated as self-
isolated units, theologically or sociologically. Indeed, it would be inaccurate to assume an 
irrevocable sectarian boundary separating Yemeni Shāfī’ī (Sunni) and Zaydi (Shī’ā) 
Muslims, as such an approach obscures how these two groups are mutually discursively 
constituted within the Yemeni context.87 In addition, these sectarian differences within 
                                                        
87 Although Zaydism is formally classed as a branch of Shī’ā Islam, Chapter 3 discussed how it differs 
significantly from Twelver Shi’ism. 
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Yemen are implicated in the post-unification nation-building project, but not primarily in 
terms of doctrinal difference. 
Although before the interwar-period ‘there was no notion of a Yemeni citizenry, and legal 
texts continued to specify affiliation in madhhab…of Zaydī or Shafī’ī membership’ 
(Wedeen, 2008: 37), it is important to emphasise that the Shāfī’i/Zaydi divide was, and is, 
as much (if not more so) rooted in geographic, tribal and socio-economic divide (Carapico, 
1998: 61). This further emphasises the need for a nuanced examination of the context, i.e. 
to simply speak of ‘Shī’ā Yemenis’ obscures that Zaydism in Yemen has a very particular 
trajectory, being very much rooted in the specific contexts and histories of North Yemen 
while also continually in dialogue with neighbouring Shāfī’i populations. The existence 
and interplay of Shāfī’ism and Zaydism in Yemen do not necessarily represent the axes of 
a ‘divide’ within the post-unification political system, as Wedeen (2008: 158) exemplifies: 
(the now ousted) ‘President ‘Alī ‘Abd Allāh Ṣāliḥ is Zaydī, but the regime, and republican 
regimes since the royalists’ decisive defeat in 1970, have been only nominally Zaydī – at 
odds with intense Zaydī political identifications or doctrinal commitments’.  
While the specific role of Islam in Yemeni politics is not the focus of this chapter, the 
above places Islam in the Yemeni context, highlighting the ambivalences of sectarian 
difference which are specific and contingent, as well as differing significantly from the 
South Asian context. That is to say, despite the contested status of unified Yemen, Islam 
nonetheless becomes involved in a complex web of (political) relations and conflicts 
which are not entirely separable from the local/regional/national contexts within Yemen. 
The role of reformist/revivalist Islam adds a further dynamic to Yemen’s religious 
landscape which is now addressed. 
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Revivalist/Reformist Islam in Yemen has been examined by several scholars (Knysh, 
2001; Wedeen, 2008; Bonnefoy, 2011; Willis, 2018) who discuss its role in the complex 
interplay of Yemeni politics, notions of nationhood, and religious/political/tribal alliances 
which resist categorisation along any simple sectarian or tribal lines. Willis (2018) traces 
the roots of reformist Islam in (North) Yemen to the rule of Imam Yaḥyā al-Dīn.88 
Although formally Zaydi, Imam Yaḥyā employed an anti-imperialist ideology which had 
much in common with the (reformist) Sunni-Salafi, pan-Islamist movements (ibid., 49). 
The discourse of a united Muslim ‘community’ in (North) Yemen was employed by Imam 
Yaḥyā (r. 1904-48) politically as a means to de-emphasise sectarian divisions. Willis 
highlights this discourse:  
Yemenis were not defined by madhhab in this formulation, even the Zaydī madhhab, but by 
tawḥīd or the doctrine of God’s absolute oneness. Division within the community was 
tantamount to the rejection of tawḥīd and therefore contrary to Islam itself. (ibid., 53) 
Thus this emphasis on (Yemeni) Muslim unity was in part to prevent strategic exploitation 
of Yemen’s internal division by the British in furthering the colonial project in Yemen 
(ibid., 52-53).   
Moving to the post-unification period, Knysh (2001) provides an account of the tensions 
between Yemeni ‘reformists’ (salafis) and ‘nativists’ (sufis), noting that the discourse 
employed by salafis in Yemen differs substantially from those in Saudi Arabia, primarily 
in that there is a distancing from associations with (Saudi-backed) Wahhabism given long-
standing grievances between Saudi Arabia and Yemen meaning that ‘acknowledging this 
[dependence on the Saudi state] would harm the salafis in the eyes of most Yemenis, since 
                                                        
88 Imam Yaḥyā al-Dīn was the ruler of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom (which later became the (North) Yemen 
Arab Republic) between 1918 and 1948, as well as being the spiritual leader of Yemeni Zaydis from 1904. 
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this would reduce them to the role of Saudi stooges.’ (ibid. 403).89 Similarly, Bonnefoy’s 
(2011) study emphasises how transnational flows between Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the 
Gulf have resulted in a ‘Yemenised’ salafism which becomes articulated vis-à-vis or in 
conjunction with other Yemeni tribal/political/sectarian identities.90 King’s (2012) study 
further illustrates the multiple positioning of Yemeni religious identities from a Zaydi 
perspective, noting ‘Zaydīs’ multiple and overlapping identities are continuously activated 
or de-activated, especially vis-à-vis adversarial groups like the Salafīs, Traditionists or 
Twelver Šīʿīs.’ (ibid., 417). 
Thus Knysh’s (2001: 414) characterisation of (reformist) Islam in Yemen as becoming 
‘“localized” through its integration into the parochial politics of Yemeni provinces’ agrees 
with more recently published work (Wedeen, 2008; Bonnefoy, 2012; Willis, 2018) which 
describes how salafism in Yemen does not neatly map onto the Shāfī’i/Zaydi distinction or 
other ‘fault lines’, instead ‘these categories and the interpretive communities to which they 
refer are not always politically salient, are not necessarily unified, and are always 
relational’ (Wedeen, 2008: 166).  
 
This section has emphasised that despite Yemen’s complex and contested political terrain 
amid sectarian difference, reformist, transnational (pan-) Islamic discourses such as those 
employed by Salafism have become important in the landscape of Islam in Yemen. 
                                                        
89 See Weir (1997, 2007) for a discussion on the emergence of Wahhabism in Yemen. She locates the 
emergence of Wahhabism in Yemen during the 1970s, particularly in the predominantly Zaydi town of 
Ṣa’dah on the Yemen-Saudi border amongst those who had worked in Saudi Arabia or participated in the 
jihad in Afghanistan. The ‘conversion’ of Ṣa’dah Zaydis to Wahhabism is particularly notable. These were 
primarily ‘young men (shabab) from a wide range of ‘tribal’ (qabili) and low-status butcher families’89 (Weir, 
1997: 22). 
90 This transnationalism was primarily due to labour migration from Yemen to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, 
where ‘Many of those [Yemenis] repatriated from the Gulf brought back practices associated with the Saudi 
intellectual traditions of tawḥīd’ (Wedeen, 2008: 199; see also Birks, Sinclair and Socknat, 1981, for Aspects 
of Labour Migration From North Yemen). 
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Historically, these have been important in emphasising Yemen’s Muslim unity (e.g. Willis, 
2018), while more recently in the post-imamate period they have developed out of 
transnational flows of migrant workers between Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Arabian 
Gulf, but nonetheless becoming re-articulated and re-asserted in Yemeni terms (see 
Bonnefoy, 2011). The proximity of Yemen to Saudi Arabia and the common association of 
revivalist Islam with Saudi Arabia poses an interesting perspective in that the dominant 
Yemeni revivalist/salafist Islam actively distances itself from the Saudi state. In essence, 
this section has argued that religious identity in Yemen is negotiated and created alongside 
other positionings such as tribal identity, political affiliation, geographic/regional 
identities, and so on, which take place in the context of Yemen as a contested state.  
 
6.3 Liverpool-Yemeni Sectarian Ambivalence 
How participants narrate their Muslim identities in terms of denomination or movement 
(or lack thereof) is thus significant as the majority stated that their families’ origin is in 
Malāḥ or other parts of the Central Region (al-Minṭaqa al-Wusṭā), which as has been 
mentioned, itself occupies an ambiguous position within Yemen. While the western side of 
the Central Region around Radā’a and Malāḥ appears to be majority Shāfī’i (Day, 2012: 
49), the area is more broadly notable for being a Shāfī’i-Zaydi mix (ibid.), unlike 
elsewhere in Yemen where regionally one denomination is more clearly dominant.91 All 
Yemeni participants who self-identified as Muslim noted that they considered themselves 
Sunni, with none expressing affiliation or adherence to any particular maddhab within 
Sunni Islam, e.g. Rīm noted ‘I’m just Muslim’. However, one participant later mentioned 
                                                        
91 More specifically, Staub (1989: 112) in his ethnography of New York Yemenis notes that there is a large 
presence of those from Riyāshiyya, just south of Radā’/Malāḥ and that the qabā’il from this region are 
largely Zaydi, but nonetheless they ‘belittle any significant difference between zaydi and shafi’i, saying that 
the differences are nothing more than a matter of varying postures during prayer’. 
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after the interview that they had asked their family whether they were Sunni or Zaydi, to 
which a family member replied ‘Zaydi’.92 This participant felt that the Sunni/Zaydi 
distinction was not relevant to their identity as a second-generation Muslim in Liverpool, 
instead echoing the other participants’ emphasis on ‘just being Muslim’. Such responses 
can be read as reflecting attitudes and dynamics described in the previous chapters, i.e. that 
second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni participants de-emphasise divisions (social, political, 
or religious) which are rooted in Yemen in their articulations of identity. This also recalls 
McLoughlin’s point regarding Bradford Muslims, as he notes:  
it struck me that many ‘ordinary’ Muslims, old and young alike, did not really identify with 
sectarian labels. Most did not have a conscious sense of being ‘Barelwis’ or indeed anything 
else - they were just ‘Muslims’ or ‘Sunnis’ or, when pressed ‘not Wahhabis’. (2000: 191) 
That said, the everyday de-emphasising of sectarian difference may also represent ‘travel’ 
from the everyday Yemeni context in that ‘Zaydi and Sunni religious doctrines were 
largely congruent. Zaydis and Sunnis intermarried, prayed together, and made common 
political cause.’ (Ahram, 2019: 100). Thus in such a context, ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ combine: 
while de-culturated Muslim identities might extend beyond any single 
locality/nation/ethnicity, such considerations as sectarian ambivalence may simultaneously 
be informed by ‘roots’. The expanding of de-culturated/transnational Muslim identities 
beyond those firmly rooted in the local/national/ethnic will be explored further in this 




                                                        
92 In addition, Nāṣir (community leader) mentioned that there were very few Zaydi families in Liverpool. 
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6.4 Travelling Islam: From Yemen to Toxteth 
Toxteth is home to two mosques: Masjid al-Salām being the largest mosque in the city, 
and Masjid al-Bayḍā’ being a smaller, more recent addition.93 The city’s main mosque is 
located off a wide, leafy boulevard which runs from the city centre into Toxteth. Despite 
its size, it is hidden from view along the main road, only becoming visible once you enter 
a largely residential street. This street, like many others in Toxteth, has been long occupied 
by derelict houses, although these are now being renovated and new housing is being 
constructed. It is possible to be completely unaware of the mosque’s location (or even 
existence), given where it is situated as there is little else of note along the street, giving 
people little reason to enter the street when travelling between the city and Toxteth.  
 
Despite its unassuming location, Masjid al-Salām is the main mosque of the city, with the 
largest capacity accomodating approximately 2,500 people.94 It was also the only purpose-
built mosque in the city, completed in 1974, when Yemenis began to arrive in larger 
numbers. Brown and de Figueiredo (2015: 79) note that the site was acquired in 1958 by 
the Liverpool Muslim Society, which was founded by the efforts of the small Pakistani and 
Yemeni community. Before the acquisition of this site, Bunnell (2016: 92) mentions that 
Muslims in Liverpool (including Malaysians who were once a significant diasporic group 
in the city) would pray in the home of the Yemeni Imam ‘Alī Ḥizzām who was a leading 
founder of the Liverpool Muslim Society. The mosque itself was refurbished in 2008 
during the ECoC, now boasting a golden dome and crescent, and golden minarets. Until 
recently, the imams and leadership, according to participants’ accounts, have been largely 
                                                        
93 Participants informed me of an additional mosque in L8 which has been described as Salafi/Da’wah which 
I did not visist. 
94 The mosque has spaces for both men and women, with a separate women’s entrance. I was unable to 




Yemeni, delivering khuṭbat al-jum’a (Friday sermon) in Arabic. Nāṣir (50s, community 
leader) notes that since it is the largest mosque in the city, it serves Muslims from all 
backgrounds: 
Masjid al-Salām is actually always, what we call the jāmi’ – jāmi’ means everyone. It has 
Nigerians, Somalis, Yemenis. To be fair, the Yemenis who were interested in the jāmi’, none of 
them had the skills to become strong board members, some of them are shopkeepers and 
good people, but not skilful to lead it and because of the nature of their background, other 
communities have people who came with education in Islam like Egyptians and Nigerians.  
 
This agrees with Timol’s (2019: 11) description above regarding its ‘cosmopolitan’ nature. 
For Nāṣir and others who echoed similar sentiments, the older first-generation Yemeni 
leadership (i.e. those who established the earlier Yemeni community associations, in 
comparison to the urban Yemeni leaders) are portrayed in more parochial terms, less 
attuned to the increasing ethnic diversity of the mosque. This also reflects the participants’ 
earlier articulations which highlighted the generational divide, or, the diasporic tension of 
‘roots’ and ‘routes’. Another participant describes how the recent change in imam and 
leadership has resulted in some Liverpool-Yemenis preferring to attend Toxteth’s other 
mosque, Masjid al-Bayḍā’, which continues to deliver the khuṭba in Arabic: 
Even [though] al-Salām was established and dominated by the Yemenis…this guy [the new 
Imam] came and he doesn’t speak Arabic even. All my life I knew they were delivering khuṭbat 
al-jum’a in Arabic, but when he came, he started delivering it in English, so they pushed the 
Yemenis and Arabs out, and they [previously] dominated the mosque…But now the majority of 
Yemeni and Arabs go to al-Bayḍā’, however I go to al-Salām sometimes as well, I have no 
issues going there. I go quite often. 
 
It is interesting to note that although the new non-Yemeni imam possesses a high level of 
Classical Arabic necessary to lead prayers and recite from the Qur’ān and other Islamic 
texts, this participant is referring specifically to the somewhat unrehearsed delivery of the 
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khuṭba in Arabic. The association of al-Bayḍā’ with older, Yemeni or Arab men in 
particular was repeated by several participants. These first-generation individuals, born in 
Yemen, are more comfortable in their native Arabic language highlighting the persistence 
of ethnicity and its role in processes of fusion and fissure in the institutionalisation of 
Islam in Britain (cf. McLoughlin, 1998; 2005b, for an account of the institutionalisation of 
Islam in Bradford). Second-participants, however, will be seen to prioritise Islamic 
knowledge in the English language. Rīm (30s, born in Liverpool, social work) notes a 
further motivation for the establishment of the more clearly Yemeni/Arab-orientated al-
Bayḍā’ in terms of proximity to the Yemeni hub of Lodge Lane: 
 
Rīm: Well the al-Salām is the main one so everyone goes there, but al-Bayḍā’ is small and ran 
by Yemenis so it's mostly Yemenis.95 Two friends opened that. They do a lot of events for kids 
and coffee mornings and fundraising and things like that. 
 
Researcher: Was it set up because they wanted a more Yemeni space? 
 
Rīm: I don't think so, I think it's just because all the shops [on Lodge Lane] were close and 
they'd want to go and pray so it's just closer. 
 
Although Rīm does not perceive its establishment as being due to specific (ethnic) Yemeni 
concerns, its proximity to Lodge Lane as a Yemeni hub, Yemeni leadership, and use of 
Arabic language nonetheless position al-Bayḍā’ more clearly as a Yemeni/Arab ‘ethnic 
mosque’ in comparison to the more ethnically-diverse al-Salām. This is further 
exemplified by the dense interpersonal connections among Liverpool-Yemenis: its 
founders being friends or relatives of several participants, as well as, for example, the 
imam of al-Bayḍā’ attending the wedding described in Chapter 3. Thus, while both 
                                                        
95 al-Bayḍā’, located in a converted terraced house has a far smaller capacity than purpose-built al-Salām. 
Although I was unable to obtain a precise figure, I estimate a capacity of no more than a few hundred. 
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mosques in Toxteth have a strong Yemeni component, al-Salām is increasingly aware of 
the multi-ethnic character of its congregation and the need to use English as a common 
language. It is also important to note that the existence of al-Bayḍā’ alongside al-Salām 
does not represent sectarian difference or conflict, as many second-generation participants 
did not show a strong preference for one mosque over the other, instead citing practical 
concerns such as location or preferred language. Ṭāriq (40s, born in Merseyside, various 
employment including community work) echoes this: 
Al-Salām was founded by Yemenis and built by Yemenis. The first imams were among the 
major rolemodels. There are Somalis and others, but we were at the forefront. There’s a few 
mosques that have opened up now as the community gets bigger, like al-Bayḍā’, which was 
opened up by Yemenis. The mosques are all sort of intermixed now, it’s difficult for them to be 
separated [along sectarian/ethnic lines]. I’d usually go to al-Bayḍā’ because it’s close and my 
dad likes going there, and an imam is my relative. But if I’m [near] by al-Salām, I’ll go there.   
 
Second-generation Layla (20s, born in Liverpool, student) reveals a generational 
difference in attitudes, noting her ambivalence regarding al-Salām under the new 
leadership: 
I used to go the big mosque a lot, but now I hardly go because it's turned political…They 
started mixing politics in their seminars. It was just too much, and also like, there's a gap 
between the older and younger generation, like they brought a new shaykh to the big mosque 
and they [the older generation of Yemenis] are questioning “Why have we got this guy?”.  
[…] 
So, we had a Yemeni shaykh, very old, traditional...but obviously his answers and 
interpretations were influenced by his upbringing, but now we have this new guy…he spoke to 
the young people in the mosque like very ghetto, but I liked it because I looked around and the 
young people were really listening. The traditional, like...getting someone to interpret...oh, it's 
just so much harder. I feel like now we've got this new shaykh everything is moving and we've 
got change now. 
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Although Layla perceives the new imam’s engagement with the youth, exemplified by his 
colloquial use of English, as positive, she also expresses ambivalence regarding the 
introduction of ‘politics’ into the sermons. Despite this shift in (institutional) focus away 
from a purely ‘traditional’ Yemen Islam, during fieldwork visits to al-Salām I frequently 
conversed with groups of predominantly older Yemeni men, several of whom I had also 
met at the wedding as well as being introduced to a part-time Yemeni imam. This indicates 
that the institutional orientation in terms of madhhab/sect, or the discourse or rhetoric of a 
prominent leader, does not necessarily correspond to how ‘everyday Muslims’ perceive or 
use these spaces. Indeed, Maḥmūd (50s, self-employed) similarly notes that despite al-
Salām’s multi-ethnic character, in his experience groups tend to form along ethnic/national 
and generational lines: 
I've seen a lot of the youths over the last five years, Yemeni or Iraqi, say. When they finish a 
prayer on Eid, they only congregate outside the mosque, like Yemeni youths there, Iraqi 
youths there, Egyptian youths there. I see the elderly also being on their own, so the elderly 
Yemeni people, they will be over there. The Syrians will be over there. So they would segment 
themselves, they will join themselves together during the ritual and prayers, but also if they're 
about to break the fast they would segment themselves during eating, so the all inclusive 
practicality, in practice, it's not really there. 
 
In contrast, Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment and activism) who has 
previously been noted for her engagement in ‘community’ projects across ethnicity enjoys 
the diversity of al-Salām: 
There are instances of ‘you can only be part of one establishment and not two’, and things like 
that. Things are changing now. I was in the mosque today and yesterday and it was open to 
everyone, it didn’t matter what school of thought you followed, or what culture, it was really 
beneficial to have that and made me feel really connected to the mosque. It is largely Yemeni 
and Somali though, a few Asians but not many. But the course yesterday, every background 
was around me. 
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The above begins to reveal the complex interrelatedness of ethnicity and Islam in 
Liverpool – on the one hand, while a prominent imam of al-Salām favours a de-culturated 
Islam, this nonetheless takes place in the context of a largely Yemeni/Arab/Somali 
congregation with participants noting the persistence of ethnicity in interpersonal 
networks.96 Thus, at this stage it is important to note that Muslim identities can be 
simultaneously narrated as extending beyond ethnicity (i.e. ‘Muslim first’ identities, 
DeHanas, 2013a), while also being part of the fabric of ethnicity. That is to say, a ‘Muslim 
first’ identity need not imply de-culturation. Whether Liverpool-Yemenis discuss Muslim 
identities in de-culturated terms will be explored in further sections.  
 
In surveying the institutional ‘terrain’ of Islam in Toxteth, this section has highlighted two 
important points: a) that (Sunni) Islam rooted in Yemen has provided the foundations for 
several of Liverpool’s Muslim institutions and b) that there is an emerging generational 
difference in attitudes which is precipitated especially upon how Islam is negotiated 
alongside ethnicity – this also links to the argument of the previous chapter which 
highlighted the second generation’s more outward-facing forms of engagement as 
‘demotic cosmopolitanism’. This section has also highlighted that whereas other UK cities 
such as Bradford show strong transnational connections to specific Islamic movements 
which arose in South Asia, the institutional landscape of Islam in Toxteth is largely non-
denominationally Sunni. The earlier generations arrived to Liverpool before or shortly 
after the unification of Yemen, establishing various ‘community’ organisations fragmented 
according to Yemenis’ regional, geographic, tribal and political divides (some of which 
continue), but a non-sectarian Muslim identity was much less contested, represented by the 
                                                        
96 This was made clear during my brief discussions with the imam, as well as his previous institutional 
affiliations. 
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establishing of a single mosque. As Knysh (2001: 403) notes, after unification ‘Islam has 
come to serve as a convenient and accepted discursive vehicle in the relatively open public 
debates around the country's political, social, and religious direction and identity’. This is 
not to say that other forms of Yemeni-based Islam do not exist in Liverpool (as indeed 
section 6.6 discusses a transnational Yemeni Sufi movement), but rather that a broadly 
Arab-Sunni institutional landscape reflects the development of a Yemeni discourse in 
which Islam became a unifying, rather than divisive, identity.97   
 
6.5 Muslim Identities: From the Family to Multi-Ethnic L8 
This section will now explore how second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis narrate their 
Muslim identities, and to what extent these are ‘de-culturated’. In her article on ‘revivalist 
Islam’, Kibria (2008) examines its rise among Bangladeshi youth in the UK and the US, 
concluding that its attraction stems from it being perceived as a means to assert a Muslim 
identity which resonates more clearly with their experience, in which they are 
‘increasingly unable to relate meaningfully to the ethnic culture of their parents. At the 
same time, they feel distant from and unaccepted by the dominant society’. (Kibria, 2008; 
246). For Kibria and numerous other scholars (Glynn, 2002; Roy, 2004; Werbner 2004a), 
this alienation underpins the growing interest in revivalist Islam among diaspora youth. 
Other studies (DeHanas, 2013a; McKenna and Francis; 2018; Phoenix, 2019), while not 
focusing specifically on revivalist Islam, also note the prevalence of ‘Muslim first’ 
identities. DeHanas’ (2013a) study corroborates Kibria’s (2008: 246) assertion that 
‘Among other things, revivalist Islam may provide Muslim migrant youth with a means to 
                                                        
97 Brandt (2017: 103) notes: ‘In 1962, the project of non-maddhab identity was taken up by republican 
ideologues whose goal was to create the Republic as an enduring ideological form through the merger of 
Sunni and Zaydi doctrines, in an effort to create a ‘unified’ Islam’ ‘.  
 
 254 
assert their distinction and independence from the immigrant generation.’ Alongside these, 
there is also a body of literature which explores non-revivalist Muslim identities, 
presenting an alternative perspective in which ‘Muslim’ is not necessarily the only or main 
identity, but more ambivalently positioned alongside other identities in comparison to the 
‘organised’ or ‘vocal’ identities associated with revivalism. (Jeldtoft, 2011:1135; see also 
Schielke, 2012; Fadil, 2017).  
The following sections will discuss how the strong transnational/local connections to 
Yemen mean second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis articulate Islam both with reference to 
Yemen, and Yemeni ethnicity and the family, (i.e. ‘culturated’ or ‘territorialised’ Islam), 
while also articulating Muslim identities as extending beyond ethnicity. The following 
quotes illustrate a variety of Liverpool-Yemenis’ narrations of Islam and Muslim identities 
from multiple perspectives. These have been chosen for highlighting important aspects of 
this chapter which now considers how these articulations reflect translocal Muslim 
identities and performances, how they reflect participants’ navigation/negotiation of their 
multiple positioned belongings, and whether participants discuss Muslim identities in 
terms of de-culturation.  
 
Maḥmūd (40s, born in the North West, self-employed) describes how his ritual 
performance is directly influenced by his experiences in Yemen, further highlighting the 
importance of the lived experiences of simply being in Yemen for many participants: 
Some might be prompt in praying five times a day, but some might find it a struggle, I'm 
talking from experience. If I want to pray, I pray when I can, but them rituals are set in stone, 
five times a day. As an individual I'd say I'm not prompt praying nor do I see it as being 
compulsory to do, and one of the reasons why is because when I was in Yemen myself when 
the call to prayer came on I’d see a number of people rush to the mosque and also the people 
who didn’t want to go, they'd just stand around and the perspective it gave me is that it’s 
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different from Saudi for example. In Saudi when the call to prayer comes on the restaurants 
and shops close and the police are patrolling around but in certain cities they actually keep an 
eagle eye, they're always on the watch. In Yemen what I saw was when the call to prayer came 
on there was no onlooking, if you chose not to go, just don't publicly announce it like ‘I’m not 
going!’, just don’t go, so when I saw that kind of movement, if that’s happening in Yemen, that 
could be happening in [among] Yemeni people here, if you want to go to the mosque, go the 
mosque. 
 
Zamīla (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment including shop work) when asked if 
she would prioritise any single identity (Yemeni, Scouse, Muslim) above the other, notes 
that they are fully intertwined for her, before discussing the role of Islam within Yemeni 
identities. She then further notes that she consciously became more observant in her 
practice of Islam due to considerations of marriage and friendship groups. Notably, the 
transcript below reveals that Zamīla’s articulations of Islam/Muslim identities were closely 
bound up with the family, connections to Yemen, and her Yemeni/Arab friends.  
It’s weird, because I’d say every single aspect of it is just as important, because all of it is part 
of my identity. I wouldn’t split them up. As much as people might like me to, I wouldn’t  
 
[…] Islam is a big part of being Yemeni, it’s a massive part of it. Because culturally, we have 
been brought up with both cultures, I’ll still cook Arab food for when people come over, 
whether it’s English mates or Arab mates. I don’t have drink in the house or anything like that. 
I still feel really in touch with it all [Yemeni culture and traditions].  
 
[…] You know how in Arab homes they have a separate men and women’s room…in our village 
they accept us, in ours, whenever visitors came we were fine to go into the men’s living room 
and have a cup of tea with my dad. Our family is brilliant like that.   
 
[…] I was a rebel until I reached about thirty, I started praying, stopped going out as much. I 
started hanging around with a lot of Arab girls, so it might have been that as well. Loads of 
reasons, I wanted to get married, loads of stuff. So for eight whole years, I started praying, 
fasting... Now and again I’d go to the mosque. In Ramadan of a night, it was with my mum and 
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dad, during Ramadan it’s lovely, but I always find it too…too many janglers [gossipers], they 
always talk about everyone, and people saying ‘I don’t like this imam, or this or that’.  
 
Zahra (20s, born in Liverpool, student) when discussing ‘Muslim first’ and ‘Arab’ 
identities instead emphasised ‘Yemeniness’ above all: 
I don't like being called Arab or Middle Eastern, I really hate that, because why is it the Middle 
East? Because it's where the Arab countries are in reference to Britain so why are we using 
them as the centre point. I don't like being called Arab either because other Arab countries 
treat Yemen quite badly. I try to do more Yemeni things, and wear more Yemeni colours like 
wristbands and scarves sometimes to prove that I am Yemeni and I don't want to be 
associated with ‘Arabness’, I'd rather be Yemeni. I feel like there is more to be proud of being 
Yemeni than Arab. 
 
Researcher: Would you say a Muslim identity takes precedence in any way?  
 
Zahra: It's like in weddings, it's just so cultured, I don't know if that makes sense, it's different 
like on Eid, it's just different, it's very distinct, like the 'Yemeniness' of it all. 
 
Ṭāriq (50s, born in Merseyside, various employment including community work) when 
discussing the role of Salafism in Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim life, noted that his father was 
a ‘traditionally conservative’ Yemeni: 
There are elements of Salafism in Liverpool…I know a number of Salafis who are lovely people. 
Everyone thinks they are very dour and serious, but the ones I know love to joke and stuff. 
One of the Salafi guys, he had a wedding, and everyone wants to dance but we didn’t. 
Everyone respected that and just got on with it. You know, there are those things and they 
happen but it’s not like a show-stopper. He’s entitled to his beliefs. But the Salafi isn’t a big 
element. I mean you could classify us as traditional, very conservative with traditions and 




When asking Layla (20s, born in Liverpool, student) about her multiple identities, she also 
emphasises ‘Yemeniness’: 
People have mentioned that they're British but it's more like Yemeni comes first. I like it, 
there's a proud voice in the Yemeni community, proud of where we've come from. But I want 
to know why they're proud, how did they come here. I think it's because Yemenis are so 
authentic, in terms of the Middle East, it's the most authentic Arab country. 
 
Researcher: So how about your thoughts on the labels ‘Yemeni’, ‘Muslim’ and ‘Arab’, and how 
you might relate to those? 
 
Layla: I hardly use the word British. I'd say I'm a Scouser and British. In terms of being Yemeni 
and Arab... I've always considered myself as Arab, then Yemeni, but Yemenis were the first 
Arabs, so...only because it makes sense I think. Religion, or being Muslim is a big part, but I've 
always seen like Yemenis don't talk about it. It's more like a spiritual journey. 
 
Ḥāmid (50s, born in Yemen, community leader) similarly notes: 
I would say, I am Yemeni, I am Muslim and I am Arab.  I am Yemeni first, Muslim, and Arab. 
Arab is a big umbrella, but before that I am Yemeni. 
 
The above demonstrates that for the majority of second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni 
participants, there was little in the way of articulations which attempt to clearly separate 
‘Islam’ from ‘Yemeniness’. Participants overwhelmingly did not express conflict between 
Yemeni ‘culture’ and ‘religion’, nor was this articulated as a motivation for moving 
towards a more de-culturated Muslim identity. Layla notably mentions that ‘Yemenis do 
mix culture and religion a lot’, going on to discuss how Islam can provide a ‘tactic’ to 
negotiate cultural expectations, particularly those surrounding young women but did not 
elaborate greatly on this. Nonetheless, she does not emphasise a ‘de-culturated’ Muslim 
identity as being more important than her ‘Yemeniness’, as she frequently asserted the 
opposite in strong articulations of being all of Scouse-Yemeni-Muslim, reflected in her 
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various artistic endeavours and performances which highlight the intersection of these 
identities.  
 
Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, various employment and activism) noted that it was only 
after becoming more knowledgeable about Islam through English-language courses that 
she ‘felt closer to Yemenis’ and Yemeni identity: 
For a long time, I would avoid Muslims. Back then they were all Yemenis, the barrier for me 
being with them was not knowing the religion, but back then I didn’t know that a lot of people 
only knew the culture. Once you get it, it becomes so easy to interact with other people, once 
you know the religion. Being Yemeni has become a bigger part of my identity now. I think 
what’s helped is that the Yemenis can speak English now, not some of the elder generation, 
but the majority of them can speak English 
 
Indeed several participants further noted in response to a hypothetical situation I posed 
them that if ‘Islam’ was removed from being ‘Yemeni’, Yemeni individuals would still 
essentially be living as Muslims. Only two Yemeni participants explicitly stated a ‘Muslim 
first’ identity, but also echoed a similar madhhab-ambivalence.  
 
When asked how she would rank various labels in order or importance, Munīra noted: 
Muslim first, Scouse, Yemeni, British, Arab. 
 
Maryam who has a background which differs significantly from other participants, also 
noted a Muslim-first identity.98  
 
                                                        
98 Maryam was born in Yemen, moving to the UK at a young age and attending a Christian boarding school 
where she had very little contact with other Yemenis. She moved to Liverpool later in life, but is now active 
in various educational projects centered around the mosque(s).  
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A Muslim is a Muslim, and the Muslim identity comes first and foremost before the culture. I 
don’t lean towards any madhhab but I practice as a Shāfī’i, but having said that I always say [to 
students in the mosque as a teacher] ‘let’s just follow the best of mankind and leave the 
divisions’. I haven’t even gone deep into the shāfī’i [maddhab]. My main contact is with al-
Salām because it’s the big one and houses lots of people from different backgrounds, the 
other mosques are quite small. The small mosque usually caters for older Yemeni men, that 
kind of thing, whereas the other is more vibrant, it houses young ones, and women, and all 
different ages. I stayed away from the mosque for a while because I don’t like the headache of 
politics. The youth relate to the new imam because he speaks English, as opposed to the 
Yemenis who only do the khuṭba in Arabic. And the kids go out not knowing anything. But 
there are still people complaining ‘Why isn’t the khuṭba in Arabic?’  
 
Seen from the various perspectives above, everyday Muslim identities must be conceived 
in terms of multiple positioned belongings. That is to say, second-generation Liverpool-
Yemenis discussed Islam in both ethnicised terms, and in terms which extend beyond 
ethnicity. Dissatisfaction with Islamic learning gained only from the family setting and 
earlier community associations, hindered by the use Arabic over English has meant a 
number of second-generation participants chose to more actively engage in Islamic 
learning later in life. The motivations for this ‘religious turn’ were narrated variously as 
stemming from increased ‘visibility’ of Islam in L8 predominantly due to the influx of 
Somalis, the impact of 9/11 for a small number of participants, personal motivations 
regarding marriage and family life, and the wish to engage more publicly with others. 
Crucially, however, this has not translated into a de-culturated Muslim identity, as the 
quotes above reveal that such re-negotiation of Muslim identities has instead reinforced 
Yemeni attachments, while simultaneously being emphasised as a means for broader 
engagement within Liverpool’s multi-ethnic Muslim landscape. Additionally, I argue that 
the context of (Sunni) Islam in Yemen as well as Yemen’s geographic location with its 
cultural, linguistic, and historical links to the early period of Islam make ‘de-culturation’ 
less salient for Liverpool-Yemenis. The idea of Yemenis being ‘the first Arabs’ was 
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repeated on many occasions, and when taken with the understanding that the emergence of 
Islam was initially an Arab phenomenon with the Yemeni region playing a prominent role 
in these histories, it becomes clearer that for Liverpool-Yemenis, Islam is intrinsically 
linked to the social imaginaries of Yemen discussed in the previous chapters.  
For example, when I asked Munīra about how she might separate ‘Islam’ from 
‘Yemeniness’ she noted:  
One way to think of it is, do you know, when you think of some traditional Yemenis, if they 
weren’t Muslim, they’d still be following Islam just without the label of ‘Islam’ quite closely. 
Whereas when I think of Asians, I don’t really get the same feel from the Asian culture, but 
that’s only my perception. 
 
This was also further exemplified when I asked participants where, if they had the choice, 
they would prefer to study Islam. All participants, excluding one who said she would 
choose the US, said they would go to Yemen, with Ṭāriq (50s, born in Merseyside, various 
employment including community work) noting that: 
To be honest, the link to Saudi Arabia is overplayed, they only reason it has any significance is 
because of Mecca and Medina. The role Saudi plays is not really that important. I would not 
choose Saudi to study Islam, if I wanted to experience the ‘wrong’ type of religious training I 
would go there. There are much more better places where you will get a better, real 
understanding. So, I know lots of people go to Ḥaḍramawt in Yemen, or Cairo, or Damascus. In 
a historical sense, Saudi is a dot in time.  
 
Similarly, Maḥmūd emphasises Yemen as a centre of Islamic learning: 
If the Yemenis…said “We're from Yemen, we have a very long-term historical tradition, would 
we have to go into Saudi Arabia to find out the true meaning of Islam that we're practicing?” 
No, I don't think so. But why would I say that? Just because we're Arabs, we don't go to Saudi? 
Would Egyptians go? 
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Hayfā, of mixed Yemeni-Malaysian background (among others), highlights the historical 
Indian Ocean-centred connections between Yemen and Malaysia in influencing where she 
would choose to study Islam. Her account further paints a picture of Liverpool as 
containing a microcosm of Yemen’s diasporic connections in that the Yemeni-Indian 
Ocean-Horn of Africa connections continue to be remade in Liverpool: 
I'd say because my dad is Yemeni, I would say Yemen [for Islamic learning], and even from my 
Malaysian side, my granddad said people would go to Yemen to study to become imams and 
stuff, so I would chose Yemen, I wouldn't really associate it with Saudi. 
 
While everyday de-culturated (British-)Muslim identities are not necessarily expressed in 
terms of self-identification with reformist movements such as Salafism, these movements 
and their associated institutions are nonetheless influential in providing ‘tactics’ for young 
British-Muslims to negotiate diasporic tensions (see DeHanas, 2013a). I argue that the 
association between Salafism/reformist Islam and Saudi-backed movements in the Yemeni 
context provides a further reason against which Liverpool-Yemenis do not clearly 
articulate de-culturated Muslim identities; to be ‘salafi’ or ‘wahhabi’ in the Yemeni 
context implies association with the Saudi state – something from which Liverpool-
Yemenis actively distance themselves. Indeed, Zahra’s earlier quote highlighted her wish 
to ‘be more Yemeni’ in response to the Gulf states’ treatment of Yemen. When asked 
whether she or other Yemenis distance themselves from associations with Saudi Arabia, 
she noted regarding the older generation that: 
I think they do, because it [associations with Saudi] has a stigma now, like, if you say you're 
Wahhabi, you'll have it [you’ll receive strong criticism]. They [Yemenis] just hate it. I just 
generally think it's a reputation thing. 
 
In this way, second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis reframe Yemen and Yemeni identities 
as legitimately ‘Islamic’, with reference to Yemen being an important centre of Arab-
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Muslim culture and Islamic learning. This, of course, now takes places in the context of 
the current crisis in which Saudi Arabia is perceived as hostile thereby providing further 
motivation for rejecting movements which carry associations with Saudi Arabia. 
Additionally, Liverpool lacks any strong institutional representation of reformist 
movements from South Asia, therefore providing a terrain in which the translocal 
connections to Yemen continue to play an important role in the continued re-making and 
re-negotiation of travelling Muslim identities among Liverpool-Yemenis. That said, while 
participants distanced themselves from associations with the Saudi state, several 
mentioned a minority of Liverpool-Yemenis of a Salafi-orientation, and as Ṭāriq’s quote 
reveals, these everyday interactions are not necessarily construed in terms of conflict, but 
reveal the co-existence of a multiplicity of Muslim identities. Rīm further exemplifies 
these everyday ambivalences: 
My family are religious but not strict. Yeah, more, I'd say culture. Like, my dad has been to 
Mecca three times, I've been twice, my brothers have been. Half practice properly, half don't, 
but we don't judge each other… I'd say most of the Yemenis just live for the culture and the 
Sunni Islam religion. And now it doesn't matter, a Shī'i will marry a Sunni, a Wahhabi will marry 
a…  
 
The above also provides a counterpoint to Roy’s (2003; 2004) notion that diasporic Islam 
in the West is increasingly de-territorialised and ‘secularised’ with an emphasis on the 
global umma. Roy (2004: 258) notes that ‘Neofundamentalism promotes the 
decontextualisation of religious practices’ and that it ‘rejects the very concept of culture’ 
(ibid.) Although Roy’s arguments may certainly apply at a global level, particularly in 
respect to the global flows of finance in various Islamic movements, the ‘meroscopia’ of 
the everyday (to borrow Werbner’s, 2002a, words) shows a far greater presence of 
ambivalence, hybridity, and multiplicity in the construction of identities (Muslim or 
otherwise) than a global perspective allows for. As has been seen, second-generation 
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Liverpool-Yemenis routinely speak of Yemeni ‘culture’, ‘just being Muslim’ alongside 
Scouse and Yemeni identities, the role of Yemeni-led mosques, or being a ‘run-of-the-mill 
shāfi’i’ – these articulations of Islam are in many ways ‘rooted’ in the everyday non-
denominational Yemeni context. In this way, ancestry, kinship, translocality and 
imaginaries of the past re-inserted into the present form an important part of Liverpool-
Yemenis’ self-understanding as Muslims. As has been seen, however, these identities are 
not fixed, pre-made, or singular: they are the result of complex negotiations of multiple 
positioned ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ through which the second generation create new forms of 
being and belonging as Scouse-Yemeni-Muslims in a multi-ethnic and majority non-
Muslim environment. 
 
Thus far the role of Islam in constructing Liverpool-Yemeni identities has been explored 
with reference to Islam in the Yemeni (national) context, the persistence of (Yemeni) 
ethnicity in Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities, and the everyday ambivalences of 
sectarian affiliation. Section 6.2 focused on the complex nature of the Sunni/Zaydi divide 
within Yemen in which discourses of (Muslim) unity have become emphasised over 
division in the context of a contested state. These also take place alongside the emergence 
of contested Salafi movement(s), as Bonnefoy (2011: 11) notes ‘Sufis, socialists, 
Nasserites, liberals, Zaydis, as well as government officials all have their say on the Salafi 
phenomenon, usually claiming its development is the result of Saudi proselytisation 
policies that aim at destabilising Yemen’. In light of this, reformist movements have little 
space in the participants’ own articulations of Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities – 
instead they reclaim Yemen and Yemeni-Muslim identities relationally against the 
backdrop of Saudi interference by invoking Yemen’s ancient histories, the Islam of the 
family, and ‘everyday’ non-denominational de-politicised Yemeni-Islam. While Salafism, 
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Yemeni or otherwise, was construed as unimportant or distant from the participants’ own 
constructions of identity, the following section now considers the role of a translocal 
Yemeni Sufi movement.  
 
Several participants mentioned that they would choose to study Islam in Ḥaḍramawt, an 
arid South-Eastern region of Yemen which has historically been the centre of diasporic 
connections flowing between Yemen and the Indian Ocean. I later found that a specific 
town in Ḥaḍramawt, Tarīm, was an important locus of a translocal (or even transnational) 
Liverpool-Yemeni (neo-traditionalist) Sufi movement. The following section, drawing 
upon fieldwork observations and participants accounts’, will now consider how this 
movement reflects both the importance and embeddedness of ‘Yemen’ in Liverpool’s 
Muslim landscape, while also differing from the more clearly ‘ethnic’ Muslim institutions 
and articulations of Muslim identity rooted in the translocal family. 
 
6.6 The Tarīm Connection: A Yemeni Sufi Order in Liverpool 
Roughly half-way through the fieldwork period, I became aware of a further Islamic 
institution in Liverpool of the Bā ‘Alawi ṭarīqa which is centred in Tarīm, in the province 
of Ḥaḍramawt.99 Several participants noted attending this institution, including Farīda and 
Sārah, both Liverpudlian reverts, one of whom has lived and studied in Tarīm for nearly a 
decade. Alongside the translocal Liverpool-Malāḥ/Radā’/Central Region connections 
represented by Liverpool-Yemeni family networks, Liverpool’s Bā ‘Alawī movement 
represents another dimension of Liverpool’s translocal connections to Yemen. This 
movement’s presence in Liverpool is not, however, strongly connected to nor maintained 
                                                        
99 Ṭarīqa meaning ‘path’ or ‘way’ is the Arabic term for a Sufi order. 
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by individual Liverpool-Yemeni translocal family networks, but nonetheless further adds 
to the Yemeni landscape of Islam in Liverpool. The following sections will discuss the 
neo-traditionalist Bā ‘Alawī ṭarīqa in the Yemeni/Ḥaḍrami context, contrasting with 
Salafi/neo-fundamentalist movements, but nonetheless both sharing a transnational 
dimension in the sense of a ‘global mission/da’wah’  with the Bā ‘Alawī ṭarīqa being 
particularly ‘international’ in its propagation (see Knysh, 2001). What role this movement 
plays in second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities will then be discussed.  
In many respects, Ḥaḍramawt is differentiated from the rest of the Yemen region in terms 
of geography, diasporic connections, and religious landscape. While the western (North 
and South) Yemeni regions have historically been orientated more towards the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Mediterranean as evidenced in the flows of people, ideas and trade, 
Ḥaḍramawt looks towards the Indian Ocean (see Ho’s, 2006, The Graves of Tarim for an 
extensive study on Ḥaḍrāmi mobility, also Freitag, 1999). Although Ḥaḍrāmis are a 
significant diaspora group spread across the Indian Ocean in Malaysia, Singapore, and 
East Africa, none of the participants in this study mentioned family connections to 
Ḥaḍramawt, nor do Ḥaḍrāmis appear to be present in any significant numbers (if at all) in 
Liverpool. Nonetheless, the importance of Ḥaḍramawt and Tarīm as a centre of Islamic 
learning was discussed by several participants, including several who are not connected to 
Liverpool’s Bā ‘Alawī movement. Thus, this section will discuss how this movement both 
reinforces wider Yemeni-attachments for some second-generation participants in a manner 
which extends beyond the family, while also representing a transnational neo-traditionalist 
Sufi movement on a much broader scale. 
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Ḥaḍramawt, and Tarīm in particular, have long been considered centres of Shāfi’ī Islamic 
scholarship with a strong connection to the Bā ‘Alawī Order.100 This branch of Sufi Islam 
is thoroughly ‘Yemeni’ in its origins, centred around those who claim descent from the 
Prophet Muhammad, as Alatas (2011: 47) writes ‘Bā ‘Alawī (children of ‘Alawī) is a term 
used to denote those descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (sāda) who settled in the 
Hadramawt valley of southern Yemen’. Contrasted with other Sufi orders, the Bā ‘Alawi 
ṭarīqa places greater importance upon the direct Prophetic lineage as a source of 
legitimacy, emphasising the imitation of the Prophet Muhammad and his descendants, 
especially the sāda of Bā ‘Alawī. Several scholars (Freitag, 1999; Knysh, 2001) writing in 
the years following Yemen’s unification, observed a possible resurgence in Sufi 
movements noting also the opposition which these generated. While opposition appears to 
have been widespread in the North of Yemen (Knysh, 2001: 402), Bonnefoy (2011: 234) 
notes that in Tarīm, ‘Probably more so than elsewhere in Yemen, resistance to Salafism 
was fully and openly expressed as it was then the Sufis who dominated the “religious 
market”’. Additionally, the Bā ‘Alawī Order is not merely a parochial form of Yemeni 
‘nativist’ Islam, as the renowned Tarīmī scholar Ḥabīb ‘Umar made significant efforts to 
internationalise his mission, the success of which Knysh (2001: 414) attributes to the use 
of multi-media technologies. Indeed, the Yemeni state engaged strategically with 
Ḥaḍramawt’s Sufi leaders due to their global network ‘that extended from the United 
Kingdom to India’ (Bonnefoy, 2011: 233). Therefore, the arrival of the Bā ‘Alawī ṭarīqa 
in Liverpool differs significantly in several respects from the travelling Islam of the other 
                                                        
100 This is not to be confused with the ‘Alawiyya Order which Seddon (2014: 118) describes as a North 
African ‘branch of the Shādhilī Sufi order’. It is also interesting to note the prominence of an Alawī shaykh, 
Abdullāh ‘Alī al-Ḥakīmī, among the earlier seafaring generation of Yemenis under whose guidance ‘the 
British Yemeni communities underwent a dramatic religious transformation, introducing new rituals and 
practices in accordance with the teachings of the ‘Alawī ṭarīqa’ (ibid. 119). Although the ‘Alawiyya Order 
appears to have dwindled among Yemenis in Britain and has no direct connection to the more clearly 
Yemeni/Ḥaḍrāmi Bā ‘Alawī Order, its earlier prominence nonetheless forms part of the history of Sufi 
movements among British-Yemenis. 
 267 
institutions: no participants noted that their families had connections or affiliation to this 
movement, nor do they come from the region where this movement is centred; in other 
words, while the overall Yemeni landscape of Islam in Liverpool may certainly have 
provided a space for it to take root, it did not ‘travel’ with the translocal families of the 
second generation as will now be discussed. 
During the fieldwork period, I was invited to attend a weekly gathering led by a prominent 
Liverpool-born non-Yemeni Muslim who studied in Tarīm for six years under the 
guidance of several renowned Bā ‘Alawī scholars, including ‘Umar bin Hafīẓ, founder of 
the neo-traditional Dār al-Muṣṭafā college (Knysh, 2001: 406).101 These weekly gatherings 
took place in a beautifully refurbished church at some distance from Lodge Lane. 
Participants described these gatherings as mawlids.102 The following are fieldwork notes 
collated from my visits which further illustrate the translocal elements of the movement, as 
well as highlighting that despite these connections to Yemen, it is more clearly a de-
ethnicised movement in the Liverpool context. 
Fieldwork Notes, April 2018: 
Upon entering, I was greeted by several participants in the café downstairs and invited to 
remove my shoes before going to the main hall upstairs. The aroma of Arabian bukhūr 
(incense) floated through the modestly, but beautifully, decorated hall with its exposed 
wooden ceiling-joints, wooden-slat windows and the several potted plants and trees placed 
about the hall, giving it a spacious and friendly atmosphere. At the front of the hall, the Shaykh 
dressed in a deep-blue thawb (robe) sat on a low cushion with the bukhūr and several books 
beside him. Men were sat on the soft carpeting at the front, while women sat at the back. I 
                                                        
101 Hamid (2014: 183) note the importance of this shaykh within ‘traditional Islam’ in Britain. See Geaves 
and Gabriel eds. (2014) Sufism in Britain for a fuller account of Sufi movements and the development of 
neo-traditional Islam in Britain. See also Werbner (2003) for discussion of transnational Sufism and 
McLoughlin and Khan (2006) for discussion on Sufism in British-Muslim diasporas. 
102 Mawlid in itself simply means ‘birthday’ or ‘birthplace’ in Arabic, being derived from the root walada ‘to 
give birth to’, but is now more commonly used with the narrower meaning of the celebration of the birth of 
the Prophet Muhammad. Mawlids, in an expanded usage of the term, can also take place regularly as a 
form of devotional practice.  
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arrived just as the ‘ishā prayer was about to begin, and sat at the back while this took place 
before joining the men at the front. Immediately after the prayer, the men began singing 
songs in praise of the Prophet Muḥammad – many knew these songs by heart, but a small 
booklet was distributed to those who wanted to follow the Arabic words. After some time, a 
young boy brought around a tray of dates stuffed with cucumber and a small finjān (cup) of 
Arabian coffee. I later learnt that this was considered a sunna, with the movement placing 
great emphasis on the prophetic traditions, with a particular interest in promoting prophetic 
sports such as archery and wrestling. Afterwards, a younger man then brought a small vial of 
‘aṭr, or Arabian oil-based perfume, which he dabbed onto our wrists. This custom was 
repeated each time I visited. I noticed that many of the men attending were wearing what 
appeared to be Pakistani-style dress or other non-Yemeni styles of clothing. Speaking to some 
of them afterwards, they confirmed that the majority of attendees were not Yemeni, and 
many were from outside of Liverpool. After the singing, a series of short sermons were given 
in English – one of which was by the shaykh who spoke on the death of three prominent 
Shaykhs (or ḥabā’ib – the beloved, as they were commonly referred to) from Tarīm. Several 
sermons then usually followed, focusing on topics such as how these Tarīmī shaykhs can 
bestow spiritual blessings. In comparison to prayers and sermons at Masjid al-Salām, these 
mawlids felt much more intimate and introspective. On most evenings, there were around 
twenty to thirty men and a similar or slightly smaller sized group of women. I was also told 
that although the building was open for the five daily prayers, they did not hold jum’ah as they 
did not want to ‘take people away’ from the main mosques in the city. 
It is striking that a Yemeni-based Sufi Order in Liverpool is attended by a majority of non-
Yemenis, but it is also unsurprising that such a movement would flourish in Liverpool 
given the overall Yemeni landscape. Despite its Yemeni orientation, very few Yemeni 
participants regularly attended along with a small number of their relatives and 
acquaintances. Several non-Yemeni attendees also mentioned that they preferred the 
environment this group provided as other Liverpool mosques could be ‘too Yemeni’ or 
relied too heavily on Arabic language. Nonetheless, in conversations with attendees and 
shaykhs afterwards, the importance of Yemen within Islam’s history was often mentioned, 
with several having also studied in Tarīm. As sectarian ambivalence among second-
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generation participants has been highlighted, this movement was also discussed in similar 
terms. That is to say, no participants explicitly self-identified in terms of Bā ‘Alawī ṭarīqa 
or as ‘Sufis’. The motivations for attending were more clearly expressed in terms of the 
Islamic and Arabic learning provided by the centre’s ‘micro-madrasah’ for adults and 
children. Indeed, the overall atmosphere was that of a group of individuals who were 
particularly motivated to further their knowledge, with many of the attendees being well-
educated professionals who had moved to Liverpool from elsewhere. Thus while the Bā 
‘Alawī presence in Liverpool further strengthens the Liverpool-Yemen connections, 
adding to the notion of Liverpool as containing ‘Yemen in one city’, I argue that this 
particular form of transnational Sufism can be understood as an alternative vision to 
transnational reformist movements, both of which have little relevance in the majority of 
the participants’ articulations. That is to say, the Bā ‘Alawī ṭarīqa emphasises ‘pure and 
authentic Islamic instruction’ (Knysh, 2001: 407) propagated via transnational networks, 
but differs significantly from Salafi movements in that it draws legitimacy not only from 
textual sources, but also from the status of its leaders as sāda – direct descendants of the 
Prophet – and also carriers of mystically illuminated knowledge. In this way, while it 
shares with Salafism an appeal to ‘pure and authentic’ Islam, it is neither de-culturated nor 
de-territorialised. The Bā ‘Alawī Order is orientated towards the spiritual centre of Tarīm, 
its mission is global, with the Liverpool centre being focused towards incorporating 
prophetic traditions into daily life and increasing one’s Islamic learning.  
Nonetheless, the relevance of this movement to second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni 
participants and their construction of Muslim identities is limited given the small number 
of Liverpool-Yemeni attendees. Although not explicitly stated in interviews (nor was this 
centre familiar to all participants), the reasons for the broader lack of appeal of this 
movement among second-generation Liverpool-Yemenis can be understood in terms of the 
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importance of ethnicity and the family network, as well as pragmatic concerns. As has 
been seen, several participants have family ties to the smaller, more Yemeni-orientated 
mosque and prefer to simply attend where their family and friends also attend, as Maḥmūd 
noted. The location of the Bā ‘Alawī centre is also somewhat outside of L8 and not within 
easy walking distance of many participants’ homes, unlike the other mosques of L8. 
Nonetheless, this movement can, in some ways, be considered an ‘outgrowth’ or 
expansion of translocal/diasporic Islam in that the Yemeni landscape of Islam in Liverpool 
is now no longer confined to, nor being produced, solely by Liverpool-Yemenis. Its 
importance for those Yemeni participants who do attend also demonstrates the complex 
and continuous negotiation of ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ in that while the Bā ‘Alawī order has not 
necessarily ‘travelled’ with Yemeni migrants to Liverpool, its rootedness in Yemen (and 
Yemen-in-Liverpool) inevitably becomes inscribed with new significance for some 
Liverpool-Yemenis. In this way, the contingencies and histories which form part of the 
processes of locality and identity production must be emphasised.  
 
6.7 Ummatic Ambivalence and Muslim Communities of       
 Co-Responsibility 
Thus far, this chapter has considered how second-generation participants invoke Yemen 
and Yemeniness in discussions of Islam and Muslim identities. While the participants’ 
Muslim identities are rooted in and articulated alongside translocal family/ethnic networks, 
Islam also provides a common ground for the many multi-ethnic friendships and relations 
which participants enjoy. In this way, I argue that while the participants’ Muslim identities 
are ‘ethnicised’ in certain contexts, they are also shaped, and themselves shape, the social 
imaginary of the multi-ethnic locality of Toxteth. As Liverpool’s Muslim population has 
increasingly diversified since the arrival of Yemenis, having seen a relatively large influx 
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of Somalis, other Arab groups, and a smaller number of South Asian groups, second-
generation participants are increasingly in contact with the city’s diverse Muslim 
population. Indeed, Munīra mentions the arrival of Somalis marking a turn to more 
‘visible’ forms of religiosity in Liverpool, such as the wearing of ḥijāb. While Islam and 
(Yemeni) Muslim identities become embedded in multi-ethnic networks and are negotiated 
in this context, this is not to say that they have become ‘de-culturated’. Rather than 
speaking only of ‘Muslim first’ identities, Liverpool-Yemenis predominantly discuss Islam 
and Muslim identities relationally in translocal (Liverpool-Yemen) terms, localised 
(Toxteth), and, less often, in global terms. Thus, I suggest that constructions of both 
‘Scouse’ and ‘Yemeni’ identities are equally important in understanding Liverpool-
Yemeni Muslim identities. Additionally, while Islam provides the basis for a multi-ethnic 
‘community of co-responsibility’ for the second generation, the relevance of the notion of 
the global umma in everyday life of participants was met with ambivalence. It is first 
worth noting that this ‘community of co-responsibility’ is more clearly being produced and 
articulated by the second generation whose identities are in many ways shaped by the post-
1981 riots (and post-Rushdie Affair) context of multi-ethnic L8 and the emergence of 
prominent Yemeni leadership in representations of ‘community’. Indeed, Aḥmad (30s, 
born in Liverpool, education sector) noted a perceived ‘hierarchy’ of priorities among the 
older generation: 
There’s a hierarchy of things they'd [the older generation] be interested in, I'm not saying 
exclusionary, but Yemeni, Arabic, Muslim, so say someone comes to the community for help 
they'll go 'help him out because he's Yemeni', and then 'ok then, he's Arab help him out', and 
then 'help out your Muslim brother if you can'. So for me that's the hierarchy if you want 
umma there, it's not saying it's irrelevant it's just saying it's among other things and functions. 
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Discussions of British-Muslim identities often begin by noting the Rushdie Affair which 
signalled a move towards ‘a political focus on Islam’ (Kibria, 2008: 249) and ‘a 
maturation of Muslim identity politics’ (McLoughlin, 2002: 44). However, given that the 
Liverpool-Muslim population was small at the time with Yemeni numbers increasing 
predominantly after 1990 according to Halliday (1992: 55) and participants’ accounts, the 
Rushdie Affair appears to have had little public reaction in Liverpool.103 Seddon also notes 
that in the wake of the Rushdie Affair in South Shields, Yemenis were portrayed 
‘positively’ in comparison to British-Muslims elsewhere:  
The successful integration of the large Muslim minority in South Shields is certainly an 
optimistic omen at a time when relations between the wider British Muslim community and its 
host country are at an all-time low (2014: 226, citing Dalrymple, 1989).104 
 
The Rushdie Affair’s apparent lack of impact in Liverpool (and among British-Yemenis 
more generally) can also partly be attributed to what Halliday (2010), Searle (2010), and 
Seddon (2014) note as the ‘encapsulation’ of earlier generations of British-Yemenis who 
had little participation in wider society, limited English ability, and due to the precarious 
nature of migration and their settlement status, did not wish to draw attention to 
themselves.105 Second-generation participants frequently noted that their parents’ or earlier 
generations ‘kept themselves to themselves’.  
 
                                                        
103 Just as Modood (1990) argues that the Rushdie Affair can equally be located in socio-economic 
pressures which Bradford Pakistanis were facing, the Toxteth Riots represented a similar phenomenon, 
albeit in more explicitly racialised terms. Halliday (1992: 55), as previously mentioned, also notes that 
during the Toxteth riots ‘Yemeni shops were largely left alone’. 
104 Seddon notes Dalrymple was writing for The Independent Magazine in an article titled ‘The Arabs of 
Tyneside’. Of course, it is debatable to what extent this account represents a ‘real’ or ‘impressionistic’ 
reading of the situation, but nonetheless participants made no mention of the Rushdie Affair nor does 
Liverpool appear to have experienced the public anger seen in cities with larger Muslim populations. 
105 I.e. migration to Britain was dependent upon being a citizen of Aden as a British Protectorate, but as has 
been noted, the majority of those who emigrated from Aden were not actually Adeni but from the Central 
and North regions. 
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In addition, I argue that the growth in Yemeni numbers in Liverpool/L8 must also be 
considered in the particular context of the lasting impact of the 1981 riots as discussed in 
the previous chapter. For Brown (2005: 58), the aftermath of the Toxteth riots led to a 
contradictory situation in which L8 ‘became more of an isolate’, while at the same time, 
‘the riots resulted in the proliferation of race relations jobs’ (ibid.). After seeing significant 
demographic change from the 1990s onwards, for second-generation participants Toxteth 
is reimagined as a multi-ethnic locality in which Muslim communities of co-responsibility 
are formed. Therefore, it is in this context which second-generation Liverpool-Yemeni 
Muslim identities become articulated and performed.  
Rīm discusses her (hybridised) Scouse-Muslim identity, noting that the notion of a 
transnational umma holds little relevance for her, instead situationally highlighting her 
Scouse identity alongside her Muslim identity when describing an aspect of her job raising 
awareness of various religions and traditions in the city: 
I'd say ‘Muslims’, but not ‘umma’. I don't speak in them terms. When it comes to it, we sit 
there and have political debates all the time in the family and the shop, I could write a book. 
[…] Because I'm a Scouser and a bit of a scally, I get on with them [the non-Muslim people who 
I work with]. 
Similarly, Layla (20s, student) herself notes ambivalence regarding ‘Muslim first’ (a term 
she used unprompted) identities among Yemeni-Muslim youth, before describing how she 
is more passionate about Scouse-Muslim identities: 
They'd [Muslim youth in Liverpool] say “I practice” but they wouldn't say “I'm Muslim first”, so 
they're not quite passionate about the umma and that.  […]  See, I'm more passionate about 
that [being a Scouse-Muslim]....I feel like because I wear a ḥijāb and look Yemeni and have a 
Scouse accent, people are always interested, it's quite unique, like get up in a ḥijāb with a 
scouse accent, people remember you. 
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Of course, global concerns are also not entirely absent as Rīm mentioned that although she 
does not consider her Muslim identity in terms of a transational umma, she nonetheless 
feels solidarity with, for example, Palestinians. While Rīm and Layla were ambivalent in 
discussing Muslim identities in terms of the umma, Munīra (30s, born in Liverpool, 
various employment and activism) noted that the multi-ethnic Muslim networks which she 
enjoys make the notion of the umma more relevant to her, while also noting that in her 
experience Yemenis are more ambivalent about using it in such a manner: 
The umma is like, that’s everyone. The whole Muslim umma. Because I’m part of a mixed 
circle, so we do talk in those terms. But with like older Yemenis, they’re just the Yemenis and 
they only really know Yemenis, so it would be the traditional…from the Shāfi’i maddhab 
whether they know it or not.  
For Munīra, the umma is important in that it situates herself as a fellow Muslim in the 
multi-ethnic context of Toxeth, also recalling Maryam’s articulation of a ‘Muslim-first’ 
identity, but it does not necessarily stand for a de-culturated Islam as she has previously 
noted that her turn to religion instead strengthened her sense of Yemeni identity. She also 
noted in a previous quote that she would place her Scouse identity before Yemeni. While 
the family and ethnic ties remain an important aspect of second-generation Liverpool-
Yemenis’ Muslim identities and religious life, for some participants Islam also provided 
the basis for a multi-ethnic ‘community of co-responsibility’. Amidst ambivalence over a 
supra-territorial imaginary of the umma, this ‘community’ is enacted in the local – various 
forms of charitable giving, fundraising, caring for local elderly Muslims, talks, lectures, 
ifṭār dinners with guests from diverse backgrounds and cross-ethnic interactions 
highlighted this.  
This exploration of (second-generation) Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities highlights 
the need to recognise ‘multiple articulations of Muslim identity found in translocal space’ 
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(Mandaville, 2001: 2), or, multiple positioned belongings (Brocket, 2020). At times 
negotiated alongside ethnicity, while at others being enunciated as a ‘cosmopolitical 
consciousness’ (McLoughlin, 2010: 228). Among second-generation participants, 
however, this consciousness notably does not recognise Saudi Arabia as ‘leadership of the 
putative global umma’. McLoughlin (ibid.) notes that British-born Pakistani youth ‘do not 
feel “at home” when they visit the Panjab or Kashmir’ (also McLoughlin and Kalra, 1999; 
DeHanas, 2013b), and therefore Islam as a prioritised identity provides a more powerful 
sense of belonging in the face of ‘local deprivation and racist social exclusion’ (ibid.) 
While participants were aware of ‘difference’ in their visits to Yemen, this sense of 
‘difference’ was not emphasised. DeHanas (2013b: 469) notes that: ‘East End second 
generation youth on short-term visits to Bangladesh tend to undergo a distancing from 
Bengali belonging’ and that ‘Mecca is growing increasingly important over Bangladesh as 
a symbolic source of fulfilment, direction, and belonging’ (ibid., 470). In contrast, 
although second-generation participants often noted that rural, village life in Yemen was at 
times strange or uncomfortable for them as children, upon reaching adulthood these stays 
in Yemen were instead articulated as reinforcing Yemeni belonging. For example, Zahra 
(20s, student) notes: 
We spent most of the time in the village [in Yemen] with my nan, it was brilliant, I loved it. It 
was strange though, very dusty… my nan, my mum's mum is amazing, everyone knows it's her 
land [the family estate] and it's amazing because it's a woman in Yemen in her village doing 
everything. They [my family] wanted to move [back] there actually. There was a third trip 
which was really bad, one of the worst experiences in my life because a drone went past into 
the mountains, I didn't hear anything, but I checked the news and a drone did go past. I think 
of that and then I think now it's getting bombed all the time. But I do feel more connected to 
Yemenis now…I did like it and I'd love to go back. 
Hayfā (30s, of Yemeni and mixed heritage, social work) noted: 
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I'm not the type of person to live in that village because the amenities aren't that good, and 
my dad says I don't really know the village because people always come and see you, and you 
don't get to [go out and] see the village, but when I'm in Yemen I feel at home. 
This again points towards the importance of the translocal family and ensuing translocal 
connections and modes of living among second-generation participants who do not feel 
wholly distanced from Yemen. Similarly, experiences of racism and exclusion were noted 
by several participants particularly during childhood, but this was nonetheless de-
emphasised as the majority instead highlight their embeddedness in Liverpool, and that all 
of Scouse, Yemeni, and Muslim creatively combine.   
 
6.8 Conclusion 
While living in a globalising age means that diasporas often confront and are negotiated in 
relation to global concerns which become enacted on a local scale, notions of the 
transnational/global umma do not clearly underpin the majority of participants’ 
articulations of identity. Of course, the very concept of the umma has deep roots within 
Islam meaning it is never entirely eschewed, but here I emphasise that the specific, modern 
imaginary of a transnational umma rooted in revivalist forms of Islam does not take centre 
stage in Liverpool. I suggest that Islam in this sense, contrasted with Yemen-as-nation as 
seen in the previous chapter, provides a clearer example of what Werbner (2002a: 252) 
terms ‘communities of co-responsibility’ for some second-generation participants. 
Nonetheless, this ‘community’ is more often discussed and enacted in localised terms 




Mandaville (2001: 11) notes that: 
Translocal political space emerges as a particularly rich site of both political identities (i.e. 
different conceptions of ‘the good’) and politicised identities (i.e. dialogue between these 
differing conceptions).  
With this understanding, Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities can also be read as 
containing an ‘everyday’ political/politicised dimension, which should not be confused 
with ‘political Islam’. As Mandaville (ibid., 9) notes ‘In this sense ‘the political’ is not a 
sharply demarcated sphere of activity unto itself, but rather it describes a mode of 
interaction – one characterised by the negotiation of identity.’ By continually negotiating 
difference along different scales of reference, (e.g. Muslim vs Non-Muslim, Yemeni vs 
non-Yemeni, North Yemeni vs South Yemeni, Scouse vs non-Scouse), Liverpool-Yemeni 
identities take on a political dimension against various antagonisms: most notably the 
marginal position of Liverpool within Britain, and similarly Yemen in the Arab world.  
This chapter has demonstrated that Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities are exemplified 
by two main sets of concerns. One is translocal and bound up with ‘being Yemeni’ in that 
Liverpool-Yemeni-Muslim identities are articulated alongside a ‘(re)claiming’ of 
Yemen/Yemeniness as a legitimately ‘Islamic’ against the antagonisms of Saudi Arabia. 
The other is expressed in terms of a Muslim ‘community of co-responsibility’ which 
extends beyond ethnicity becoming incorporated into the multi-ethnic social imaginary of 
Toxteth. The construction of Muslim identities alongside ‘Scouse’ and ‘Yemeni’ also 
brings into focus the diasporic tension – Muslim identities are at once ethnicised while also 
providing broader forms of belonging in a way which the ethno-national ‘community’ 
cannot. Nonetheless, these Muslim ‘communities’ become re-localised and re-imagined 
within the social imaginary and lived experiences of multi-ethnic Toxteth. 
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Mandaville further notes that:  
The first sense in which translocal space changes the boundaries of Muslim political community 
is related to the fact that in many of the cases we have dealt with community is constituted not 
in accordance with ethno-national identity, but rather in terms of one’s identification with and, 
more crucially, rearticulation of a particular set of ethical claims. (2001: 186) 
The emphasis participants placed on multi-ethnic Muslim networks and the multi-ethnic 
character of Islam in Liverpool highlights Mandaville’s point that Muslim political 
communities often transcend ethno-national identities, but I also emphasise that this does 
not necessarily mean individual Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim subjectivities are expressed in 
de-ethnicised terms. Instead, this chapter has attempted to the reveal the highly contextual 
and situational nature of these identities – ‘Muslim’ is not the only identity participants 
hold, and even within the category of ‘Muslim identities’, Liverpool-Yemenis construct 
these in relation to a multitude of concerns and experiences.  
By tracing the ‘travel’ of Islam from Yemen to Liverpool and establishing the institutional 
context of Islam in L8 and beyond, this chapter has explored how second-generation 
participants construct and articulate everyday Liverpool-Yemeni Muslim identities. 
Although it has been noted that these contain a political dimension being negotiated in 
light of various antagonisms, the focus of the chapter has been to explore multiple 
subjectivities which are constructed in the context of ‘translocal living’. It has highlighted 
that while the various Muslim institutions in Liverpool broadly reflect the religious 
landscape of Yemen, i.e. as represented by the non-denominationally Sunni mosques of 
L8, the Yemeni Bā ‘Alawī Order, and participants’ reports of a smaller number of Salafi-
leaning groups, participants’ Muslim identities are not solely formed around nor informed 
by institutional affiliation. Of course, taking an everyday perspective means understanding 
the role of these institutions from the point of view of the participants, which as has been 
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seen, is more often than not expressed ambivalently. Instead, ethnicity, locality, gender, 
language abilities, translocal connections to Yemen, and Yemen’s position within the Arab 
world are all invoked as informing participants’ Muslim identities. Significantly, this 
chapter has argued that Liverpool-Yemenis do not express de-culturated Muslim identities, 
instead actively connecting their Muslim identities to ‘Yemeniness’ and ‘Scouseness’, 























This thesis has presented an ethnographic snapshot of contemporary Liverpool-Yemeni 
life, addressing the overarching research question of ‘How do Liverpool-Yemenis 
negotiate their complex, multiple positioned belongings?’. As the majority of the 
Liverpool-Yemeni participants are of the ‘post-migration’ (or ‘second’) generation, being 
born and/or raised in the UK, the thesis has revealed emerging generational differences 
and changing attitudes in constructions and performances of ethnic, national, and religious 
identity as those born in the diaspora negotiate the tensions between ‘roots and routes’ 
(Gilroy, 1993). Generational categorisation has also been problematised in that 
participants’ extended stays in, and strong translocal connections to, Malāḥ and other 
regions of Yemen make a linear model of progression from the migration of the first 
generation to the acculturation of the second and further generations less clear.  
 
The current dynamics of Liverpool-Yemeni life also accentuate that diaspora is best 
viewed as a contingent process. As political mobilisation towards the homeland has 
decreased in comparison to earlier generations (Halliday, 2010), new forms of engagement 
and belonging have arisen among the post-migration generation. In many instances, it is 
the ‘everyday multiculturalism’ (Werbner, 2013b) of the multi-ethnic neighbourhood of 
L8 which is prioritised outside of the family network, as seen through various articulations 
of hybridised Scouse-Yemeni identities and forms of religious and non-religious 
engagement. Nonetheless, the second generation also maintain strong physical and 
emotional attachments to Yemen, most clearly visible in the production of a ‘hidden’ 
aesthetic diaspora in which the physical experiences of being in Yemen and the presence 
of the first-generation remain important. This ‘aesthetic’ Yemeni diaspora is characterised 
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by events such as the wedding, which was rich in symbolic and material Yemeniness, 
styles of dress, the decoration and furnishing of homes, the many Arab-themed restaurants 
and shops of Lodge Lane and the translocal flow of Yemeni goods such as coffee, 
perfumes, incense, and so on. Nonetheless, it has been seen that this dimension of 
Liverpool-Yemeni life exists largely within intra-family networks, in a world hidden from 
the view of institutions and the wider public.  
On a broader scale, the contemporary ‘community’ organisational landscape of Liverpool, 
while having significant Yemeni input, gives little evidence of specifically Yemen-
orientated ‘community’ building projects. Indeed, the lack of any real Yemeni diasporic 
public sphere in Liverpool highlights this point. Nonetheless, an everyday perspective has 
shown that diasporic individuals construct, negotiate, and perform identities according to 
multiple, contextual orientations which reflect the multifaceted and often ambivalent 
realities of lived experience. The most salient of these outside of the family network are 
the local context of multi-ethnic L8 and the role of Islam and Muslim identities in offering 
alternative forms of belonging. Both ‘Yemeniness’ and ‘Scouseness’ have been seen to 
combine in processes of organic hybridisation, exemplified by the many phrases of 
participants (such as ‘Yemenis are the Scousers of the Arab world’), the importance 
participants placed on Scouse accents, and the examples of grassroots activism in L8 
which highlight the multi-ethnic connections, commitments, and shared experiences of life 
in this neighbourhood. The notion of ‘hybridity’ used in this thesis has also emphasised 
that ‘hybridised’ identities are not the result of the ‘combination’ of two or more 
essentialised identities, but rather reflect Brah’s (1996) notion of a ‘confluence of 
narratives’ – each ‘narrative’ itself being located in and produced according to contingent 
historical contexts and social relations. Indeed, it is not only the intersection of ‘Scouse’ 
and ‘Yemeni’ identities which are involved in these processes as hybridisation can occur 
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on multiple scales, as seen through the many Yemeni-Somali connections which have 
produced new hybridised forms of language among Yemeni and Somali youth in L8. A 
perspective which prioritises the local and the demotic is thus important in gaining a 
clearer understanding of how everyday diasporic life can involve multiple relations, 
connections, and experiences not only between minority and majority groups, ‘locality’ 
and ‘nation’, but also those which exist between various minority groups.  
Thus while Liverpool-Yemenis have been described throughout the thesis as broadly 
constituting a ‘diaspora’ understood in terms of multilocal lives and attachments, a 
processual understanding also problematises the idea that diasporans and diaspora life can 
be discussed according to any single ‘fixed’ identity – ethnic, national, religious or 
otherwise. For Brubaker (2005) diaspora is, then, best discussed in terms of diasporic 
‘stances’ or ‘idioms’ rather than as an ‘entity’. In this understanding, second-generation 
Liverpool-Yemenis can be said to have a decreasingly ‘diasporic stance’ as evidenced by 
the lack of collective commitment and organisation towards the homeland. Nonetheless, 
the thesis has also emphasised participants’ continued awareness of and attachments to 
people and places in Yemen as well as a diasporic consciousness which invokes 
imaginaries of Yemen’s past into the present – while these have not resulted in a diasporic 
public sphere, they are nonetheless an important element of Liverpool-Yemeni life. Thus 
Brah’s (1996) notion of ‘diaspora space’ has remained important in that it: 
relies on a multi-axial performative notion of power. This idea of power holds that individuals 
and collectivities are simultaneously positioned in social relations constituted and performed 
across multiple dimensions of differentiation; that these categories always operate in 
articulation. (1996: 239) 
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Thus far I have summarised the overarching conclusion that although post-migration 
Liverpool-Yemenis do not take part in nor form a ‘politico-moral’ diaspora centred around 
the homeland, this is not to say that Yemen and Yemeni identity have no importance. The 
existence of a rich, embodied aesthetic Yemeni diaspora and the re-claiming and re-
imagining of Yemeni identity amidst various antagonisms attests to this. In this way, the 
thesis has also highlighted that an understanding which views identity as contextual and 
relational can shed light on the nuances of diasporic life which resist easy generalisation. 
Rather than assuming Liverpool-Yemenis share a pre-determined, essentialised ‘culture’ or 
identity, this thesis has explored the terms with which Liverpool-Yemenis themselves 
‘make’ culture and in which contexts these terms become salient. Baumann’s (1999) 
framework of the multicultural triangle has proved useful in demarcating these various 
cultural collective identities, all the while noting the interplay of dominant and demotic 
discourses. A significant contribution of this thesis has also been to show that this 
framework benefits greatly from the additional dimension of translocality which informs 
each of these cultural identities in various ways. This is not something considered by 
Baumann. The addition of a translocal dimension to Baumann’s framework also 
demonstrates that dominant discourses of culture are not only those which are generated 
by national/local contexts ‘here’, but that they can also travel from ‘there’, as was seen in 
the participants’ contestations of Yemeni social hierarchies and divisions. 
 
Chapter 4 revealed that Yemeni identities and performances of Yemeni culture remain an 
important aspect of Liverpool-Yemeni life. However, these largely take place behind the 
doors of the (translocal) family network; ethnicised Yemeni identities do not form the 
basis of any large-scale public engagement or mobilisation. Chapter 5, by telling the 
‘story’ of Yemeni-led community building projects, highlighted how the national contexts 
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(of both Yemen and the UK), as well as national discourses and agendas have impacted 
fictions of Yemeni-led ‘community’ representation in L8. This was contrasted with the 
demotic, everyday experiences and articulations of the second generation as seen through 
practices of ‘demotic cosmopolitanism’ which rests on a shared identity across difference 
in multi-ethnic L8. Chapter 6 then explored how Islam and Muslim identities are both 
invoked in reinforcing Yemeni identities against the backdrop of Saudi antagonisms in 
particular, while also extending beyond ethnic ties for many participants in the multi-
ethnic context of L8. Crucially, it has been seen that Liverpool-Yemenis rarely discuss 
Muslim identities in de-culturated terms, but nonetheless ‘everyday’ Islam provides a 
broader ground for imagined communities which transcend, but do not necessarily reject, 
other cultural identities. While Werbner (2002a) highlights the tensions between the 
aesthetic South Asian diaspora characterised by ‘fun’ and ‘consumption’, and the 
religious, transnational ‘Muslim diaspora’ in which Manchester-Pakistanis take part, the 
Liverpool-Yemeni participants in this study indicated no such conflict. Instead, Yemeni 
culture and identity are re-claimed as legitimately ‘Islamic’ in themselves. This was 
exemplified by participants’ discussions regarding an increased knowledge of Islam 
reinforcing a sense of Yemeniness, and the emphasis placed upon Yemen, as opposed to 
Saudi Arabia, as an alternative sacred ‘centre’ of Islam. In this case, the imaginary of 
Yemen as an alternative ‘centre’ of Islam has now extended beyond the confines of a 
single Yemeni ethnic group, being (re)produced by various non-Yemeni Muslims in the 
city. This shows that diasporic groups can also shape the localities in which they settle 
rather than simply being shaped by them.  
 
In addition to the empirical contributions of the thesis, which enrich the field of 
Arab/Muslim diaspora studies and add a further, contemporary dimension to the literature 
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on British-Yemenis, the theoretical approaches taken in the thesis also demonstrate that an 
ethnographic study of diaspora benefits from the synthesis of several main theoretical 
concerns in keeping with the research questions. Given the internally heterogeneous nature 
of diasporas and an emphasis on multiple belongings, no single theory can adequately 
address the multitude of subjectivities, experiences, attitudes, and everyday modes of 
being examined in such a study. Instead, I have drawn upon Gilroy’s (1993) notion of 
‘roots and routes’ to highlight the diasporic tensions characteristic of the post-migration 
generation, de Certeau’s (1984) conceptualisation of the everyday as an important locus of 
embodied agency, Bakhtin’s (1981) notion of organic hybridisation, Brah’s (1996) 
theorisation of ‘diaspora space’ which allows for a more processual and relational 
understanding of diaspora, and Appadurai’s (1996) conceptualisation of locality as both 
being produced by and producing ‘local subjects’ within specific sets of power relations. 
In addition, the thesis has also drawn upon the more empirically-driven works of scholars 
of diaspora such as Werbner (1990, 1996, 2002a, 2011) and McLoughlin (1996, 1998, 
2009, 2014). In so doing, this study has notably emphasised that any discussion of 
‘Muslim diasporas’ or ‘British-Muslims’ must be equally as attentive to the differing 
contexts, contingencies, and trajectories as to the commonalities. A context- and scale-
sensitive approach to the question of multiple belongings can shed light on how everyday 
subjects utilise (and indeed make) ‘culture’ in its various forms and the surrounding 
dominant/demotic discourses to shape their own identities and modes of engagement in the 
social world. Rather than beginning with assumptions that any of Scouse, Yemeni, or 
Muslim identities take precedence, the thesis has shown that all of these have importance, 
albeit in different contexts and often with differing sets of concerns – at times articulated 
and performed simultaneously, and at others kept separate. While existing studies have 
employed ‘British-Arabs’ and ‘British-Yemenis’ as ‘default’, broad categories, this thesis 
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has significantly devolved such notions by limiting the focus to a single, local context. 
Many of the lived experiences and articulations of the participants can only be understood 
through a nuanced examination of the local histories and dynamics of Liverpool, L8, and 
regions within Yemen alongside the broader contexts in which they are embedded. 
Therefore the thesis also proposes that any discussion of ‘British-Arabs’ or ‘British-
Yemenis’ must recognise that such broad groupings may hold little analytic value in a 
study of everyday subjectivities and collective identities within a particular locality. 
 
As any ethnography can only provide a partial and limited snapshot of a particular context 
and time, this thesis opens up new avenues for future study concerning British-Arabs 
and/or British-Muslims. Notably, ethnographic studies which focus on the spaces which I 
was unable to access primarily due to my ‘outsider’ status or gender would greatly 
complement this thesis and provide a counterpoint to many of the themes discussed. 
Additionally, in-depth ethnographic studies of second-generation Yemenis in other UK 
cities such as Birmingham or Cardiff would allow for a comparative dimension in 
exploring the significance of locality in Yemenis’ constructions and performances of 
cultural identities, thereby providing a multifaceted perspective of what being Yemeni in 
everyday, contemporary Britain means. A particularly interesting avenue of exploration is 
how post-migration Yemenis in other UK cities in which they are not the majority Muslim 
group construct their identities. Furthermore, despite a strong sense of ‘Scouse-
Yemeniness’ emerging among the post-migration generation, it remains to be seen how the 
impact of the ongoing crisis in Yemen and the inability to be ‘there’ will shape Liverpool-







Abbas, T. 2005. British South Asian Muslims: before and after September 11. In: Abbas, 
T. ed. Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure. London: Zed Books, pp.3-17. 
 
Ahram, A. 2019. Break All the Borders: Separatism and the Reshaping of the Middle East. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Akhtar, P. 2005. ‘(Re)turn to religion’ and Radical Islam. In: Abbas, T. ed. Muslim 
Britain: Communities under Pressure. London: Zed Books, pp.164-176. 
 
Al-Jumly, M. and Rollins, J. 1997. Emigration and the Rise of the Novel in Yemen. World 
Literature Today. 71(1), pp.39-47. 
 
Alasuutari, P. 2010. The rise and relevance of qualitative research. International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology. 13(2), pp.139-155. 
 
Alatas, S. F. 1997. Hadhramaut and the Hadhrami Diaspora: Problems in Theoretical 
History. In: Freitag, U. G. and Clarence-Smith, W. G. eds. Hadrami Traders, Scholars and 
Statesmen in the Indian Ocean, 1750s-1960s Leiden: Brill, pp.19-34. 
 
Alatas, S. F. 2011. Becoming Indonesians: The Bā ‘Alawī in the Interstices of the Nation. 
Die Welt des Islams. 51(1), pp.45-74. 
 
Alba, R., Logan, J., Lutz, A. and Stults, B. 2002. Only English by the Third Generation? 
Loss and Preservation of the Mother Tongue Among the Grandchildren of Contemporary 
Immigrants. Demography. 39(3), pp.467–484. 
Albrecht, S., Boos, T., Deffner, V., Gebauer, M., de Araújo, S. H. 2016. Editorial: 
Conceptualising ‘Muslim Diaspora’. Journal of Muslims in Europe. 5(1), pp.1-9. 
Alexander, C., Chatterji, J, and Jalais, A. 2015. The Bengal Diaspora: Rethinking Muslim 
Migration. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Alunni, A. 2019. Long-distance nationalism and belonging in the Libyan diaspora (1969–
2011). British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 46(2), pp.242-258. 
Aly, R. M. K. 2015. Becoming Arab in London: Performativity and the Undoing of 
Identity. London: Pluto Press. 
Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism. London: Verso. 
 
Angrosino, M. 2007. Doing Ethnography and Observational Research. London: Sage. 
 
Ansari, H. 2004. ‘The Infidel Within’: Muslims in Britain since 1800. London: Hurst & 
Company. 
 
Anthias, F. 1998. Evaluating ‘Diaspora’: Beyond Ethnicity? Sociology. 32(3), pp.557-580. 
 288 
Antweiler, C. 2015. Ethnicity from an anthropological perspective. In: University of 
Cologne Forum eds. Ethnicity as a Political Resource: Conceptualizations across 
Disciplines, Regions, and Periods, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, pp.25-38. 
 
Appadurai, A. 1986. Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery. Comparative Studies 
in Society and History. 28(2), pp.356-361. 
Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Asad, T. 1979. Anthropology and the Analysis of Ideology. Man. 14(4), pp.607-627. 
Asad, T. 1986a. The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam. Washington, DC: Centre for 
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University. 
Asad, T. 1986b. The concept of cultural translation in British cultural anthropology. In:  
Clifford, J. and Marcus, G. eds. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.141-164. 
 
Asad, T. 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Atkinson, J. 2017. Journey into Social Activism: Qualitative Approaches. New York: 
Fordham University Press. 
Bakhtin, M. 1981. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Translated by C. Emerson and 
M. Hosquist. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barth, F. 1998. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture 
Difference. Reprint of original edn. Illinois: Waveland Press. 
 
Bashear, S. 1989. Yemen in Early Islam: An Examination of Non-Tribal Traditions. 
Arabica. 36(3), pp.327-361. 
Bauman, Z. 1973. Culture as Praxis. London: Routledge. 
Bauman, Z. 1992. Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Bauman, Z. 1997. The Making and Unmaking of Strangers. In: Werbner, P. and Modood, 
T. eds. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-
Racism. London: Zed Books, pp.46-57. 
 
Bauman, Z. 1999. Culture as Praxis. Revised edn. London: Sage. 
 
Bauman, Z. 2005. Liquid Life. Cambridge: Polity. 
Bauman, Z. 2012. Liquid Modernity. Revised edn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 289 
Baumann, G. 1996. Contesting Culture: Discourses of identity in multi-ethnic London. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baumann, G. 1997. Dominant and Demotic Discourses of Culture: Their Relevance to 
Multi-Ethnic Alliances. In: Werbner, P. and Modood, T. eds. 1997. Debating Cultural 
Hybridity: Multi-cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism. London: Zed Books, 
pp.209-225. 
 
Baumann, G. 1999. The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious 
Identities. New York: Routledge. 
Bayat, A. 2013. Post-Islamism at Large. In: Bayat, A. ed. Post-Islamism: The Changing 
Face of Political Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.1-32. 
Belchem, J. 2005. 'Whiteness and the Liverpool-Irish'. Journal of British Studies. 44(1), 
pp.146-152. 
 
Belchem, J. 2006a. Merseypride: essays in Liverpool exceptionalism. Revised edn. 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
 
Belchem, J. 2007. Irish, Catholic and Scouse: The History of Liverpool-Irish, 1800-1939. 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
 
Belchem, J. 2014. Before the Windrush: Race relations in 20th-century Liverpool. 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
 
Belchem, J. ed. 2006b. Liverpool 800: Culture, Character and History. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press. 
 
Bendixsen, S. 2013. The Religious Identity of Young Muslim Women in Berlin: An 
Ethnographic Study. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Berg, B. and Lune, H. 2014. Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. 8th 
edn. Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
 
Betts, A. 2013. Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Bhabha, H. 1994. The location of culture. London: Routledge. 
Bhimji, F. 2008 Cosmopolitan belonging and diaspora: second-generation British Muslim 
women travelling to South Asia. Citizenship Studies. 12(4), pp.413-427. 
 
Bidwell, R. 1983. The Two Yemens. Essex: Longman Group. 
 
Birks, J., Sinclair, C., and Socknat J. Aspects of Labour Migration from North Yemen. 
Middle Eastern Studies. 17(1), pp.49-63. 
 
Birt, J. 2005. Lobbying and Marching: British Muslims and the State. In: Abbas, T. ed. 
Muslim Britain: Communities Under Pressure. London: Zed Books, pp.92-106. 
 290 
Birt, J. 2009. Islamophobia in the Construction of British Muslim Identity Politics. In: 
Hopkins, P. and Gale, R. eds. Muslims in Britain: Race, Place and Identities. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, pp.210-227. 
 
Blackwood, B. G. 1976. The Catholic and Protestant Gentry of Lancashire during the Civil 
War Period. Transactions of the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire. 126, pp.1-
29. 
 
Boland, P. 2008. The construction of images of people and place: Labelling Liverpool and 
Stereotyping Scousers. Cities. 25(6), pp.355-369. 
 
Boland, P. 2010. Sonic Geography, Place and Race in the Formation of Local Identity: 
Liverpool and Scousers. Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography. 92(1), pp.1-
22. 
Bolognani, M. and Mellor, J. 2012. British Pakistani women’s use of ‘religion versus 
culture’ contrast: A critical analysis. Culture and Religion. 13(2), pp.211-226. 
Bonakdar, A., and Audirac, I. 2020. City Branding and the Link to Urban Planning: 
Theories, Practices, and Challenges. Journal of Planning Literature. 35(2), pp.147–160. 
 
Bonnefoy, L. 2011. Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity. London: 
Hurst & Company. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In: Richardson, J. ed. Handbook of Theory and 
Research for the Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood, pp.241-258. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 2003. Participant Objectivation. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute. 9(2), pp.281-294. 
Bowen, J. R. 2004. Public Migration: Islam as a Transnational Public Space. Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies. 30(5), pp.879-894. 
Boyle, M. 1997. Civic Boosterism in the Politics of Local Economic Development—
‘Institutional Positions’; and ‘Strategic Orientations’ in the Consumption of Hallmark 
Events. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space. 29(11), pp.1975–1997. 
 
Brah, A. 1996. Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities. London: Routledge. 
 
Brandt, M. 2013. Sufyān's “Hybrid” War: Tribal Politics during the Ḥūthī 
Conflict. Journal of Arabian Studies. 3(1), pp.120-138. 
 
Brandt, M. 2017. Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Brehony, N. 2015. Yemen and the Huthis: Genesis of the 2015 Crisis. Asian Affairs. 
46(2), pp.232-250. 
 291 
Brewer, J. 2000. Ethnography. Philadelphia: Open University Press. 
 
Brewer, J. 2004. Ethnography. In: Cassel, C. and Symon, G. Essential Guide to 
Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research. London: Sage, pp.313-322. 
Brickell, K. and Datta, A. 2011. Translocal geographies: spaces, places, connections. 
Farnham: Ashgate. 
Brocket, T. 2020. From “in-betweenness” to “positioned belongings”: second-generation 
Palestinian-Americans negotiate the tensions of assimilation and transnationalism. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies. 43(16), pp.135-154. 
Brown, J. N. 2005. Dropping Anchor, Setting Sail: Geographies of Race in Black 
Liverpool. Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Brown, S. and de Figuereido, P. 2015. Religion and Place: Liverpool’s historic places of 
worship. Swindon: English Heritage. 
 
Brubaker, R. 2002. Ethnicity without groups. European Journal of Sociology. 43(2), 
pp.163-189. 
 
Brubaker, R. 2004. Ethnicity without Groups. London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Brubaker, R. 2005. The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 28(1), pp.1-19. 
 
Brubaker, R. 2009. Ethnicity, race, and nationalism. Annual Review of 
Sociology. 35, pp.21-42. 
 
Brubaker, R. 2017. Revisiting “the ‘diaspora’ diaspora”. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 40(9), 
pp.1556-1561. 
 
Bruneau, M. 2010. Diasporas, transnational spaces and communities. In: Bauböck, R. and 
Faist, T. eds. Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp.35-49. 
 
Brustad, K. 2017. Diglossia as Ideology. In: Høigilt, J. and Mejdell, G. eds. The Politics of 
Written Language in the Arab World: Writing Change. Leiden: Brill, pp.41-67. 
 
Bryceson, D. and Vuorela, U. eds. 2002. The Transnational Family. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Bryman, A. 2012. Social Research Methods. 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bujra, A. S. 1970. Urban Elites and Colonialism: The Nationalist Elites of Aden and South 
Arabia. Middle Eastern Studies, 6(2), pp.189-211. 
 
Bullen, C. 2016. Comparing the Cultures of Cities in Two European Capitals of Culture. 
Etnofoor. 28(2), pp.99-120. 
Bunnell, T. 2016. From World City to the World in One City: Liverpool Through Malay 
Lives. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. 
 292 
Butler, A. 2020. Toxic Toxteth: Understanding press stigmatization of Toxteth during the 
1981 uprising. Journalism. 21(4), pp.541–556. 
 
Butler, J. 1988. Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology 
and Feminist Theory. Theatre Journal. 40(3), pp.519-531. 
 
Butler, J. 1993. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Butler, J. 2006. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. 2nd edn. Oxon: 
Routledge. 
 
Calhoun, C. 2000. Nationalism and ethnicity. In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A. D. eds. 
Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science. Routledge: London, pp.388-419. 
 
Calvey, D. 2019. The everyday world of bouncers: a rehabilitated role of covert 
ethnography. Qualitative Research. 19(3), pp.247-262. 
 
Canagarajah, S. and Silberstein, S. 2012. Diaspora Identities and Language. Journal of 
Language, Identity & Education. 11(2), pp.81-84. 
 
Carapico, S. 1998. Civil Society in Yemen: The political economy of activism in modern 
Arabia. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Carter, B. and Fenton, S. 2010. Not Thinking Ethnicity: A Critique of the Ethnicity 
Paradigm in an Over-Ethnicised Sociology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 
40(1), pp.1-18. 
 
Caton, S. 1990. “Peaks of Yemen I Summon Thee”: Poetry as a Cultural Practice in a 
North Yemeni Tribe. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
 
Caton, S. 1993. Icons of the Person: Lacan’s “Imago” in the Yemeni Male’s Tribal 
Wedding. Asian Folklore Studies. 52(2), pp.359-381. 
 
Cause, F. G. 1988. Yemeni Unity: Past and Future. Middle East Journal. 42(1), pp.33-47. 
 
Chalcraft, J. 2011. Migration and Popular Protest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf in 
the 1950s and 1960s. International Labor and Working-Class History. 79(1), pp.28-47. 
 
Chamkhi, T. 2014. Neo-Islamism in the post-Arab Spring. Contemporary Politics. 20(4), 
pp.453-468. 
 
Clausen, M. 2018. Competing for Control over the State: The Case of Yemen. Small Wars 
& Insurgencies. 29(3), pp.560-578. 
 
Clifford, J. 1986. Introduction: Partial Truths. In: Clifford, J. and Marcus, G. eds. Writing 
Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, pp.1-26. 
 
Clifford, J. 1994. Diasporas. Cultural Anthropology. 9(3), pp.302-338. 
 293 
Clifford, J. and Marcus, G. eds. 1986. Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Cohen, R. 1978. Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology. Annual Review of 
Anthropology. 7, pp.379-403. 
 
Cohen, R. 2008. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. 2nd edn. London: Routledge. 
 
Crang, P. 2010. Diasporas and Material Culture. In: Knott, K. and McLoughlin, S. eds. 
Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities. London: Zed Books, pp.139-144. 
Crowley, T. 2012. Scouse: A Social and Cultural History. Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press. 
Dahya, B. U.-D. 1965. Yemenis in Britain: An Arab Migrant Community. Race. 6(3), 
pp.177–190. 
 
Dalrymple, W. 1989. The Arabs of Tyneside. The Independent Magazine. 7 October.  
 
Damsa, D. and Ugelvik, T. 2017. A Difference that Makes a Difference? Reflexivity and 
Researcher Effects in an All-Foreign Prison. International Journal of Qualitative Methods. 
16, pp.1-10. 
 
Darwich, M. 2018. The Saudi Intervention in Yemen: Struggling for Status. Insight 
Turkey. 20(2), pp.125-142. 
 
Day, S. W. 2012. Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
de Certeau, M. 1984. The practice of everyday life. Translated by S. Rendall. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
DeHanas, D. 2013a. Elastic Orthodoxy: The Tactics of Young Muslim Identity in the East 
End of London. In: Dessing, N., Jeldtoft, N., Nielson, J. and Woodhead, L. eds. Everyday 
Lived Islam in Europe. Farnham: Ashgate, pp.69-84. 
 
DeHanas, D. 2013b. Of Hajj and home: Roots visits to Mecca and Bangladesh in everyday 
belonging. Ethnicities. 13(4), pp.457–474. 
Demant, P. R. 2006. Islam vs Islamism: the dilemma of the Muslim world. Westport: 
Praeger. 
Denny, F. M. 1975. Ummah in the Constitution of Medina. Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies. 36(1), pp.39-47. 
Denzin, N. 2001. Interpretive Interactionism. 2nd edn. London: Sage. 
 
Denzin, N. K. 1997. Interpretive Ethnography: Ethnographic Practices for the 21st 
Century. London: Sage. 
 294 
Dessing, N. 2013. How to Study Everyday Islam. In: Dessing, N., Jeldtoft, N., Nielson, J. 
and Woodhead, L. eds. 2013. Everyday Lived Islam in Europe. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 39-
52. 
 
Dessing, N., N. Jeldtoft, N., Nielson, J. and Woodhead, L. eds. 2013. Everyday Lived 
Islam in Europe. Farnham: Ashgate. 
 
DeWalt, K. and DeWalt, B. 2011. Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers. 2nd 
edn. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Dilger, H., Pels, P. and Sleeboom-Faulkner, M. 2019. Guidelines for data management and 
scientific integrity in ethnography. Ethnography. 20(1), pp.3–7. 
 
Dirks, N. 2004. Edward Said and Anthropology. Journal of Palestine Studies. 33(3), 
pp.38-54.  
 
Dresch, P. 1989. Tribes, Government and History in Yemen. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Dresch, P. 2000. A History of Modern Yemen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Dufoix, S. 2016 The Dispersion: A History of the Word Diaspora. Leiden: Brill. 
Eade, J. and Garbin, D. 2006. Competing visions of identity and space: Bangladeshi 
Muslims in Britain. Contemporary South Asia. 15(2), pp.181-193. 
Eickelman, D. 1982. The Study of Islam in Local Contexts. Contributions to Asian 
Studies. 17, pp.1-16.  
Eickelman, D. and Piscatori, J. eds. 1990. Muslim Travellers: pilgrimage, migration, and 
the religious imagination.  Berkley: University of California Press. 
Eid, P. 2007. Being Arab: Ethnic and Religious Identity Building Among Second 
Generation Youth in Montreal. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
El-Zein, A. 1977. Beyond ideology and theology: the search for the anthropology of Islam. 
Annual Review of Anthropology. 6, pp.227-254. 
Ellen, R. 2010. Theories in anthropology and 'anthropological theory'. The Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute. 16(2), pp.387-404. 
 
Eriksen, T. H. 1991. The Cultural Contexts of Ethnic Difference. Man. 26(1), pp.127-144. 
 
Fadil, N. 2017. Recalling the ‘Islam of the parents’ liberal and secular Muslims redefining 
the contours of religious authenticity. Identities. 24(1), pp.82-99.  
 
Fadil, N. and Fernando, M., 2015. Rediscovering the “everyday” Muslim. HAU: journal of 
ethnographic theory. 5(2), pp.59–88. 
 295 
Faist, T. 2010. Diaspora and transnationalism: What kind of dance partners? In Bauböck, 
R. and Faist, T. eds. Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp.9-34. 
Fardon, R. 2008. Cosmopolitan Nations, National Cosmopolitans. In: Werbner, P. ed. 
Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism: Rooted, Feminist and Vernacular 
Perspectives. Oxford: Berg, pp.233-259. 
 
Fergany, N. 1982. The Impact of Emigration on National Development in the Arab 
Region: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic. International Migration Review. 16(4), 
pp.757–780. 
 
Ferguson, G. R. 2013. Language practices and language management in a UK Yemeni 
community. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development. 34(2), pp.121-135. 
 
Freitag, U. 1999. Hadhramaut: A Religious Centre for the Indian Ocean in the Late 19th 
and Early 20th Centuries? Studia Islamica. 89, pp.165-183. 
Freitag, U. and von Oppen, A. 2010. Translocality: the study of globalising processes from 
a southern perspective. Boston: Brill. 
Friedman, J. 1997. Global Crises, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual 
Porkbarrelling: Cosmopolitans versus Locals, Ethnics and Nationals in an Era of De-
hegemonisation. In: Werbner, P. and Modood, T. eds. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-
Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism. London: Zed Books, pp.70-89. 
Frost, D. 1996. Racism and social segregation: Settlement patterns of West African 
seamen in Liverpool since the nineteenth century. Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies. 22(1), pp.85-95. 
 
Frost, D. 2000. Ambiguous identities: constructing and de-constructing black and white 
‘Scouse’ identities in twentieth century Liverpool. In: Kirk, N. ed. Northern Identities: 
Historical Interpretations of ‘The North’ and ‘Northernness’. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.195-
217. 
 
Frost, D. 2011. Liverpool ’81: Remembering the Toxteth Riots. Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press. 
 
Frost, D. and Catney, G. 2019. Belonging and the intergenerational transmission of place 
identity: Reflections on a British inner-city neighbourhood. Urban Studies, pp.1-17. 
 
Geaves, R. 2010. Islam in Victorian Britain: The Life and Times of Abdullah Quilliam. 
Markfield: Kube. 
Geaves, R. 2010. Islam Today. London: Continuum. 
Geaves, R. and Gabriel, T. eds. 2014. Sufism in Britain. London: Bloomsbury. 
 
Geertz, C. 1966. Religion as a Cultural System. In: Banton, M. ed. Approaches to the 
Study of Religion. London: Tavistock, pp.1-46. 
 296 
Geertz, C. 1968. Islam observed: religious development in Morocco and Indonesia. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Gilham, J. 2015. Upholding the Banner of Islam: British Converts to Islam and the 
Liverpool Muslim Institute, c.1887–1908. Immigrants & Minorities. 33(1), pp.23-44. 
 
Gilham, J. and Geaves, R. eds. 2017. Victorian Muslim: Abdullah Quilliam and Islam in 
the West. London: Hurst. 
 
Gilliat-Ray, S. 2010. Muslims in Britain: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Gilroy, P. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double 
Consciousness. London: Verso. 
 
Giordano, J., O’Reilly, M., Taylor, H., and Dogra, N. 2007. Confidentiality and 
Autonomy: The Challenge(s) of Offering Research Participants a Choice of Disclosing 
Their Identity. Qualitative Health Research. 17(2), 264–275. 
Glynn, S. 2002. Bengali Muslims: the new East End radicals? Ethnic and Racial Studies. 
25(6), pp.969-988. 
Gobo, G. 2007. Sampling, representativeness and generalizability. In: Seale, C., Gobo, G., 
Gubrium, J. and Silverman, D. eds. Qualitative Research Practice. London: Sage, pp.405-
426. 
 
Google Maps. 2020. Al-Bayḍā Governorate, Yemen. Map Data: Google. [Online]. 
Available from: https://www.google.com/maps/place/Al+Bayda'+Governorate,+Yemen  
 
Google Maps. 2020. L8, Liverpool. Map Data: Google. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Liverpool+L8/. 
 
Grant, A. and Grey, C. eds. 2008. The Mersey Sound: Liverpool’s Language, People and 
Places. Liverpool: Open House Press. 
Grillo, R. 2004. Islam and Transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 
30(5), pp.861-878. 
Haigh, C. 1981. From Monopoly to Minority: Catholicism in Early Modern 
England. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. 31, pp.129-147. 
 
Hall, S. 1990. Cultural Identity and Diaspora. In: Rutherford, J. ed. Identity: community, 
culture, difference. London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp.222-237. 
 
Hall, S. 2012. Avtar Brah's cartographies: moment, method, meaning. Feminist Review. 2, 
pp.27-38. 
 297 
Halliday, F. 1992. Arabs in Exile: Yemeni Migrants in Urban Britain. London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Halliday, F. 2010. Britain’s First Muslims: Portrait of an Arab Community. 2nd edn. 
London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Hamid, S. 2013. The Rise of the ‘Traditional Islam’ Network(s): Neo-Sufism and British 
Muslim Youth. In: Geaves, R. and Gabriel, T. eds. Sufism in Britain. London: 
Bloomsbury, pp.177-196. 
 
Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. 2007. Ethnography: Principles in Practice. 3rd edn. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Hammond, A. 2007. Popular Culture in the Arab World: Arts, Politics, and the Media. 
Cairo: The American University Press. 
 
Hannerz, U. 1990. Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture. Theory, Culture & 
Society. 7(2-3), pp.237-251. 
 
Hannerz, U. 2006. Two Faces of Cosmopolitanism: Culture and Politics. Barcelona: 
Fundació CIDOB. 
 
Ho, E. 2006. The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Holstein, J. and Gubrium, J. 2008. Constructionist Impulses in Ethnographic Fieldwork. 
In: Holstein, J. and Gubrium, J. eds. Handbook of Constructionist Research. London: 
Guilford Press, pp.373-395. 
 
Homan, R. 1980. The ethics of covert methods. British Journal of Sociology. 31(1), pp.46–
59.  
 
Honeybone, P. 2008. New-dialect formation in nineteenth century Liverpool: a brief 
history of Scouse. In Grant, A. and Grey, C. eds. The Mersey Sound: Liverpool’s 
Language, People and Places. Liverpool: Open House Press, pp.106-140.  
 
Hufford, D. 1999. The Scholarly Voice and the Personal Voice: Reflexivity in Belief 
Systems. In: McCutcheon, R. ed. The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion: A 
Reader. London: Cassell, pp.294-310. 
 
Hutnyk, J. 2010. Hybridity. In: In: Knott, K. and McLoughlin, S. eds. Diasporas: 
Concepts, Intersections, Identities. London: Zed Books, pp.59-62. 
 
Jacobsen, C. 2010. Islamic Traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway. Leiden: Brill. 
 
Jeldtoft, N. 2011. Lived Islam: religious identity with ‘non-organized’ Muslim minorities. 
Ethnic and Racial Studies. 34(7), pp.1134-1151. 
 
Jenkins, R. 2008. Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations. 2nd edn. London: 
Sage. 
 298 
Johansson, M. and Kociatkiewicz, J. 2011. City festivals: Creativity and control in staged 
urban experiences. European Urban and Regional Studies. 18(4). pp. 392-405  
Johnson, R. B., and Onwuegbuzie, A. J. 2004. Mixed Methods Research: A Research 
Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. Educational Researcher. 33(7), pp.14–26. 
 
Jones, P. and Wilks-Heeg, S. 2004. Capitalising Culture: Liverpool 2008. Local 
Economy. 19(4), pp.341–360. 
 
Jones, S. H. 2015. The ‘metropolis of dissent’: Muslim participation in Leicester and the 
‘failure’ of multiculturalism in Britain. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 38(11), pp.1969-1985. 
 
Jordan, S. and Yeomans, D. 1995. Critical Ethnography: problems in contemporary theory 
and practice. British Journal of Sociology of Education. 16(3), pp.389-408. 
 
Juneau, T. 2016. Iran’s policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: a limited return on a modest 
investment. International Affairs. 92(3), pp.647-663. 
 
Kassimeris, G. and Jackson, L. 2012. British Muslims and the discourses of dysfunction: 
community cohesion and counterterrorism in the West Midlands. Critical Studies on 
Terrorism. 5(2), pp.179-196. 
 
Keating, E. 2015. Discourse, Space, and Place. In: Tannen, D., Hamilton, H. and Schiffrin, 
D. eds. The Handbook of Discourse Analysis. 2nd edn. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell. 
 
Kendall, E. 2019. The Failing Islamic State within the Failed State of Yemen. Perspectives 
on Terrorism. 13(1), pp.78-87. 
Kibria, N. 2008. The ‘new Islam’ and Bangladeshi youth in Britain and the US. Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 31(2), pp.243-266. 
Kindermann, M. 2019. A Muslim voice in Victorian Britain: conversion and strategies of 
encounter in W.H. Abdullah Quilliam’s poetry. European Journal of English 
Studies. 23(1), pp.11-25. 
 
King, G. R. D. 2004. The Paintings of the Pre-Islamic Ka’ba. In: Necipoğlu, G., Behrens-
Abouseif, D.and Contadinia, A. eds. Essays in Honor of J. M. Rogers. Leiden: Brill, 
pp.219-229.  
 
King, J. 2012. Zaydī revival in a hostile republic: Competing identities, loyalties and 
visions of state in Republican Yemen. Arabica. 55, pp.404-445. 
 
Knott, K. 1992. The Role of Religious Studies in Understanding the Ethnic Experience. 
Community Religions Project Research Papers No. 3. Leeds: Department of Theology and 
Religious Studies, University of Leeds. 
 
Knott, K. 2005a. The Location of Religion: A Spatial Analysis. London: Equinox. 
 
Knott, K. 2005b. Insider/Outsider Perspectives. In: Hinellls, J. R. ed. The Routledge 
Companion to the Study of Religion. Oxon: Routledge, pp.243-258. 
 299 
Knott, K. 2010. Space and movement. In: Knott, K. and McLoughlin, S. eds. Diasporas: 
Concepts, Intersections, Identities. London: Zed Books, pp.79-83. 
 
Knysh, A. 2001. The “Tariqa” on a Landcruiser: The Resurgence of Sufism in Yemen. 
Middle East Journal. 55(3), pp.399-414. 
Kraidy, M. M. 2005. Hybridity, or the cultural logic of globalization. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Kundnani, A. 2009. Spooked: How not to prevent violent extremism. London: Institute of 
Race Relations. 
 
Lackner, H. 2017. Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of 
the State. London: Saqi Books. 
 
Lawless, R. I. 1995. From Ta’izz to Tyneside: An Arab Community in the North-East of 
England During the Early Twentieth Century. Exeter: Exeter University Press. 
 
Lévi-Strauss, C. 1963. Structural Anthropology. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Lewis, H. 2007. The Influence of Edward Said and Orientalism on Anthropology, or: Can 
the Anthropologist Speak? Israel Affairs. 13(4), pp.774-785 
 
Liverpool Charity and Voluntary Services (LCVS). 2019. Liverpool City Council Resource 
Grants. [Online]. Available from: https://www.lcvs.org.uk/liverpool-city-council-
community-resource-grants-now-open/ 
 
Liverpool City Council. 2013. Ward Census Summaries. [Online]. Available from: 
https://liverpool.gov.uk/council/key-statistics-and-data/census/ward-census-summaries/ 
 
Liverpool City Council. 2015. The Index of Multiple Deprivation 2015: A Liverpool 
analysis. [Online]. Available from: https://liverpool.gov.uk/media/10003/2-imd-2015-
main-report-final.pdf 
 
Liverpool City Council. 2015. 2011 Census: Liverpool Summary. [Online]. Available 
from: https://liverpool.gov.uk/media/9900/full-report.pdf 
 
Liverpool City Council. 2018. Inclusive Growth Plan: A Strong and Growing City Built on 
Fairness. [Online]. Available from: https://liverpool.gov.uk/media/1356878/mayoral-
growth-plan-a4print.pdf 
 
Lyons, T. and Mandaville, P. 2010. Think Locally, Act Globally: Towards a Transnational 
Comparative Politics. International Political Sociology. 4(2), pp.124-141. 
 
Madianou, M. and Miller, D. 2012. Migration and New Media: Transnational families and 
polymedia. Oxon: Routledge. 
Mahmood, S. 2005. Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. 
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 300 
Mahoney, D. 2016. The Political Construction of a Tribal Genealogy from Early Medieval 
South Arabia. In: Hovden, E., Lutter, C. and Pohl W. eds. Meanings of Community across 
Medieval Eurasia. Leiden: Brill, pp.163-182. 
 
Mandaville, P. 2001 Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the umma. London: 
Routledge. 
Mandaville, P. 2007. Global political Islam. London: Routledge. 
Mandaville, P. 2009. Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and 
the UK after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology and Authority. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies. 35(3), pp.491-506 
Mandaville, P. 2014. Islam and Politics. London: Routledge. 
Mandel, R. 1990. Shifting centres and emergent identities: Turkey and Germany in the 
lives of Turkish Gasarbeiter. In: Eickelman, D. and Piscatori, J. eds. Muslim Travellers: 
pilgrimage, migration, and the religious imagination. Berkley: University of California 
Press, pp.153-171. 
Marotta, V. P. 2007. The hybrid self and the ambivalence of boundaries. Journal for the 
study of Race, Nation and Culture. 14(3), pp.295-312. 
Masud, M. K. 1990. The obligation to migrate: the doctrine of hijra in Islamic law. In: 
Eickelman, D. and Piscatori, J. eds. Muslim Travellers: pilgrimage, migration, and the 
religious imagination. Berkley: University of California Press, pp.29-49. 
Mavroudi, E. 2007. Diaspora as Process: (De)Constructing Boundaries. Geography 
Compass. 1(3), pp.467-479. 
 
Mawby, S. 2005. British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955-67: Last outpost of a 
Middle East empire. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
McGuire, M. 2008. Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
McKenna, U and Francis, L. 2019. Growing up female and Muslim in the UK: an 
empirical enquiry into the distinctive religious and social values of young Muslims. British 
Journal of Religious Education. 41(4), pp.388-401. 
McLoughlin, S. 1996. In the name of the umma: globalisation, “race” relations and 
Muslim identity politics in Bradford. In: Shadid, W. A. R. and van Koningsveld, P. S. eds. 
Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States. Kampen: Kok 
Pharos, pp.206-228. 
McLoughlin, S. 1998. The Mosque-Centre, Community-Mosque: Multi-Functions, 
Funding and the Reconstruction of Islam in Bradford. The Scottish Journal of Religious 
Studies. 19(2), pp.211-227. 
 
 301 
McLoughlin, S. 2000. Researching Muslim minorities: some reflections on fieldwork in 
Britain. In: Hawting, G. R., Mojaddedi, J. A. and Samely, A. eds. Studies in Islamic and 
Middle Eastern texts and traditions in memory of Norman Calder. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.175 – 194. 
 
McLoughlin, S. 2002. Recognising Muslims: Religion, Ethnicity and Identity Politics in 
Britain. Cahiers d’études sur la Médterranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien 
(CEMOTI), 33, pp.43-54. 
 
McLoughin, S. 2005a. Migration, diaspora and transnationalism: Transformations of 
religion and culture in a globalising age. In: Hinellls, J. R. ed. The Routledge Companion 
to the Study of Religion. Oxon: Routledge, pp.526-549. 
 
McLoughlin, S. 2005b. Mosques and the Public Space: Conflict and Cooperation in 
Bradford. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 31(6), pp.1045-1066. 
McLoughlin, S. 2005c. The State, 'New' Muslim Leaderships and Islam as a 'Resource' for 
Engagement in Britain. In: Cesari, J and McLoughlin, S. eds. European Muslims and the 
Secular State. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.55-69.  
McLoughlin, S. 2006. Writing a BrAsian City: ‘Race’, Culture and Religion in Accounts 
of Postcolonial Bradford. In: Ali, N., Kalra, V. and Sayyid, S. eds. A Postcolonial People: 
South Asians in Britain. London: Hurst, pp.110-140. 
McLoughlin, S. 2007. Islam(s) in Context: Orientalism and the anthropology of Muslim 
societies and cultures. Journal of Beliefs and Values 28(3), pp.273-296 
McLoughlin, S. 2009. Contesting Muslim Pilgrimage: Pakistani Identities, Sacred 
Journeys to Makkah and Madina, and the Global Postmodern. In: Kalra, V. S. ed. 
Pakistani Diasporas: Culture, Conflict, Change. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 
pp.233-265. 
McLoughlin, S. 2010. Muslim travellers: homing desire, the umma and British-Pakistanis. 
In: Knott, K. and McLoughlin, S. eds. Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities. 
London: Zed Books, pp.223-229. 
McLoughlin, S. 2013. Imagining a Muslim Diaspora in Britain? Islamic Consciousness 
and Homelands Old and New. In: Alexander, C. et al. eds. The New Muslims. London: The 
Runneymede Trust, pp.34-36. 
McLoughlin, S. 2014. Introduction. In: McLoughlin, S., Gould, W., Kabir, A. J., and 
Tomalin, E. eds. Writing the City in British Asian Diasporas. Oxon: Routledge, pp.1-17 
 
McLoughlin, S. 2015. Pilgrimage, Performativity, and British Muslims: Scripted and 
Unscripted Accounts of the Hajj and Umra. In: Mois, L. and Buitelaar, M. Leiden: 
Sidestone Press, pp.41-64. 
McLoughlin, S. and Kalra, V. S. 1999. Wish You Were(n’t) Here? Discrepant 
Representations of Mirpur in Narratives of Migration, Diaspora and Tourism. In: Kaur, R. 
 302 
and Hutnyk, J. eds. Travel-worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Politics. London: 
Zed Books, pp.120-136. 
 
McLoughlin, S. and Khan, M. 2006. Ambiguous traditions and modern transformations of 
Islam: the waxing and waning of an ‘intoxicated’ Sufi cult in Mirpur. Contemporary South 
Asia. 15(3), pp.289-307. 
 
McLoughlin, S. and Knott, K. 2010. Conclusion: new directions. In Knott, K. and 
McLoughlin, S. eds. Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities. London: Zed Books, 
pp.269-273. 
 
McLoughlin, S. and Zavos, J. 2014. Writing Religion in British Asian Diasporas. In:  
McLoughlin, S., Gould, W., Kabir, A. J., and Tomalin, E. eds. Writing the City in British 
Asian Diasporas. Oxon: Routledge, pp.158-178. 
 
McLoughlin, S., Gould, W., Kabir, A. J., Tomalin, E. eds. 2014. Writing the City in British 
Asian Diasporas. Oxon: Routledge 
 
Mills, J. 2001. Being Bilingual: Perspectives of Third Generation Asian Children on 
Language, Culture and Identity. International Journal of Bilingual Education and 
Bilingualism. 4(6), pp.383-402. 
 
Mitchell, C. 2006. The Religious Content of Ethnic Identities. Sociology. 40(6), pp.1135-
1152. 
 
Modood, T. 1990. British Asian Muslims and the Rushdie Affair. The Political Quarterly. 
61(2), pp.143-160. 
 
Morgan, D. 2007. Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications 
of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research. 1(1), pp.48–76. 
 
Morgan, K. 2007. Liverpool's Dominance in the British Slave Trade, 1740–1807. In 
Richardson, D., Schwarz, S. and Tibbles, A. eds. Liverpool and Transatlantic 
Slavery. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp.14-42. 
 
Mouffe, C. 1994. For a Politics of Nomadic Identity. In: Robertson, G., Mash, M., Tickner 
L., Bird, J., Curtis, B., and Putnam, T. eds. Travellers’ Tales: Narratives of Home and 
Displacement, London: Routledge, pp.105-113.  
 
Müller, M. 2015. A Spectre is Haunting Arabia: How the Germans Brought Their 
Communism to Yemen. Bielfeld: Transcript Verlag. 
 
Nagel, C. and Staeheli, L. 2008. Integration and the negotiation of ‘here’ and ‘there’: the 
case of British Arab activists. Social & Cultural Geography. 9(4), pp.415-430. 
 
Nagel, C. and Staeheli, L. 2010. ICT and Geographies of British Arab and Arab American 
Activism. Global Networks. 10(2), pp.262-281. 
 
 303 
Naji, A. 2015. Stateless confederations: Revolutions of Islamic consciousness in the Arab 
World. In: Hamdar, A. and Moore, L. eds. Islamism and Cultural Expression in the Arab 
World. Oxon: Routledge, pp.253-269. 
 
Neal, F. 1988. Sectarian Violence. The Liverpool Experience, 1819–1914: An Aspect of 
Anglo-Irish History. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Nespor, J. 2000. Anonymity and Place in Qualitative Inquiry. Qualitative Inquiry. 6(4), 
pp.546–569. 
 
Nevola, L. 2015. Blood Doesn’t Lie: Hierarchy and Inclusion/Exclusion in Contemporary 
Yemen. Ph.D. thesis, University of Milano-Bicocca. 
 
O’Brien, D. 2010. ‘No cultural policy to speak of’ – Liverpool 2008. Journal of Policy 
Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events. 2(2), pp.113-128. 
 
O’Reilly, K. 2009. Key Concepts in Ethnography. London: Sage. 
 
O'Toole, T., DeHanas, D. and Modood, T. 2012. Balancing tolerance, security and Muslim 
engagement in the United Kingdom: the impact of the ‘Prevent’ agenda. Critical Studies 
on Terrorism. 5(3), pp.373-389. 
 
O’Toole, T., Meer, N., DeHanas, D., Jones, S. and Modood, T. 2016. Governing through 
Prevent? Regulation and Contested Practice in State-Muslim Engagement. Sociology. 
50(1), pp.160-177. 
Oakes, T. and Schein, L. 2006. Translocal China: linkages, identities and the reimagining 
of space. London: Routledge. 
Office for National Statistics. 2011. NOMIS QS203EW Dataset – Country of Birth by 




Office for National Statistics. 2011. NOMIS QS213EW Dataset – Country of Birth: North 
West. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/QS213EW/view/2013265922?cols=measures 
 
Peach, C. 2005. Britain’s Muslim Population: an Overview. In: Abbas, T. ed. Muslim 
Britain: Communities Under Pressure. London: Zed Books, pp.18-30. 
Peschier, F. 2018. Scenography and the construction of Liverpool identities at the 
Liverpool Everyman and Playhouse Theatres between 2004 and 2015. Ph.D. thesis, 
University of the Arts London. 
Phillips, S. 2008. Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage 
and Pluralized Authoritarianism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Phillips, S. 2011. Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. New York: Routledge. 
 
 304 
Phoenix, A. 2019. Negotiating British Muslim belonging: a qualitative longitudinal 
study. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 42(10), pp.1632-1650. 
Platt, L. 2011. Liverpool 08 and the performativity of identity. Journal of Policy Research 
in Tourism, Leisure & Events. 3(1), pp.31-43. 
Pooley, C. 2008. Liverpool: past, present and future. Urban History. 35(3), pp.497-501. 
 
Riccio, B. 2001. From “ethnic group” to “transnational community”? Senegalese migrants' 
ambivalent experiences and multiple trajectories, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 
27(4), pp.583–99. 
Robertson, R. 1995. Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity. In: 
Featherstone, M., Lash, S., Robertsone, R. eds. Global Modernities. London: Sage, pp.25-
44. 
Robertson, R. 2012. Globalisation or glocalisation? Journal of International 
Communication. 18(2), pp.191-208. 
Rookwood, J. 2012. ‘We’re not English, we are Scouse!’ Examining civic loyalty and 
collective fan identities at Liverpool Football Club. In: Hughson, J., Palmer, C. and 
Skillen, F. eds. The Role of Sports in the Formation of Personal Identities: Studies in 
Community Loyalties. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, pp.95-120. 
Roy, O. 1998. Naissance d’un Islam Européen. Esprit. 239, pp.10-35 
Roy, O. 2004. 2004. Globalised Islam: The Search for a New umma. London: Hurst 
Roy, O. 2013. Secularism and Islam: The Theological Predicament. The International 
Spectator. 48(1), pp.5-19. 
 
Rubel, P. and Rosman, A. 2009. The Transnational Family Among Urban Diaspora 
Populations. In: Prato, G. B. ed. Beyond Multiculturalism: Views from Anthropology. 
Farnham: Ashgate, pp.57-77. 
 
Safran, W. 2004. Deconstructing and Comparing Diasporas. In Kokot, W., Tölölyan, K., 
and Alfonso, C. eds. Diaspora, Identity and Religion: New Directions in Theory and 
Research. London: Routledge, pp.19-40. 
 
Said, E. 1978. Orientalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Salmoni, B., Loidolt, B., Wells, M. 2010. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The 
Huthi Phenomenon. Santa Monica: RAND. 
 
Saunders, B., Kitzinger, J., and Kitzinger, C. 2015. Anonymising interview data: 
challenges and compromise in practice. Qualitative Research. 15(5), pp.616–632. 
 
Sayyid, B. 1997. A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism. 
London: Zed Books. 
 305 
Scharbrodt, O. 2020. Creating a Diasporic Public Sphere in Britain: Twelver Shia 
Networks in London. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations. 31(1), pp.23-40. 
Schielke, S., 2009. Being good in ramadan: ambivalence, fragmentation, and the moral self 
in the lives of young Egyptians. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 15(1), 
pp.24–40. 
Schielke, S. 2010. Second thoughts about the anthropology of Islam, or how to make sense 
of grand schemes in everyday life. ZMO Working Papers. Berlin: Zentrum Moderner 
Orient, pp.1-16. 
Schielke, S. 2012. Being a Nonbeliever in a Time of Islamic Revival: Trajectories of  
Doubt and Certainty in Contemporary Egypt. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. 44(2), pp.301–320. 
 
Schielke, S. and Debevec, L. 2012. Introduction. In: Schielke, S. and Debevec, L. eds. 
Ordinary Lives and Grand Schemes: An Anthropology of Everyday Religion. Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, pp.1-16. 
 
Searle, C., and Shaif, A. 1991. “Drinking from one pot”: Yemeni unity, at home and 
overseas. Race & Class. 32(4), pp.65–81. 
 
Searle, K. 2010. From Farms to Foundries: An Arab Community in Industrial Britain. 
Bern: Peter Lang AG. 
 
Seddon, M. 2010. Constructing identities of “difference” and “resistance”: the politics of 
being Muslim and British. Social Semiotics. 20(5), pp.557-571. 
 
Seddon, M. 2014. The Last of the Lascars: Yemeni Muslims in Britain 1836-2012. 
Markfield: Kube. 
 
Select Committee on Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: Housing, Planning, Local 
Government and the Regions. 2004. Memorandum by Liverpool City Council. SOC67. 
[Online]. Available from: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmodpm/45/45we09.htm 
Shih, C. and Ikeda, J. 2016. International Relations of Post- Hybridity: Dangers and 
Potentials in Non-Synthetic Cycles. Globalizations. 13(4), pp.454-468  
Sleeboom-Faulker, M. and McMurray, J. 2018. The Impact of the New EU GDPR on 
Ethics Governance and Social Anthropology. Anthropology Today. 34(5), pp.22-23. 
Smith, P. 2011. Translocality: A Critical Reflection. In Brickell, K. and Datta, A. eds. 
Translocal geographies: spaces, places, connections. Farnham: Ashgate, pp.181-198. 
Sofu, H. 2009. Language shift or maintenance within three generations: examples from 
three Turkish–Arabic-speaking families. International Journal of 
Multilingualism. 6(3), pp.246-257. 
 
 306 
Staub, S. 1989. Yemenis in New York City: The Folklore of Ethnicity. Philadephia: The 
Balch Institute Press 
 
Steffens, H. 1979. Population Geography of the Yemen Arab Republic. Wiesbaden: L. 
Reichert. 
 
Suleiman, Y. 2011. Arabic, Self and Identity: A Study in Conflict and Displacement. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Svend, B. 2013. Qualitative Interviewing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Taylor, C. 2004. Modern Social Imaginaries. London: Duke University Press. 
 
The Liverpool Echo (author unspecified). 2008. Tribute to newsagent gunned down in 




Thiollet, H. 2014. From Migration Hub to Asylum Crisis: The Changing Dynamics of 
Contemporary Migration in Yemen. In: Lackner, H. ed. Why Yemen Matters: A Society in 
Transition. London: Saqi, pp.265-285. 
 
Timol, R. 2019. Structures of Organisation and Loci of Authority in a Glocal Islamic 
Movement: The Tablighi Jama’at in Britain. Religions. 10(10), 573. 
 
Tölölyan, K. 1996. Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless Power in the Transnational Moment.  
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies. 5(1), pp.3-36. 
Tölölyan, K. 2007. The contemporary discourse of diaspora studies, Comparative Studies 
of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 27(3), pp.647–655.  
Turan, Z. 2004. Personal Objects from the Homeland: Reconstructing Cultural and 
Personal Identities. International Journal of the Humanities. 1, pp.465–80.  
Turan, Z. 2010. Material Objects as Facilitating Environments: The Palestinian Diaspora. 
Home Cultures. 7(1), pp.43-56. 
 
Turner, S. 2010. Diasporas, conflict and security. In: Knott, K. and McLoughlin, S. eds. 
Diasporas: Concepts, Intersections, Identities. London: Zed Books, pp.97-101. 
 
Uduku, O. 2003. Ethnic Minority Perspectives. In: Munck, R. ed. Reinventing the City: 
Liverpool in Comparative Perspective.  Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, pp.122-
143. 
 
UK Government. 2019. Guidance: Building a Stronger Britain Together. [Online]. 
Available from: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/building-a-stronger-britain-together 
 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2019. 




Valkonen, S. 2014. The embodied boundaries of ethnicity. European Journal of Cultural 
Studies. 17(2), pp.209–224. 
 
Varisco, D. 2009. Agriculture in al-Hamdānī’s Yemen: A Survey from Early Islamic 
Geographical Texts. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient. 52(3), 
pp.382-412. 
 
Vertovec, S. 1999. Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies. 22(2), pp.447-462. 
Vertovec, S. 2004. Religion and Diaspora. In:  Antes, P., Geertz, A. W. and Warne, R. 
New Approaches to the Study of Religion. Berlin: Verlag de Gruyter, pp.275-303. 
Vertovec, S. 2009. Transnationalism. London: Routledge. 
Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. 2002. Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism. In: 
Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. eds. Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, Practice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.1-22. 
 
vom Bruck, G. 2010. Regimes of Piety Revisited: Zaydī Political Moralities in Republican 
Yemen. Die Welt des Islams. 50(2), pp.185-223. 
 
Wade, E. 1948. British Nationality Act, 1948. Journal of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law. 30(3), pp.67-75. 
 
Walford, G. 2005. Research ethical guidelines and anonymity. International Journal of 
Research & Method in Education. 28(1), pp.83-93. 
 
Walford, G. 2018. The impossibility of anonymity in ethnographic research. Qualitative 
Research. 18(5), pp.516–525. 
 
Wedeen, L. 2008. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Weir, S. 1997. A Clash of Fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen. Middle East Report. 
204, pp.22-26. 
 
Weir, S. 2007. A Tribal Order: Politics and Law in the Mountains of Yemen. London: The 
British Museum Press. 
Werbner, P. 1990. The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts and Offerings among British 
Pakistanis. Oxford: Berg Publishers. 
Werbner, P. 1991a. Introducion II. In: Werbner, P. and Anwar, M. eds. Black and Ethnic 
Leaderships: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action. London: Routledge, pp.12-26. 
 
Werbner, P. 1991b. The fiction of unity in ethnic politics: aspects of representation and the 
state among British Pakistanis. In: Werbner, P. and Anwar, M. eds. Black and Ethnic 
Leaderships: The Cultural Dimensions of Political Action. London: Routledge, pp.77-100. 
 308 
Werbner, P. 1996. Fun Spaces: on Identity and Social Empowerment among British 
Pakistanis. Theory, Culture, and Society. 13(4), pp.53-80. 
Werbner, P. 1997. Introduction: The Dialectics of Cultural Hybridity. In: Werbner, P. and 
Modood, T. eds. 1997. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-cultural Identities and the 
Politics of Anti-Racism. London: Zed Books, pp.1-26. 
 
Werbner, P. 2001. The Limits of Cultural Hybridity: On Ritual Monsters, Poetic Licence 
and Contested Postcolonial Purifications. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. 
7(1), pp.133-152. 
 
Werbner, P. 2002a. Imagined Diasporas among Manchester Muslims: The Public 
Performance of Pakistani Transnational Identity Politics. Oxford: James Curry 
 
Werbner, P. 2002b. The place which is diaspora: citizenship, religion and gender in the 
making of chaordic transnationalism. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 28(1), 
pp.119-133. 
 
Werbner, P. 2003. Pilgrims of Love: Anthropology of a Global Sufi Cult London: Hurst & 
Company. 
 
Werbner, P. 2004. The Predicament of Diaspora and Millennial Islam: Reflections on 
September 11, 2001. Ethnicities. 4(4), pp.451–476. 
 
Werbner, P. 2008. Introduction: Towards a New Cosmopolitan Anthropology. In: 
Werbner, P. ed. Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism: Rooted, Feminist and 
Vernacular Perspectives. Oxford: Berg, pp.1-29. 
 
Werbner, P. 2009. Revisiting the UK Muslim diasporic public sphere at a time of terror: 
from local (benign) invisible spaces to seditious conspiratorial spaces and the ‘failure of 
multiculturalism’ discourse. South Asian Diaspora. 1(1), pp.19-45. 
 
Werbner, P. 2010. Complex Diasporas. In: Knott, K. and McLoughlin, S. eds. Diasporas: 
Concepts, Intersections, Identities. London: Zed Books, pp.74-78. 
 
Werbner, P. 2011. The Materiality of Late Modern Diasporas: Between Aesthetics and 
“Real” Politics. In: Anteby-Yemeni, L., Berthomière, W., and Sheffer, G. eds. Les 
diasporas: 2000 ans d’histoire. Rennes: Press Universitaires de Rennes, pp.469-487. 
 
Werbner, P. 2013a. Folk devils and racist imaginaries in a global prism: Islamophobia and 
anti-Semitism in the twenty-first century. Ethnic and Racial Studies. 36(3), pp.450-467. 
 
Werbner, P. 2013b. Everyday multiculturalism: Theorising the difference between 
‘intersectionality’ and ‘multiple identities.’ Ethnicities. 13(4), pp.401–419. 
 
Werbner, P. 2016. Vernacular Cosmopolitanism as an Ethical Disposition: Sufi Networks, 
Hospitality, and Translocal Inclusivity. In: Buskins, L. ed. Islamic Studies in the Twenty-




Werbner, P. 2017. Barefoot in Britain – yet again: On multiple identities, 
intersection(ality) and marginality. The Sociological Review Monographs. 65(1), pp.4-12. 
 
Werbner, P. and Fumanti, M. 2012. The Aesthetics of Diaspora: Ownership and 
Appropriation. Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology. 78(2), pp.149-174. 
 
Werbner, P. and Modood, T. eds. 1997. Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-cultural 
Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism. London: Zed Books. 
 
West, H. F. 2013. Accent variation on the Merseyside/Lancashire border: A sociophonetic 
study of Southport and Ormskirk. Ph.D. thesis, University of York. 
 
Willis, J. M. 2009. Making Yemen Indian: Rewriting the Boundaries of Imperial Arabia. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies. 41(1), pp.23-28. 
 
Willis, J. M. 2018. The Salafī Imāmate: Moral Reform and Anti-Imperialism in the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom. Journal of Arabian Studies. 8(1), pp.47-65. 
 
Wimmer, A. 2013. Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Wise, A. and Velayutham, S. 2009. Everyday Multiculturalism. Basingtoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Wolfe-Robinson, M. 2019. Six Pull out of Bradford festival over counterextremism 




Yuill, C. 2018. Is anthropology legal? Anthropology and the EU General Data Protection 
















Male. 40-50. Various employment. Arab, non-Yemeni. 
Born in an Arab country. Has frequent contact with Yemenis through mosques. 
 
Aḥmad 
Male. 30-40. Education sector. Yemeni. 
Born in Liverpool. 
 
Dālyā 
Female. 30-40. Artist. Arab, non-Yemeni. 
Born in Liverpool, has spent time in another Arab country. 
 
Farīda 
Female. 30-40. Various employment. White-British revert. 




Female. 30-40. Social work. Yemeni of mixed heritage. 
Born in Liverpool. 
 
Ḥakīm 
Male. 50-60. Board member of a mosque. South Asian heritage. 
Moved to the UK for education, Liverpool at a later date. 
 
Ḥalīma 
Female. 30-40. Various employment. South Asian heritage. 
Born in the UK, moved to Liverpool at a later date. Has frequent contact with Yemenis. 
 
Ḥāmid 
Male. 50-70. Community leader. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen, educated in Ṣan’ā. 
 
Jane 
Female. 40-50. Education sector. White-British. 
Born in Liverpool. Has frequent contact with Yemenis as part of her employment. 
 
Karīma 
Female. 30-40. Various employment including shop work. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen. Moved to Liverpool as a spouse of a Liverpool-Yemeni. 
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Layla 
Female. 20-30. Student and artist. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen. Moved to L8 at a young age. 
 
Maḥmūd  
Male. 40-50. Self-employed. Yemeni. 
Born in the North West. Moved to L8 at a young age. Childhood spent in Yemen. 
 
Maryam 
Female. 50-60. Involved in mosque activities. Yemeni. 




Male. 50-70. Community work. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen, educated in Aden. 
 
Munīra 
Female. 30-40. Various employment. Yemeni. 
Born in Liverpool. 
 
Nāṣir 
Male. 50-70. Community work. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen, educated in Aden. 
 
Qays 
Male. 50-70. Community work. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen, educated in Aden. 
 
Rīm 
Female. 30-40. Various employment including social work. Yemeni. 
Born in Liverpool.  
 
Samīr 
Male. 50-70. Community work. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen, educated in Aden. 
 
Sāra 
Female. 30-40. Various employment. White-British revert. 
Born in Liverpool. Has many connections with Liverpool-Yemenis. 
 
Ṭāriq 
Male. 40-50. Various employment including community work. Yemeni. 
Born in Merseyside region. Moved to Liverpool at a young age. 
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‘Umar 
Male. 50-70. Community work. Yemeni. 
Born in Yemen, educated in Ṣan’ā. 
 
Zahra 
Female. 20-30. Student. Yemeni. 
Born in Liverpool. 
 
Zamīla 
Female. 30-40. Various employment including shop work. Yemeni. 




Total number of participants:  21 
Yemeni:          14  
Arab, non-Yemeni:       2   
Other Ethnicity:        5 
Male:           8  




Note: Community leaders have been split into several pseudonyms for greater anonymity. 
The total number of participants reflects the actual number of individuals who participated 
in interviews. This thesis has attempted to give space to multiple perspectives and voices, 

















Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Name of Project: Liverpool-Yemenis: Locality, Diaspora, Transnationalism and Religion 
in a British-Arab Community 
 
Invitation to Participate in Research 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. It is important for you to fully understand 
why the research is being done, and what it will involve before you decide whether you would like 
to participate. Please take time to read the following information carefully. You can discuss this 
with the researcher David Harrison, who is a current PhD research student at the University of 
Leeds, or others if you wish. Please do not hesitate to ask if anything is unclear, or if you would 
like more information. Take time to decide whether you wish to participate. 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
 
As the Liverpool-Yemeni community has a long and vibrant history, but has received little 
attention, this research hopes to explore and analyse its members' stories, histories, and 
experiences. Some main topics the research will address are: Liverpool-Yemeni identity, the local 
community's ongoing relationship with Yemen and with ethnicity and religion, challenges the 
community faces, inter-community dialogue, and community-based projects. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
You have been invited to participate as you are a member of the Liverpool-Yemeni community, 
and your history, experiences, and/or stories would be valuable to the research. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation is completely voluntary. If you wish to participate, you will be asked to sign a 
consent form and will be given a copy to keep. If you change your mind before participating, you 
can inform the lead researcher that you wish to withdraw from the project, and you do not need to 
give a reason.  
 
What will my participation involve? 
 
Participation will involve an interview with the researcher. Interviews will last approximately one 
hour. The place and time will be mutually agreed. Questions will be open-ended and will invite 
you to share stories and experiences relating to the questions. You may refuse to answer any 
questions or leave the interview at any point without giving a reason. 
 
Will I be audio recorded and who will have access to my responses? 
 
The researcher will want to make an audio recording of the interview using a digital recorder. This 
is to ensure that your responses are transcribed accurately and it also allows for better quality 
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analysis. The recordings will only be available to the researcher. Transcriptions of recordings will 
be available to the researcher and the two research supervisors with your permission. They will be 
kept in a University password-protected drive which only the researcher has access to. Hand-
written notes taken by the researcher during the interview are also a possibility if the participant 
does not wish to be recorded. The same conditions apply to written notes and any recorded 
material regarding confidentiality.  
 
Will my participation be kept confidential? 
 
No names (or other identifiable information such as date of birth or addresses) will be used in the 
outputs of the research. The researcher will assign pseudonyms and individuals will remain 
anonymous. You will also be requested to give permission for the researcher to use quotes from 
your interview (see Consent Form). There is a possibility that you might be able to identify 
yourself from a quote, but no personal names or other identifiable information will be attached to 
quotes. 
 
Can I withdraw after participating? 
 
Please note that if you have participated and later wish for your data to be withdrawn, you should 
request this within 3 months of your participation as the data will be anonymised for the analysis 
and it may be impossible to identify you thereafter. You do not need to give a reason for 
withdrawing.  
 
During the interview 
 
You are advised that any information you give to the researcher which would result in harm to 
yourself or others, or involves criminal activity must be reported to the relevant authorities. 
 
Who has ethically reviewed this project? 
 
The University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee have given ethical approval to this project. 
The project is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council under the White Rose College 
of the Arts and Humanities award. 
 
What will happen when the research is complete? 
 
The final results of the research will be compiled into a doctoral thesis. It is hoped that this may 
then be published as a book or journal article.  
 
Contact details  
 
Researcher:    David Harrison     
Email:     ml08deh@leeds.ac.uk  
Institute:     University of Leeds, Theology and Religious Studies 
Supervisors:     Dr Seán McLoughlin (s.mcloughlin@leeds.ac.uk)  
               Dr Jasjit Singh (j.s.singh@leeds.ac.uk) 
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Appendix 3: Informed Consent Forms 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Researcher: David Harrison, University of Leeds, ml08deh@leeds.ac.uk 
Supervisors: Dr Seán McLoughlin, Dr Jasjit Singh, University of Leeds 
 
 
Add your initials to the box if you agree with the statement. 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet explaining the  research 
project and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the  project. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any  time 
without giving any reason. If I do not wish to answer a particular question(s), I  understand that 
I am free to decline without giving reason. 
 
 
3. I give permission for the researcher and two research supervisors to have access to my 
 responses. I understand  that my name or other identifiable information will not be  used 
in the thesis or further publication(s).  
 
 
4. I give permission for quotes from my responses to be used in the thesis or further 
 publication(s). I understand that I will remain anonymous, but I may be able to identify 
 myself from a quote. 
 
 
6. I understand that I can withdraw my responses up to 3 months after the interview has  taken 




7. I agree to take part in the above research project and I will inform the researcher if my 




To be signed and dated in the presence of the participant: 
 
 
Interview Number: ________________ Name of researcher: David Harrison 
 
Date:   ________________   Date:   ________________ 
 




Appendix 4: Example Interview Questions 
Could you tell me about how you/your family arrived in Liverpool (or the UK) from Yemen?  
Which part(s) of Yemen are you/your family from? 
Could you tell me about what you/your family did after first arriving from Yemen? 
Could you tell me about your experiences growing up in Liverpool? 
Could you talk about your relationship to the Arabic language/the Scouse accent? 
Could you tell me about your experiences with any of the Arabic or Yemeni community centres in 
Liverpool? 
Could you talk about your relationship to L8, Toxteth, or Lodge Lane if these places are important 
to you? 
How do you feel about the labels Arab/Yemeni? How about Scouse/British? 
Is a Scouse identity important to you in any way? 
Could you talk about your relationship to or perceptions of non-Yemeni Arabs in the city?  
Do you/your family travel to Yemen often? If so, could you say a little about this? 
Do you/your family send remittances to Yemen?  
Could you talk about whether/how a Muslim identity is important to you?  
Could you describe your relationship to or experiences of any of the religious insitutions in 
Liverpool? 
Do you have a preferred mosque? If so, what is this preference based on? 
If you had the choice of place to study Islam, where would this be and why? 
As the umma is increasingly talked about, could you tell me how/if you relate to this concept? 
How do you feel about ideologies (such as Wahhabism) which are associated with/promoted by 
Saudi Arabia? Could you talk about how these might interact or conflict with a Yemeni identity? 
How do you feel about the relationship between ‘Yemeni culture/ethnicity’ and ‘Islam’? 




Appendix 5: Research Poster 
Are you Yemeni and live in 
Liverpool? 
 
David Harrison is a researcher at the University of 
Leeds where he studied Arabic language. 
 
He is currently undertaking a project on Liverpool-
Yemeni life, and is looking for people who would be 
interested in talking to him. 
 
The project is to explore the history of the Liverpool-
Yemeni community, their experiences and opinions 
on various matters such as Yemen, life in Liverpool, 
religion and language. 
 
If you would be interested, please contact him on:  
ml08deh@leeds.ac.uk 
 







                
 
 
 (نم وأ) يف نكاسو ينمی تنا لھ
 ؟لوبرفیل
 
 ةغللا سرد ثیح زدیل ةعماج يف ثحاب نوسیراھ دیفید
 .ةیبرعلا
 
 يف ينمیلا عمتجملا نع ةسارد  عورشمب نلآا موقی وھ
 ثدحتلل ينمیلا عمتجملا نم صاخشأ نع ثحبیو لوبرفیل
 .ھعم
 
 لوبرفیل يف ينمیلا عمتجملا خیرات قیثوتل  عورشملا اذھ
 ٫لوبرفیل يف ةایحلاو ٫نمیلا يف مھءارآو مھبراجتو
 .ةیبرعلا ةغللاو ،ملاسلإاو
 
 ،ھعم ثدحتت نأ ىضرت تنكو عورشملاب متھت تنك اذا
   :لیمیلاا يف ھب لاصتلاا ىجری
 ku.ca.sdeel@hed80lm
 




Appendix 6: Ethics Committee Approval 
 
 
Research & Innovation Service 
Level 11, Worsley Building 
University of Leeds 
Leeds, LS2 9NL 





Theology and Religious Studies (School of PRHS) 
University of Leeds 
Leeds, LS2 9JT 
 
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures Research Ethics Committee 
University of Leeds 
 
06 April 2017 
 
Dear David  
 
Title of study Liverpool-Yemenis: Constructions of British-Arab Diaspora 
Identity and 
Transnational Islam in a Global Age 
Ethics reference PVAR 16-061 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the above research application has been reviewed by the 
Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Cultures Research Ethics Committee and I can confirm a 
favourable ethical opinion as of the date of this letter.  The following documentation was 
considered: 
 
Document    Version Date 
PVAR 16-061  Data Management Plan David Harrison.docx 1 14/03/2017 
PVAR 16-061  Focus Groups Consent Form.docx 1 14/03/2017 
PVAR 16-061  Focus Groups Information Sheet.docx 1 14/03/2017 
PVAR 16-061  Interviews Consent Form.docx 1 14/03/2017 
PVAR 16-061  Interviews Information Sheet.docx 1 14/03/2017 
 
Please notify the committee if you intend to make any amendments to the information in 
your ethics application as submitted at date of this approval as all changes must receive 
ethical approval prior to implementation. The amendment form is available at 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/EthicsAmendment.    
 
Please note: You are expected to keep a record of all your approved documentation and 
other documents relating to the study, including any risk assessments. This should be 
kept in your study file, which should be readily available for audit purposes. You will be 
given a two week notice period if your project is to be audited. There is a checklist listing 
 320 
examples of documents to be kept which is available at 
http://ris.leeds.ac.uk/EthicsAudits.  
 
We welcome feedback on your experience of the ethical review process and suggestions 





Research Ethics Administrator, Research & Innovation Service 
On behalf of Dr Kevin Macnish, Chair, PVAR FREC 
 
 
